









THE
BIBLIOTHECA SACRA.

EDITED BY

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THE
BIBLIOTHECA SACRA.

ARTICLE I.

THE INCARNATION.

BY PROF. JOHN A. REUBELT, INDIANA UNIVERSITY, BLOOMINGTON.

“It is one of the most important and sacred duties of modern theology to overcome, in keeping with the uniform impression of true humanity and personal oneness produced by the person of Christ as delineated in the New Testament, the contradictory dualism beyond which the church doctrine of the God-man has so far failed to advance, and that in such a manner that the substance of the catholic dogma be preserved, and all exploded errors be avoided.”¹

A threefold impression is made upon every serious and unprejudiced reader of the New Testament concerning Jesus Christ, to wit, that he is a real man, that he sustains a unique relation to the Deity, and that this relation grows out of the very substance of his being. Wherever, whenever, on whatsoever occasion, under whatsoever circumstances, Jesus meets us, he makes the impression on us that we are in the presence of a real man, who has all the attributes and wants of humanity — who thinks, wills, resolves, has emotions, grieves, rejoices, sleeps, travels, grows fatigued, needs

¹ Dr. Delitzsch.

rest, eats and drinks, not for a show, but to satisfy his real wants, etc. But this real man assumes a relation to the Deity which no created being can claim without blasphemy, saying that he is of one substance (ἐν) with God; that he was with God in heaven before he came down on earth; that he wishes to return thither after the accomplishment of his mission, — representing himself as an ambassador of God, that he acts in God's name and stead, whose doctrine is not his own, but God's, who performs his miracles in the power of God, etc.

His most intimate and highly gifted followers and disciples have both confirmed and enlarged these declarations of their Master. John tells us expressly that his Master had existed from all eternity in a capacity to which self-consciousness and personality belong, and that he in the course of time had become something that he was not always, namely, man. In the beginning was the Logos, and the Logos was toward (πρός) God (τὸν Θεόν), and the Logos was God" (Θεός); and v. 14: "And the Logos became flesh." Nearly the same is affirmed by the Apostle Paul, who says (Phil. ii. 6, 7): "Who, existing in the form of God, considered it not robbery to continue in this Godlike state of existence, but emptied himself, having assumed the servant form, and having become in the likeness of men." Declarations to this effect abound in the New Testament; but these two may suffice for the present. Moreover, not only the highest honors that can be paid by an intelligent creature to another, but even supreme worship is paid to him by his disciples. He places himself on a level with the Father and the Holy Ghost in baptism; he is joined with them in invoking the divine blessing; he is represented as being intrusted with the government of the world, with hearing and answering prayer. These and similar declarations of Jesus concerning himself, and of his apostles and disciples — made at first by word of mouth, and subsequently reduced to writing, that they might be an infallible guide for the church of all times to come — furnished to

the infant church the general outlines of the Saviour's image, and sufficient material to complete it in days to come; and the church set herself soon to work to draw from these data her Saviour's picture in detail, by endeavoring to become conscious of all she had of Christ through faith, by endeavoring to give a scientific expression to the contents of her faith.

Was she right in making this attempt; and did she succeed in it?

These two questions do not receive a uniform answer from all; some contending, not without a show of reason, that it would have been infinitely better if the church had contented herself at all times with the simple Bible teaching, with the inspired words of the evangelists and apostles; that all could have arrived by these means at a saving knowledge of the truth at any subsequent time, as well as in the days of the apostles themselves. And, if we bear in mind that all the parties that took part in the struggles that grew out of the christological question appealed to the Bible as the word of God, that in all the contending parties there were sincere and God-fearing persons that were actuated by the very best of motives, and that untold miseries were entailed by these contentions on countless multitudes, that the church herself was torn into hostile factions, etc., etc. — if, we repeat, we bear all this in mind, we are almost ready to wish that no attempt as indicated had been made.

But, notwithstanding all this, the thing was absolutely necessary; the constitution of the human mind being such that it cannot hold anything permanently as its own which it does not understand, which it has not analyzed, reconstructed, and thus appropriated to itself in a scientific form. Christian theology is the necessary result and condition of Christian life; life-producing faith carrying in itself the fruitful germ of *γνῶσις*, or knowledge.

The unchristian, bloody scenes that grew out of these attempts were, moreover, not their legitimate results, and ought never to have taken place; and we may trust that

the church has profited by past experience ; that she will no longer persecute with fire and sword all dissenters ; that individual believers will no longer look upon their own views as an infallible apprehension of the Bible, or on any creed or confession of faith as an infallible exposition of the oracles of God, and, for the same reason, on opposite views as the outgrowth of malice and wickedness, unfitting its advocates for the company of good men here and the enjoyment of the Saviour hereafter.

Without fear of successful contradiction, we say, therefore, that the labors of the church with regard to the Christological as well as all other Christian questions, were legitimate and necessary ; and, if the results so far reached are not in every respect satisfactory, the efforts must be continued until perfectly satisfactory results are realized.

It is absolutely necessary to acquaint ourselves with the whole history of the Christological question during the eighteen centuries of the existence of the Christian church, in order to pass a correct judgment on the relative merits or defects of its present status, and to make, with some prospect of success, any effort to advance it to a higher state of development.

The human side of the Saviour — his humanity proper — was never seriously questioned in the church. All doubts and erroneous notions on this subject had their origin and life outside of the church, and rested even here on *a priori* conclusions. Because matter is intrinsically evil, and because every emanation of light coming into contact with matter contracts a moral stain, a moral contamination, as many of the so-called Gnostics believed, they could not entertain the idea that the highest Eon, Christos, Logos, the Only-begotten, who dwelled temporarily in Jesus of Nazareth, should have occupied a material body. Jesus had, therefore, no actual, but only an apparent, body, which this high Eon had brought down from heaven. Being of an unchristian origin, these docetic notions had no permanency ; but, after threatening for a while to eclipse the very splendor

of the church, they died away without leaving any traces ; and when they reappeared in the Reformation period as admixtures with Christian truth they found but little favor with the people, and are, virtually, held by no one in our days.

Not so with the other, or divine, element in our Saviour. Although the greatest possible freedom from all preconceived notions must claim that the divinity proper of Jesus is distinctly taught by some writers of the New Testament, and is perfectly consistent with the teachings of all, although they do not expressly teach it, yet there have been at all times those within the bosom of the Christian church who denied the divinity of the Saviour, from the Ebionites in Judea down to the Unitarians of New England in the nineteenth century. But it may be said here, also, in perfect consistency with truth and charity, that the rigid monotheism of these parties is also the result of *a priori* reasoning. Their deistical notions forbid them to conceive of any change whatever in the Deity, and there is consequently no trinity of persons, and still less an incarnation of one of these three persons. Unitarian notions are certainly not the result of the teachings of the New Testament. In the Old Testament the incarnation proper of Jehovah, or of a divine hypostasis, was not taught as something to be looked for ; incommunicability, as well as immutability, being some of the chief divine attributes. "Of all the theologoumena of those days, it must be said that they were either not hypostatical, but merely symbols of the divine presence ; or, if hypostatical, they were not really divine. The idea of the incarnation of the really divine is foreign to these theologoumena. From the anthropological point of view we arrive at the same result. It was impossible from the Old Testament point of view to say that a man was God or his Son in a metaphysical sense ; although it must be said that, if reality had not gone beyond these Old Testament ideas, the idea of God's revelation would have remained incomplete." ¹

We find, accordingly, that when Jesus claimed really

¹ Dr. Dorner.

divine sonship, he gave great offence to the Jews, and even his Jewish followers were only gradually raised to the belief in his divinity, while many of them never rose to this height.

The heathen, likewise, had no idea of a real incarnation, as the gods of the multitude were not really divine; and the Absolute of the philosopher was still more unapproachable to creatures than the Jehovah of the Jews. The idea of the incarnation is of specifically Christian origin, and, in order to apprehend it, it is absolutely necessary to submit to the Spirit of Christ, and to receive instruction from this source exclusively.

Many of the Unitarians paid, indeed, divine honors to Christ, but not as being entitled to them by dint of his nature, but by his extraordinary merits; still he remained unto them what he always had been, a creature, however glorious and exalted. Others could not account for Jesus's whole character on the assumption that he was a mere man, but were, at the same time, prevented by their deism from believing in an incarnation, and they assumed, therefore, special divine favors showered upon him, yea, they even believed that divine powers, indeed, all the divine powers, had been centred on him, in a manner, however, that precluded a hypostatical union or an incarnation. This was the case with Sabellius, Paul of Samosata, the different shades of Patripassians, Monarchians, etc. Arius, not satisfied with either of these views, held that Jesus was more than a mere man, that a high Eon, who was, however, also a creature, had been so united with Jesus as to fill in him the place of the rational faculty in man, the *νοῦς*. These views of Arius were condemned by the Synod of Nice, and through the matchless efforts of Athanasius the *ὁμοούσιον*, i.e. the doctrine that the Son of God is distinct from the Father personally, but of the same substance with him, was declared to be the orthodox faith. The other error of Arius, that was subsequently revived in a somewhat modified form by Apollinarius, namely that the higher Eon or Logos had filled the

place of the *νοῦς* in Jesus, was not formally condemned at Nice.

From this time onward the divinity proper and real humanity of the Saviour may be considered as the settled doctrines of the Christian church; but another question presented itself now to the Christian consciousness, namely how were the divine and human elements hypostatically present in the Saviour? It was understood that this presence must be hypostatical, as the unhypostatical presence of all or some divine attributes in Jesus had been admitted by Sabellianism, which had, nevertheless, been rejected by the church. Apollinaris, bishop of Laodicea, thought he could meet all the difficulties besetting the subject, by assuming that the divine element, the Logos, had supplied in Jesus the place of the *νοῦς*, the rational soul. Holding trichotomical views, he could and did assume a soul, the principle of physical life in the Saviour; and this his view was to him only an exposition of the Bible expression, *καὶ ὁ Λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο*. But its real basis was also an *a priori* argument. If the Logos, he reasoned, unites himself with a rational human soul, this soul has consciousness and will, and is, therefore, either not fully penetrated by the Logos (thus constituting two persons), or the human will and the human consciousness are merged in the divine personality, and thus lose their own identity; and one or the other of the two conclusions seemed to him to follow irresistibly from the premises, either that there was no real humanity in the Saviour, or that there were two personalities in him, a divine I and a human I, either of which seemed to him to be destructive of the specific nature of Christianity. Athanasius urged against this theory, that in order to be our model in all things, it was absolutely necessary for the Saviour to be like ourselves, to have a body and a rational soul, that sin is no necessary attribute of human nature. Gregory of Nazianz insisted also against Apollinaris, on the necessity of a true and perfect humanity, not only as the vehicle of revelation, but also in order to redeem and sanctify human nature. The Synod of Constantinople, met

in A.D. 381, solemnly condemned this theory of Apollinaris, but this condemnation, however justifiable in the case, did neither remove nor invalidate the condemned bishop's objections to the general view.

In perfect consistency with this theory, Apollinaris could and did say: "Our God has been crucified," and "the man Jesus is exalted at the right hand of God"; "Mary is the mother of God."

Against these and similar positions Nestorius, patriarch of Constantinople, protested, finding fault particularly with the term *θεοτόκος*, which came to be pretty generally applied to the blessed virgin. In keeping with the teaching of the school of Antioch, Nestorius insisted that the "divine and the human nature" in Christ be completely separated from each other, so that what applies to the one does not necessarily apply also to the other. Diodorus of Mopsuestia (died 394) had taught: "The divine nature has not been begotten from out of the virgin, but only what is of the virgin's substance has been brought forth by the virgin; not the divine word has been born of the virgin, but the seed of David; not the divine Logos has been born of the virgin, but he that was formed by the Holy Ghost in her; he was born of no mother who is of the same substance with the Father, being according to blessed Paul, without mother." And Nestorius taught: "No creature gave birth to him who cannot be created, nor did God beget in the virgin the word, which was according to John in the beginning. The creature did not give birth to the Creator, but gave birth to the man, the instrument of God. The Holy Spirit did not create the divine word, but prepared from out of the virgin a temple for the word."

Although Nestorius was willing to adopt the term "Mother of God" under proper restrictions, and to extend religious worship also to the human side of Christ, protesting emphatically against a separation of the two natures, with which he was charged, yet his doctrine was condemned by the third general Synod held at Ephesus, A.D. 431. The views of Nes-

torius deserve the more attention, because in the days of the Reformation the Reformed church adopted views that came very near those of Nestorius, and because in this country especially views prevail extensively, between which and those of Nestorius it may be very hard, if not impossible, to discover any real difference.

After disposing, by the condemnation of Nestorius, of the separation of the two natures, the Cyrillian party that had ruled at Ephesus, pushed its views of the absolute oneness of the Redeemer so far as to maintain only one nature in Christ. The views of the archimandrite Eutyches, that were formally condemned by the Synod of Chalcedon in A.D. 451, seem not to have been very clearly developed; and it is the more difficult for us to understand them correctly, because we have them only through the reports of his enemies. According to the acts of the Synod of Constantinople, that deposed him in A.D. 448, he taught that after the incarnation of the Divine Word, i.e. after the begetting of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, there is only one nature in the Saviour, and that of the incarnated God. He allowed two natures before the union (*πρὸ τῆς ἐνώσεως*), but admitted only one after this act. His views, however, were formally condemned by the Synod of Chalcedon, and as the decrees of this body are recognized by nearly all Christians of our days, and as they were virtually received into all the confessions of faith of the leading churches of the Reformation, and as, moreover, from them the views of Eutyches can be learned with a tolerable degree of correctness, we give both a translation, and the original of the decrees of the synod and of the letter addressed by Leo the Great to Flavian, bishop of Constantinople, on which the decisions of the synod were mainly based.

This so-called Flavian epistle reads: "Majesty took upon itself humility; strength, weakness; eternity, mortality, without impairing the properties of each nature and substance that unite in one person. In order to pay the debt due by man, the inviolable nature (of God) united itself with our frail nature, in order that according to the requirements of

our case, one and the same Mediator between God and men, the man Jesus Christ, might be mortal according to one side of his being, and immortal according to the other. The true God was, accordingly, born in the full and perfect nature of a real man, complete in the attributes of both his own nature and of ours, etc. For he that is truly God is also truly man; nor is this union merely apparent, the lowliness of humanity and the highness of Deity communicating themselves to each other. For as God is not changed by compassion, so the humanity is not crushed by the dignity conferred upon it. For each nature does, in connection with the other, what is peculiar to itself, i.e. the Word does what is the Word's, while the flesh carries out what belongs to the flesh."¹

In the same epistle birth, hunger, suffering, death, burial, etc., are claimed for his human nature, while his miracles are ascribed to his divinity. What the Lord says John xiv. 28, applies to his human nature, but the words recorded John x. 28 must be referred to his divine nature.

The decrees of the Synod read: "Following the holy Fathers, we unanimously confess and teach that our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ is one and the same, perfect as to his divinity, and perfect as to his humanity, truly God and truly man, having a rational soul and a body; equal to the Father according to his divinity, and of the same substance with us according to his human nature, and like unto us in all things, sin alone excepted; begotten of the Father from all eternity according to his Godhead, but born of the Virgin

¹ *Salva proprietate utriusque naturae et substantiae et in unam coëunte personam, suscepta est a majestate humilitas, a virtute infirmitas, ab eternitate mortalitas; et ad resolvendum conditionis nostrae debitum natura inviolabilis naturae est unita passibili, ut quod nostris remediis congruebat, unus atque idem mediator Dei et hominum, homo Jesus Christus, et mori posset ex uno et mori non posset ex altero. In integra ergo veri hominis perfectaque natura verus natus est Deus, totus in suis, totus in nostris, etc. Qui enim verus est Deus, idem verus est homo, et nullum est in hac unitate mendacium, dum invicem sunt et humilitas hominis et altitudo deitatis. Sicut enim Deus non mutatur miseratione, ita homo non consumitur dignitate. Agitat enim utraque forma cum alterius communione, quod proprium est: Verbo scilicet operante, quod Verbi est, et carne exsequente, quod carnis est, etc.—Mansi, v. pp. 13–59.*

Mary, the mother of God, in these last days, for us and our salvation, according to his humanity, and declared as one and the same Christ, Son, Lord, Only-begotten, and consisting of two natures, without intermixture, change, division, or parting; the difference of the two natures being by no means abolished in the union, but the properties of each, constituting one person and hypostasis, being fully preserved; not divided or taken apart into two persons, but one and the same Son and Only-begotten, the divine Word, Lord Jesus Christ.”¹

These decrees enjoy, as a matter of course, the rank of infallible truth in the Roman Catholic church, which attaches as much, and, practically, more, importance to the decisions of general councils than to the Bible itself. They have also been embodied, as to their main features, as was remarked before, by nearly all the churches of the Reformation into their symbolical books.

The Lutheran church receives the Symbolum Quicunque, falsely ascribed to Athanasius, which teaches (§§ 28–35): “We believe and confess that our Lord Jesus Christ is equally God and man. As God, begotten of the substance of the Father from all eternity; as man, born in time of the substance of the virgin. Perfect God and perfect man, consisting of a rational soul and human flesh. Although he is God and man, yet there are not two Christs; but there is only one Christ—one, not through the conversion of the

¹ Ἐπόμενοι τοίνυν τοῖς ἁγίοις πατράσιν, ἓνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ὁμολογεῖν υἱὸν τὸν κύριον ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν συμφώνως ἅπαντες ἐκδιδάσκουμεν, τέλειον τὸν αὐτὸν ἐν θεότητι καὶ τέλειον τὸν αὐτὸν ἐν ἀνθρωπότητι, θεὸν ἀληθῶς καὶ ἄνθρωπον ἀληθῶς τὸν αὐτὸν ἐκ ψυχῆς λογικῆς καὶ σώματος, ὁμοούσιον τῷ Πατρὶ κατὰ τὴν θεότητα, καὶ ὁμοούσιον τὸν αὐτὸν ἡμῖν κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπότητα, κατὰ πάντα ὅμοιον ἡμῶν χωρὶς ἁμαρτίας· πρὸ αἰώνων μὲν ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς γεννηθέντα κατὰ τὴν θεότητα, ἐπ’ ἐσχάτων δὲ τῶν ἡμερῶν τὸν αὐτὸν δι’ ἡμᾶς καὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν σωτηρίαν ἐκ Μαρίας τῆς παρθένου τῆς θεοτόκου κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπότητα, ἓνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν Χριστὸν, Ὑἱόν, Κύριον, μονογενῆ ἐκ δύο φύσεων ἀσυγχύτως, ἀτρέπτως, ἀδιαρέτως, ἀχωρίστως γινωριζόμενον· οὐδαμοῦ τῆς τῶν φύσεων διαφορᾶς ἀνηρημένης διὰ τὴν ἔνωσιν, σωζομένης δὲ μᾶλλον τῆς ιδιότητος ἐκατέρας φύσεως καὶ εἰς ἓν πρόσωπον καὶ μίαν ὑπόστασιν συντρεχούσης· οὐκ εἰς δύο πρόσωπα μεριζόμενον, ἀλλ’ ἓνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν Ὑἱὸν καὶ μονογενῆ, θεὸν λόγον, κύριον Ἰησοῦν Χριστόν.

divinity into flesh, but through the assumption of humanity by the Godhead — one, not through a confusion of substance, but by a oneness of person. For, as the rational soul and flesh constitute one man, so are also God and man one Christ.” Art. III. of the Augsburg Confession reads: “We teach that the Son of God has become man, was born of the Virgin Mary, and that the two natures, the human and the divine, are inseparably united in one person, constituting one Christ, who is true God and true man.”

Art. VIII. of the Formula Concordiae reads: “We teach, believe, and confess: (1) That the divine and the human nature are united in Christ personaliter in such a manner that there are not two Christs — the one the Son of God and the other the Son of Mary, — but that one and the same is the Son of God and the Son of man. (2) That the divine and the human nature are not blended into one being; that neither is changed into the other, but that either retains its own attributes, which never become those of the other nature. (3) Art. III. enumerates the attributes of the divine, and Art. IV. those of the human nature, and Art. V. goes on to say: “The personal union of the two natures does not mean such a conjunction of them that neither has anything in common with the other through this union — as when a man glues two boards together, neither giving anything to the other, nor receiving anything from it, — but this union is such that from it everything flows that is believed humanly of God and divinely of the man Jesus; which union and communion of the two natures the old church Fathers explained by the similes of hot iron, and of the union of soul and body in one man. Hence (6) do we believe that God is man, and man God, which would be impossible if the divine and the human nature had no attributes in common with each other. (7) Mary did not conceive and bear a mere man, but the true Son of God, whence she is properly called the Mother of God. (8) Not a mere man has suffered, died, etc. for us, but such a man whose human nature sustains such a deep and inexpressible union and

communion with the Son of God that it makes with him one person. (9) The Son of God has truly suffered for us, yet according to his human nature, which he received into union with his divine person, so that he could suffer and become our High-priest, as it is written: 'They crucified the Lord of glory,' and, 'We are purchased with the blood of God' (1 Cor. ii. 8; Acts xx. 28). Art. X. teaches that the Son of Man was exalted to the right hand of God after he had been received into the Deity. Art. XI. maintains that the exalted Saviour laid aside only the servant form, not human nature, which is destined to be everlasting." As false and heretical are denounced with others the following propositions: "The personal union makes only names and titles common"; "It is only a phrase to say, God is man, and man is God, since Godhead and manhood have nothing in common with each other"; "that the human nature is localiter omnipresent"; "that the human nature of Christ alone has suffered for us, and that the divine nature took no part in his sufferings."

In these, as well as in all her other declarations of faith, the Lutheran church protests strongly against everything that looks like a separation of the two natures in Christ. Whether she succeeded in establishing one personality as constituted by two natures, we shall discuss hereafter.

At the bottom of all the Reformed Confessions, is the endeavor to put the two natures of Christ in such a relation to each other as to guard against their blending or uniting in such a manner as to impair any of the essential attributes of either. Whether the Nestorian views appeared, in some form or other again, in the teachings of the Reformed churches, and the Eutychean notions in those of the Lutheran church, while both professed to abide by the decisions of the Synod of Chalcedon, will appear hereafter. Of the declarations of the Reformed churches, clothed with symbolical authority, we quote the following: Question thirty-five of the Heidelberg Catechism, not only adopted by all the Reformed churches of continental Europe, but also approved

by the Synod of Dort, reads: "What is the meaning of the words, 'he was conceived by the Holy Ghost'?" and is answered: "That God's eternal Son, who is and continues true and eternal God, took upon him the very nature of man, of the flesh and blood of the Virgin Mary, by the operation of the Holy Ghost, that he might be also the true seed of David, like unto his brethren in all things, sin excepted." Question forty-seven reads: "Is not Christ, then, with us, even to the end of the world, as he has promised? Answer: Christ is very man and very God; with respect to his human nature he is no more on earth; but with respect to his Godhead, grace, and spirit, he is at no time absent from us." Question forty-eight: "But if his human nature is not present where his Godhead is, are then the two natures in Christ separated from each other? Answer: Not at all; for since the Godhead is incomprehensible and omnipresent, it must necessarily follow that the same is not limited with the human nature he assumed, and yet remains personally united to it."

That the venerable authors of the Heidelberg Catechism felt, however, the necessity of the divine element taking a part in the work of redemption, appears from question seventeen, which runs: "Why must the Saviour be also very God?" and the answer: "That he might, by the power of his Godhead, sustain in his human nature the burden of God's wrath, and might obtain for, and restore to, us righteousness and life."

All the Confessions of the several Reformed churches are to the same effect. The church of England, and after her the Methodist Episcopal church says: "The Son who is the Word of the Father, the very and eternal God, of one substance with the Father, took man's nature in the womb of the blessed virgin; so that two whole and perfect natures, that is to say, the Godhead and manhood, were joined together in one person, never to be divided, whereof is one Christ, very God and very man, who truly suffered, was crucified, dead, and buried, to reconcile his Father to us and to

be a sacrifice, not only for our original guilt, but also for actual sins of man."

The Westminster Confession uses this language: "The Son of God, the second person in the Trinity, being very and eternal God, of one substance and equal with the Father, did, when the fulness of time was come, take upon himself man's nature, and all the essential properties and common infirmities thereof, yet without sin; being conceived by the power of the Holy Ghost in the womb of the Virgin Mary, of her substance; so that two whole, perfect, and distinct natures, the Godhead and the manhood, were inseparably joined together in one person, without conversion, composition, or confusion. Which person is very God and very man, yet one Christ, the only Mediator between God and man."

More authorities it may be unnecessary to quote, as all so-called orthodox Christians, that believe in the Divinity proper of Jesus Christ, take in Christology either the Lutheran or the Reformed view, the Roman Catholic church abiding professedly also by the decrees of Chalcedon, but she has in reality fallen into the errors of Eutyches, not only sanctioning such expressions as "Mother of God," "God has been crucified," but getting Christ's humanity virtually altogether out of the way, in order to place the church instead thereof. This, however, is not the case with all the theologians belonging to the different parties in their individual capacity. Some of them tell us, indeed, that we have to deal here, as well as in the Trinitarian question, with a mystery, and that the *fact* implied in the mystery, and not the *how*, is an object of our faith. Others take a different view, and, while they are by no means averse to mysteries, they are unwilling to ask of the human understanding to consent to propositions that are not free from contradictions or imply impossibilities, which as a matter of course, have no foundation whatever in the word of God. These men believe, e.g. firmly in the divinity proper of Jesus Christ, in his being of the same substance with the Father; but they regret exceed-

ingly the manner in which these truths are set forth in the so-called Athanasian symbol (Quicumque). So also with regard to the subject of Christology. This class of theologians hold fast to everything in the Bible; they hold fast to the divinity proper of Jesus Christ, equally fast to his humanity, but also to the reality of his Incarnation, which, as it seems to them, is in the Lutheran view only apparently admitted, while it is virtually excluded by the other. Their object, therefore, is to fall back upon the Bible, to examine its teachings on this as well as on any other subject in their organic connection, in order to develop them, if possible, into formulas that are free from all well-founded objections, even as to their terminology, etc.; mysteries will remain after all, but it is not mysteries that are objected to as such, since they must be looked for in the Christian economy; but the unsatisfactory manner in which they are stated. George Hill says: "After the fact is admitted that the divine and human natures were united in Jesus Christ, all speculations concerning the manner are vague and unsatisfactory, all disputes on this point degenerate instantly into a mere verbal controversy, in which the terms of human science are applied to a subject which is infinitely exalted above them, and words are multiplied very far beyond the number and clearness of the ideas entertained by those who use them. There are no disputes, even in scholastic theology, which are more frivolous, and none which in the present state of science appear more uninteresting than those that respect the doctrine of the Incarnation."¹ This language would indeed be justified if it were an established fact that the doctrine in question was stated in the very words of the Bible in the different symbols, or if these expressed fully and unmistakably the sense of the Bible. But to assume this is a *petitio principii*, or popish infallibility claimed by Protestants. Nor is this all; the two views under consideration are in a number of points diametrically opposed to each other, the Lutheran symbols condemning, e.g. the following points held by the Reformed

¹ Lectures in Divinity, Book iii. chap. viii.

churches ; to wit : that Christ's humanity alone did suffer ; that Christ is everywhere present solely according to his divine nature ; that his human nature is not capable of any really divine attributes, etc., etc. ; and the Reformed neither are, nor ever were, loth to retaliate.

German divines, both of the Reformed and the Lutheran church, have for a long time acknowledged the insufficiency of the existing symbols, and have accordingly labored hard to develop the Bible teachings on the Incarnation, and to improve the symbols. And what objections do they urge against either of the two theories ? The Lutheran view holds such a personal union of the two natures as to constitute only one person ; this person was at all times, from the moment of the conception to his death on Calvary, in the possession of all divine attributes, although he did not always make use of them. Some of the divine attributes are such that we can indeed draw a distinction between their possession and their use, as e.g. omnipotence ; but others are such that their possession implies their use, their disuse their non-possession, as e.g. omniscience, eternal holiness, etc. If the incarnated Logos was always in the possession of his divine or eternal holiness, how could he learn obedience, how could he be perfected (Heb. v. 8, 9) ? The same may be asked with regard to his omniscience : How could he not know the day of his second coming if he was possessed of omniscience ? How could that take place which is said of him in Luke ii. 52 ?

It seems, therefore, that this view sacrifices the humanity proper of Jesus Christ, and however promptly the charge of Eutychianism or Docetism may be rejected by those who hold this view, it would seem, nevertheless, that the possession of really divine attributes by any person makes his humanity, his childhood, his development, etc., a mere appearance.

This difficulty was felt by the Reformed churches, and hence their great anxiety to establish and guard the real humanity of the Saviour ; but it is charged in turn that they did this in such a manner as to destroy the personal oneness of the Saviour, and the reality of the Incarnation. If the

Logos, e.g. was present everywhere, continued to be omnipresent after his incarnation ; if, as the Heidelberg Catechism says, his Godhead neither was nor is limited to his human nature which he assumed ; he (the Logos) may have been united in some intimate way or other with the human nature, but not by a *personal union*, which implies that the whole Logos be confined to the human nature as the man Jesus, be, consequently, nowhere outside of him, as the human soul is personally present only in the body during the latter's life ; a different incarnation would seem to be no reality, no incarnation at all. Again, if the Saviour knew some things as to his divine nature, which he did not know as to his human nature ; if he could truthfully say that the Father was greater than he as to his human nature, but that the Father and he, as to his divine nature, were one, the divine nature and the human nature can evidently not have been united in him by a personal union, nor can they have been so united as to constitute oneness of personality. On the contrary, by ascribing all the attributes of personality, as self-consciousness and will, thinking, judging, feeling, to each nature, and even the expression of personality, viz. *I*, "nature" is thereby made synonymous with "personality," and two such "natures" cannot form one person.

"Personality," says Dr. Ranch, "is the centre and union of the manifold, like individuality ; but personality is, unlike individuality, a union that is awake in itself, that has found and laid hold of itself, and having once found cannot again lose itself, but will enjoy forever ; it is the centre of our bodily and mental activities. The expression of personal identity is the *I*, as the conscious centre of body and soul The mind is one, and reason and will are so inseparable that the one includes the other. They have one principle and one life, and what is on one hand liberty of will, is on the other spontaneity of thought."

"So far," says Dr. Delitzsch, "as man knows himself in the innermost depth of his being as *I*, and comprehends the totality of his being in the *I*, we call him a person. The

Bible does indeed not use the Greek term *πρόσωπον* and the Hebrew *panim* in this sense, but in that of self-manifestation on the part of God and man, in the sense of outward appearance. The Greek noun *ὑπόστασις* (Heb. i. 3) does not mean the self-conscious substance, but phenomenal substance, while the Latin *persona* is used by the best writers in the sense of personality. Personality is that which every member of the human family has, and which raises him above the plant and the animal. There is between the perception, feeling, instinct, of the animal, and the self-conscious and self-determining agency of man, not a gradual, but a specific difference; man's personality raises him to God, who is supremely personal."

If these definitions are correct, it follows that every being that consciously says *I*, is a person. In order to escape this double personality that is thus charged to adhere to the Reformed Christology, Drs. Auberlen and Ebrard have assumed that the Logos fully emptied himself in becoming man, subjecting himself to the laws of human development, while he continued, at the same time, in the possession and exercise of all divine attributes in the universe. But how the Logos could be personally in a finite being, or rather be the principle of a finite personality, and continue, at the same time, outside of that finite personality, in the universe in the exercise of all divine attributes, is something that not only passes all understanding, but seems to involve a positive and direct contradiction. If the meaning were that a certain power of the Logos, or some impersonal element of the Logos had been granted to Jesus, or had become personal in Jesus, as Hegel taught that the impersonal Deity attained first to consciousness in man, we could understand the proposition, however erroneous it might seem to us; but this is evidently not the meaning of these two eminent Christian scholars. But as the Saviour repeatedly referred to his antemundane state of existence as that of self-consciousness, of personality, it is impossible to conceive how one Logos-consciousness should have become human in Jesus, while

another Logos-consciousness continued as such to pervade, uphold, and govern the universe.

Dr. Ebrard himself, modifying this view in Herzog's Real-Encyclopedia, s. v. Jesus Christus, compares the incarnation of the Logos to the act of a crown-prince who becomes of his own accord a slave, this being the only means by which the release of his captured younger brother can be effected; and then goes on to say that this prince may truthfully be called and spoken of as a prince and a slave — he being both at the same time — but not as a prince that has united himself with or to a slave, nor as a being that is neither prince nor slave, but holds an intermediate position, as, for example, that of a chamberlain. To a certain extent this comparison is unexceptionable, and shows clearly how serious a mistake is involved in the phraseology, "the Logos united himself with the man Jesus," raising the attributes slavery and humanity to concretes; the first to a slave, the second to a man. But the comparison holds good only to a certain extent, failing, as it does, in its essential features. A prince may become a slave by his free will, by an accident, or otherwise, without a change of the principle of personality in him being necessitated thereby; but not so in the incarnation. The Logos's becoming man involves more than a change of condition or position. The personality in God, as well as in man, is self-consciousness and will; and, in order to become man or human, the self-consciousness of the Logos must know itself as human, must be human. If the self-consciousness of the Logos is not a human self-consciousness, he is no man, and the Incarnation is merely phenomenal, not real.

Another theory is, that Jesus was conceived and born as merely human, but that the Logos united himself by degrees with the soul of Jesus, until this indwelling of the Logos in Jesus became personal, and the human self-consciousness of Jesus was either displaced or swallowed up by the Logos-consciousness. But, not to press the fact that this theory virtually denies the fact of the Incarnation, it is positively

contradicted by a number of declarations of the Saviour. So in John xvii. ; only a short time before, he had declared that he did not know the time of his second coming ; in the same prayer he declared that he was *then* not in possession of the glory that he once had been in possession of ; but in this very declaration the personal identity of the speaker and of the ante-mundane Logos is maintained, and the personal indwelling of the Logos in Jesus was therefore anterior to the resurrection ; simultaneous with which act it is supposed to be by the theory under consideration.

Some eminent divines of this country and of England seem to be of the opinion that all these difficulties can be got rid of by assuming that the humanity of Jesus was impersonal, or, as another one expressed it, pan-hypostatical. But a theory that gives us an impersonal humanity in the Saviour, or a Saviour with a divine personality — for this is the meaning of an all-personal humanity — cannot meet with our approbation, since an impersonal, as well as a divine humanity, is no real humanity at all.

But, if all theories are unsatisfactory, what then ? Is the mystery of the Incarnation not true, because all attempts to give it a scientific expression have so far failed ? Or does the mystery of the Incarnation, as taught in the Bible, really involve contradictions or impossibilities, as we have discovered in all the theories under review ? Does the Bible really teach that there was in the Saviour really a divine *I* and a human *I*, and that these two *I*s constituted only one *I*, one personality ? Does the Bible teach that the Logos was an omnipotent, omniscient child ; that all divine and all human attributes co-existed personally in Jesus, as divine omnipresence and human limitedness, divine omniscience and human ignorance, divine omnipotence and human weakness, etc. ? Before we answer these and similar questions in the affirmative, it may be well to re-examine the Bible, in order to ascertain what it really teaches in organic connection on this sublime and all-important subject.

The first passage on this subject is John i. 14: *καὶ ὁ Λόγος*

σάρξ ἐγένετο (and the Logos became man). But, instead of taking these words in their natural import, and making them the basis of the whole Christological fabric, we are, in the first place, told that the Logos's becoming man meant that he "took upon himself our nature"; and this, again, is made to mean that the Logos united himself with the man Jesus, conceived by the Holy Ghost, and born of the Virgin Mary, in some mysterious manner. But to these explanations we object, as being unbiblical in diction and meaning, although we admit that the phrase "he took upon himself our nature" may be so understood as to convey an altogether biblical idea.

The passage Heb. ii. 16 reads, indeed, in the common version: "He took not on him the nature of angels, but he took on him the seed of Abraham." But this translation is unqualifiedly false. The original reads: οὐ γὰρ δῆπου ἀγγέλων ἐπιλαμβάνεται, ἀλλὰ σπέρματος Ἀβραὰμ ἐπιλαμβάνεται. Whatever ἐπιλαμβάνεσθαι may mean here, it does *not* mean that he took on him the seed of Abraham, i.e. the nature of the seed of Abraham; it being used in the present tense, whereas the preceding finite verb (μετέσχε) and the following (ᾧφειλε) are used in the aorist, and the action expressed by ἐπιλαμβάνεται is present at all times, was present when the apostle wrote. We propose to translate the passage: "For verily, he does not lay hold of angels (to succor them), but he lays hold of the seed of Abraham," i.e. he is the Saviour, not of angels, but of the seed of Abraham.

The Saviour prays, John xvii. 5: "And now, O Father, glorify thou me with thyself with the glory which I had with thee before the world was." Here the Saviour prays for the re-instatement into something (δόξα) which he was not in possession of at that time, of which he had been in possession once, and of which, we must add, he had not the power *then* to possess himself. Whatever we understand by this δόξα, it is absolutely certain that Jesus was *then* dependent for it on his Father, since he prayed for it; and it would be very irreverent, if not blasphemy, to say that his

prayer was a mere formality, that he could give himself what he prayed to his Father for. Many commentators understand by this *δόξα* the light in which God is said to dwell, and which the apostle calls (1 Tim. vi. 16) *ἀπρόσιτον*, *not to be reached*; but this seems to us to fall short of the full meaning of *δόξα*, because this prayer had evidently been answered, when the Saviour said: "All power is given unto me," etc.; and, with the exception of the transfiguration, no trace of that glorious light is ever spoken of in connection with our Saviour's earthly life. It must have implied more, and we are led to think that it meant the *μορφή Θεοῦ*, in which Jesus Christ is said to have existed at one time, but of which he divested himself at another (Phil. ii. 6-7).

But what is meant by the *μορφή Θεοῦ*? The passage reads: "Who (Jesus Christ) existing in the form of God considered it not robbery (*res rapta*, to be retained with robber-like tenacity) to exist in a manner like God, but emptied himself, having taken the servant-form, having become in the likeness of men."¹

We are afraid that the "form of God" is taken by many for something unreal, outward, changeable, as it is said of the risen Saviour, that he appeared in another form, without having the nature of his being affected thereby. But to what does this view lead with irresistible necessity? The subject of vs. 6 and 7 is also the subject of v. 8, *ἐταπείνωσεν ἑαυτόν*, of the *γενόμενος ὑπήκοος μέχρι θανάτου σταυροῦ*. If the *μορφή Θεοῦ* is only something outward, something phenomenal, that can be changed or laid aside without affecting the nature of the subject, then by parity of reason the same is true with the *μορφή δούλου*; and from this it would follow that Jesus was not a real, but only a phenomenal man, and

¹ τὸ εἶναι ἴσα Θεῷ does not mean, *to be equal to or with God*; but, *to exist in the same manner in which God exists*. This mode of existence the Logos enjoyed with the Father from eternity, but did not consider it as something to be retained with robber-like tenacity; hence laid it aside or exchanged it for the human form of existence. As to the translation of *ἴσα εἶναι*, see Winer's Gramm. des N. T. Sprachidioms, p. 204.

that his death was only an appearance, no reality. This would be Docetism in its worst form. For the introduction of a man or the man Jesus, with whom the Logos might have united himself personally, there is no room left, as the subject is throughout the same. The subject that suffered death on the cross is the same that had existed from all eternity in glory with the Father, or in the form of God; and since God, as God, cannot suffer, the apostle tells us that the Logos did something that enabled him to suffer, i.e. he emptied himself, exchanged the *μορφὴ Θεοῦ* for the *μορφὴ δούλου*, or as John expresses it, he became man. If the *μορφὴ Θεοῦ* means the manner in which God exists as God, his being above time and space, independent of everything outside of himself; the *δούλου μορφὴ* means the form of existence of the finite being, which is over against God, *δούλος*, which is subject to the laws of time and space, and is dependent. Jesus, in exchanging his *μορφὴ Θεοῦ* for the *μορφὴ ἀνθρώπου*, became a dependent being, and was, as such, subject to the laws of time and space.

To the same effect, and, if possible, still stronger, is the language employed by the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews (v. 7-8): "Who having offered in the days of his flesh prayers and supplications unto him who was able to save him from death, with strong crying and tears, and having been heard on account of his piety, learned obedience from what he suffered, and having been perfected became to all that obey him the author of eternal salvation." The *ὅς* of v. 7 is evidently the *Χριστός* of v. 5, of whom it is said: "This day have I begotten thee," one of the strongest passages for the eternal sonship of the Logos. This eternal Son, then, was once "in the days of his flesh," i.e. was man, but not only man, but he even *learned*, as such, something, namely, obedience, and was thus made perfect. One can scarcely conceive how any stronger language could have been used than that which was actually employed by the sacred writers in giving to the church for all times to come their God-inspired views of the personality of the Saviour.

If this view is correct it must be confirmed by the whole appearance of the Saviour on earth, by the whole tenor of his life, and of what he himself says of his relation to God. It is a fact worthy of note that the Saviour, during his whole earthly existence, never speaks of the Logos, never addresses any prayer or petition to him, but speaks solely and exclusively of and to the Father, and of the Holy Spirit, who is declared to be sent by the speaker; if another personality, another *I*, than that of the Logos had been in Jesus, it is inconceivable that no mention should have been made thereof. No, the *I* in Jesus is the Logos himself, sustaining, however, as we have seen, a relation to the Father different from that which he had sustained to him in his ante-mundane state, as well as from that which he sustains to him since his complete glorification. In his earthly state the Logos represents himself as the Father's ambassador, who does not his own will, but his Father's who sent him; he represents his doctrine not as his own, but as his Father's, all of which he could not have done if he had been at all times in the possession of omniscience; and he consequently disclaims this attribute formally (Mark xiii. 3, 2). It is true, different and widely varying interpretations have been given to this celebrated passage, but they are all so thoroughly imbued with the theory in whose favor they are made, that they have but moderate, if any claims at all, on our serious consideration. If the words say anything, they say that Jesus himself did then not know the day of his second coming. Even the latest commentator, Dr. Lange, gives us an interpretation of these words of the Saviour, that is scarcely worth the paper on which it is written; namely, "Jesus did not know the day in question for his disciples, while he knew it for himself." On a subsequent occasion his disciples asked the same question, and received, indeed, no answer to it, but were plainly given to understand that Jesus knew the answer to it.

The words in question are worth our attention in more than one respect; while the Saviour disclaims therein for

the time being omniscience, he claims a higher degree of knowledge than is possessed by any created being: "Of that day and hour knows no one, i.e. no man, nor the angels [whose knowledge exceeds that of man] nor the Son [whose knowledge was superior to that of angels], but the Father."

Were it true, as is sometimes claimed, that he predicated this partial ignorance of the man Jesus exclusively, he would have claimed for man a degree of knowledge more than angelic, and this is positively contradicted by a number of passages of the scriptures. But not only omniscience, but also omnipotence and omnipresence are disclaimed by and for the Saviour during the days of his flesh. In Matt. xxviii. 18 the Lord says that all power is given unto him in heaven and upon earth, which is plainly synonymous with omnipotence; and as the Saviour declares that it was *given* unto him, it plainly follows that he had not possessed it for some time; that omnipotence belonged consequently as well as omniscience to the *μορφή Θεοῦ*, of which he had divested himself, to that *δόξα* which he had possessed with the Father from all eternity, and with which he prayed to be glorified, evidently not possessing it then. That the Lord was during the days of his flesh not in the possession of omnipotence, follows also from what he says John xi. 42: "I knew that thou always hearest me," representing all his miracles performed by power granted to him by his Father in answer to his prayer. In Eph. iv. 10 the apostle teaches that the earthly Jesus was not present everywhere at the same time.

But while the Saviour thus plainly disclaims really divine attributes during the days of his flesh, while he represents himself as his Father's ambassador, he claims at the same time a relation to God, and an amount of power, knowledge, and dignity, not only such as no created being possessed, but could scarcely have received at the hand of Omnipotence itself; and a number of these passages have been understood as if they ascribed really divine attributes to the Saviour on earth. This view is altogether inconsistent with

what has so far been said, and the passages in question must therefore be thoroughly examined.

It is scarcely necessary to repeat here that really divine attributes are ascribed to the Logos in his ante-mundane state as well as to the glorified Jesus; all passages bearing on the subject must, therefore, be closely examined as to what period of the Saviour's life they apply. To the earthly life of the Saviour the following passages evidently refer: John iii. 13; v. 20; Matt. xi. 27.

The first of these passages is rendered: "And no man has ascended up to heaven, but he that came down from heaven, even the Son of Man, which is in heaven." On this passage Hill comments: "Who is in heaven at the time when the body with which he has united himself is upon earth." Omnipresence is here claimed for Christ during the days of his flesh; and it is readily granted that, if this passage really says what it is thus made to say, it disproves much that has so far been advanced. But does it say so? Is the translation correct? Everything turns on the translation of the part. ὧν. In 2 Cor. viii. 9 it also occurs, and is translated: "though he was rich." That the pres. part. may thus be translated no scholar will question; the participles as such expressing no time, but only completeness or incompleteness of action.¹ In John vi. 62 the language of the Saviour is: "If you now see the Son of Man ascending to where he *was* before," i.e. before he came down and was incarnated. But, although there is thus ample authority for translating the participial clause by "who was in heaven," we prefer a somewhat different view of the whole passage. The leading verb is the pres. perf. (ἀναβέβηκε) followed by an aor. part. (καταβάς) and the attrib. part. ὧν. The pres. perf. either expresses action completed now, or the abiding result of the completed action. Hence ἀναβέβηκε means, no one has (now) completed his ascension, or, no one is now in heaven by ascension, except he who had come down, namely, the Son of man, being (always) in heaven.

¹ See Harrison's Exposition of some of the Laws of the Lat. Lang. p. 270.

Topically taken the words were not true, and they must therefore be taken tropically, and their sense seems then to us to be: "No one enjoys personal intercourse with God, from which all higher knowledge flows, except he who by virtue of his natural relation to God, always enjoys this divine communion, notwithstanding his going out from the Father, and his having come down from heaven for the purpose of being incarnated." This furnishes also the key to a correct understanding of the two other passages quoted above, and of all similar passages. John v. 20 reads: "For the Father loves the Son, and shows him all that he himself does, and will show him still greater things than these"; and Matt. xi. 27: "All things were delivered to me by my Father; and no one knows the Son except the Father; nor does any one know the Father except the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son may be willing to reveal him." There is, indeed, in these and many other passages, a relation of the Son to the Father claimed, even during the former's being in the flesh, that cannot exist between any creature and God; but the possession of any really divine attribute by the Son is not implied in either of these passages. In the former, the present works shall be followed by greater ones, which is increase, development; and in the latter a knowledge of the Father by the Son is spoken of, which is communicable to believers — is, consequently, not omniscience. Nor are the words "All things were delivered unto me of my Father" paramount to those recorded in Matt. xxviii. 18: "All power was given unto me in heaven and upon earth," meaning, with the former passage, in all probability, for the time being, only the souls of men, but carrying in themselves at the same time the earnest of enlargement, the earnest of what was actually given, according to the latter passage. Nor is this the case in these passages alone. In John xvii. 5 the Lord prays to be clothed with a glory which he had possessed before the foundation of the world; and in v. 22 of the same chapter he speaks of a glory which had been given him (then) by his Father, and which he had

given to his disciples. This latter glory, being communicable to mortals, cannot possibly have been the glory which is the prerogative of the Deity alone. See also John i. 14, where a glory is spoken of that the disciples had seen during their Master's tabernacling among them.

The Saviour's earthly life was, moreover, emphatically a life of faith. In Heb. xii. 2 he is called the Chief and Completer of faith (*ἀρχηγὸς καὶ τελειωτὴς τῆς πίστεως*). Had he possessed his knowledge of divine things, his intercourse with his Father, in any other way than by faith, those violent commotions of his mind of which his whole life was full could not have taken place. "He sighed deeply in his spirit" (Mark viii. 12); "He groaned in the Spirit" (John xi. 33); as the last conflict drew nigh, his spirit was at one time at the highest height, at another at the lowest depth, as during his great intercessory prayer (John xvii.), and during his agony in Gethsemane, where he prayed: "O my Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from me," after he had shortly before said: "My soul is exceedingly sorrowful, even unto death" (Matt. xxvi. 38, 39). This state of mental depression reached its climax on the cross, and found expression in those awfully important words: "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me (Matt. xxvii. 46.)?"

These words seem to exclude also every view of the Incarnation that radically differs from the one advanced here. They exclude the Lutheran view, as the Logos as such could not possibly have given utterance to them; they exclude the dualistic view, since they must have been addressed either to the Logos or to the Father; but if to the Logos, it must have been because the Logos had left the man Jesus (and this would be Cerinthianism); if to the Father it is inexplicable why the Logos should have been passed by entirely in this decisive hour, and also how a man personally united with the Logos could have felt himself forsaken of God. But in an Article like this not every Christological passage can be examined, since it would thereby swell into a commentary; we must therefore leave off this most interesting part of our subject, and pass to another.

From the passages that we have thus briefly examined, and the tenor of all other Christological passages, it seems to us that the following propositions are fairly deducible: The Logos, who is co-eternal and of the same substance with the Father, becomes, of his own free will and accord, for our salvation, man — the man that realized the idea of humanity — *the* man, whose substance was indeed the divine substance, but whose self-consciousness, will, thinking, judging, feeling, etc., were genuinely human, and subject to the laws of human development. But two features distinguished this unique man Jesus from every other man, and made his development, although genuinely human, likewise unique. In the first place, he was sinless. Sin being not a constituent part of human nature, but only an accident, Jesus could be a true, and at the same time a sinless, man. Now this sinlessness alone would have secured to him a development of all his powers, a progress in holiness and knowledge of divine things, of which it may be impossible for us to have an idea, as history furnishes us with only one sinless man. But Jesus was, though really human, at no time merely human. The substratum of his being was divinity; and such a basis secured, as we can readily understand, a development even far beyond that of a merely sinless man. We hear, accordingly the boy Jesus, when twelve years old, speak of God in such a manner as no man has ever spoken of God; while we notice at the same time development, progress in his knowledge, not only as to the subject-matter, but also as to its form. The boy speaks of God as his Father, but entertains the idea that it is in the temple at Jerusalem where he can, if not exclusively, at least better than anywhere else, engage in his Father's service; but the *man* Jesus says: "The hour cometh when ye shall neither in this mountain, nor yet in Jerusalem, worship the Father. The true worshippers shall worship the Father in spirit and in truth; for the Father seeketh such to worship him." As his whole organism developed, his self-consciousness left the narrow limits of human knowledge; it fully

grasped the fact of his ante-mundane state, of his physical relation to God, without, however, becoming fully aware before the resurrection of the full contents of the Logos-consciousness. The self-consciousness of the risen Saviour is in extent and contents equal with the Logos-consciousness, and includes all divine attributes, which had been held, as it were, in abeyance during the gradual expansion of the circumscribed self-consciousness of Jesus. In John v. 26 the Saviour said: "As the Father has life in himself, so he gave also to the Son to have life in himself." In John vi. 57, subsequently, he said: "As the living Father sent me, and I live by the Father; so he that eateth me, even he shall live by me." In the latter of these passages the Lord declares that during his life on earth he was dependent on his Father for his life, as his disciples are dependent on the glorified Redeemer for their lives. (The first passage must therefore be prophetic in its main features in order to be consistent with the second; and the context justifies this view fully.) But this state of dependence, this state of being circumscribed, ceased with his resurrection; the risen body had become the adequate bearer of the whole divinity, wherein henceforth the fulness of the Godhead can and will dwell.

To this view it is objected that it implies an impossibility. "In like manner, the opinion of those who by the form of God understand the divine nature and the government of the world cannot be admitted; since Christ when he became man could not divest himself of the nature of God."¹ But this way of settling by our own preconceived notions what God can do, and what he cannot do, does not become the Christian mind. To pass an intelligent judgment on this question by *a priori* reasoning is altogether impossible for us. Our duty is to learn what God has done, and to believe it. What he has done was, of course, possible for him to do. Many sorts of infidels take virtually the same ground. The deist, e.g. rejects miracles, because by *a priori* reasoning he has come to the conclusion that a miracle is

¹ Adam Clarke.

an impossibility; the pantheist believes that personality is a limitation of the Infinite, and he rejects, therefore, a personal God; because matter and force appear uniformly united with each other — no force without matter, no matter without force, the atheist or materialist rejects a God as unnecessary; and as long as these disbelievers adhere to these their preconceived notions, it is impossible to cure them of their fatal delusions. Our subject belongs, of course, only to believers, and their highest authority is the Bible. By this standard every question proposed to our faith must ultimately be settled, and to this decision we humbly submit. We do not think that we have settled the Christological question — we have merely given our candid views, in order to call attention to the most important subject that can claim the Christian thinker's attention. Should it be shown that the views advanced here are wrong, no one will receive the instruction more thankfully than the writer; should they prove in the main correct, and set any one to thinking, and assist him in getting a deeper insight into the truth, the writer will be more than amply rewarded for his labor. Many subjects legitimately connected with the Christological question, as that of the Trinity, the mutual relations of the three Persons of the Trinity, whether aseity must be ascribed to each of them, or to the Father alone; whether the incarnation of the Logos introduced no disharmony into the trinitarian relation and the government of the world, — these, and some more important subjects, we can here not even touch upon, as this Article is too long already. God willing, we may give our views on these subjects at a future time; but we bring this Article now to a close, with the prayer that the exalted and glorified Saviour may propitiously look upon and bless it.

ARTICLE II.

REVELATION AND INSPIRATION.

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No. V.

THE CREDIBILITY OF THE GOSPEL NARRATIVES.

THEY who in modern times refuse to acknowledge the credibility of the Gospel narratives as plain statements of facts stand, as a general rule, on the denial of the supernatural. The basis of all their reasoning is the assumption, openly or in a tacit way, that no supernatural event can happen, and, therefore, that no supernatural event can be authenticated. It is the old ground of Hume — “that a miracle can never be proved so as to be the foundation of a system of religion,” — only set forth with more show of scientific demonstration. How fully Renan stands on this basis will be evident from the following:

“It is an absolute rule of criticism to deny a place in history to narratives of miraculous circumstances; nor is this owing to a metaphysical system, for it is simply the dictation of observation. Such facts have never been really proved. All the pretended miracles near enough to be examined are referable to illusion or imposture. If a single miracle had ever been proved, we could not reject in a mass all those of ancient history; for, admitting that very many of these last were false, we might still believe that some of them were true. But it is not so. Discussion and examination are fatal to miracles. Are we not, then, authorized in believing that those miracles which date many centuries back, and regarding which there are no means of forming a contradictory debate, are also without reality? In other words, miracles only exist when people believe them. The supernatural is but another word for faith. A miracle never takes place before an incredulous and sceptical public,

the most in need of such a convincing proof. Credulity on the part of the witness is the essential condition of a miracle. There is not a solitary exception to the rule that miracles are never produced before those who are able or permitted to discuss and criticise them.”¹

The very obvious objection to his position that, “if it is impossible to prove that there ever was any instance of supernatural power, it is equally impossible to prove that there was not,” he meets by saying: “It is the duty of him who affirms a proposition to prove it; while he to whom the proposition is made has only to listen to the proof, and to decide whether it is satisfactory.”² But how can any proof be satisfactory to him who has assumed beforehand that “it is an absolute rule of criticism” — the reader will please mark the expression, not a general rule, which may be modified upon sufficient evidence, but an “absolute rule” — “to deny a place in history to narratives of miraculous circumstances.” With him, and all who stand on his ground, it is a foregone conclusion that whatever is miraculous in the Gospel narratives must be set aside as unreal. Then there arises, of necessity, the question in what way the miraculous element shall be eliminated from the evangelical narratives. Here three principles of elimination offer themselves. First, the assumption that the Gospel narratives are myths, that is, pure ideas embodied in the form of historic facts. They who adopt this theory do not deny to the several narratives of the life of Jesus a basis of true history. But they hold that the writers wrought up facts in themselves purely natural into a miraculous form, for the purpose of thus representing in a lively and poetic way the spiritual ideas contained in them. The miracles are only the symbolical dress of the ideas, and not intended to be received as veritable facts of history. Secondly, the assumption that the miracles of the Gospel narratives are purely subjective; in other words, that they existed only in

¹ The Apostles, p. 37. We quote from the New York edition of 1866.

² Ibid. p. 38.

the excited imagination of the early Christians; that, to give one example out of a multitude, "the glory of the resurrection belongs to Mary of Magdala," she having mistaken a "light vision" of Jesus for his veritable person.¹ Thirdly, the assumption that the miraculous stories of the Gospels are deliberate impositions. These three theories blend more or less with each other, like the colors of the rainbow. Between the second and third, especially, there is a strong natural affinity; fanaticism and hypocrisy being twin sisters. Hence it is not surprising that some writers, as Renan, should endeavor to ride both horses at once.

To begin with the last assumption, that the authors of the Gospel narratives were deliberate deceivers, — it is enough to say that it wants all reasonable ground of evidence, and that the positive proof of the truthfulness of these men is as strong as it can be. The sincerity of the writers themselves, and of the primitive Christians who received their narratives as true, shines forth, like the sun in the firmament, from every page. Here the Saviour's argument applies in its full force: "How can Satan cast out Satan? If Satan rise up against himself, and be divided, he cannot stand, but hath an end." Satan's kingdom is one of fraud and falsehood. But the life-long work of the evangelists and their associates was that of casting out of the human heart and the world at large all fraud and falsehood. Instead of being indifferent to truth, they inculcate its supreme importance in every conceivable way. They teach that men will be saved, not by sincerity of belief, but by knowing and obeying the truth. The scope of all their doctrine is to make men truthful inwardly and outwardly; and what they did and suffered in its behalf is to all reasonable men a sufficient pledge of the "simplicity and sincerity of truth" with which they held and propagated it.

But were they not enthusiasts, who mistook the dreams of their own fancy for facts? This second hypothesis is the favorite one of Renan. He does not scruple, indeed, to

¹ Renan, *Apostles*, p. 61.

impugn their truthfulness when it suits his purpose. Of Luke, whose writings he takes particular pains to disparage, he says: "It will readily be understood that a man who possesses such a disposition" — that is, as he has just affirmed, "too loyal to condemn Paul, too orthodox to place himself outside the pale of prevalent opinion" — "is of all others the least capable of representing things as they really are. Historic fidelity is to him a matter of indifference; he is only anxious to edify the reader."¹ And of Mary of Magdala:

"The female conscience, when under the influence of passionate love, is capable of the most extravagant illusions. Often it is the abettor of its own dreams. To introduce these kinds of incidents regarded as miraculous, deliberately deceives no one; but all the world, without thinking of it, is induced to connive at it. Mary of Magdala had been, according to the parlance of the age, 'possessed with seven devils.' In all this we must consider the want of precision in Eastern women, from their absolute defect of education and the particularly slight knowledge of their sincerity."²

This is but a decent way of saying that the element of hypocrisy mingled itself with that of enthusiasm in Mary's character. Renan's main endeavor, however, is to show how the crowning miracle of the Gospels, that of Christ's resurrection, was but a dream of the primitive Christians, having no objective reality. "A man of penetration," he says, "might have announced during the Saturday that Jesus would arise."³ He does not mean, of course, that he might have announced it as a veritable reality from an intelligent interpretation of the prophecies of the Old Testament, and of the Saviour's own words; but he might have announced it from the inability of the disciples "to acknowledge that death could have the victory over Jesus — over him who came to abolish the power of death." Accordingly, the little Christian society on Sunday "worked the veritable miracle; they resuscitated Jesus in their hearts

¹ The Apostles, p. 23

² Ibid. p. 81.

³ Ibid. p. 57.

by the intense love which they bore towards him. They decided that Jesus had not died.”¹ And he proceeds to tell exactly how this feat was accomplished. Mary, standing at the open sepulchre, her mind absorbed with the question where they had put the body, suddenly hears a light rustling behind her. She turns, and there is a man standing whom she addresses as the gardener.

“‘Oh,’ she says, ‘if thou hast borne him hence, tell me where thou hast laid him, that I may take him away.’ For the only answer, she thinks that she hears herself called by her name: ‘Mary!’ It was the voice that had so often thrilled her before; it was the accent of Jesus. ‘Oh, my master!’ she cries. She is about to touch him. A sort of instinctive movement throws her at his feet to kiss them. The light vision gives way, and says to her: ‘Touch me not.’ Little by little the shadow disappears.

“But the miracle of love is accomplished. That which Cephas could not do, Mary has done; she has been able to draw life, sweet and penetrating words, from the empty tomb. There is now no more talk of inferences to be deduced or of conjectures to be framed. Mary has seen and heard. The resurrection has its first direct witness. The glory of the resurrection belongs, then, to Mary of Magdala. After Jesus, it is Mary who has done most for the foundation of Christianity. The shadow created by the delicate sensibility of Magdalene wanders still on the earth. Queen and patroness of idealists, Magdalene knew better than any one how to assert her dream, and impose on every one the vision of her passionate soul. Her great womanly affirmation, ‘He has risen,’ has been the basis of the faith of humanity. Away, impotent reason! Apply no cold analysis to this *chef d’oeuvre* of idealism and of love. If wisdom refuses to console this poor human race, betrayed by fate, let folly attempt the enterprise. Where is the sage who has given to the world as much joy as the possessed Mary of Magdala?”²

There, reader, you have the whole process of the resurrec-

¹ Apostles, p. 26.

² Ibid. pp. 60–62.

tion. It only remained that Mary of Magdala should propagate the story, which the disciples were prepared beforehand to believe. She is to be commended because her "folly," in imposing on the world her dream for a reality, has done for "this poor human race, betrayed by fate," what "wisdom" — the wisdom of reason and truth — refused to perform. It was a grand mistake of the Apostle Paul to affirm: "If Christ be not risen, then is our preaching vain, and your faith is also vain."¹

But Mary was only a single person. Could a like hallucination come over two of the disciples together? Very easily, according to Renan. Thus: Two of them, on their way to Emmaus on Sunday afternoon, are joined by a third person — not an apparition, but a veritable "pious man, well versed in the scriptures, quoting Moses and the prophets," — who holds with them the conversation recorded by Luke.² "At the evening meal with the stranger, he takes bread, blesses it, breaks, and gives to them. This act recalls so visibly to their minds the gestures and tones of Jesus in performing the same office, that, absorbed in the thought of him, they forget the stranger; it is Jesus whom they see holding the bread, and then breaking it and offering it to them. These remembrances took such a hold on them that they scarcely perceived that their companion, anxious to continue his journey, had left them. And when they had recovered from their reverie: 'Did we not perceive,' they said, 'something strange? Did you not recognize him at the breaking of the bread?' 'Yes, up to that time our eyes were closed; they were opened when he vanished.'"³

There, reader, you have the process again. This "pious man, well versed in the scriptures," slipped out, "scarcely perceived, while the two disciples were in a reverie, saying one to another: "Is he not like the Master?" And the fact of his vanishing was to them a proof that he was the Master himself. Most satisfying explanation, is it not? Next, we have a like hallucination coming over the whole

¹ 1 Cor. xv. 14.² Luke xxiv. 25 seq.³ Apostles, pp. 66, 67.

company of the apostles. On that same evening of Sunday, when they were assembled in a room with closed doors,

“During a moment of silence, some slight breath passed over the face of the assembly. At the same time that the breath was perceived, they fancied that they heard sounds. Some of them said that they had discerned the word *shalom*, happiness or peace. This was the ordinary salutation of Jesus, and the word by which he signified his presence. No possibility of doubt; Jesus is present; he is in the assembly. That is his cherished voice; each one recognizes it. Some pretended to have observed on his hands and his feet the mark of the nails, and on his side the mark of the spear which pierced him.”¹

In a similar way the author disposes of the appearance of Jesus to seven of his disciples at the sea of Galilee.² It is obvious to ask: What is the use of offering evidence to one whose mind is thus made up beforehand to set aside all evidence? Has Renan a shadow of proof for the historic reality of his explanations? No; they are only baseless assumptions. But it is with him an “absolute rule of criticism to deny a place in history to narratives of miraculous circumstances,” and therefore they must be set aside by the best hypothesis that offers itself, however destitute it may be of any foundation. The difference between him and Hume is this: Hume decides that a miracle wrought in the interest of any new system of religion is a cheat; and directs us not only to “reject the fact, but even reject it without further examination.” Renan agrees with Hume that such an alleged miracle is a cheat, but calls for evidence,³ with the purpose of setting it aside as fast as it is offered. He assumes that the primitive Christians were a company of heated enthusiasts who mistook visions and dreams for realities, simply because the facts narrated are supernatural. For, aside from this circumstance, no proof whatever exists that they were visionary men, but abundant proof to the

¹ Apostles, pp. 67, 68.

² John xxi.

Apostles, p. 74 seq.

³ Apostles, pp. 37, 38.

contrary. Their narratives have the costume of sober realities. They are calm, unimpassioned, and straightforward, without expatiating on the greatness of Christ's character and works, and the wickedness of his enemies, as is the way of all excited enthusiasts. To show who was the calm narrator, and who is the visionary dreamer, we have only to place side by side one of John's simple and circumstantial narratives and Renan's account of the same transaction.

JOHN.

"They went forth and entered into a ship immediately; and that night they caught nothing. When the morning was now come, Jesus stood on the shore; but the disciples knew not that it was Jesus. Then Jesus saith unto them, Children, have ye any meat? They answered him, No. And he said unto them, Cast the net on the right side of the ship, and ye shall find. They cast, therefore, and now they were not able to draw it for the multitude of fishes. Therefore that disciple whom Jesus loved saith unto Peter, It is the Lord. Now when Simon Peter heard that it was the Lord, he girt his fisher's coat about him (for he was naked), and did cast himself into the sea. And the other disciples came in a little ship (for they were not far from land, but, as it were, two hundred cubits), dragging the net with fishes. As soon then as they were come to land, they saw a fire of coals there, and fish laid thereon, and bread. Jesus saith unto them, bring of the fish which ye have now caught. Simon Peter went up, and drew the net to land full of great fishes, an hundred and fifty and three; and, for all there were so many, yet was not the net broken. Jesus saith unto them, Come and dine. And none of the disciples durst ask him, Who art thou? knowing that it was the Lord. Jesus then cometh, and taketh bread and giveth them, and fish likewise."¹

RENAN.

"On one occasion they had toiled all the night without taking a single fish. All on a sudden the nets are filled; this was a miracle. It seemed to them that some one had told them from the shore, 'Cast your nets to the right.' Peter and John looked at each other. 'It is the Lord,' said John. Peter, who was naked, hastily covered himself with his tunic, and jumped into the sea, that he might go and rejoin the invisible counsellor. At other times Jesus came to share their simple repasts. One day, when they had done fishing, they were surprised to find the coals lighted, with a fish upon the fire and some bread beside it. A lively recollection of their feasts in times past took possession of their minds; for the bread and the fish had always been essential characteristics of them. Jesus was in the habit of offering portions to them. They were persuaded, after their meal, that Jesus was seated at their side, and had presented them with these victuals, which had already become in their view eucharistic and holy. It was John and Peter, more than all the others, who had been favored with these intimate conversations with the well-beloved phantom. One day Peter, dreaming, perhaps (but why do I say this? Was not their life on these shores a perpetual dream?), thought that he heard Jesus ask him, 'Lovest thou me?'"² etc.

The mythical hypothesis need not long detain us; since it is manifestly an invention in the interest of pure naturalism.

¹ John xxi. 3-13.

² Apostles, pp. 74, 75.

The first thing that strikes us on hearing it propounded is its unnaturalness. Why, we ask, call these narratives myths? Have they not, in all respects, the dress and appearance of veritable history? Certainly they have; and men of plain, unsophisticated good sense have received them as such century after century. But then they record miraculous events, and it "is an absolute rule of criticism" — that is, rationalistic criticism — "to deny a place in history to narratives of miraculous circumstances." The mythical theory is accordingly propounded, because it is one way of eliminating from the Gospels their supernatural element. This is its only recommendation; while the objections to it are weighty and decisive. We will specify two of them:

It wholly fails to account for the mighty movement of the human mind connected with the introduction of Christianity; the most intense and persistent which history records. Myths, received as myths, — and, if the primitive disciples to whom they were propounded did not receive them as myths, but as true historic narratives, then their authors were impostors and deceivers, — myths, we say, received as myths, do not turn the world upside down, as did the preaching of Christ and his apostles. Myths do not inspire the souls of men and women by tens of thousands with heroic zeal and courage, enabling them steadfastly to endure persecution, torture, and death in defence of them. If the facts recorded in the Gospels are realities, we have an adequate explanation of the intense excitement which they produced, and which shook not only Judea, but the whole Roman empire to its centre. It was not love towards the mythical idea of a Saviour, but towards the veritable Son of God, crucified and risen in deed and in truth, that made the primitive Christians victorious alike over inward sinful affection and outward persecution. It would be too much to affirm that a belief must be in all cases well grounded that it may be powerful. What we are now insisting upon is its reality, not its reasonableness. The followers of Mohammed believed in his divine mission and in the sensuous

paradise which he promised to all the faithful. Philosophers, like Socrates, may die in the interest of a pure idea. But historic facts alone, with the eternal verities embodied in them in a comprehensible form, can warm the souls and elicit the energies of the masses.

Another objection to the mythical theory, as direct as it is fatal, is found in the position of the apostles in respect to our Lord's resurrection. In writing to the Corinthians on this very subject Paul affirms its historic reality in the strongest possible terms, and to crown all adds: "If Christ be not risen, then is our preaching vain, and your faith is also vain. Yea, and we are found false witnesses of God; because we have testified of God that he raised up Christ: whom he raised not up, if so be that the dead rise not."¹ Can any sane man doubt whether Paul believed in the historic reality of Christ's resurrection, or whether, in this particular, he represented the general belief of the apostles and primitive churches? But if the apostles taught the doctrine of our Lord's resurrection not as a myth, but as an objective fact — as in truth the great objective fact of the gospel — what becomes of the mythical hypothesis? It goes to its own place, to that "limbo of vanity" whither so many crude notions have already gone, or are on the way thither:

"Cows, hoods, and habits, with their wearers, tossed
And fluttered into rags; then relics, beads,
Indulgences, dispenses, pardons, bulls,
The sport of winds."

Thus far we have been occupied with the character of the Gospel narratives and their authors. We have shown that they are not myths but veritable histories, written by honest and sober-minded men. But two important questions still remain: Were the circumstances of these authors and their relations to the facts which they record such as to enable them to give a correct account of them? and, Were the facts themselves of such a nature as to admit of full authentication?

¹ 1 Cor. xv. 14, 15.

The first of these questions, that which concerns the *competency* of these writers *as witnesses* to the facts recorded by them, has been mainly answered in our previous Article establishing the genuineness of the Gospel narratives.¹ If the authors of our four Gospels, instead of being apostles or associates of apostles, had lived and written after the apostolic age, they would not have been worthy of our full credence. But the genuineness of these records having been established, we have a strong presumption in favor of their credibility; for then the writers were in circumstances to know the certainty respecting the facts recorded by them. With regard to the apostles Matthew and John this matter need not be argued. Renan does indeed affirm that the Gospel of John "cannot be accepted as the echo of the thought of Jesus."

"The discourses which the fourth Gospel attributes to Jesus already contain a germ of theology. But these discourses being in contradiction with the synoptic Gospels, which represent without any doubt the primitive *logia*, they should be considered as elements of apostolic history, and not as material for the life of Jesus."²

"It is John the evangelist, or his school, who afterwards sought to prove that Jesus is the Word, and who created from this point of view an entirely new theology, very different from that of the kingdom of God."³

All baseless assumption; as if the discourses of our Lord recorded in the fourth Gospel, which bear in a pre-eminent degree the marks of historic truthfulness, as we propose to show presently, must be regarded as "in contradiction with the synoptic gospels" simply because the former goes further than the latter in unfolding the divinity of our Lord's person. It was in entire harmony with the character of the bosom-disciple, and his relations to Jesus, that he should remember and record those wonderful discourses of the Saviour which could not be so easily and naturally embodied in "the

¹ Bibliotheca Sacra, Vol. xxvi (1869), p. 79 seq.

² Life of Jesus, p. 104, note.

³ Ibid. p. 225

primitive *logia*” as his miracles and discourses to the multitude.

As to the other two evangelists, Mark and Luke, the latter states very fairly the position which he occupied: “It seemed good to me also, having accurately traced out all things” (as the original signifies) “from the beginning, to write to thee in order,” etc.¹ Luke had in abundance the means of accurately tracing out all things relating to our Lord’s life and works; and he tells us that he made a good use of these means, obtaining his information from those who “from the beginning were eye-witnesses and ministers of the word.” The same is true of Mark also, whose relations to Paul as well as Peter are well known. No man, then, can reasonably disparage the testimony of the four evangelists on the ground that they were not in circumstances to know the truth respecting the facts which they record. As witnesses they were thoroughly competent.

We will next turn our attention to the character of the *facts themselves*, and the circumstances connected with them. Here we remark at the outset that it would be superfluous to examine in detail all the miracles recorded in the Gospels. Though they all proceeded alike from the divine agency, they are not all alike open to human inspection. Even Renan concedes that “if a single miracle had ever been proved, we could not reject in a mass all those of ancient history.”² If, then, we find, upon candid examination, that the supernatural origin of many of them is raised above all reasonable doubt, it is a reasonable inference that the rest of them had the same divine origin. We might with reason insist upon the miracles ascribed to our Lord within the sphere of inanimate nature; such as the conversion of water into wine, the feeding of many thousands with a few loaves and fishes, and walking upon the sea. But passing by these, let us consider some that were performed on the persons of men. Palsy, dropsy, withered limbs, blindness, the want of hearing and speech, leprosy, confirmed lunacy — all these

¹ Luke i. 1 seq.

² Apostles, p. 37.

maladies were as well known in their outward symptoms eighteen hundred years ago as they are to-day. Persons could not be afflicted with such evils for months and years in a corner. The neighbors must have known then, as certainly as neighbors do now, the particulars of such cases, and have been unexceptionable witnesses to their reality. When persons feign blindness or other infirmities, they go among strangers. No man can pass himself off as palsied, deaf and dumb, blind — especially as blind from birth — halt, or withered, in his own neighborhood. In all our communities we have more or less of such cases, and the reality of the maladies is beyond all question. Just so it was in the Saviour's day. If a man had been lying for months or years in a palsied condition, or had a withered arm, or was lame or blind from birth, the fact was known, not to one or two persons, but to the neighbors generally, and when they saw him instantaneously and perfectly restored at the Saviour's word, what room was there for doubt or delusion? Undoubtedly a case of feigned blindness or paralysis might be cleverly contrived in secret, and then the pretended patient exhibited in carefully arranged circumstances and suddenly healed. We may concede also that certain affections might be healed through the power of excited expectation. But when every kind of disease throughout a whole region is instantaneously and perfectly removed at the word of one man, no ground is left for denying the reality of the miracles. Now this is precisely what the Gospel narratives record of our Saviour: "And Jesus went about all Galilee, teaching in their synagogues, and preaching the gospel of the kingdom, and healing all manner of sicknesses, and all manner of diseases among the people. And his fame went throughout all Syria: and they brought unto him all sick people that were taken with divers diseases and torments, and those which were possessed with devils, and those which were lunatic, and those that had the palsy; and he healed them."¹ "And when they were come out of the ship, straightway they

¹ Matt. iv. 23, 24.

knew him ; and ran through that whole region round about, and began to carry about in beds those that were sick, where they heard he was. And whithersoever he entered, into villages, or cities, or country, they laid the sick in the streets, and besought him that they might touch, if it were but the border of his garment : and as many as touched him, were made whole.”¹ The immense number of our Lord’s miracles, their diversified character, and the fact that they were performed everywhere, as well without as with previous notice, very many of them too in the presence of the multitude in the most open and public manner — all these characteristics separate them wholly from the pretended feats of some who in modern times lay claim to miraculous power. These latter have always a select circle of wonders, the exhibition of which is restricted to particular places. No one of them would venture to undertake the cure of a man born blind, or that had a withered limb, or that had been a paralytic for scores of years ; much less to heal every diseased or disabled person that might be brought to him. But with Jesus of Nazareth there was no distinction of easy and difficult, since to his divine power nothing was hard.

It is with good reason that we lay special stress upon the fact that the Saviour performed many of his greatest miracles in the presence of his enemies, who had both the means and the will to institute a searching investigation concerning them, and who would have denied their reality had it been in their power to do so. “A miracle,” says Renan, “never takes place before an incredulous and sceptical public, the most in need of such a convincing proof. There is not a solitary exception to the rule that miracles are never produced before those who are able or permitted to discuss and criticise them.”² This is but an indirect way of saying that the authors of the Gospels were wilful deceivers ; for if we admit simply their honesty, Renan’s assertion is as far from the truth as it can possibly be. How was it in the case of the man with a withered hand, who was healed on the Sabbath

¹ Mark vi. 54-56.

² Apostles, pp. 37, 38.

day in the synagogue in the presence of the Pharisees, who, unable to deny the miracle, went out and held a council against Jesus how they might destroy him?¹ or of the woman who had been for eighteen years bowed together and could in no wise lift up herself; who was also healed in the synagogue on the Sabbath, when the ruler of the synagogue “answered with indignation, because that Jesus had healed on the Sabbath day, and said unto the people, there are six days in which men ought to work: in them therefore come and be healed, and not on the Sabbath day”?² or when “the blind and the lame came to him in the temple and he healed them,” and the chief priests and scribes, seeing the wonderful things that he did, were sore displeased?³ Sad indeed is the record of the perverse opposition and calumny of the Jewish rulers. But even this has its bright side. It shows us that the Saviour’s miracles were “produced before those who” were both able and permitted “to discuss and criticise them,” and that they could endure the severest scrutiny; that after every means which power, wealth, patronage, and official influence could command had been used for their disparagement, their divine origin still shone forth like the unclouded sun at noon-day. Let any one read attentively the ninth chapter of John’s Gospel, which records the investigation instituted by the Jewish rulers respecting the healing of a man born blind, and he must be satisfied that in no modern court of justice was a question of fact ever subjected to a severer scrutiny. And the result was that they could not deny the miracle, but could only say: “Give God the praise; we know that this man is a sinner.” Nicodemus expressed the judgment of every fair-minded man when he said: “Rabbi, we know that thou art a teacher come from God; for no man can do these miracles that thou doest, except God be with him.”⁴

An independent argument of transcendent power lies in the character and life of Jesus of Nazareth. The portraiture

¹ Matt. xii. 10 seq.

² Luke xiii. 11 seq.

³ Matt. xxi. 14, 15.

⁴ John iii. 2.

drawn of him by the four evangelists verifies itself. Of this a modern writer has said with equal beauty and force: "The character is possible to be conceived, because it was actualized in a living example."¹ Of the childhood of Jesus the same author says:

"If any writer, of almost any age, will undertake to describe, not merely a spotless, but a superhuman or celestial childhood, not having the reality before him, he must be somewhat more than human himself, if he does not pile together a mass of clumsy exaggerations, and draw and overdraw, till neither heaven nor earth can find any verisimilitude in the picture."²

Dr. Bushnell confirms his position by pertinent illustrations from the Rabbinical and apocryphal ideas of a superhuman childhood. All that he says holds good of the Saviour's manhood also. The portraiture proves the historic reality of the personage described. The character of Jesus is perfectly original. Nothing like it was ever conceived by the loftiest minds of antiquity. Nothing like it has appeared since his day. Far be it from us to attempt a eulogy of that which is so high above all human excellence. The sun shining in his strength needs no encomiums, and so it is with this glorious Sun of Righteousness. What is now to be said is not eulogy. It is part of an argument for the reality of the events recorded in the Gospel history. We propose to consider the evangelic portraiture in three particulars — the perfect humanity which it exhibits in Jesus of Nazareth, his originality and perfection as a teacher, and the originality of the ways in which he manifested his divine nature; to all which may well be added the manner itself of the portraiture.

First of all, let us look at our Lord's *perfect humanity* as presented by the evangelists. We are concerned now with

¹ Bushnell, "Nature and the Supernatural," p. 324.

² Bushnell, pp. 280, 281. The whole chapter on the character of Jesus contains a most convincing argument for the reality of the evangelic portraiture. Starting from the same fundamental position, that "the character is possible to be conceived because it was actualized in a living example," we propose to carry out the argument in several different lines of thought.

the human element in the Saviour's character ; but we must not forget that this can never be separated from the divine element, In him the human and the divine interpenetrate each other, so as to constitute together one indivisible and glorious whole. Jesus could not be, even in idea what he is as man, unless he were God also. And what he is as God, he is as God made flesh and dwelling as a man among men. It is the *God-man* which the Gospel narratives present to us. The true echo of "Ecce homo" is "Ecce Deus"; and of "Ecce Deus" is "Ecce homo." Nevertheless we can, for convenience of argument, speak now of the human, and now of the divine side; although we are assured that the two belong inseparably and forever to one and the same Son of God. The perfection of our Lord, as a man, lies in the union in just proportion as well as in full measure, of all the qualities which constitute humanity; so that the possession in perfect fulness of one attribute implies no deficiency in other attributes, and thus no one-sidedness of character. He has each and all the attributes of humanity in perfect harmony with each other.

Our Lord's *tranquillity* shines forth through the whole course of his ministry, and manifests itself alike in things great and small. He performs his mightiest works as one conscious that divine power belongs to him of right, and that the exercise of it in its very highest forms is nothing new or strange. In connection with his most stupendous miracles he calmly gives directions as respecting ordinary occurrences. When he has fed many thousands with a few loaves and fishes, he says: "Gather up the fragments that remain, that nothing be lost." When he has raised from the dead the daughter of Jairus, he commands "that something should be given her to eat." When he has called from the sepulchre one who had been dead four days, he directs that they should "loose him, and let him go." Even in Gethsemane, when oppressed with insupportable agony, his self-possession remains as perfect as his submission to his Father's will. That his serenity never left him for a moment during the process of

his arrest, trial, sentence, and crucifixion, is a truth which shines forth from the pages of the sacred narrative, like his own raiment on the mount of transfiguration, "white and glistening." Yet this deep composure of spirit is not that of stoicism or a cold temperament. It is the composure of an ardent soul, burning always with an intense flame of zeal for the glory of God and good will towards men; of a spirit moved with womanly tenderness in view of human suffering. It unites in full measure *tranquillity and fervor*.

This leads us naturally to notice the combination in our Lord's character of *tenderness and severity*. He opened his ministry at Nazareth, by reading from the prophecy of Isaiah the portraiture of his own character: "The spirit of the Lord God is upon me, because he hath anointed me to preach the gospel to the poor, he hath sent me to heal the broken-hearted, to preach deliverance to the captives, and recovering of sight to the blind, to set at liberty them that are bruised, to preach the acceptable year of the Lord."¹ For penitents he had only words of kindness and comfort. Towards the infirmities and mistakes of his sincere disciples he was wonderfully forbearing. Yet this tender and compassionate man, who took little children in his arms and blessed them; who said to the widow of Nain: Weep not, and wept himself at the grave of Lazarus; this same Jesus of Nazareth could denounce with withering severity the scribes and Pharisees in the presence of all the people. He who said: "Come unto me, all ye that labor, and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest," said also in the self-same hour: "Thou, Capernaum, which art exalted unto heaven, shall be brought down to hell."² There are some in these modern days who write and preach as if the gospel were all good nature, and had no stern side. Such teachers strangely forget that the most severe denunciations of hypocrisy and wickedness contained in the New Testament, and the most awful descriptions of the future punishment of the impenitent fell from the Saviour's own lips. In the tenderness of Christ, as in the

¹ Isa. lxi. 1, 2.

² Matt. xi. 20 seq.

love of the gospel which he preached, there is no element of weakness.

Of the Saviour's perfect *wisdom* it would be superfluous to speak. There shines through it a superhuman element, a capacity to discern at once men's inmost thoughts. Yet, it is, in its manifestations, pre-eminently human; a wisdom that adapts itself instantly to the circumstances in which it is placed, and speaks and acts accordingly. Our Lord was surrounded by crafty adversaries, who contrived all manner of plans "how they might entangle him in his talk." Yet his wisdom was never for a moment at fault. In the twinkling of an eye he turned their stratagems against themselves, and put them to shame before the multitude. The point to be especially insisted on here is the union of this wisdom with perfect *sincerity and truthfulness*. Not the slightest trace of deceit or cunning artifice appears in his ministry from first to last. No stain of hypocrisy could possibly be fastened on his spotless character. Were a man found perverse enough to make the attempt,

"The ethereal mould,
Incapable of stain, would soon expel
Her mischief, and purge off the baser fire
Victorious."

Wisdom in the sphere of practical life takes the form of *prudence*. In our Lord's character this quality was harmoniously blended with *boldness*. Though he feared no man and shrunk from no peril, he never needlessly encountered opposition and danger. He was never bold for the purpose of making a display of boldness. Again and again he withdrew himself from his enemies. Not until the time had come that he should die for the sins of the world did he expose himself to their rage. Then he went boldly into Jerusalem at the head of his disciples. Throughout his ministry he perfectly exemplified his own precept: "Be ye wise as serpents, and harmless as doves."

Our Lord described himself as "meek and lowly in heart,"¹

¹ Matt. xi. 29.

and his *meekness and humility* shine forth with serene brightness through all his words and actions. "When he was reviled, he reviled not again; when he suffered, he threatened not; but committed himself to him that judgeth righteously."¹ Certainly no one could have conceived beforehand that if a messenger from God should come making loftier claims than were ever advanced by man or angel, he would appear as one "meek and lowly in heart." How can one, he would ask, who claims not only outward power over nature, but inward power over the human spirit here and hereafter, come to men with childlike meekness and humility? But in the appearance of Jesus of Nazareth the great problem was solved. He asserted, in a way as steadfast and persistent as it was calm, his absolute control over the destinies of all men. On the way to the grave of Lazarus he affirmed: "I am the resurrection and the life; he that believeth in me, though he die yet shall he live:² and whosoever liveth, and believeth in me shall never die."³ Yet when we read the account of such amazing claims, which no archangel would dare to lisp, we have no feeling that they were incongruous or presumptuous. The only possible explanation is, that this meek and lowly Jesus made good his claim to be the Son of God by what he was and by what he did. Invent such a blending of perfect meekness with the quiet assumption of all power in heaven and earth! Away with the absurd supposition! To have been described it must have been seen in actual life.

Another very conspicuous quality in our Lord's character is his perfect *elevation above this world*. His own precept to his disciples: "Lay not up for yourselves treasures upon earth, but lay up for yourselves treasures in heaven," was the law of his inner life. He had no treasures here below but the souls of men; and these are not earthly, but heavenly treasures. In him "the lust of the flesh, and the lust of the eyes, and the pride of life" could find no place for a single moment. He kept the world always and perfectly under

¹ 1 Peter ii. 23.² Gr. *καὶ ἀποθάνη ζήσεται*.³ John xi. 25, 26.

his feet. Yet his heavenly mind was free from every *tinge of asceticism*; and this is the point that deserves special attention. Many attempts have been made to portray the idea of a perfect man. The perfect man of heathen writers lived and moved wholly in the sphere of worldly interests. He wanted, to say nothing of other defects, the element of a heavenly temper of mind. He had, in truth, no conception of the scriptural precept: "Set your affection on things above, not on things on the earth." The perfect man of the Mediæval ages, on the other hand, sought to rise above the world by running away from it into some desert or monastery. He wanted the true scriptural conception of overcoming the world while we stay in it, and meet its responsibilities. He knew no better way than to take an austere and frowning attitude towards all worldly enjoyments. Coarse fare, hair shirts, and other penances of human invention, were his way to "mortify the flesh with its affections and lusts." But the heavenly mind of Jesus was free from all stoicism or asceticism. He made no war upon the genuine passions and affections of humanity, but subjected them all to his higher spiritual nature; in other words, to the divine law. Except temporarily for meditation and prayer, he never withdrew himself, nor encouraged his disciples to withdraw themselves, from the cares and temptations of active life. He fasted on certain emergencies, but not systematically like the scribes and Pharisees, nor did he enjoin systematic fasting upon his disciples. He lived among men, ate and drank with them, and made no show of austerity. His heavenly mind lay not in the renunciation of God's gifts, but in maintaining his affections constantly raised above the gifts themselves to the divine Giver. His heavenly mind, therefore, like all his other human qualities, was imitable, and is propounded to all for imitation. His virtues are not the virtues of a king on his throne, or a philosopher in his school, or a monk in his cell; but of a man moving among men in the sphere of common life, and filling out common life with all the duties appropriate to it. They are therefore available for the imi-

tation of all classes of men. We may boldly affirm that such a character as that of Jesus of Nazareth could never have been conceived of had it not actually existed.

Looking next at our Lord's *character as a teacher*, the first fact that strikes us is his perfect elevation above the errors and prejudices not only of his own age and nation, but of all ages and all nations. He saw intuitively and perfectly what God is, what man is, and what are man's relations to God and to his fellow-men. He was therefore able to establish a religion for men, as men, that needs no change for any age, nation, or condition of life. Educated among the common people, he had no special human training. He lived in an age of narrowness and formalism. The scribes and Pharisees, who sat in Moses's seat, had covered up the true meaning and spirit of the Old Testament beneath a mass of human traditions. Yet, in such an age, Jesus is described to us as coming forth a perfect Teacher of divine truth; as sweeping away at once the glosses of the Jewish doctors, unfolding to the people the true meaning of the law and the prophets, and giving to the world a religion that meets the wants of all classes and conditions of men in all ages and nations; a religion that needs no amendment or change, but remains from century to century adequate to the wants of all men, adapted to humanity as the air is to the lungs and the light to the eyes. Here is a mighty fact that must have some basis of reality. If we accept the Saviour's own explanation, "My doctrine is not mine, but his that sent me,"¹ we have an adequate account of it; and no other account is possible. The primitive Christians, with their narrow Jewish prejudices — the unmistakable manifestations of which appear all along the line of the evangelic narratives — could never have conceived of such a universal religion as that described in the Gospels unless it had actually existed; and it could not have existed without God for its Author. Gifted men may be in advance of their own age; that is, they may see before

¹ John vii. 16.

others what is the next thing indicated by the progress of society. But no gifts, short of true objective inspiration, will lift a man at once and perfectly above all the errors and prejudices of the age in which he has been born and educated into the region of absolute light and truth. All the work that men do is imperfect, and needs emendation at the hand of those who come after them. But the religion of Christ, when freed from human additions, and received in its original purity, is all that our fallen humanity needs. Considered as the good leaven which God has cast into the lump of this world, the gospel has continual progress;¹ but, considered as a system of doctrines and duties revealed for our salvation, it can have no progress, for it is perfect. A religion that thus remains from age to age adapted to the wants of man, as man, must be from God.

Thus far we have considered the *matter* of our Lord's teaching. If we look to the *manner*, that is perfectly original, and has all the marks of a historic reality that could be described because it had been witnessed. Perhaps the most striking fact concerning it is that the Saviour saw through the world of nature and of mind at a glance, apprehended it perfectly in its relations to God and man, and therefore had it always ready at hand to furnish him with illustrations and arguments — illustrations and arguments as simple and natural as they were profound and comprehensive, and by means of which he unfolded the deepest truths in the plainest and most intelligible forms. Teaching by parables, without any false analogies, and in a way that interested and instructed alike the learned and the ignorant, this was a wonderful characteristic of his ministry. It is a very noticeable fact that no one of his apostles, not even the bosom-disciple, attempted to imitate him in this particular. They who heard him open his mouth in parables felt instinctively that here he was inimitable; and they manifested true reverence in refraining from a work which they could only have travestied. The more we study our Lord's manner

¹ Matt. xiii. 33.

of teaching, so fresh and varied, and yet so like itself from beginning to end, so interwoven with the daily incidents and surroundings of his life, so full of minute, characteristic touches growing immediately out of present occasions, the more must we be satisfied that the possibility of the description has for its basis the reality of the thing described.

Let us now turn our attention to the *divine side* of our Lord's character. On the fact that his mission was from God we need not dwell. If there is one truth asserted by him more fully than any other, it is this. "The works," said he, "which the Father hath given me to finish, the same works that I do, bear witness of me, that the Father hath sent me."¹ "I am not come of myself; but he that sent me is true, whom ye know not. But I know him; for I am from him, and he hath sent me."² "If God were your Father, ye would love me; for I proceeded forth and came from God; neither came I of myself, but he sent me."³ But it is not on the divine mission of Jesus that we now propose to dwell, but upon the manifestations which he made of his divine personality. We assert that these are, if possible, more original than anything else in his history, and bear in themselves the impress of reality. Let us suppose that a company of men—and here it is a company of illiterate Jews—have formed the conception of a Divine Being uniting Deity with humanity, and that they sit down, whether together or separately, to draw the portraiture. Doubtless they would put into his lips many direct assertions of his divinity, and make his life abound with stupendous miracles. These would constitute the staple materials of their proof. It is not likely that they would introduce in a pure and simple way incidents apparently inconsistent with his Deity. If they brought them in at all, it would be with a superabundance of explanations. But it is in no such crude way that our Saviour's divinity manifests itself in the Gospel narratives. It is true, indeed, that in the manner of his miracles he makes everywhere the impression that he performs them

¹ John v. 36.² John vii. 28, 29.³ John viii. 42.

by virtue of a power residing in himself. In this respect there is a sharp contrast between his manner and that of the prophets before him and the apostles after him. In the case of these men the power, as well as the commission, came from God, and they were careful to impress this fact upon the beholders: "O Lord, my God, I pray thee, let this child's soul come into him again"¹; "In the name of Jesus Christ of Nazareth, rise up and walk"²; "Eneas, Jesus Christ maketh thee whole."³ Yet, even here, it is worthy of particular notice that, when the authors of the Gospels introduce any incident or remark implying our Lord's subordination to the Father, such as his prayer at the grave of Lazarus,⁴ or his declaration: "The words that I speak unto you I speak not of myself; but the Father that dwelleth in me, he doeth the works"⁵; or this: "If ye loved me, ye would rejoice, because I said, I go unto the Father; for my Father is greater than I,"⁶ they add not a word of explanation; a convincing proof that they are not prepossessed with any favorite idea, but are seeking simply to tell what our Lord said and did. Meanwhile the divine nature of our Lord's person shines forth from the Gospel narratives in ways as original as they are indirect, and which transcend all power of human invention.

He calls *God his Father* in a peculiar and incommunicable sense. In the form of prayer given for the use of his disciples, he said: "Our Father"; but he never classes himself with other men in such a way that he can say "Our Father," as one of them. His words are always "My Father," showing that he stands alone in this relation to God, and is the "Son of God," also, in the same peculiar and incommunicable sense. And the divine fulness of meaning that dwells in these two correlative terms, "my Father" and "the Son of God," he himself brings out in his discussions with the unbelieving Jews. As the Son of God, he has the same nature with the Father, and, though

¹ 1 Kings xvii. 21.² Acts iii. 6.³ Acts ix. 34.⁴ John xi. 41, 42.⁵ John xiv. 10.⁶ John xiv. 28.

acting, as he is everywhere careful to state, under his commission and authority, the same prerogatives also. As the Son of God, he claims the right and power to do whatever the Father does, and to receive the same honor as the Father. His vindication of himself for exercising divine power on the Sabbath-day is simply this: "My Father worketh hitherto, and I work." The Jews rightly understood this to be an assertion of his equality with the Father; for they "sought the more to kill him, because he not only broke the Sabbath, but said also that God was his own Father,¹ making himself equal with God." To this the Saviour answers: "The Son can do nothing of himself" — acting in his own name and without the concurrence of the Father's will, — "but what he seeth the Father do; for what things soever he doeth, these also doeth the Son likewise. For the Father loveth the Son, and showeth him all things that himself doeth; and he will show him greater works than these, that ye may marvel. For as the Father raiseth up the dead and quickeneth them, even so the Son quickeneth whom he will. For the Father judgeth no man, but hath committed all judgment unto the Son, that all men should honor the Son, even as they honor the Father. He that honoreth not the Son honoreth not the Father who sent him."² Through these wonderful words two great truths run side by side. The first is that Jesus does nothing of himself, that is, acting in his own name. He comes to men under the Father's commission to do the work which the Father has committed to him. What this work is he knows with absolute certainty; for the Father loveth the Son, and showeth him all things that himself doeth." This is manifestly a representation, under human modes of conception, of the high truth elsewhere stated, that the Son dwells from eternity in the Father's bosom, and therefore knows all his counsels³ — a truth on which our Lord insists very earnestly and fully, lest any one should think that his actions could be at variance with the will of God. The second

¹ Gr. *πατέρα ἰδιον*.² John v. 17-23.³ John i. 1, 18; xvii. 5-24.

truth is that, though subordinate to the Father in office, he is *equal to the Father in power and glory*. He shares all the Father's counsels, and does all the Father's works—two things that imply omniscience and omnipotence. He is thus qualified to judge the world; and the Father has accordingly committed all judgment to the Son. And because the Son is equal to the Father in power and glory, and has the destinies of all men in his hands, all men are required to honor the Son as they honor the Father. If these words do not contain an assumption of divinity, it cannot be made in human language. The point, however, on which we are now insisting, is not so much the claim of divinity, as the unique character of the way in which the claim is made good. Where, we ask, in the whole compass of human literature, can a passage be found more grandly original, and bearing more fully in every part the impress of historic reality? It could be written by the evangelist, because it is a plain, unvarnished record of what took place in his hearing; but it is far above the reach of one writing from his own invention.

Again: the Saviour represents himself as the *Light and Life* of all mankind. "I am the Light of the world; he that followeth me shall not walk in darkness, but shall have the light of life."¹ "I am come a light into the world, that whosoever believeth on me should not abide in darkness."² "I am the living bread, which came down from heaven. If any man eat of this bread, he shall live forever; and the bread that I will give is my flesh, which I will give for the life of the world."³ "Verily, verily, I say unto you, if a man keep my saying, he shall never see death."⁴ In comparison with what he here claims for himself, the outward work of giving sight to the physically blind and raising to life the physically dead, dwindles into nothing. Our Lord's miracles were only the seals of his divine mission. But the giving of light and life, light and life spiritual and eternal, is the work itself of his mission. The resurrection of Lazarus,

¹ John viii. 12.² John xii. 46.³ John vi. 51.⁴ John viii. 51.

stupendous as was that exercise of divine power, does not fill us with such awe and amazement as the mighty words addressed to Martha on the way to the sepulchre: "I am the Resurrection and the Life; he that believeth in me, though he die, yet shall he live; and whosoever liveth and believeth in me shall never die."¹ In this and other like declarations, he does, as it were, draw aside the veil of his humanity, and give us a bright glimpse of the Godhead that dwells within him. In his spiritual character, as the Redeemer of the world, he is transfigured to the eyes of our understanding, even as his body was transfigured to the natural eyes of the disciples on the holy mount. Utterances like these, so calm, so lofty, so original, do not sound like the inventions of idealists. They wear the costume of heavenly realities. When we read them, we feel assured that the only explanation of their existence in the Gospel narratives is their historic truth. The bosom disciple could record them because he had heard them.

In another kindred class of passages the Saviour asserts his *inward dominion over the human spirit*. "Come unto me," he stands and proclaims to weary, suffering humanity, "all ye that are weary and heavy-laden, and I will give you rest."² "Peace I leave with you; my peace I give unto you. Not as the world giveth give I unto you."³ The world gives rest and peace at the best outwardly, and too often only in empty words. But Jesus of Nazareth lays claim to the power of giving rest and peace inwardly and directly. A part of this work lies in the forgiveness of sin, which he claims as his prerogative, because "what things soever" the Father "doeth, these also doeth the Son likewise." Another part of this work lies in revealing himself inwardly to his disciples as an all-sufficient Saviour, and thus shedding abroad in their hearts "the peace of God which passeth all understanding." This he does because he has direct access to the inmost fountains of feeling, and can give rest and peace inwardly and efficaciously. Before his outward presence

¹ John xi. 25.² Matt. xi. 28.³ John xiv. 27.

in this world sorrow fled away. He turned into songs of joy the tears of the widow of Nain, by raising her son to life. But far more glorious is his inward presence, by which he says to the troubled spirit: "Weep not," and makes it victorious over all "the sufferings of this present time." "These things," said he, "I have spoken unto you, that in me ye might have peace. In the world ye shall have tribulation; but be of good cheer; I have overcome the world."¹ He overcomes the world, not outwardly alone, but within the hearts of believers; and this is the office of Deity. The apostles, in the name of their Master, raised the dead to life. But no apostle could have ventured to say: "In me ye shall have peace." The words contain in themselves an assumption of divinity which is perfectly original; and they verify themselves as a true historic record.

The idea of the *mutual indwelling* of our Lord and his disciples is peculiar to the gospel. The Saviour himself introduced it, and from his lips it passed to the church. "Abide in me, and I in you. As the branch cannot bear fruit of itself, except it abide in the vine, no more can ye, except ye abide in me. I am the vine, ye are the branches. He that abideth in me, and I in him, the same bringeth forth much fruit; for without me" — *χωρὶς ἐμοῦ*, in a state of separation from me, like a branch cut off from the vine — "ye can do nothing."² Here we have in all its fulness the idea, so perfectly original with the Saviour, of a *vital union* between himself and the soul of each believer, through which the latter receives strength and growth and fruitfulness in the Christian life. Hence comes the expression, so frequent in the Pauline Epistles, of being "in Christ Jesus," and the favorite form of speech used by the beloved disciple, "dwelling in God, or in Christ, and he in us." The very idea implies Deity. The Jews regarded Moses with the highest reverence; but no one of them ever spoke, or could have spoken, of dwelling in Moses and having Moses dwelling in himself. Had any Christian disciple represented himself

¹ John xvi. 33.² John xv. 4, 5, and the context.

as dwelling in Paul or Peter, and the apostle in himself, the language would have been justly regarded as blasphemous.

Let, now, any candid man consider these indirect, but efficacious, ways in which our Lord manifested his divinity, and other like ways that might be specified — all of them so original, so majestic, and so simple, and yet all of them so far removed from anything that could have occurred to one sitting down to draw from his own imagination the portraiture of a divine person — and he must be convinced that such a record as that contained in our four canonical Gospels was possible only because it is a simple and truthful record of what Jesus said and did. Plain men can give a straightforward account of what they have themselves witnessed or learned from eye-witnesses. But it transcends the genius of any man to invent such narratives of such a character.

We say such narratives, for *the manner of the portraiture* should be taken into account, as well as the picture itself. The Gospel narratives are marked throughout by artless simplicity. It is not by labored attempts to give a high ideal of perfect humanity in union with Deity that the evangelists have been so successful in presenting to us the wondrous portraiture, but by simply stating the facts in the sincerity of truth. Each writer goes straight forward with his story, never thinking for a moment of what his own genius is to accomplish, intent only on exhibiting to the world his Lord and Master as he was in his daily intercourse with men. The character described possesses supreme excellence and loveliness, not through the author's consummate genius, but because of his faithful adherence to historic truth; and because this divine person is a living and glorious reality he possesses from age to age an undying power over every heart that receives him. Love towards him is the mightiest principle on earth, for suffering, as well as for doing. It makes the soul of which it has taken full possession invincible. When Jesus of Nazareth is enthroned in

the human heart, not all the powers of earth and hell can overcome it.

Standing, now, upon the position that the Gospel narratives are an authentic record of facts, it follows that in the person and life of our Saviour we have a *supernatural revelation* from God to man, in the fullest sense of the words. That his origin was supernatural the Gospels teach in explicit terms, and that in two respects. He existed from eternity with the Father, before his appearance on earth in human nature, and his human nature was conceived by the Holy Ghost in the womb of the virgin Mary. If one admits the former of these propositions, it would seem as if he could have no interest in denying the second, which is in such harmony with it; and he can deny neither, without falsifying the record or rejecting it as untrue. "I came forth from the Father," he says, "and am come into the world: again, I leave the world, and go unto the Father";¹ "And now, O Father, glorify thou me with thine own self, with the glory which I had with thee before the world was."² The account of his supernatural conception and birth is given us by two of the evangelists. And because he was a divine person — God manifest in the flesh — his supernatural power manifested itself wherever he went. His pre-existence with the Father from eternity, his incarnation through the miraculous power of God, and his divine works — all these cohere as parts of one self-consistent whole. The miraculous element is so wrought into the very substance of the Gospel history that it can never be separated from it. The Gospel is, in truth, a supernatural warp into which is woven a woof of human history. The attempt to eliminate from it the miraculous element is simply an attempt to take out of the web the entire warp without destroying it. Far more logical would it be to cast the web aside in its entirety. And why all this persistent endeavor to set aside the supernatural from human history? If there is a personal God, who is before nature, above nature, and the free author of nature, he can,

¹ John xvi. 28.

² John xvii. 5.

if he chooses, manifest himself immediately in supernatural ways within the sphere of nature. And why should men affirm so stoutly, without the ability to prove their affirmation, that it can never be consistent with his infinite wisdom and goodness to do so? If our Father in heaven cares for us, why should it seem to any one incredible that he may reveal himself to us in supernatural forms, when the end is our deliverance from the bondage of sin, and our preparation for an eternity of holiness and happiness. To deny this is to make nature the highest end of God — to put the world of God's intelligent moral subjects under nature, instead of making nature their servant and minister. We do not assume *a priori* that God must have made a supernatural revelation to men; but we take the Gospel narratives as proof of the fact that he has made such a revelation; and we say to the philosopher of Renan's school: How came you to know that miracles, in the proper sense of the word, are incredible? You do not know it. You only put assertion for proof; and it is too much to ask us, on the strength of your unfounded assumption, to reject these Gospel narratives that come to us with all the marks of historic verities.

Aside from the supernatural character of the events recorded in the Gospels, the *objections* that can be urged against them are reduced to a very small residuum coming under the two heads of *dogmatic* and *historic*. Those of the first class relate to *doctrines*: those, for example, concerning demons and demoniacal possessions, eternal punishment, etc. Here the only reasonable rule is to argue from the certainty of the record to the truth of the doctrines, and not the reverse. He who first assumes that a certain doctrine cannot be true, and then sets himself to the work of invalidating the record which contains it, exalts his own finite understanding to be the supreme arbiter of truth, and to him an authoritative revelation becomes an impossibility. We have, indeed, certain primitive intuitions which lie at the foundation of all knowledge; such, for example, as the immutable obligation that rests on all men to be just, benevolent, and truthful.

There are certain moral axioms, also, which shine by their own light ; like the fundamental truth of theology announced by the apostle : “ God is light ; and in him is no darkness at all.” We are sure that no revelation from God, when properly interpreted, can contradict any such necessary and universal conviction. But there are many weighty truths that lie altogether above the sphere of our finite understandings, respecting which we are dependent upon God’s judgment, in whatever way made manifest to us. Unless we take the Sadducean ground of denying the existence of all created spiritual being that lies beyond the apprehension of our material senses, and therefore say “ that there is no resurrection, neither angel nor spirit,”¹ we cannot, with any show of reason, reject the scriptural doctrine that there are myriads of finite intelligences invisible to our bodily eyes, yet having in some way access to our spirits, and power to exert upon them influences good or evil. Nor until we know not only the inmost essence of man’s material-spiritual nature in all the interactions of its composite parts, but also the inmost essence of the nature belonging to these invisible spiritual beings, can we deny that, under certain conditions of the human subject, bodily and mental, they may gain an overmastering control of his spirit ; or, in scriptural phrasology, take possession of it, and bring it into a state analogous to that of lunacy, if not identical with it. That God should allow to these impure spirits such liberty is a mystery. But it has its parallel in what we see among men, where the wicked deceive and corrupt the ignorant and unwary. Doubtless God is infinitely wise, powerful, and good. Yet under his administration of human affairs, wicked men are allowed great power and scope, at least for a season. The expostulation of the Psalmist : “ Lord, how long shall the wicked, how long shall the wicked triumph ? How long shall they utter and speak hard things, and all the workers of iniquity boast themselves ? They break in pieces thy people, O Lord, and afflict thine heritage. They slay the widow and

¹ Acts xxiii. 8.

the stranger, and murder the fatherless,"¹ has not become obsolete in this world, nor even in some parts of these United States. Why deny the extension of the same broad principle of liberty to the world of unseen intelligences? An endless development awaits God's moral government. Its issues run on into eternity, and it will require eternity that we finite beings may intelligibly comprehend them.

These suggestions are pre-eminently applicable to the doctrine of endless rewards and penalties. When we read the awful declaration: "These shall go away into eternal punishment, but the righteous into eternal life,"² we find it exceedingly difficult for us to think of anything but the woe of the lost spirit down the long line of eternity. The infinite interests of God's moral government are so above our comprehension that we practically lose sight of them. But God, who dwells in eternity, and comprehends eternity, and has established his moral government for eternity, understands what are the right principles for such an everlasting government—a government, let it be remembered over free responsible beings; and he will administer this moral government in accordance with these principles, even though it should involve the endless sinfulness and misery of some. We invert the right process of judgment, when we decide beforehand that God cannot sentence the wicked to endless punishment, and then set ourselves at work to eliminate this doctrine from the New Testament. The only reasonable mode of procedure is to inquire what Christ and his apostles taught on this momentous question.

The *historic* objections alleged against the Gospel narratives rest largely on false assumptions respecting their true character. If each of them professed to give a full history of our Lord's life and works arranged in chronological order, we might with more show of reason array them against each other. But now that each of the evangelists has given us

¹ Psalm xciv, 3-5.

² Gr. *εἰς κόλασιν αἰώνιον* and *εἰς ζωὴν αἰώνιον*, Matt. xxv. 46. The two expressions are the exact counterparts of each other in form as well as in meaning.

only a selection from the incidents of the Saviour's life and teachings, often without regard — certainly without strict regard — to the chronological order of events, they cannot be reasonably held responsible for a work which they never attempted. How far circumstantial variations are admissible in narratives of the same transaction is a question intimately connected with that of inspiration, and which will, therefore, be discussed in another place. At present we stand not on the ground of the inspiration of the record, but simply on that of the credibility of the evangelic narratives, judging them as we do any other writings. Viewing them from this position we find in them no discrepancies that affect a single doctrine or duty of Christianity. The disagreements, whether real or alleged, relate, not to the substance of the things recorded, but to incidental matters, such as the time and order of the events, the accompanying circumstances, etc. Had we all the missing links of the evangelic history, we might be able to reconcile these differences. But without them it is, in some cases at least, impossible. Nor is it necessary; since, where different writers record the same transactions, substantial agreement with diversity in respect to details is everywhere the characteristic mark of authentic history.

We propose to devote another Article to the consideration of the *Sequel to the Gospel Narratives*; that is, to the writings which naturally grew out of the facts recorded in them. The way will then be prepared to discuss the momentous question of the *Inspiration of the Record*.

ARTICLE III.

THE HUMAN INTELLECT

BY REV. JOHN BASCOM, PROFESSOR IN WILLIAMS COLLEGE.

It is pleasant that an able work on a difficult theme should meet with an appreciative reception. This satisfaction is granted us in the cordial way in which the labors of Professor Porter have been recognized. The reviews seen by us have abounded with praise, and professed a sincere admiration for the success achieved. We trust that what we have to say will be regarded as no exception to this general feeling, though we shall devote most of our space to a criticism of some of the views presented in the work, which we honor for its clear, faithful, comprehensive thought. We choose this method as more called for, and more instructive, than one of laudation, however well deserved.

The first merit of the book is its practical, inductive form of inquiry. The analysis and deductive reasoning are constantly guided and corrected by the facts of mind sought by the author in consciousness, and further revealed by language and the actions of men. A second great merit is its comprehensive, historic method. The historic element is very important and very prominent. We see how opinion has swayed to the one side or to the other, and the relation of the view of the author to previous views. This is perhaps the most characteristic feature of the work. Not least among its excellences should be placed its thorough and hearty rejection of every form of materialism. These qualities, with the elaborate and independent discussion given to the subject in its many bearings, make it a very note-worthy book, attracting at once the attention of every one interested in metaphysics.

¹ The Human Intellect; with an Introduction upon Psychology and the Human Soul. By Prof. Noah Porter, D.D., of Yale College. 1 vol. 8vo. New York. 1869.

Over against these great excellences, we should put, as passing blemishes, an occasional prolixity of discussion ; as, for instance, a chapter of ten pages devoted to the question : Is the soul active in sense-perception ? or one of eighteen pages on the products of sense-perception. Yet even these are in keeping with the slow, thorough movement of the author. There are also occasional statements, the truth of which is by no means obvious. The following are examples. Having spoken of sensation and perception, he says : "Certain other mental states, far more numerous, are attended by no affections of the body whatever" (p. 25). I suppose the proof, if not absolute, is sufficient to establish a destruction of brain-tissue in connection with all thought. He affirms : "The brute is not self-conscious under the most favorable circumstances, nor can he become so as the result of any development whatever" (p. 102). The difficulty here seems to be, as the context serves to show, in the peculiar meaning attached to the word *self-conscious*. In no ordinary signification of the word is the assertion true, nor ought it to be true in any use of it. Perception and sensation as simple, single acts should not be regarded as different in kind, wherever they occur, whether in man or the brute ; and consciousness is their inseparable condition. Again he says (p. 292) : "It [the mind] cannot think of any object which the phantasy does not bring within its field of vision." This is true only of phenomenal, not of unphenomenal, being ; and to press the statement closely would be to exclude all intuitive ideas.

We prefer to pass all minor points of commendation and criticism, and employ our entire space on leading topics. The first of these is consciousness.

Our author lays it down in clear and explicit statement, that consciousness is a power of mind. This we regard as erroneous and very confusing. Consciousness is not a distinct act or power of mind, for two unmistakable reasons. If it were such an act, it would require a second act for its own apprehension ; or if not, if the first act of consciousness is directly, immediately known to the mind, as its own

act, so may every act of the mind be, whether it be one of perception, inference, or memory; and the alleged complementary act of consciousness is superfluous. Either the mind uniformly knows what it itself does and suffers, or it remains unexplained how it knows through another movement of its own, called an act of consciousness, itself open to the same difficulties which have attended on every previous effort. A second equally fatal objection is found in the fact, that no power or capacity of mind can retain its essential substance and character without the element or condition of consciousness. Knowledge, feeling, volition, all and equally disappear, except as consciousness is the stamina, the characteristic, of them. That, therefore, which is the substance of every power cannot be made a separate power, and any thing be left, out of which to construct the several faculties. Hamilton so far is wiser in making consciousness the generic sum of the intellectual powers. No one, however, can have read his Lectures carefully, with the attention directed to this point, without observing the confusion occasioned by the mixed and double meaning which he has attached to this word. The whole drift of use is such as to require consciousness to include in its meaning the knowledge which the mind has of its own states. To this Hamilton furtively adds the knowledge which the mind attains through each of its faculties, and then plays backward and forward between the broader and the more restricted signification, as if we could take the same appeal to consciousness in the one sense as in the other. Consciousness, as the mind's knowledge of the states immediately present to it, is never disputed by any one, indeed cannot be doubted; whereas the products of our several faculties are frequently distrusted by all of us. Hamilton at times recognizes this fact, but immediately forgets it, and takes a bold appeal to consciousness against his adversary, when the point in debate is one of analysis and reasoning.

It is of the last importance for clearness and steadiness of conception, that we confine the word to the momentary

knowledge which the mind has of its own states and acts ; and that we see this knowledge to be incident to, a necessary feature of, every mental phenomenon, requiring no second faculty or activity for its explanation. Every act of mind, because it is an act of mind, is known to the mind whose it is ; without this it would cease to be mental. Consciousness is the common characteristic, or condition, or field, or quality of certain phenomena, for this reason, and no other, called mental. The singleness of the state or act is not in the least degree lost by its being a conscious state or act. The doubleness is one of relation and not of being ; and the notion that consciousness is a faculty has arisen largely from the awkwardness and deficiencies of language. We are compelled to say, I know that I know, I know that I feel, the mind knows its own states ; and hence the obvious inference, this knowledge is the product of a faculty. Our author having recognized consciousness as a distinct power, begins immediately to fall into the confusion incident thereto, and to assign it an office broader than can with any fitness or clearness be covered by the word. Regard consciousness as the intuitive, regulative idea, the inseparable condition, of mental phenomena, and the danger is effectually avoided. Let us glance at the fortunes of our author in the handling of his new central faculty.

He first denies it to the brute ; a thing impossible in its limited, appropriate signification. He confines it to the intellect, thus putting an intellectual act at the core and centre of every feeling and volition, and thus marring the distinction between the three forms of activity. He goes so far in one passage as to exclude from consciousness the exact thing to be designated by it. "By consciousness is understood the distinct apprehension of the psychical states, as the states of the individual *ego*, and not that fleeting knowledge of them which is essential to any intellectual activity" (p. 337). Pray what is that "fleeting knowledge," if not consciousness ? and what need have we to designate "distinct apprehension," or consideration as consciousness, since

it is an activity of the thinking or judging faculty? Again he says (p. 63) of "physiological or psycho-physical operations which condition sense-perception," and which "may be entirely removed from consciousness," that "they are all properly psychical acts." That is, consciousness is not the sole condition of psychical or mental acts; that is, again, we are to look elsewhere, in the brain or body, for some of the phenomena of the soul. Let me say in fairness, that Professor Porter has avoided in his large work, with remarkable care and steadiness, any implications confounding mental and physical phenomena; but his idea of consciousness has admitted the above statement. It has also allowed him, in one instance at least, to argue deductively phenomena into consciousness, instead of holding patiently to the inductive inquiry: What is there? This, however, he does more rarely than most metaphysicians. The passage occurs in the explanation of a fact arising under the law of association: A is followed in the mind by F, and the question is presented: How has it come to appear without the intervening connections B, C, D, and E? Professor Porter infers from the fact that we can in some cases recall the intervening objects, that these "objects might have been, nay, that they actually were, present to the consciousness, though they seemed not to have been" (p. 289). It seems, then, that consciousness may in some instances be told what is present to it, and needs not always to be inquired of concerning its facts.

Another grave error into which Professor Porter is led by his view of consciousness as an act of mind, making its own states objects of contemplation, appears in his division of this power into two, the natural and the reflective consciousness. As we do make the phenomena of mind the objects of thought in reflection, this use of our powers inevitably allied itself to that faculty just recognized as consciousness. How, then, is it? In reflection, in philosophy, in an act of thought directed toward the facts of mind, is there no natural consciousness? or do we have thought and reflective consciousness and natural consciousness? or do we have thought and

reflective consciousness as one, and these revealed to the mind by natural consciousness? Here is an occasion for complete confusion. Let the reflective act, the act of judgment, not in the least altered by its object, be all; and be known to the mind inevitably as its own, in its very putting forth, and everything is plain; but the division disappears. Philosophical thought is not different from other thought in its condition, consciousness.

We must consider a further difficulty of this view in connection with perception, our second general point of criticism. Consciousness and perception are so blended in their treatment, as to make it necessary to consider them together. We first present the view of the author, as found compactly gathered up here and there. "The soul, in its single act, discerns two objects — its own condition and some material reality. One of these is subjective, and hence is called a *subject-object*; the other is objective, and is denominated an *object-object*" (p. 127). He affirms that the *non-ego*, directly perceived by the mind, is "the bodily organism itself, or rather that part of the sensorium which is excited to action" (p. 132). "In original perception, *the object* directly apprehended is the sensorium as excited to some definite action" (p. 220). Let us now add to this view of perception and sensation the author's view of the action of consciousness in the same connection. "Every state or condition of the spirit is in its real nature, and must be actually known by the soul, to be complex, even in its extreme simplicity. The elements are, the identical *ego*, either agent or patient, according as the case may be; the object with respect to which it acts or suffers; and the present state or action in which it exists or acts. The soul, in consciousness, is directly cognizant of all these elements as entering into every one of its states" (p. 91). Emphasis is to be laid on the word *directly*, for Professor Porter would carefully exclude reflection or judgment as a means of reaching these first truths. This theory, essentially that of Hamilton, though more tenable in the part assigned to consciousness, has

the support of great names, and seems to us greatly to need them.

Let us look at it first in connection with consciousness. Consciousness as an activity of mind, makes the mind itself its direct object, and recognizes it intuitively. This is a result entirely distinct from that by which the act, in which the mind is at the moment engaged, is known to it. In addition to this necessary and incidental knowledge, which fittingly covers all that should be expressed by consciousness, the mind improves the opportunity to take a direct look at itself, and thus the *ego* sees the *ego*, and pronounces it to be no sham. For our part, we do not understand, why this pure intuitive act need wait as an occasion an act of perception, or any other act of mind. If the mind can intuitively see, know itself, it is not plain why it must abide opportunities, catch itself, as it were, in a sensation, and then gaze. How many activities of consciousness are there, according to this view, attendant on perception? Hardly less than three; one disclosing the perceptive act; a second intuitively beholding the *ego*; and a third revealing this intuitive, distinct act. Of what nature is this intuitive act of consciousness? We have two classes of intuitive faculties: those which disclose phenomenal being, as the senses, and what for convenience of expression merely is called an inner sense, consciousness; and the reason, yielding ideas, notions, not phenomenal being. To which of these classes does consciousness, in the action above assigned it, belong? Certainly not to the first, for the *ego*, as the *ego*, has no phenomenal being or form. But if we say, that it is an idea of the *ego* which is furnished us by consciousness, then we have confounded its office with that of the reason. What does this intuitive action yield? If phenomena, then these are not the *ego*; if an idea, then its office is that of the reason, and the reality of that idea of the *ego*, remains to be established. Put over against this view a simpler, plainer analysis: A perception becomes to the mind, under the notion of causation, an occasion of a judgment, declaring the existence or reality of the *ego* whose it is.

Carry this analysis to our own experience for decision. Is it not possible to discriminate a taste, merely as a taste, and, checking all tendency to reason or analyze or infer, to overlook the *ego* wholly? Let the mind begin to move in judgment or thought, and do we not then infer or conclude, to our own being as the seat of the sensation, though the judgment is made inconspicuous by its rapidity and ease? The knowledge of the *ego* is thus neither ideal nor phenomenal, but inferential, and, aside from consciousness, three powers of mind are involved; a perceptive activity as an occasion, a notion of cause or source as ground of an inference, and the inference or judgment itself. These flash before the mind, in the ease and rapidity of performance, as one act.

Let us now look at this view as regards a knowledge of the *non-ego*. There has been a strong effort among later metaphysicians, especially of the Scotch school, to establish the doctrine of a direct perception of the external world. This has been done in the interest of belief, of an establishment of the valid being of matter; and also because this view has been thought to express more directly the common convictions of men. For the first purpose, we have no occasion for this doctrine; nor yet for the second, if we rightly consider what the general opinion expresses. It is this, that we do know by means of the complex, unanalyzed act of perception, the external object. Direct and acquired perception, perception proper and the judgments locked up in it by experience, are not distinguished by the common mind, and therefore, it simply affirms that the undivided process, perception, yields an assurance of the existence of an external world. Indeed, if this sentiment is to be pushed further, as testimony to a direct, simple perception of a *non-ego*, that *non-ego* must be the outside object, not the sensorium, or any part of it. That it cannot be the external thing presented to the sense is sufficiently shown in our author's admirable chapter on acquired sense-perceptions. Why he should not have allowed the argument here initiated to sweep the whole ground is difficult to understand. This he does not, but

withdraws the *non-ego* from the external world into the sensorium itself, and there affirms it to be a direct object of perception. The first line of defense yielded, he retires on the second, even more untenable than the former. Who of learned or unlearned men thinks that he has a direct knowledge of "the trinal extension of the sensorium." Certainly this idea is the farthest possible from the common mind. Indeed, who of us with all our indirect, acquired knowledge would wish to be set to the task of defining the exact limits of the sensorium, that is, the portion of the nervous system which is directly and exclusively the seat of our several perceptions and sensations? Does the sensorium, for example, include, as regards sight, the retina of the eye? If it does, would Professor Porter venture to say, that we have in perception a direct apprehension of that retina, that the eye sees itself? Will he affirm that the nose smells itself, the tongue tastes itself? Or if these remote expansions of the nerves are not portions of the sensorium, what are its bounds, and what the proof that within those bounds the mind is directly cognizant of it? If it be strange that the mind should in consciousness see itself, it is not less strange that the perceptive organ should know itself. Indeed this seems so impossible a view, that we can hardly believe that Professor Porter quite intends it, and are ready to imagine that the mind in some way is thought to know, not in perception but aside from perception, the organ or organs used. But this, again, would involve new and impossible powers to be ascribed to consciousness.

Let the argument from acquired perceptions have its full, unrestrained force, and we shall ascribe our knowledge of the senses, their location and appertainings, and their connection with the brain, to experience; precisely as our author refers to it the position, form, valid being of objects in the external world. This further conclusion follows at once, if we come to a knowledge of our bodies from the outside, instead of from within; if they are made objects of the senses, and thus, through them, reported to the mind. If this is

not so, and we know directly the sensorium in its "trinal extension," the reproach brought against metaphysicians, that many of them "have never seen a brain," falls to the ground, since they should understand it much more perfectly than the physiologist, looking at it, as they are asserted to do, directly, from within, in active play as a sensitive organ.

Take the true doctrine, which Professor Porter does so much in enabling us to establish, that the sensation and perception are purely subjective, and, by the notion of causation and the many judgments of a protracted experience, are made the mediums and conditions of a complete knowledge of the external world, and our system becomes consistent and simple. Rid of many difficulties, it is burdened with none which does not equally rest on the half-way view above given. If the notion of causation and the judgments which it conditions are valid, then have we a correct and sufficient knowledge of material existence; and a like trust in our faculties is involved in direct perception. I may as well go to one faculty as to another for a conclusion; if I find it in any, its authority is the same. How matter and mind communicate, the one inducing a state or action in the other, is an unsolved difficulty, common to all alike.

The manifold and inextricable judgments involved in all our sensations and perceptions are well stated and illustrated in the chapter referred to, and we cannot pause to restate or to enlarge the proof. If a man can refer sensations to his hand when the arm has been removed; if he can look into a mirror and mistake all its objects for real existences; if he can project *muscae volitantes* into the space before him, and then strive to brush them away; if he can take the merest points of coloring matter on a smooth surface, and instantly create a landscape out of them, with many square miles of surface; if he can thus constantly expand the double, inverted, miniature representations of the retina, it is plain that the constructive judgment is the chief element in the actual products of perception, and that its inferences may as wisely

be searched for the existence of matter, as for its locality, form, and relations.

The next point we wish to consider is that of association of ideas. Here we gladly accord with the general drift of the work before us, and have only to criticise it as not quite complete in perfecting its own view. Professor Porter rejects the notion of cohesive thoughts, adhesive ideas, inseparable sentiments, and thus helps to sweep away those material images, and that unmeaning mechanism, with which the materialist displaces the powers of the mind, and interlocks its phenomena in a ceaseless, causal flow. This resolution of facts into an orderly continuity, into a necessary, inherent proclivity of movement called progress or evolution, to the oversight of the forces and purposes by which this is secured, is the common fallacy of materialism, and imparts much of their deceptive force to the First Principles of Herbert Spenser. As long as we allow the imagery of the material world, not merely to illustrate, but to express and expound, the facts of mind, we shall have in it a refuge of materialism. Feelings do not, by repetition, root into the mind, nor are thoughts attached one to another; we are to look elsewhere for the forces which maintain the laws of association. Professor Porter, though rejecting in the main the view now censured retains some traces of it in his own explanations. His italicised statement of the principle of association is this: "It is to be found in the comprehensive general fact or law, *that the mind tends to act again more readily in a manner or form which is similar to any in which it has acted before, in any defined exertion of its energy*" (p. 282). He proceeds later to say: "The law of association rests upon the same original principle which explains the law of habit, one object suggests another, because one mental state which is similar in part to another tends to be like it in every particular." Here again there is an introduction of tendencies, and the simple powers of the mind are not kept steadily in the foreground of the explanation. Habit is conditioned on physical relations, and has little power of illustration or exposition in this con-

nection. Habit, as in evil habits, is the result of permanent states of body occasioned by indulgence. Habit, as in the acquisition of skill, owes its influence to a certain automatic interaction of nerves and muscles, secured by repetition. Neither of these forms of habit cast light, we imagine, on the connections of associations. These we would refer to the powers of the mind, with the ultimate, additional fact that these powers increase or grow.

The laws of association are chiefly due to memory. These do not explain memory; memory, as a simple, primitive power, explains them. Memory is an orderly, rational faculty, integral with the mind, and conforming to the connections or relations which the reason assigns to all its activities. The notions of space and time and causation and resemblance are efficient in memory and imagination, because they are inwrought in all the faculties, making them to be the faculties of a rational mind, that is, one intuitively grasping these relations. What the mind has observed under these connections, the memory recalls under them; and events return as the mind first received them, the memory being the efficient force, while its orderly action is due to the rational element present in all that the intellect does. Time and space, cause and resemblance, owe their efficiency, not to any connection in things themselves, but to the use which the mind makes, and must, by its rational constitution, make, of these conditions of being. Another force, productive of the so-called laws of association, is the logical faculty. This necessarily marks out for itself lines of action, directs attention and effort into them, and thus impresses on the trains of thought an order or dependence. It cannot be otherwise if the mind pursues a purpose, than that it should sort objects, and unite activities, in reference to it. The desires, also, have the same power in determining the order of ideas. In idle revery the images come and go as these make way for them. Their general character is decided by the state of feeling, while their precise form is fixed by past experience and the resources of the fancy.

The laws of association, as they are often urged, are not merely sand-ropes, facts cunningly arranged ; they are also fitted, and designed, to cover up and disguise the real efficient powers of the mind. This notion of them belongs fitly enough to a philosophy that is anxious to resolve all dependence into one of order, but should be sedulously shunned by those who hold to the independent power of the mind, and to the regulative force of its intuitive ideas.

Professor Porter divides the faculties into those of presentation, representation, thought, and intuition. The second of these is again divided into memory, phantasy, and imagination. As a verbal criticism, barely worth the making, we would express a doubt as to the fitness of speaking of the representative power, and subsequently dividing it into three powers. In a philosophical treatise, it would seem well to limit the word "power" to those single forms of activity, yielded in final analysis. We should also doubt the wisdom of a division which separates phantasy and imagination, and so closely unites memory and imagination. The first two seem to be the same power in different forms of activity. The imaging act itself is not altered in character by the fact that it now plays off its fancies at the beck of indolent desires, and anon, in the service of creative art, gives proportion and power to its presentations. The last two, on the other hand, should be regarded as wholly distinct. The imagination is indeed constantly at work under the guidance of the memory, but this does not identify the two activities. It is a simple, peculiar power, that by which we recognize the past in the present conceptions of the mind. This difference of the two powers shows itself clearly in the fact that each can act without the other. Imagination subserves the artist a purpose above and beyond recollection. Independent and original combinations are open to him ; independent, save only in the symbols employed. Memory, on the contrary, recalls abstract ideas and words, often accompanied with no sensible imagery. One may repeat a list of prepositions, or a metaphysical discussion turning chiefly on general terms, and fasten the

thought with little or no movement of the imagination, we doubt, on the whole, whether Hamilton or Professor Porter has improved on the old division of memory and imagination. We must commend in passing the chapter on phantasy, as one especially full and interesting.

We now pass to the third great division, that of thought; we shall here offer but few criticisms. The comprehensive, elaborate chapter on concepts is especially worthy of attention. The points of difference and doubt, which we wish concisely to present in this division, relate, first, to the definition of thought, its office; and, second, to the distinction between inductive and deductive reasoning. Our author's definition of thinking we give in his own words. It is found on the three hundred and seventy-fifth page: "To know by thinking, is to unite individual objects by means of generalization, classification, rational explanation, and orderly arrangement; thought-knowledge, is that knowledge which is gained by the formation and application of general conceptions."

We know not exactly what importance or significance Professor Porter attached to the words, "rational explanation"; but we judge from subsequent illustrations of the definition, that they play no prominent part, but are expounded by the words employed with them. This definition, then, seems to resolve the office of the understanding or "thought-process," into one of classification. This view is strenuously urged by Herbert Spencer, and receives, at least, too much aid from the above statement of functions. We believe the true and precise view of the understanding to be, that it unites in judgments the phenomenal matter of perception and consciousness, under the appropriate regulative ideas. Classification thus ceases to be the sole function of the judgment, and is only its very frequent service. When I say, the apple is, I do not classify the apple; but bring to a phenomenon the notion of existence, for its explanation or apprehension. When I say, the apple is a Baldwin, I classify it; but this act also is performed under the light of an intuitive idea — that of resemblance. Now if every product of thought thus

deals with two elements, derived from two distinct sources, two extremes of our nature, weaving them into one result, this fact would seem to constitute the true, inclusive statement of its function. The fact we believe to be, that every judgment pertains to phenomena, united or explained to the mind by regulative ideas, which define their conditions or relations. This becomes, therefore, a more philosophical and inclusive statement of thought-knowledge, than that it is the result of classification and its adjunct processes.

The second point calling for remark is the very vexed one of inductive and deductive reasoning. Professor Porter makes the two to rest, in final analyses, on one basis. In this we believe him to be mistaken. We gather from various quarters a few sentences which concisely express the author's view. Those who wish its complete exposition and defence, will find it in the work itself, spread through many pages. "The analysis already given of the deductive process has shown that it rests primarily upon the relation of reason to conclusion, which in its turn rests upon the relation of cause to effect" (p. 512). "When we say, *all magnets attract iron; this is a magnet; therefore it attracts iron*; the word "all" suggests or indicates that there is some reason founded on the nature or properties of the magnet, which forces us to believe that this particular magnet will do the same. The relation of *whole* to a *part* is stated as a fact, but the fact indicates a *reason*, and it is upon this last relation that the necessity and convincing force of the deduction always turns" (p. 449). Speaking of geometrical reasoning he says: "The nature of space, or of bodies existing in space, is the actual *reason* that the mind accepts the conclusion. The geometrical construction has a *quasi* causal efficiency, the effect or consequence of which cannot be set aside" (p. 453). "The purely *logical properties* or *relations* are as truly causes of the object known in the conclusion, as are *physical causes* and *mathematical relations*" (p. 464).

This view refers inductive and deductive reasoning alike for their final authority to one act or link of thought, that

of causation. We object to it, as confounding two distinct movements of thought, and giving an explanation applicable to but one of them. The inductive and deductive processes are radically different, and spring respectively from the forms of knowledge due to observation and intuition. The conclusions of induction are not absolute, are not demonstrative; those of deduction are, at least in their relation to their premises. These granted, and also the correctness of the form of statement, and the conclusion is inevitable. In the inductive argument, the same is not true. By as much as the conclusion transcends the premises, does it fall short of perfect certainty of demonstration. Much confusion on this subject has been occasioned by Hamilton. He denies that to be argument — at least, proof within the province of logic — which all look upon as such; and treats as argument much which is merely a formal statement of previous knowledge. His logic thus becomes a science of forms of expression, rather than of proof. If argument is the reaching of new conclusions, either positive or probable, from accepted premises, — and if we make our definition more narrow than this, we merely push aside for a moment that which our practical wants will soon compel us to restore to attention, — then much that is accepted in logic under the forms of the syllogism is not argument, and much that is often excluded is argument. Under this definition, arguments drop into two classes — those in which the conclusion is probable, and those in which it is demonstrative; or inductive and deductive reasoning.

Inductive reasoning pertains to things, facts, and proceeds on the ground of resemblance. From an agreement in certain particulars, we infer an agreement in some further particular which we have found uniformly associated therewith. This proof can never be demonstrative, as the observed qualities are not seen necessarily to involve the alleged quality; but only, in the light of experience, render its presence probable. The conviction which attends this form of proof may rightly be referred, in ultimate analysis, to the uniformity of causes,

or, more explicitly, to the division and establishment of causes incident to design. Groups, fixed associations of forces, indicate design, and this design recognized prepares the mind for its extension and application everywhere. Hence, a certain degree of likeness gives the mind strong presage and promise of likeness throughout. We expect the other characteristics of the lilies to be found associated with tripartate divisions, because this group of causal forces uniformly exhibit this tendency. We anticipate the attraction of iron by each new magnet, not because we see the magnetic force necessarily to involve this attraction; but because this result, in its persistency, seems to indicate some causal connection or dependence between this influence over iron and the power to assume a polar-direction.

In deduction, the conclusion proceeds necessarily from the premises; and these premises are either wholly ideal, or pertain to some distinctly conceived, separated, and clearly defined qualities, which are taken into consideration to the exclusion of all partially known and modifying qualities. Thus, in the proposition pertaining to the equivalence of squares in a right-angled triangle, the proof holds of an ideal triangle and construction, and each of its steps are axiomatic. The conclusion, though necessarily involved in the supposition, is not at once seen to be so contained, and when reached by the skilful arrangement of intervening steps. each self-evident, enlarges our knowledge. The demonstrative conclusions of mechanics accept certain laws, deal with definite, hypothetical forces, exclude conflicting agencies, and thus reach the certainty which the mind directly sees to be in them. I may affirm, all existence must be attended by phenomena of some sort which reveal or establish it: the only phenomena of mind are those which transpire in consciousness; the mind, then, in sleep must either pass out of being or remain consciously active. Here is a deductive line of proof, reaching, to some at least, an unexpected result; but one which cannot be escaped if the premises are conceded; nor yet one which the concession of the premises would at

once disclose, or impliedly, tacitly affirm. To say of these deductive arguments, that they are "*quasi causal*," is so to enlarge the meaning of the word "causal," as to make the explanation wholly verbal. The demonstrative argument is attended with an insight into relations which does not belong to induction, and turns on necessary, intuitive connections which are in no proper sense causal.

The difficulties which beset this subject will be greatly reduced, if we direct our attention solely to independent arguments, and set aside syllogisms which have the form, but not the fact of proof, which are mere statements of knowledge; or, if looked on as argumentative, must find the link of thought in some previous syllogism of a different character. Of both of these barren syllogisms we will give an illustration. Here is one, deductive in form, taken from Hamilton: "A horse is a quadruped; Bucephalus is a horse; therefore Bucephalus is a quadruped." If this is reasoning, the words, "Tabby is a cat," must be an incipient enthymeme; and, "My dog Bouncer," a stroke of ratiocination. Here is a second like luminous proof under Hamilton's so-called inductive form. Ox, horse, dog, etc., are animals; ox, horse, dog, etc., constitute the class quadruped; therefore quadruped is contained under animal. Of the second kind of syllogism mentioned, those deductive in form but referable, so far as they imply argument, to a previous inductive syllogism, the one pertaining to magnets, already given from Professor Porter, is an example. The whole work of argumentation is complete when the major premise is established, all magnets attract iron, and this premise rests on inductive reasoning. Into this form of proof Professor Porter resolves the deduction when he says, "The word 'all' suggests or indicates that there is some reason founded in the nature or properties of the magnet, which forces us to believe that this particular," that is, that every, "magnet will do the same." Certainly, and for that reason we accepted the inductive conclusion, All magnets attract iron. This established, the deductive syllogism sinks into a statement, a parcelling out,

of previous knowledge. Professor Porter's analysis is too restricted to meet the demonstrative power of true, deductive reasoning. This is due to the direct, intuitive action of the mind, and this action is possible, because the subject-matter of proof, and the connections of proof, are removed from actual, physical, causal dependences; dependences that are never perfectly or exhaustively penetrated by the eye of the mind.

It only remains for us to speak further of the last great division of the work, that of intuition. This is the portion of every work on mental philosophy which we seek for first, as defining its character, grasp, and value. It furnishes the key of systems, and still more their practical influence and tendencies. The merits and defects of the work of Professor Porter are here more marked than elsewhere. Few books contain so much that is just, or present it so well. The view is far more complete, consistent, and defensible than that of Hamilton. The chapter on the Infinite and the Absolute is one of great merit. Let us, however, in accordance with the general plan of our critique, pass lightly those parts which stand out boldly in their own merits, and discuss chiefly those points which seem to us to require more investigation. We beg the author's pardon for this colder, less appreciative method; yet we feel that he can well endure it; and the ends of knowledge are thus only to be reached.

We attach no great value to the author's division of the intuitions into the formal, the mathematical, and the real; not enough to deem it worth while. The formal are defined as "those which are necessarily involved in the act of knowledge, whatever be its object-matter." These are — if we mistake not the author, for he is not quite as firm and clear as usual in his presentation, leaving us sometimes in doubt whether he regards a given category as primary or secondary — being, relationship, diversity, identity. The mathematical categories "are those which grow out of the existence of space and time, and suppose these to be realities." These are space, time, and number, and the concepts subordinato

to these "The *real* are those which are ordinarily recognized as generic and fundamental to the so-called properties and qualities of existing things, both material and spiritual." These are causation and adaptation. This division does not seem to include the infinite, and gives no firm distinction between those ideas embraced in it. Space and time are as truly formal in many of their applications as they are mathematical, and in others as real as are the phenomena to which they pertain. Or why should being be regarded as formal and causation as real? Or identity less "generic and fundamental" than design?

But we wish to criticise the labor of our author, first, in the intuitions introduced, and, second, in those omitted. Those given as primary ideas seem to be, *being, relationship, diversity, identity, space, time, number, causation, design, the infinite or absolute*. We are in doubt whether Professor Porter means to subordinate number as a category to that of time, or to accept it as primary and independent. Evidently the last is the true ground, for the notion of time can exist without that of number, and number is no more necessary to it than to space, than to the application of other categories. Being, space, time, number, causation, we accept as primitive, intuitive ideas. Relationship, we believe, has no claim to this rank. It is a secondary, generalized notion rather. We cannot have the idea of space without including therein the idea of here and there, on this side and on that, centre and circumference. These all involve or express relation, and therefore *specific, definite* relations are included in the very expansion of the notion of space. Thus is it with time; the relation of succession is involved as a part of it, a peculiar form of it. So, too, in number, equality, greater and less, are relations indigenous in it. If, therefore, these specific relations must be known in knowing these ideas, we have no occasion for a primary category of relation, since this can be generalized from these special forms of relation already recognized.

Again, diversity and identity are but two phases of one

category, which may be expressed by the word "resemblance," or by the contrasted words "agreement" and "disagreement." We see the different colors, but we do not see them to differ. The act of comparison and judgment takes place under the idea of resemblance, and this is supplied by the intuitive power of the mind on conditions fitted to call it forth. This is a very important category, and the neglect of it has often given to materialists a very unfair advantage in the argument. They have been allowed to collate and compare phenomena, without being called upon to explain or justify the movement of mind by which they did it. Thus the empirical evolution of intuitive ideas has commenced with a tacit assumption of one of the most significant of them. Identity and personal identity are nothing more than perfect agreement, or one limit of the idea of resemblance. That which agrees with itself at different moments in substance and attributes is the same thing, comes under the secondary idea of identity; that which does not, gives application to the notion of diversity.

The regulative idea which is most unexpected and objectionable in the list of Professor Porter is that of design. The chapter on design, or final cause, does not reach the general level of the work. The position of the author is distinctly taken: "The point which we assert and defend is, that this relation is believed, *a priori*, to pervade all existence, and must be assumed as the ground of the scientific explanation of the facts and phenomena of the universe" (p. 594). The notion of design is plainly the fruit of our knowledge of what takes place in our own minds. There is not the least necessity of regarding it as an intuitive idea, since our consciousness of our purposes speedily supplies it. Indeed the word "design" is the designation of an act, as much so as the word "thought," and can not thus be a regulative idea. This knowledge gained within the mind, we at once use in explaining the external world, as we discover one after another of its orderly arrangements. That men do believe in the universality and necessity of design, as they do in

that of causation, is plainly not true, nor even approximately true. It is a struggle for most minds to accept the statement, that absolutely every thing and event has been distinctly contemplated and purposed in reference to an end.

None of the arguments presented by Professor Porter are satisfactory, and most of them do not even tend to establish the position assumed. They are such as these: "The relations under which this axiom requires that objects should be connected, is higher than that by which they are united under the category of efficient or blind causative force." "The principle has been of essential service in scientific discovery." "The entire superstructure of the inductive philosophy rests upon the principle in question." These and like observations are true enough; but are just as true if the conception of design is transferred from our own experience, as if we regard it as a primitive, independent notion. "That there is an intelligent and wise adaptation of powers and laws to rational ends" in the external world is a fact learned by experience, and then made the premises whence we infer the existence of God. From this conclusion we travel slowly to the further conviction, that everything comes under his plan or purpose.

The manner in which the author answers objections to his view, indicates the same unexpected missing of the exact criteria of a regulative idea. He seems to think that it may be admitted, that "there may be some portion of this universe which design does not control," and his intuitive notion not thereby be invalidated. An idea that in the presence of like phenomena is not necessary in every place, is not necessary in any, is not a regulative idea. He also strangely says, in answer to the objection, that a knowledge of the adaptation of means can be derived from our conscious activity, that this is also true of efficient cause. Not at all; quite the reverse. We are conscious of a volition, are aware of the action that follows it, but are not in the least cognizant of the causal connection between the two. This the mind supplies in explanation of the results. So ignorant are we

of the presence and efficiency of the causal force, that we often make a tentative effort to move a limb, in order to test the existence of sufficient power.

But the omissions of Professor Porter are more noteworthy than the ideas which he has included in his list of categories. We say nothing further of consciousness, but express our surprise that neither beauty nor right nor liberty were found worthy to stand in this high assemblage of primitive, intellectual nobility. Professor Porter has laid no foundation whatever, either for art or ethics, duty or power. Nothing can remain to him in morals, but some form of generalization, and, as the only plausible and inclusive one, some phase of utilitarianism. This in an intuitive philosophy is the grosest of defects. Nor can he, in our view, consistently with his philosophy, recognize the freedom of the will: since freedom is not, any more than causation, a phenomenal fact, laid open in consciousness; but is an idea furnished by the mind in exposition of its own action. It supplies the idea of liberty in solution of its own sense of responsibility, and the apparent possibility of each of the alternative lines of action. We know not how Professor Porter would handle these higher questions of our spiritual nature, but he has broken no ground for them in his mental science.

We think the work before us more marked for its comprehension, for its appreciative criticism, for its discrimination in gathering, using, shaping, and systematizing material, than for any new views furnished by it. It indicates great interest in the subject and mastery over it, and is therefore well fitted to arouse and guide thought. So able a work not only shows the presence of new power, but we may trust will develop it in others. The service to metaphysics of such a work is incalculable; and we hail it as the more auspicious, since, in labors like these, we are to find a chief corrective of that exclusively scientific, materialistic tendency so prevalent with us.

ARTICLE IV.

THE PROGRESS OF TRUTH DEPENDENT ON CORRECT INTERPRETATION.¹

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THE excellent and learned Dr. Cudworth, in the opening of his celebrated sermon preached before the House of Commons in 1647, has these words: "The sons of Adam are now as busy as ever himself was about the tree of knowledge of good and evil, shaking the boughs of it, and scrambling for the fruit; whilst, I fear, many are too unmindful of the tree of life." Such an apprehension is as becoming in our day as it was two centuries ago. All knowledge, whether of God himself or of his works, of man, his nature and capacity, or his duty and destiny, should advance us in fitness and disposition to glorify and enjoy God. No higher aim can be proposed to us. The exercise of our faculties in the discovery and comprehension of laws and principles, both in material things and in the realm of mind, affords pleasure. But the pleasure of knowing, elevated as in one sense it is, is trivial and ephemeral when compared with the fruit of knowing, as knowledge feeds, fashions, and purifies the proper life and being of the soul. The divine goodness has made the bread we eat sweet to our taste, and the satisfaction of hunger a relish and delight. Yet is it unworthy of us to eat for mere pleasure; so it is with knowledge, which is to be got for the right use of it, rather than for the luxury of knowing.

The text has relation to a particular kind of knowledge, namely, that of God's truth; and it implies a particular end to be gained by it, namely, holiness: "Sanctify them

¹ John xvii. 17: "Sanctify them through thy truth: thy word is truth." A discourse delivered before the Convention of Congregational Ministers, in Boston, May, 1868.

through thy truth; thy word is truth." As God in his moral character is comprehensively described as holy, and as the summit of human attainments is likeness to God, it follows that understanding and applying God's truth is the way to secure the true and noblest end of our being.

Our chief duty lies with the word of God and the use of it. We admit without question, as implied in the text, that the word of God is truth. The designed effect involves the necessity of knowing it. The spirit of it, transfused through the soul, quickening it, and dwelling at the centre of activity and inciting us, is the power of spiritual growth and vigor; even as the heat of the sun, permeating the soil, seeking out the rootlets of a plant, and imparting warmth, is the quickening force in vegetable life. This, however, we should consider,—there is no magical power in the words of God—no charm in the letter to sway us and transform us, but only a moral power, acting through our understanding upon our will and affections. So then, having the words of God, we are to draw out from them the true idea of which they are the symbols, and thence derive life.

If, now, God's revealed truth is to operate as the sanctifying agency in the world, a true and thorough interpretation is pre-eminently necessary and altogether invaluable.

What are the contents of these divine oracles? What are the profound principles of life and conduct lying hidden in the word? What are the truths, eternal and unimpeachable, that are to be gathered by working this mine of infinite wisdom? The Christian world has had the *letter* for twenty centuries; but no unanimous answer is given to these fundamental questions. And yet the word of God is not changeful and contradictory, but one; not self-destructive, but self-consistent and self-sustaining. Its utterances are not double-tongued and deceptive, as were the responses of the oracle at Delphi. They are pure, like the virgin gold, and need only to be uncovered and looked at with a rectified vision to be seen in their incorruptible brilliancy. The discords and confusion attributed to the heavenly voices are

the refrains taken up by sincere but imperfect minds, or the broken echoes and reverberations resounding among antagonistic and impassioned clans. The notes of the *spirit*, could we only hear them with all their clearness, would thrill the reverent listener like the melody of the new song. The truth is an imperfect instrument, so long as it is imperfectly conceived and imperfectly applied. The channel that opens out its treasured blessings is interpretation.

We use this word for convenience ; meaning by it the whole effort and result, both intellectual and moral, by which the truth becomes a spiritual power in forming a holy life. It is a very restricted view of the work of an interpreter to declare the meaning of words detected by the weary drudgery of lexicons and grammars. We can as little find the divine idea by minute analysis and fine-spun disquisitions on points and particles as we can catch the glory of the Apollo among the chips of the stone-worker. There is a service not to be spoken lightly of in the knowledge of language as the medium of thought ; and the scholars who bring to the exposition of the word the skill attained by careful and generous study of the ancient dialects, aided by all helps of archaeology, history, topography, knowledge of manners, customs, theories, and speculations of past ages, are entitled to high honor, and their labor is as fruitful as it is indispensable. But there is a power in language to convey thought which is not representable through the definition of words. We may define with etymological and lexical accuracy the word "God." Do we thereby express its contents? The interpretation of that word is approached but very distantly when we comprehend, as best we may, the whole volume of his revelation, the vastness of his works, and the life of his Son. We substitute in our Bible, the word "God" for the Greek Θεός. If we have the power by the deepest research to understand even the whole that this word symbolized to the Greek mind, how very little does it inform us of God, as we conceive of the Infinite One whose name we thus write ! To exhaust the contents of that one

word is beyond the capacity of our thought and all we have accumulated, and defies the inferences and conclusions of the widest career of learning. Even when the laboring mind shall be helped by a vision of the Holy One in his unclouded glory, there will still lie beyond our sight an unexplored infinite in the being of the Most High.

The truths of revelation come to us in language ; and the words have definite significations. These significations must be fixed, if we are to derive information from the words. When Harvey discovered the circulation of the blood, he contributed to the science of the human body a fact of rare value. But when we consider man in the higher attributes of his moral and intellectual nature, his vast powers of thought, his profound responsibilities, his eternal being, with his capacity for doing, enjoying, and suffering, to what a point in our conception of this complex being does this central fact in physiology dwindle ! The settlement of a rule of grammar, the determination of the use and force of the article, may shed light upon the exegesis of a scripture text. The mint, annise, and cummin are not to be despised, though there are weightier matters of the law. As judgment, mercy, and faith transcend these inferior acts of duty, so the idea, in its possibilities and applications, transcends the naked meaning of the words in which it sleeps, and from which it is summoned into life and action, to expand and stretch itself, as the infant rises from unconscious slumbers to grow to manhood and display the powers and faculties latent in him.

The precept "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself" is one of the earliest of the written code. So far as the words are concerned, the phrase presents no difficulties. But who has as yet comprehended the length and breadth of moral obligation imbedded in it ? Who has realized the wealth of human kindness stored up in this minute casket ? The Jew had it of old ; but he dwarfed it so that it could not extend out of Jewry. Christ sundered the fetters which restrained it, and gave it dominion broad as the earth. But

his disciples tethered it, so that its freedom was only the liberty of a sect or the narrow domain of a nation. England hemmed it in within the four seas; and the French across the narrow channel were not neighbors, and the swarthy Indians under a tropical sun were uncircumcised Gentiles.

In this fair land, consecrated to freedom and humanity, the breadth of its spirit has not been comprehended. The old divine at Newport, like Paul at Athens, brought certain strange things to our ears when he ventured a new interpretation. Its heavenly voice was unheeded in "the city of brotherly love," in this nineteenth century of grace, when a man could not in safety speak a word for his fellow-men, manacled and robbed; for the slave was no neighbor to his master, though born within sight of the family mansion. Five years of agony and blood have been working out an interpretation of the gem of truth set three thousand years ago in God's word to sparkle with divine light. The mists of passion and ignorance have hung heavily over it. The twilight has been long; but when the day dawns, and the sun rises, the glory of that revelation will blaze from land to land, from shore to shore, and the concentrated myriads of earth will be one neighborhood, rejoicing in the light of a common love as truly as in the light of the same sun in the firmament.

It is sometimes said to the disparagement of the Bible that it is old and out of date. An arrogant wisdom pronounces its truths obsolete, having no other value than historical data in the succession of opinions, or as curious fossils bearing the impression of effete ideas. These notions are related to a conception of progress in which the human mind by the force of its own capacity in observing and reasoning is credited with the power of originating and developing new truths. If, however, the Bible is, as we assume it to be, objective truth, a repository of truths fundamental and eternal, it can no more grow old and be outlearned than can the universe, in respect to which our knowledge seems to be so rapidly advancing. The laws of the material world, the forces of nature, and the system of

which we are a part, are now as they have been from the beginning. Science has created nothing. The earth revolved about the sun when all men believed, upon the testimony of their senses, that the earth stood still. The error was ignorance of fact. Copernicus and Galileo interpreted nature better than Ptolemy and the Romish conclave. The phenomena have not changed; we have learned to read them. And all that science can ever do to the end of time, if its powers of vision are multiplied a thousandfold in minuteness, and the spaces over which its observation extends are stretched a thousandfold, is to read the phenomena. The laws, the motions, the forces, the results, were imparted and fixed by the Infinite mind. Nature has nowhere changed. The sunbeam was the great painter before the prism was known. Its chemical power was inherent in it when chemistry had no existence. The utmost that can be said of man is that he laboriously turns over the leaves of this vast volume, and slowly spells out the words of wisdom and love engraven on its pages by the finger of God. Now, notwithstanding the freedom and the sense of superior intelligence indicated in the declarations concerning the Bible as a fossiliferous record, it stands to us as a field of investigation very much in the same attitude as the material world does. The truth is in it. The elements of spiritual life are there given by the Spirit of God. The principles of growth and elevation for the race and the individual are deposited in its words. All that will be necessary in all time for instruction and discipline, for purification, strength, and exaltation — all that man needs in his earthly trial, duty, and enjoyment, and in preparation for absolute happiness with God — lies enfolded in it, and is to be brought out from it. The progress of truth is not by the discovery of new truths, but by a knowledge of truths not comprehended. The Bible has suffered, just as the material world has, by false and partial interpretations. We are seeing through a glass darkly. The handling of scripture according to the forms of theology, and harmonizing it so as to conform it to the

necessities of a system, is putting a force upon truth which it cannot bear.

To work out a body of divinity by human ingenuity, and then invoke the spirit of truth from the Bible to inspire it, and set that up as Divine authority, is doing what Lord Bacon charges upon the scholastic divinity—"reducing divinity to an art." Whereas, divine knowledge is drawing out from a divine fountain the living waters, as they are gathered there for use and information. In making systems there is ever danger of forcing the divine idea to advance a human plan; and we can call it nothing less than a felony to coerce truth to subserve a purpose for which the God of truth never designed it. But this is the way in which the light of truth has been hindered in its shining. Devout and holy, but imperfect men have shaped their doctrines, framed their systems, and reduced the word of God to a symmetrical form for enunciation and defence. And then the Bible has been compelled to do service in vindication, not of truth in its simplicity, but of truth complicated with errors of human judgment and the misapprehensions of human short-sightedness. This method of dealing with truth has resulted in giving more of a complexion of changeableness to religious opinion than of progress. But this is not a fault to be charged upon the scriptures. The Bible is not responsible for false interpretations, or for incongruous systems built up out of its pages. The word of God is not chargeable with the errors of Calvinism, Arminianism, or Socinianism, any more than the solar system, in its simple balance and harmony under one all-pervading law, is responsible for the ingenious, but baseless theory of cycles and epicycles. It is perhaps hardly presumptuous to say that the phrase, "The just shall live by faith," was as little comprehensible by the Hebrew, in the midst of his outward ordinances and an earthly temple, as the celestial mechanics of La Place would have been to the Persians, who watched the courses of the stars amid the ravishing glories of an oriental sky.

That phrase, so pregnant with meaning and with mercy, was at the beginning, as it were, a nebular mist, in the eye of the generation to whom it was at first declared. The new dispensation resolved it, when it was seen under the power of the death of Christ, illuminating the old types. It stood out with more impressive distinctness when Paul applied to it the divine logic, with which God's Spirit filled his words. It gained clearness and brilliancy when Luther felt its power with a new freshness, as his soul came into liberty from the heavy burden of works and penances. The interpretation has been going on, not by force of study, not by acuteness of perception, not by the penetration of the human intellect, and the keenness of dialectics, but under the tuition of the Great Teacher, who in the conspiring work of his providence and his grace, is ever unfolding the treasures of his love, to edify and form the body of Christ, for the glory of the final manifestation. But even now, after the growth of centuries, this truth is not so cleared of the obscurities hung around it by the narrow conceptions of those who have held it, as to present to all minds one and the same bright beam from the loving heart of God. Throughout Roman and Greek Christendom it is still burdened with the rubbish of inventions and the bribes of self-righteousness. At the other extreme it is reduced to a shadow by the annulling assertion of the worth of meritorious goodness. And even where humble pity is seeking with patient endeavor to find the will of God, there is not only among various divisions of believers a conflict, but individual disciples are vibrating, in painful unrest, between the firm foundations laid for hope in the mercy of God and the unsatisfying consciousness of their own obedience. If now the great scheme of God's redemption is what it is foreshadowed to be upon the very face of scripture, it is no presumption to say, that much of the broad and solid substructure of truth upon which is to be reared the eternal repose of immortal souls has not as yet been laid bare to our eyes. It is all there, and will yet be seen, we may devoutly believe, when the trained

vision shall know how to divine the whole spirit of the record in the symbols that preserve it. But time is necessary. The underlying rocks, with their garnered deposits, were unknown testimony to the history of the globe for ages. Our reading the characters is not a creation of facts, but an extension of vision. The crust has been broken, and new wonders brought to light. It is possible that some excited minds, intoxicated with the novelty, are quite exultant in having unravelled the whole history of creation. More time and patient research will widen the boundaries of knowledge, and among other things expose the folly of hasty conclusions, of which geology is peculiarly prone to be guilty; as was the case with Werner, one of the early founders of the science, who partially investigated a province, and then inferred the structure of a world. The volume of nature and the volume of inspiration are both sealed with the signet, and marked with the character of One, almighty and all-wise. We shall not master either record in a life-time. And as one record is the history of a finite, perishing, material system, and the other the principles and institutes of an order of beings intellectual and immortal, we are to presume that the depths of this divine revelation are more unfathomable than the depths of the universe of matter.

We are thus led to affirm the truth, that the interpretation of the word of God presents to us a field as boundless as our conceptions can be. It embraces the whole study of the infinite, as the Infinite One has unveiled himself to be looked upon and known in the relations he holds to us, and in his purposes in regard to our destiny. If we knew all the universe—the subtilist attractions, the most comprehensive laws, the minute pulsation of infusorial life, and the vast forces swaying the visible and invisible immensity of celestial systems—we should know less than God. And if all these systems have a limit and a termination, even though that limit be fixed at myriads of ages hence, it is inferior to the race of immortal beings, whom God by the revelation of himself and his purposes is training for immortal glory.

Our powers of investigation may be exhausted; but the theme cannot be.

We must confess to some degree of wonder, that men accustomed to serious thought and having exercised on great subjects the faculty of reason are so easily persuaded to exalt the science of things above the science of being; and to be so much more satisfied with investigating the laws of matter than the laws of mind; and to hold it so much more a triumph to know the secrets of mute organisms than to understand the secret of God in his provisions for the progress of the soul in a glory and happiness outliving all organizations and systems. But it is often so with the fascinating aspirations of philosophy, falsely so called. One thing gives pre-eminence to the Bible over nature, that it is the treasury of forces in their application and results augmenting and developing through all time, and stretching on beyond the confines of time in unending continuance. Whereas the system of nature, however magnificent, is a doomed system, having in it the principle of decay, and marching in the solemn procession of the countless bodies that compose it, to a certain dissolution. The revelation of God in his word is the method of his discipline, by which he is to secure infinite results. We know but little of God's connection with nature. God upholds and conducts its movements to their final issue. It is the silent energy of power. But it is only power. There is in it no thought, no pulsation of love, no responsive voice, no action of will. God is neither felt nor recognized in all the sphere of insensate being. The vast realm lies unconscious in his hand. The immense systems are operated and moved, as dead matter, joyless and dreary, yielding a revenue, but receiving none.

But God comes into the affairs of men. He communicates himself to us, invites our knowledge, opens himself to our intercourse, craves our reverence and affection, and rewards our obedience. From the high throne of his sovereignty, he looks upon us with the heart of a father, with pity in his eye. To restore to us the wantonly forfeited bliss, he comes

into the scene of things with us. To aid us in our exaltation he gives us a teacher and lays before us the lesson to be learned. He condescends to speak and to listen. Man speaks to God, and the Most High hears and answers our request. Of much of this intervention of God it may be truly said, it is complicated with mystery. The progress of interpretation is the unfolding of the mystery; marking the process of such an unfolding illustrates the advance of truth. Christ was but little understood by those who saw him, and had intimate intercourse with him. There were many things to be known, of which he said, "ye cannot bear them now." The former discipline did its work but very slowly. The dimness of types and shadows was great. The latter dispensation, the interpretation of the types and shadows, is in like manner a discipline of tardy advancement. The distinctive name of the followers of Christ is not yet an obsolete appellation. They were disciples. All true followers are yet disciples, pondering a lesson in which the light is ever breaking in upon the mind; but yet a lesson, the end of which is not overtaken. No observer of our day can have failed to see how unsatisfied the minds of serious thinkers are in regard to the person and character of Christ. To meet this demand the best intellect of Christendom is devoting itself to investigate and elucidate the great theme. It is not now the Nicene problem; that sharp struggle belonged to another epoch of the human intellect. It was the inevitable craving to combine into a symmetrical whole the elements that seemed to be scattered up and down in the history and sayings of Jesus. It was as reasonable to seek a formal expression for the mode of the divine existence out of the glimpses so marvellously shooting across the field of their vision, as it is for a naturalist to seek for the underlying principles and common facts that distinguish genera and species in plants and animals; for classification and definition are the measure and boundaries of knowledge. Whatever we may think of the result of that gigantic discussion, it has been accepted since as so nearly exhaustive

within its range that all later conflicts have been but faint echoes of that imperial clash of arms. And yet we may doubt whether its contribution to the true interpretation of the doctrine of Christ was as great as has been sometimes imagined. So far as it furnished a formula, the terms of which embrace all that human words can convey of the thought which its framers gathered from scripture upon a subject so momentous, it may satisfy the conditions of the problem. But how little this will do towards incorporating into the life of man the life of the Son of God, and making us one with Christ, as he is one with the Father, may be easily imagined. Sharply defined and measured statements seldom touch the chords of feeling. The living Christ was the necessity, or Jesus would never have come in the flesh. That the divine should touch the human under all the common conditions of humanity was indispensable to our accepting in our life what Christ was in his life. And therefore Christ is a history — a life opened out to us under human conditions, though moved and pervaded by a divine energy. The discussion that is moving Christendom to-day is to find out this life ; that is, to find the true interpretation of the gospel history. The progress of the world's sanctification is marked by the advance it makes in the spiritual likeness of Christ. And this results from a comprehension of Christ, and the application of the law of life in him to our own life. The truth evoked will work its effects. For no man doubts that the nearer the race is brought to the image of God in its moral character the higher will its elevation be. If, as Christ teaches, we are to know the Father by knowing himself, then the true yearning of man after God is to be satisfied in knowing Christ. This is the way that leadeth upwards : not a way of profound aspirings and giant strugglings after the infinite ; but of humble imitations and childlike following of that Jesus who went about doing good, whose human sympathies were as clearly defined as was his divine love for his Father and our Father.

In this day when the heart of Christendom is moved

beyond all measure of former times in benevolent endeavors to extend light, to raise the fallen, to diminish the burdens and alleviate the sorrows of sin, it is not surprising that there is an evident yearning to know more of the Redeemer of sinners. The hope of the world lies in the path which was trodden by the Son of God. The proud achievements of science answer many and munificent ends. But sadly must even the philanthropist turn away from the most brilliant triumphs of knowledge with the unwelcome admission, that the lusts of the human heart will not obey the skill of the mighty enchanter. The modern alchemy, with its prodigious force of agents and re-agents, with its resistless batteries, its microscopic vision, and its adventurous assertion of power to generate even life itself, is as abortive now as was its aspiring progenitor to discover the potent elixir. The words of Jesus of Nazareth have a power which the masters of all the arts cannot wield. This power is realized as the incarnate Son of God is felt after and found in the supply he brings to the deep and ever-craving wants of our spiritual nature. The wide-spread and deep-reaching activities of this generation develop not only new capacities but new aspirations. The unfoldings of the word, if kept in even pace with the expanding life of the followers of Christ, will furnish the untriment for that life. This is God's method. It is the repetition of the past, and an upward movement to a higher plane, by the same line projected forwards. The higher truth is the higher apprehension of Christ. If the old statement contained the naked and transparent dogma, the new experience is luminous with the light of love, and the life of the Spirit. We gather into the law of our life some new facts, which the law in the word contained, but which our vision did not detect. The opaque grows transparent; the nebulous mist is resolved into clusters of stars; the sunbeams yield warmth as well as light, and the truth comes to us with its transforming agency as well as with its informing power. We no longer gaze from the outside of the paradise of God upon the bright flowers, the rare fruit,

and the sparkling fountains, but are admitted within the gates, our sense delighted with its fragrance, our taste gratified with its clusters, and our thirst refreshed with its clear waters.

If what we have intimated in these remarks is correct, the interpretation by which the truth yields a higher sanctifying influence is not a rendering of the text into a more significant form of language, but unfolding for use and application that of which all words of scripture are merely symbols. It has been laid down as a fundamental principle, "That no biblical doctrine reaches its perfect form until the latest period of revelation." So it may also be laid down as a maxim, that no revelation of God reaches a perfect interpretation until the truth it contains has been perfectly developed in the spiritual life of believers. And as the progress of time marks the growth of holiness, it is only in the end of time that the completed power of God's word will exhibit completed sanctification. In the process there must of necessity be much of laborious toiling, with only slow and gradual results. For, although it be a divine work, yet is it a work subjected to human infirmities and limitations. What work of man is not burdened with these conditions? The arts of life all go on so. The dim idea takes but an uncouth shape at first. The germinal thought is defined and expanded in many minds before the perfect machine stands in our sight, the exact counterpart and realization of the mental conception. Philologists, metaphysicians, expositors, have wrought assiduously, and it would indeed be humiliating if in the reiterated hammering no sparks were struck out. It would, nevertheless, be an unenviable task to rescue the truth of God from the vast piles of commentary under which it has been buried. Words are always cheaper than works; and, although we would not disparage the honest and godly motives which have led to the mountainous accumulation, it must be said that, after all, the actual advance is more truly made in the less definable process by which the Spirit of God informs the

understanding of those who sit down at the word, with the prayer going up from sincere hearts: "Lord, what wilt thou have me to do?" The more studious endeavor may have all honor for the proportion of good it does. But it is a fragment and a folly if we stop with it. The digging of the ore, the smelting and rolling, the casting and turning, the filing and fitting, are of great value in bringing out that modern wonder, a steam-engine. But the fire and the water are indispensable to completeness and efficiency. And so in myriad instances all effort at knowing is powerless, until, in the very last step of the process, the willing spirit obeys the truth, and the dead letter becomes life.

These views are confirmed by a remarkable assertion of Lord Bacon. "That form of writing in divinity," he says, "which in my judgment is most rich and precious is positive divinity, collected upon particular texts of scripture in brief observations, a thing abounding in sermons, which will vanish, but defective in books, which will remain. I am persuaded that, if the choicest and best of those observations which have been made dispersedly within this your majesty's island of Great Britain by the space of these forty years and more had been set down in continuance, it had been the best work in divinity which had been written since the apostles' times."

The philosopher, whose penetrative power led him so far into the mysteries of nature, and who at the same time bowed with a more subdued reverence before the mysteries of revelation, came to this conclusion, we imagine, from the conviction he had that truth, both in nature and religion, is known only as it is apprehended in its processes and applications. Speculation is a barren wilderness. Godly living is a well-watered garden, abounding in fruits and fragrance. It has been said: "The touch of truth is the touch of life." If so, the power of truth is the life it quickens and feeds. The truth lying cold in the understanding is the seed in the clefts of the rock, where neither sun nor dew reaches it. An analysis of the doctrine of force, and an analysis of the

doctrine of regeneration under the same conditions would be equally inefficient. Every one knows that there is in us a power of apprehension and appreciation forerunning a scientific understanding. The most artistic creations of architecture precede the determination of the laws of construction and support. Art is older than science. We see and feel before we analyze and explain. The universal admiration bestowed upon the Sistine Madonna does not imply a knowledge of the rules of drawing and grouping, or the art of coloring. There is an aesthetic intuition by which beauty in its impressiveness is felt by the cultured and uncultured. And so, also, there is a moral intuition by which truth is perceived, its force felt, its warmth, enjoyed, its strength appreciated. The aim of interpretation is to satisfy this appreciative faculty, to transfuse the energizing power into the soul, to electrify the soul, to inspire its action and purify and exalt its motives. An interpreter must be something more than a scholar; he can be nothing less than a disciple. For, except he is receptive of the truth, he is only playing a game, in which the intellect is exercised and amused. And how can he interpret to others the truth which still lies outside of his own spiritual life?

There is no complete interpretation until the truth is transmuted into thoughts, feelings, purposes, actions. The end of divine knowledge is holiness, and the progress in knowledge is progress in holiness, or an assimilation to God — what the old divines called “the life of God in the soul of man,” or what is more fitly described by the apostle as “being made partakers of the divine nature.” And through this tuition and intuition the souls of believers advance, from all conditions of culture and discipline, to the same elevation of knowing and being known of God.

It is because so much of interpretation, in expositions, in controversies and discussions, in sermons and treatises, has lacked the unction of spiritual appreciation that it has fallen so far short in helpfulness. The sanctification has been slow, because the knowledge of truth has been so far

confined to the letter, and the work of the Spirit has been so exclusively in the life of the few scattered disciples, and not the all-embracing light of the whole body. And, therefore, the progress which opens before the church in hopefulness is progress in spiritual life — progress in assimilating the truth — progress in living after the divine type. As the buried coal-fields hold in trust the solar energy that in the world's progress is to be transmuted into active force, turning the shafts and driving the wheels of the world's gigantic enterprises, so the divine energy deposited in the word is to become the spiritual force, vitalizing and sustaining Christian progress, and bearing forward in the grand evolutions of truth the mightier enterprises of the church.

The elements of progress are not, then, to be sought nor found outside of and beyond the word of God, as some imagine, but within the range of revelation, and by knowing the depths of wisdom and love therein treasured. The struggle to reach the circumference of that circle radiant and crowded with the thoughts of God may weary us; while still, beyond the outermost arc of our survey there will lie fields unexplored and objects unmeasured, in never ending successions. When the living word has wrought out its possible achievements, the new Jerusalem will have come down from God out of heaven. When the race of man has comprehended in experience the entire revelation in its miracles of love and mercy, then may the Redeemer say again: "It is finished"; and he will deliver up the kingdom to the Father.

As the light which has been shining for six thousand years is still a study and a wonder to the devout lover of God's works, so the depths of God's purposes and methods of administration, as they have been shining in prophecy and promise all down the ages, are still the wonder and joy of his reverent children.

The science that detects, arranges, and classifies the facts in nature, and educes its laws, presents one of the noblest

aspects of the high endowments of the human mind. But the science of God in redemption is greater. Nothing is in the end to be feared, but much to be hoped for, from research into the secrets of the material world. The day of the just ascendancy of the truth of God, in the clear understanding and application of it, will witness the harmony of all knowledge. The firmament that showeth God's handiwork will be a brighter mirror reflecting his glory when God himself shall be better known. History and art and philosophy will join in the same song of praise, when the submissive will rejoice in God's law, and the delighted mind reverentially adores his presence. All God's works will praise him; but man, sanctified by the truth, will lead in the anthem, and all creatures, animate and inanimate, will swell the chorus.

ARTICLE V.

BETHESDA AND ITS MIRACLE.¹

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THERE is no better example of the great value of the "Researches in Palestine," of the late Dr. Robinson, than in those made by him in connection with the Pool of Siloam. It was the first object that attracted his attention on arriving at Jerusalem.

Leaving the high level part of Zion, not included within the walls of the modern city, where the Christian cemeteries are located, he proceeded eastward along the southern wall of the city, and, passing by the Zion gate, descended along the slope towards the valley of the Tyropœon, or Cheesemakers. Entering a path which soon left the wall, he descended obliquely down the slope southeast, in the direction of Siloam. In this part the Tyropœon forms a deep

¹ John v. 1-16.

ravine with banks almost precipitous. At its lower end it opens into the vale of Kidron. Here, still within the Tyropœon, is the Pool of Siloam, a small, deep reservoir in the form of a parallelogram, into which the water flows from under the rocks out of a smaller basin, hewn in the solid rock, a few feet further up. This is wholly an artificial work; and the water comes to it through a subterraneous channel from the fountain of the Virgin, or the fountain of Mary, so called, situated at a point above in the valley of Jehoshaphat. The ridge or hill Ophel lies here, between the Tyropœon and the valley of Jehoshaphat, and ends just over the Pool of Siloam in a steep point of rock forty or fifty feet high. Along the base of this the water is conducted from the pool in a small channel hewn in the rocky bottom, and is then led off to irrigate gardens of fig and other fruit-trees and plants lying in terraces quite down to the bottom of the valley of Jehoshaphat; a descent still of some forty or fifty feet.¹

He now passed up the valley of Jehoshaphat, which is here narrow, and the sides high and steep. On the right, clinging to the rocky sides of the Mount of Offence, are the hovels of the straggling village of Siloam, many of which are built before caves, or rather excavated sepulchres; in many cases the sepulchres themselves being used as dwellings. A little further up the valley, under the opposite or western hill, is the Fountain of the Virgin, a deep excavation in the solid rock, evidently artificial, into which one descends by two successive flights of steps. The water is apparently brought hither by some unknown and perhaps artificial channel, and flows off through a subterraneous passage under the hill Ophel to the Pool of Siloam. Above this fountain the valley becomes very narrow. It is everywhere only a watercourse between high hills; and the brook Kidron now never flows, and probably never flowed, along its bottom, except after heavy rains. From the fountain a path ascends obliquely, but steeply, to the southeast corner of the area of the great

¹ Biblical Researches, i. p. 231.

mosque, which at the same time forms the extreme south-east corner of the city wall, standing directly on the brow of the almost precipitous side of the valley, here about one hundred and fifty feet deep.¹ The cavity of this fountain is deep, running in under the western wall of the valley, and is wholly excavated in the solid rock. To enter it, one first descends sixteen steps; then comes a level place of twelve feet, and then ten steps more to the water. The steps are, on an average, each about ten inches high; and the whole depth, therefore, is about twenty-five feet, or some ten or fifteen feet below the actual bottom of the valley. The basin itself is perhaps fifteen feet long, by five and six wide; the height is not more than six or eight feet. The bottom is strewed with small stones; and the water flows off by a small passage at the interior extremity, leading under the hill Ophel to Siloam; the reservoir of which is fifty-three feet long, eighteen feet broad, and nineteen feet deep. There is now no other outlet from the fountain of the Virgin than that which connects it with Siloam, and, apparently, a different one never existed.

This subterranean passage is first mentioned by Quaresmius, writing about A.D. 1625. He refers to an unsuccessful attempt of his friend Vinhoven to explore it, and says that a pater Julius had passed through it a few years before. But he gives no definite information respecting the canal, and is unable to say whether the waters of Siloam came from the Fountain of the Virgin. Notwithstanding this tolerably full notice, the canal seems again to have been forgotten, or, at least, overlooked, for another century. Le Brun, Maundrell, and other careful observers, are wholly silent as to its existence; although they describe both the fountains. Slight and imperfect notices of it appear in the eighteenth century, and more in the nineteenth. All these, however, are so confused and unsatisfactory, that one of the latest and most successful investigators² of the topography of

¹ Biblical Researches, i. p. 232.

² Crome, in Ersch und Gruber's Encyc., art. "Jerusalem."

Jerusalem declares, in A.D. 1839, that the question is yet undecided, whether the water flows from the Fountain of the Virgin to Siloam, or *vice versa*.

Dr. Robinson found it to be the current belief at Jerusalem, both among natives and foreigners, that a passage existed quite through between the two fountains; but no one had himself explored it, or could give any definite information respecting it. He therefore determined to make an attempt himself to explore it. Of this attempt, which proved successful, he gives a highly interesting account:

Repairing, one afternoon (April 27th, 1838), to Siloam, in order to measure the reservoir, he found no person there; and, the water in the basin being low, he embraced this opportunity for accomplishing his purpose. Stripping off his shoes and stockings, and rolling his garments above his knees, he entered with his light and measuring-tape in hand. The water was low, nowhere more than a foot in depth, and for the most part not more than three or four inches, with hardly a perceptible current. He found the bottom everywhere covered with sand brought in by the waters. The passage is cut wholly through the solid rock, everywhere about two feet wide; somewhat winding, but in a general course north-northeast. For the first hundred feet it is from fifteen to twenty feet high; for another hundred feet or more, from six to ten feet; and afterwards, not more than four feet high; thus gradually becoming lower and lower as he advanced. At the end of eight hundred feet, it became so low that he could advance no further, without crawling on all fours, and bringing his body close to the water. As he was not prepared for this, he thought it better to retreat, and try again another day from the other end. Tracing, therefore, upon the roof, with the smoke of his candle, the initials of his name and those of his attendant and the figures 800, as a mark of their progress, they returned, with their clothes somewhat wet and soiled.

It was not till three days afterwards that he was able to

complete his examination and measurement of the passage. He went now to the Fountain of the Virgin, and, having measured the external distance (twelve hundred feet) down to the point east of Siloam, concluded that, as he had already entered eight hundred feet from the lower end, there could now remain not over four or five hundred feet to be explored. He found the end of the passage at the upper fountain rudely built up with small, loose stones, in order to retain the water at a greater depth in the excavated basin. Having caused these stones to be cleared away, and having clothed (or rather unclothed) himself simply in a pair of wide Arab drawers, he entered and crawled on, hoping soon to arrive at the point which he had reached from the other fountain. The passage here is in general much lower than at the other end. Most of the way Dr. Robinson could advance on his hands and knees; yet in several places he could only get forward by lying at full length, and dragging himself along on the elbows.

The sand at the bottom has probably a considerable depth, thus filling up the canal in part; for otherwise it is inconceivable how the passage could ever have been thus cut through the solid rock. At any rate, only a single person could have wrought in it at a time, and it must have been the labor of many years. There are here many turns and zigzags. In several places the workmen had cut straight forward for some distance, and then, leaving this, had begun further back at a different angle; so that there is, at first, the appearance of a passage branching off. He examined all these false cuts very minutely, in the hope of finding some such lateral passage, by which water might come in from another quarter. He found, however, nothing of the kind. The way seemed interminably long; and he was for a time suspicious that he had fallen upon a passage different from that which he had before entered. But at length, after having measured nine hundred and fifty feet, he arrived at his former mark of 800 feet, traced with smoke upon the ceiling. This makes the whole length of the passage

to be seventeen hundred and fifty feet — a result scarcely conceivable, although the passage is very winding. The difference between the internal and external measurements is so great that Dr. Robinson, on subsequently recurring to this subject, was compelled to suppose some error in the former; made, as it was, under circumstances of inconvenience and difficulty.¹ Instead of retracing his course to the Fountain of the Virgin, he kept on, and came out at the Pool of Siloam.

In constructing this passage, he remarks, that it is obvious the workmen commenced at both ends, designing to meet somewhere in the middle. At the upper end, or at the Fountain of the Virgin, the work was carried along on the level of the upper basin, and there was a tendency to go too far to the right, or towards the west under the mountain; for all the false cuts above mentioned were in that direction. At the lower end, the excavation would seem to have been begun on a higher level than at present; and when, on meeting the shaft from the other end, this level was found to be too high, the bottom was dug down until the water flowed through it; thus leaving the southern end of the passage, towards Siloam, much loftier than the other part. The bottom has very little descent; so that the two basins are nearly on the same level; the upper one (the Virgin) ten feet or more below the valley of Jehoshaphat, and the other some forty feet above the same valley. The water flows through gently, and with little current.

The purpose for which this difficult work was undertaken, it is not easy to discern. The upper basin must obviously have been excavated at an earlier period than the lower, and there must have been something to be gained by thus carrying its waters through the solid rock into the valley of the Tyropœon. If the object had been merely to irrigate the gardens which lay in that quarter, this might have been accomplished with far less difficulty and expense, by conducting the water around upon the outside of the hill. But

¹ Biblical Researches, 1852, iii. p. 189.

the whole looks as if the advantage of a fortified city had been consulted, and as if it had been important to carry this water from one point to the other in such a way that it could not be cut off by a besieging army. Now, as this purpose would have been futile had either of these points lain without the ancient fortifications, this circumstance, as Dr. Robinson remarks, furnishes an argument to show that the ancient wall probably ran along the valley of Jehoshaphat, or, at least, descended to it, and included Siloam, as well as this upper fountain. The water in both these fountains, then, is the same, notwithstanding travellers have pronounced that of Siloam to be bad, and that of the upper fountain to be good. Dr. Robinson says that he drank of it often in both places. It has a peculiar taste, sweetish and very slightly brackish, but not at all disagreeable. When the water is low, it is said to become more brackish and unpleasant. It is the common water used by the people of the village of Siloam.¹ The name Siloah, or Siloam, is found only three times in the scriptures as applied to waters; once in the prophet Isaiah, who speaks of it as running water; again, as a pool, in Nehemiah; and lastly, also as a pool, in the account of our Lord's miracle of healing the man who had been born blind.² None of these passages afford any clew as to the situation of Siloam. But Josephus makes frequent mention of Siloam as a fountain, and says expressly it was situated in the mouth of the Tyropœon, or the valley of the Cheesemakers, on the southeast part of the city, as it is found at the present day.³ Its waters, he says, were sweet and in great plenty. There can be no room for question that the Siloam of Josephus is identical with that of the scriptures.

Jerome, near the close of the fourth century, says that Siloam is a fountain at the foot of Mount Zion. Again, he remarks that the idol Baal was set up near Jerusalem, at

¹ Biblical Researches, 1858, i. pp. 337-341

² Isa. viii. 6; Neh. ii. 15; John ix. 7-11.

³ Bel. Jud. v. 4, 1.

the foot of Mount Moriah, where Siloam flows.¹ Moriah must here be taken as including the ridge which runs from it towards the south; and the mention of the idol Baal limits the position of Siloam to the gardens at the mouth of the Tyropœon and valley of Hinnom. Siloam is mentioned, both as a fountain and pool, by Antoninus Martyr, early in the seventh century; and as a pool by the monk Bernhard in the ninth. Then come the historians of the Crusades, who also place Siloam as a fountain in its present site, near the fork of two valleys. Sir John Maundeville mentions it as a "welle" at the foot of Mount Zion, towards the valley of Jehoshaphat.

All the historical notices thus far refer only to the present Siloam, in the mouth of the valley of the Tyropœon, which still exhibits both a fountain and a reservoir; and there is no reference in any of them to the Fountain of the Virgin, further up the valley of Jehoshaphat, with which, as we have seen, the waters of Siloam stand in connection. The mention of gardens around Siloam, and of its waters as flowing down into the valley of the Kidron, is decisive on this point; for neither of these circumstances could ever have been applicable to the other fountain. Indeed, singular as the fact must certainly be accounted, there seems to be nothing which can be regarded as an allusion to the Fountain of the Virgin during the long series of ages from the time of Josephus down to the latter part of the fifteenth century. The two fountains of Siloam and the Virgin began at that time to be distinctly mentioned; but their connection by a sub-montane passage seems to have been first brought to notice by Quaresmius, in the beginning of the seventeenth century.²

In Jerome, we have the first mention of an irregular flow of the waters of Siloam.³ William of Tyre also mentions this irregular flow,⁴ as does also Marinus Sanutus.⁵ This

¹ Comm. in Esa. viii. 6; in Matt. x. 28.

² Biblical Researches, 1838, i. pp. 333-335.

³ Comm. in Esa. viii. 6. ⁴ Will. Tyr. viii. 4. ⁵ De Sec. fid. Cruc. iii. 14, 9.

irregular flow of the water, mentioned by writers of the earlier and middle ages as characteristic of Siloam, must of course have belonged equally to both fountains; except as the rush of water towards Siloam might have been impeded and diminished by the dam of loose stones, if it then existed, as now-a-days, at the upper end of the passage. Ever since the fourth century this remarkable circumstance seems to have been almost, if not entirely, overlooked by travellers. Dr. Robinson says that he had searched in vain through all the more important writers, from Sir John Maundeville down to the present day, without finding any distinct notice respecting it, derived from personal observation. All the writers on Biblical Geography, from Adrichomichus and Reland onward to the present time, are wholly silent, except so far as they refer to the testimony of Jerome. Yet the popular belief in this phenomenon was still firm among the inhabitants of Jerusalem. Our friends had often heard of it; but, having themselves never seen the irregular flow, they regarded the story as one of the many popular legends of the country. "We were more fortunate in this respect," says Dr. Robinson, "having been very unexpectedly witnesses of the phenomenon in question; and we are thus enabled to rescue another ancient historical fact from the long oblivion, or, rather, discredit, into which it had fallen for so many centuries.

"As we were preparing to measure the basin," he proceeds, "of the upper fountain (in the afternoon of April 30th), and explore the passage leading from it, my companion was standing on the lower step, near the water, with one foot on the step and the other on a loose stone lying in the basin. All at once he perceived the water coming into his shoe, and, supposing the stone had rolled, he withdrew his foot to the step, which, however, was now also covered with water. This instantly excited our curiosity; and we now perceived the water rapidly bubbling up from under the lower step. In less than five minutes it had risen in the basin nearly or quite a foot; and we could hear it

gurgling off through the interior passage. In ten minutes more it had ceased to flow, and the water in the basin was reduced to its former level. Thrusting my staff in under the lower step, whence the water appeared to come, I found," says Dr. Robinson, "that there was here a large hollow space; but a further examination could not be made without removing the steps." Meanwhile, a woman came to wash at the fountain. She was accustomed to frequent the place every day; and from her he learned that the flowing of the water occurs at irregular intervals; sometimes two or three times a day, and sometimes in summer once in two or three days. She said she had seen the fountain dry, and men and flocks, dependent on the water, gathered around, and suffering from thirst, when, all at once, the water would begin to boil up from under the steps, and (as she said) from the bottom in the interior part, and flow off in a copious stream.

An Arab who was there, whom Dr. Robinson had seen at the bath in the city, told him that the water came down from a fountain beneath the great mosque which occupies the site of the temple on Moriah. But how, or why? This is a mystery which former ages have not solved, and which must be left to the researches of future travellers under more favorable auspices fully to unfold. At the bath above named, situated in a covered passage-way leading to one of the western entrances of the mosque, he was conducted through several apartments and passages to the parallel street leading to the southern entrance of the mosque, and then up a flight of steps to a platform eighteen or twenty feet above the level of the street. Here, in a low arched room, he found two men drawing water in leathern buckets suspended over a pulley from a narrow well sixty-five feet below the surface of the ground. The water stood in it three and a half feet deep. One of the men told him that the water came to the well through a passage of mason-work four or five feet high from under the grand mosque, where the water boiled up from the bottom of the fountain. He expressed

a willingness to accompany Dr. Robinson to the bottom of the well, where he had often been ; but the Doctor failed to obtain the necessary permission from the authorities. He drank of the water, and found it had the same peculiar taste which he had remarked in the waters of Siloam and the Fountain of the Virgin in the valley below. There seemed, he thought, no reason for doubt as to the main fact, viz. that there is in the heart of the rock, at the depth of some eighty feet under the mosque, a fountain, the water of which has the same essential characteristics as that flowing out at the artificial excavations in the valley below. He thinks it not improbable that there may be some hidden channel, by which the waters in the fountain beneath the mosque find outlet through these excavations. But from what quarter they are first brought into this fountain remains an unsolved question, as well as whether the irregular flow of the fountains in the valley is to be explained by some connection with these waters in the fountain from above.¹

The words of Moses to the children of Israel respecting the promised land : “ A land of brooks of water, of fountains and depths that spring out of the valleys and hills,”² are literally true. Travellers tell us that there is no land where they are so numerous and so beautiful, and that many of these fountains have peculiar characteristics ; some are tepid, and not a few remittent or wholly intermittent. Josephus gives an account of a stream which he calls the Sabbatic River. He says that while Titus Caesar was exhibiting magnificent shows in the cities of Syria, he came to a river as he journeyed, “ of such a nature as deserves to be recorded in history. It runs in the middle between Arca belonging to Agrippa’s kingdom and Raphenea. It hath somewhat very peculiar in it ; for when it runs its current is strong and has plenty of water. After which its springs fail for six days together, and leave its channel dry, as any one may see ; after which days it runs on the seventh

¹ Biblical Researches, i. pp. 341, 342.

² Deut. viii. 7.

day as it did before, and as though it had undergone no change at all. It hath also been observed to keep this order perpetually and exactly. Whence it is that they call it the Sabbatic river; that name being taken from the sacred seventh day among the Jews.”¹ Pliny has been supposed to refer to the same river; but he makes it run six days, and rest every seventh: “In Judaea rivus, Sabbatis omnibus siccatur.”² The translator and editor of Josephus makes light of what Josephus says, by adding in a note that, as this river is vanished, he shall say no more about it. The learned Reland and the celebrated Danish traveller Niebuhr treat it as a fable.

But the author of that excellent work, “The Land and the Book,” Dr. W. M. Thomson, for more than twenty-five years a missionary in Syria and Palestine, claims that he discovered this river and its source in 1840. Examining the passage from Josephus, he says: “From Beirût, Titus marched north to Zeugma on the Euphrates. On his march he saw this river running between Arca in the kingdom of Agrippa and Raphanea. The mention of Agrippa’s kingdom probably induced most travellers to look for the Sabbatic river somewhere in the south of Palestine, where it is not to be found; although there are traces of ancient cities in that region, with names similar to those of Arca and Raphanea. But the kingdom of Agrippa did actually extend at one time as far north, I believe, as the River Eleutherus, and therefore included Arca. At any rate, the account requires that we search for the Sabbatic river between Arca and Raphanea; and there I found it. Arca, the capital of the Arkites, lies about half-a-day’s ride to the northeast of Tripoli, and between it and Hamath, on the east of Jebel Akkar, is the site of Raphanea. In the wady below the great Convent of Mar Jirius is a fountain called Nebâ el-Fûârr, which throws out at stated intervals an immense volume of water, quite sufficient to entitle it in this country to the dignified name of river. This site answers to the description of Josephus in

¹ Bel. Jud. vii. 5, 1.

² Nat. Hist. xxxi. 11.

all respects ; but there are some discrepancies between the actual phenomena of this fountain and his Sabbatic river.”¹

Instead of flowing one day in seven according to Josephus, or six days and resting on the seventh according to Pliny, this Nebâ el-Fûârr is quiescent two days, and active on a part of the third. The cave out of which the river flows is at the base of a hill of limestone, “entangled in a vast formation of trap-rock.” Dr. Thomson supposes the Sabbatic river was always nearly what we find the stream below Mar Jirius now to be. The vagueness of general rumor, the love of the ancients for the marvellous, and the desire to conform this natural phenomenon to the Jewish division of time, will sufficiently account for the inaccuracies of these historians.

It is well known, says Dr. Thomson, that these intermitting fountains are merely the draining of subterranean reservoirs on the principle of the siphon. The condition necessary to make the stream intermit is that the capacity of the siphon be greater than the supply. If the supply were greater than this capacity, or exactly equal to it, the pool would be always full, and there could be no intermission. The periods of intermission and the size of the stream depend upon the size of the pool, the supply, and the calibre of the siphon. Dr. Thomson says that the main source of the Litany at 'Anjur is a remitting fountain of a peculiar kind. A constant stream issues from the pool ; but there are frequent and vast augmentations in the volume of water, occurring at irregular periods, sometimes not more than twice in a day, while at others these augmentations take place every few hours. In Lebanon there are likewise fountains which entirely intermit at stated periods, or are subject to partial remissions. “Such, too,” he says, “is the Fountain of the Virgin, in the Valley of Jehoshaphat. All such instances can be explained by supposing either that the entire stream is subject to this siphonic action, as at the Sabbatic river, or that the constant, regular stream is at

¹ The Land and the Book, Vol. i. pp. 407, 408.

times augmented by tributary intermitting fountains, as at 'Anjur and Siloam.'¹

But the great interest which attaches to the results of these investigations lies in their bearing on the locality of one of the most interesting miracles of our Lord — his healing of the impotent man at the Pool of Bethesda, and on the right interpretation of the inspired record in connection with that miracle. Dr. Robinson suggests, as the Sheep [gate], near which Bethesda was situated, seems to have been not far from the temple, and the wall of the ancient city probably ran along this valley, whether that gate may not have been somewhere in this part, and this Fountain of the Virgin have been Bethesda — the same with the "King's Pool" of Nehemiah, and the "Solomon's Pool" of Josephus.² The monks and many travellers have chosen to find the Pool of Bethesda in the deep reservoir or trench on the north side of the area of the great mosque; and in the two long vaults at its southwest corner they profess to find two of the five ancient porches. There is not the slightest evidence that can identify it with the Bethesda of the New Testament. The name has doubtless been assigned to the reservoir in question comparatively in modern times, from its proximity to St. Stephen's Gate, which was erroneously held to be the ancient Sheep Gate.³ Dr. Robinson thinks that the deep reservoir now commonly known as the Pool of Bethesda was a trench which protected the fortress Antonia on the north. His supposition is that this fortress occupied the whole breadth of the western part of the present enclosure around the great mosque, between the ancient northern wall and the present Bethesda. The peculiar character and great depth of the Pool of Bethesda, so called, have been a stone of stumbling to many travellers; but by thus bringing it into connection with the fortress its peculiarities are at once accounted for. This reservoir lies along the outside

¹ The Land and the Book, Vol. i. pp. 408–411.

² Biblical Researches, 1838, Vol. i. p. 343.

³ Ibid. Vol. i. p. 330, 331.

of the present enclosure, of which wall its southern side may be said to form a part. Its eastern end is near the wall of the city; so near, indeed, that only a narrow way passes between them, leading from St. Stephen's Gate to the great mosque. The pool measures three hundred and sixty English feet in length, one hundred and thirty feet in breadth, and seventy-five feet in depth to the bottom, besides the rubbish which has been accumulating in it for ages. It was once evidently used as a reservoir; and it would seem as if it once extended to the westward, in which direction lofty arched vaults have been built up in and over it, to support the buildings above.¹ Dr. Robinson's theory that this deep cut was part of the system of defences around the temple has everything to support it. It could not have been the Bethesda of scripture. His suggestion that the Fountain of the Virgin was this Bethesda seems to be altogether probable. Dr. Thomson evidently agreed with Dr. Robinson in the opinion that the trench or fosse now known as Bethesda could not have been the ancient pool known by that name in scripture. He says: "I looked in upon the vast chasm or fosse on the north side of the temple area, which I hear called Birket Israîl, and see on the maps written Bethesda."² He elsewhere remarks that he has discovered nothing new to be added to the discoveries of Dr. Robinson respecting the Fountains of the Virgin and Siloam, and confesses that he had not zeal enough to follow him through the passage connecting the two. We accept, therefore, Dr. Robinson's suggestion, that the Fountain of the Virgin is the true site of the ancient Bethesda, and that the water of this fountain probably has its source in a living spring beneath the site of the ancient Temple.

Dean Stanley says: "All accounts combine in asserting that the water of the two pools of Siloam, as well as that of the many fountains of the Mosque of Omar, proceeds from a living spring beneath the Temple vaults. There was no

¹ Biblical Researches, 1838, Vol. i. p. 293.

² The Land and the Book, Vol. ii. p. 524.

period of its history when such a provision would not have been important to the Temple, for the ablutions of the Jewish, no less than the Mussulman worship; or to the city, which else was dry even to a proverb. It was the treasure of Jerusalem, its support through its numerous sieges; the "fons perennis aquae" of Tacitus;¹ the source of Milton's

"Brook that flowed
Hard by the oracle of God."

But more than this, it was the image that entered into the very heart of the prophetic idea of Jerusalem. "There is a river ["Nahar," perennial river] the streams whereof shall make glad the city of God, the holy place of the tabernacle of the Most High."² In Ezekiel's vision³ the thought is expanded into a vast cataract flowing out from the Temple rock eastward into the Kidron, till it swells into a mighty river, fertilizing the desert of the Dead Sea."⁴

But Dr. Robinson makes another suggestion, which bears on the proper exegesis of the passage containing the account of the miracle at Bethesda. In that account we are told that "an angel went down at a certain season into the pool, and troubled the water," and then, whosoever first stepped in was made whole.⁶ He asks: "Does not this 'troubling' of the water look like the irregular flow of the fountain first described?"⁷

The healing of the impotent man at Bethesda occurred on a visit of our Lord to Jerusalem at the second passover after he entered on his public ministry, at the beginning of its third year. In order to consider the question which Dr. Robinson proposes, it will be necessary to have the passage which records the miracle before us: "After this there was a feast of the Jews, and Jesus went up to Jerusalem. Now there is at Jerusalem by the Sheep Market [Marg. Gate] a pool which is called in the Hebrew tongue Bethesda, having five porches. In these lay a great multitude of impotent

¹ Tac. Hist. v. p. 12.

² Ps. xlv. 4.

³ Ezek. xlvii.

⁴ Sinai and Palestine (London), p. 180.

⁶ John v. 4.

⁷ Biblical Researches, Vol. i. p. 343.

folk, of blind, halt, withered, waiting for the moving of the water. For an angel went down at a certain season into the pool, and troubled the water. Whosoever then first after the troubling of the water stepped in was made whole of whatsoever disease he had. And a certain man was there which had an infirmity thirty and eight years. When Jesus saw him lie, and knew that he had been now a long time *in that case*, he saith unto him, Wilt thou be made whole? The impotent man answered him, Sir, I have no man, when the water is troubled, to put me into the pool; but while I am coming, another steppeth down before me. Jesus saith unto him, Rise, take up thy bed, and walk. And immediately the man was made whole, and took up his bed, and walked; and on the same day was the Sabbath.”¹

The feast spoken of, as already intimated, was the Pass-over, and this is one of the passages which prove that the ministry of Christ continued three and a half years. The word “market,” in the second verse, is not in the original. The marginal reading, “gate,” is to be preferred, as we know there was a gate of this name (Neh. iii. 1, 32; xii. 39); but there is no mention of such a market. Near this gate was a pool, the Hebrew name of which was Bethesda, House of Mercy. It had five porches, or places roofed over, where the diseased who came hoping to receive benefit from the water were deposited, while waiting for the moving or rising of the water. We are thus brought to that portion of the passage the consideration of which involves the answer to the question suggested by Dr. Robinson. The best critics of the original text, and some of the ablest modern expositors, regard this portion, or the closing words of the third verse, “waiting for the moving of the water,” to the end of the fourth verse, as spurious, — in the Greek, from the word *ἐκδεχόμενων* to the word *νοσήματι*. Tischendorf, in his edition of the Greek Testament, now in course of publication, omits the entire passage. Tregelles, who stands next in authority on questions of this nature, does the same in

¹ John v. 1-9.

his edition. To the authority of the Vatican MS., which belongs to the middle of the fourth century, and the Codex Regius in the imperial library at Paris, written in Egypt in the fifth century, and that of Beza in the University of Cambridge, belonging to the sixth century, and of the old Latin and others enumerated by Tregelles for the omission of verse fourth, Tischendorf adds that of the Sinaitic, belonging to the early part of the fourth century; and which he thinks it not impossible may have formed one of the fifty copies of the Bible which in the year 331 Constantine ordered to be executed under the direction of Eusebius, and that it was sent by the Emperor Justinian, the founder of the Sinaitic monastery, to the monks at Sinai, where he discovered it. Thus we have the authority of the earliest MSS. known to be in existence for the omission of the fourth verse; and we have that of the two oldest of these MSS., the Sinaitic and the Vatican, for the omission of the last clause of the third. The entire passage is also omitted by the Curetonian Syriac, the Memphitic MSS., and the Thebaic version. Of the Armenian, many leave out the fourth verse, and among the few which have it some mark it as doubtful. Augustine is cited as omitting the verse. Tertullian and Chrysostom have the passage.¹ Bishop Marsh says: "We have proof that the [fourth] verse was originally nothing more than a marginal scholium, and of course spurious." Greisbach and Mill reject it. Copyists had no motive for omitting these passages, if they had them before them; for there was no wish to avoid anything which spoke of miraculous interference. On the contrary, if they found in the water, like Tertullian and Chrysostom, a symbol of the baptismal water, they would have found a motive in their dogmatic interest for the retention rather than the exclusion of the passage. On the other hand, scholiasts had strong reasons for explaining, according to the notions of the times, why the multitudes lay in the porches, and to what the moving of the water referred.

¹ See Tregelles's Account of the printed Text, pp. 243-246.

Neither Lücke nor Tholuck regard the disputed clause as genuine, although they do not take the trouble to give it a very minute examination. Tholuck thinks that when regard is had to the numerous variations in those who retain the clause, and to the fact that no reason can be given for the omission, it must be rejected. He refers to Bretschneider, Baur, and De Wette, as disposed to decide for the genuineness of the clause, in order to help out the position that the Gospel of John is spurious. Olshausen says of it: "Here is an addition to the account (from ἐκδεχόμενον to νοσήματι) which, according to the evidence derived from criticism, is to be regarded as spurious." "It is in the highest degree probable that it was introduced into the text from MSS. in the margin of which their owners had made this note from personal observation. Doubtless, therefore, it was a fact that the water from time to time fitfully bubbled, and in such seasons the greatest efficacy was ascribed to it. Now, since the sick man refers to this fact (ver. 7), it was evidently very natural to annex the above information by way of explaining his words." Trench, in his work on Miracles, treats the passage as spurious.

But, apart from the conclusion to which criticism seems inevitably to lead, there are certain grounds of argument affecting the question which seem also to favor the omission of the passage. In addition to what has already been repeated in regard to there being no motive for its omission, while every motive existed for its retention if already in the text, it may be said that the descent of an angel at certain seasons to trouble the water and impart to it healing efficacy would have been a continuous or repeating miracle, and it is surprising there is no mention of this elsewhere in the entire scriptures. And for what end was it wrought, that is, what divine messenger or message was it designed to attest? It is also surprising that Josephus, the Jewish historian, who describes everything about Jerusalem with so much particularity, should have passed over in utter silence, as he does, a permanent miracle of this nature. He could have

feared no such contempt for the marvellous in his pagan readers as would lead him to suppress it. Rather, we may conclude, he would have seized upon it with avidity, had there been any foundation for an account beyond that of a popular impression among the ignorant, and for the truth of which he could have referred to their own procurators and travellers. It is necessary, in order to account for the great number of diseased persons waiting at Bethesda, to suppose that they believed some healing virtue was imparted to the water by its periodical rising or commotion; and it is probable that there was a popular belief among the more credulous and superstitious, that an angel came down to agitate the water and impart to it healing efficiency. But it has been made sufficiently evident that it is no part of the inspired evangelist's testimony that there was any such perpetual or recurring miracle by angelic agency.

If we omit the disputed clause, the narrative flows on, without the appearance of break or hiatus, and evidently intact, as it came from the hand of John: "In these lay a great multitude of impotent folk, of blind, halt, withered. And a certain man was there which had an infirmity thirty and eight years." Or if, according to some of the authorities, we retain the closing words of the third verse, and omit the fourth, there will be nothing to interrupt the historic flow, or to destroy the concinnity of the parts. The multitude waiting for the moving of the water, in the third verse, answers perfectly to the impotent man's having no one to put him into the pool when it was troubled, in the seventh. In that excellent and valuable work, "Commentary on the Gospel of John," by the late Dr. John J. Owen, of New York, he quotes a remark of Steir with approbation, that "verse 7 absolutely requires the whole addition; for taken alone, without the explanation furnished by the fourth verse, it is wholly unintelligible." Neither Steir nor Dr. Owen appears to have had his attention directed to the facts which identify the waters of Siloam with those of ancient Bethesda, and the periodical perturbation and rising of these waters.

If they had, they never could have affirmed that the omission of the fourth verse, or of the entire disputed passage, served to render the account in John unintelligible. Dr. Owen defends the retention of the whole warmly, and remarks: "We are bound to receive this as a plain matter of revelation, and as furnishing another proof that benevolent spirits are employed as the instruments of good to men, in like manner as wicked spirits are busily employed in the infliction of evil." And yet he strangely adds: "It is unnecessary to suppose that the Jewish people at this time were acquainted with the cause of the healing properties of this pool, or of the wondrous phenomena attending it. This has been made known to us by the revealed word of God. They knew only this — a fact which in the outset may have been stumbled on by the merest accident — that at a certain apparent commotion of the waters, whoever first succeeded in bathing himself in the pool was immediately cured of his disease. They learned to avail themselves of this wondrous virtue of the water, ignorant, however, of what has been revealed to us by John, that it was caused by angelic agency." So this permanent recurring miracle becomes an unapparent one, or one in which those who are benefited and cured, as well as those who are witnesses of the cures, are wholly ignorant that there is any supernatural agency excited at the fountain. They looked upon it in the same light as upon other remitting or intermitting fountains found in their country; or, if as more than this, simply as deriving certain sanitive properties from some mineral with which it became impregnated, by the water being perturbed from the bottom by some natural cause; while it was really caused by an angel descending from heaven. This is too difficult to believe.

It seems difficult to make the note of the Rev. Mr. Barnes on this passage consistent with itself. He says: "This fountain, it seems, had strong medicinal properties. Like many other waters, it had the property of healing many diseases that were incurable by any other means. Thus the waters of Bath, of Saratoga, etc., are found to be highly

medicinal, and to heal diseases that are otherwise incurable. In the case of the waters of Bethesda, there does not appear to have been anything miraculous; but the waters seem to have been endued with strong medicinal properties, especially after a periodical agitation. All that is peculiar about them in the record [as if there were nothing in what is said to have happened supernatural, or even remarkable] is that this was produced by the ministry of an angel. This was in accordance with the common sentiment of the Jews, the common doctrine of the Bible, and the belief of the sacred writers. Nor can it be shown to be absurd or improbable that such blessings should be imparted to man by the ministry of an angel. There is no more absurdity in the belief that a pure spirit or holy angel should aid man than that a physician or parent should, and no more absurdity in supposing that the healing properties of such a fountain should be produced by his aid than that any other blessing should be. It is not implied that this was done [the healing of the sick] instantaneously, or by a miracle. The water had such properties that he was healed, though probably gradually. It is not less the gift of God to suppose that this fountain restored gradually, and in accordance with what commonly occurs, than to suppose, what is not affirmed in this text, that it was done at once, and in a miraculous manner."

It is difficult to decide which view Dean Alford intends to favor — whether to accept or reject the passage. He says it "labors under strong suspicion of spuriousness"; and he marks it, by enclosing it in brackets and lines, either as spurious or highly doubtful; and adds that "in this short space there are no less than seven words either used here only, or here only in this sense." And yet he argues and quotes in favor of the genuineness of the passage, and the miraculous view of the whole.

Dr. Jacobus defends the genuineness of the passage, and says: "We see no reason for evading the plain sense of the terms, which would surely convey the idea of a supernatural

power exerted at intervals for the cure of *one*, and limited to the one who first stepped in; whereas, if the healing lay in the virtue of the water, how could it have been so restricted?" He says that to leave out the clause would destroy the connection of the passage; and he asks, in the words of Alford: "Why should the sick be lying there, and why should the man have been so long waiting anxiously to be put in, unless some known effect followed on the troubling of the water at these intervals, when he wished to be put in, and could not be?" In answer to which, all that needs to be said is, that the remittent character of the fountain being established and well known, there is no want of connection in the passage in consequence of omitting the disputed clause; and that the healing properties, which were undoubtedly attributed to the water, whether with reason or not, would be sufficient to prompt the diseased to wish to be brought there, and patiently to wait for an opportunity to step in, or to be put in.

Bloomfield seems not to have been well acquainted with the best results of criticism, as they bear on the question whether this disputed passage should be cancelled or retained; and criticism has probably made great advances since he wrote. He says that "there is only the authority of two MSS., two very inferior versions, and Nonnus" for the omission. "Besides, the MSS. are such as abound with all sorts of liberties taken with the text." He concludes, therefore, that the words must be retained, and that they utterly exclude the notion of anything short of miraculous agency.

Doddridge, who, as the late Moses Stuart says, "was by no means an ordinary adept in a critical knowledge of the the sacred languages," in his note on the words "an angel descended into the pool and stirred the water" (as he translates), says that this "is the greatest of difficulties in the history of the evangelists, which few commentators enter into." He imagines that the pool might have been remarkable for some mineral virtue attending the water;

and that some time before the Passover an extraordinary commotion was probably observed in the water; and Providence so ordered it that the next person who accidentally bathed there, being under some great disorder, found an immediate and unexpected cure. The like phenomenon, in some other desperate case, was probably observed on a second commotion. And these commotions and cures might happen periodically for some weeks or months. This the Jews would naturally ascribe to some angelic power, as they did afterwards the voice from heaven (John xii. 29), though no angel appeared. And they and St. John had reason to do it, as it was the scripture scheme that these benevolent spirits had been, and frequently are, the invisible instruments of good to the children of men."

Such is the hypothesis of the excellent Doddridge. There can be no doubt that had he lived to see the results of Tischendorf's and Tregelles's studies and criticism of the text, he would have been convinced that what he felt to be the greatest of all difficulties in the evangelists, the angel at the Pool of Bethesda, belongs not to the evangelists at all, but is the work of mere scholiasts and copyists.

On the authority and use to be made of the ancient MSS. of the scriptures, Tischendorf, in the Introduction of his Tauchnitz edition of the English version of the New Testament, recently published, well says that "it would be either unwarrantable arrogance or blameworthy indolence to treat these primeval documents with neglect; it would be a misunderstanding of the dispensations of Providence, which have preserved these documents for fourteen or fifteen centuries, amid all the vicissitudes of time, and given them into our hands, if we were not ready most thankfully to give heed to them, as instruments worthy of the highest respect for the recovery of the truth."

As to the tendency or effect of suggesting readings at variance with the received and authorized version, he asks: "Is our undertaking, by any possibility, adverse to religion? May that which by long use for several centuries in churches

and schools and houses has won respect and affection, be called in question as uncertain, and distrusted as inexact? He who should recognize irreligion in our testing, and even calling into doubt, that text of the Bible, respect for which simply results from common use, would greatly err. It seems to us much rather the greatest act of piety to regard confidently as the word of God nothing which is not accredited and established as such by the most ancient, and also most trustworthy, evidences which the Lord has placed in our hands. From this point of view, and with this conviction, the writer of this Introduction has for thirty years past explored the libraries of Europe, as well as the recesses of monasteries in the Asiatic and African east, in search of the most ancient copies of the holy scriptures; and he has devoted his whole energy to collect all the most weighty documents of the kind, and to labor upon them, to publish them for the benefit of posterity, and to restore on the basis of scientific research the very original text of the apostles."

The way is now prepared, in order to carry out the purpose for which the foregoing discussion has been undertaken, — for a brief consideration of the real miracle at Bethesda. Christ came to this place, where he saw a great multitude of impotent folk, of blind, halt, withered, lying, or sitting, beneath the covered arches, waiting for the moving of the water. In him resided that miraculous power to heal which this wretched crowd attributed to the water. This belief, which scholiasts had indicated on the margin of certain copies, and which the transcribers of them have made a part of the text, hinders us from perceiving the beauty and force of the contrast between him and the so-accredited miraculous fountain. The removal of the interpolation at once reveals that contrast in striking relief. He singles out one of the sufferers, a poor impotent man, who for nearly forty years had been in that condition, as the object of his healing mercy. No reason is given for the selection of this man from the crowd of sufferers, or for not extending the power of healing to others. It may have been because he was the most help-

less and pitiable of all. He had none to help him make trial of the virtue of the water. We are not to suppose that he had been waiting at the pool for thirty-eight years; but this expresses the period he had been suffering from his malady. The question, "Wilt thou be made whole?" to a man in his condition, waiting there for an opportunity to be put into the pool, was not unmeaning or superfluous. It had its purpose. He had probably "waited so long, and so long waited in vain, that hope was dead, or well-nigh dead, in his bosom; and the question is asked to awaken in him anew a yearning after the benefit which the Saviour, compassionating his hopeless case, was about to impart. His heart may have been withered through his long sufferings and the long neglects of his fellow-men; it was something to persuade him that this stranger pitied, was interested in his case, would help him if he could. So, persuading him to believe in his kindness, he prepared him also to believe in his ability to do him good. Our Lord was now giving the faith which presently he was to demand of him."¹ He seems to interpret Christ's question as an imputation of carelessness or neglect to avail himself of the healing virtue of the water, and replies, as one who would most gladly be healed: "Sir, I have no man, when the water is troubled, to put me into the pool." The language implies that the swelling or moving of the water was only at irregular intervals, which answers precisely to the phenomena at the waters of Siloam to this day. The place appears to have been narrow, by no means answering to the extensive excavation which now passes under the name of Bethesda at Jerusalem; and those less helpless than himself, while he was trying to reach the pool, would step down before him.

But his long season of disappointed hope and helplessness draws to an end: "Jesus saith unto him, Rise, take up thy bed, and walk." The cure was instantaneous. He rises, and carries the bed on which he had been borne, as an evidence of the completeness of his cure. He was expecting

¹ Trench, "Notes on the Miracles," p. 205.

to be healed by the water, and appears to have had no knowledge of Christ until now. His impotency of nearly forty years standing, as far as human means were concerned, was altogether hopeless; but his cure, at the word of Christ, was immediate and perfect. This was a genuine and most wonderful miracle, wrought at a pool in the midst of a large company of the diseased, where an angel, if we are to accept the incorporated scholion as expressing a popular belief, was expected to descend and impart miraculous virtue to the water.

It was the Jewish Sabbath when the miracle was wrought. The healed man was seen conveying his bed. "The Jews," that is to say, the party among the Jews who were particularly hostile to Jesus, the leaders or spiritual heads of the nation, rebuked the man for carrying his bed. He told them he was acting in accordance with the direction of him who had healed him; but he could not tell them who it was; he did not know so much as his name. Soon after, Jesus found the man in the Temple, and instructed him, and warned him to sin no more. The man, no doubt, in the simplicity of his heart, thinking it would contribute to the honor of one to whom he owed so much, went and told the Jews that it was Jesus who had made him whole. But the miracle was nothing, in their estimation; and they sought to varnish over their enmity to Christ with a professed zeal for the Sabbath. "Woe unto you, scribes, Pharisees, hypocrites!"

As to the significance or moral teaching of this miracle, as now explained, it seems, in the main, to be simply this — it seems fitted to exhibit the contrast between the baseless delusions and vain hopes of multitudes, when they discover their sad spiritual condition, and are prompted to seek deliverance, with the sure help which is to be found only in the great Saviour of the world. Many in the wastes of heathenism, under a deep sense of the evil and condemnation of sin, having no light, wander sadly from shrine to shrine, and from one sacred stream to another, seeking in vain to

wash away the pollution and guilt of sin. And too often those who have the light of Christianity, seem to prefer to seek some fountain which may be discovered to them in their philosophy, in their humanitarianism, or in their works, in which they may wash and be healed, rather than come to Christ and the fountain opened in him. They are like the crowd of blind, halt, and withered, waiting in the portico of ancient Bethesda for the legendary angel to descend and trouble its waters. They know not that he whom all angels worship, and to whom all diseases render prompt and willing obedience, is among them. This miracle seems designed to present—but we discover it not, till we separate the false from the genuine in the text—the Saviour of the world in striking contrast with all those false deities, supports, and helps which sinful men are fain to search out in seeking after peace of conscience and hope towards God.

ARTICLE VI.

THE DOCTRINE OF THE APOSTLES.

BY S. B. ASBURY, RESIDENT LICENCIATE AT ANDOVER.

[Continued.]

THE DISCOURSE OF STEPHEN.

Introduction.

STEPHEN may be recognized in his single speech as the immediate predecessor of Paul. We meet here with all those ideas which distinguish the doctrine of Paul from those already considered. It might be expected that the teaching of Jesus as to the profound antithesis between Law and Gospel would be apprehended and further developed by some believers prior to the conversion of Paul; and hence there is no reason to doubt the historical character of this discourse. A token of its genuineness has also been discovered in the circumstance that the expression “Son of

Man," used by Jesus himself, and still current in the infant church, occurs here for the last time in the New Testament.

The Fundamental Idea

of the discourse is the irreceptivity of the Jewish people in all periods towards the divine revelation. Their unbelief with respect to Christ is not isolated, but constantly repeated, and ends in their exclusion from the kingdom of God.

In Stephen's discourse, the imperfection of the Mosaic law and ritual is first expressly set forth, and the impending dissolution of the old covenant prophesied. While James, and Peter in the earlier period of his ministry, in accordance with their position towards the law and ritual, attributed to the believing Jews a certain preference over heathen converts, on account of their observance of the law, Stephen is the immediate predecessor of Paul in regarding this adherence to the legal point of view as only an imperfect stage of development, and in bringing into full consciousness the inadequacy of the Mosaic ritual. It was natural that this should be done first by a Hellenist, like Stephen; the Hellenists being naturally most inclined and adapted to apprehend and set forth the universal elements of Christianity.

THE DOCTRINE OF PAUL.

Introduction.

The Sources. The discourses of Paul recorded in the Acts, though presenting less of his peculiar view of Christian truth than the Epistles, are not without importance. Had it been the intention of the author of the book of Acts, as alleged by some modern critics, to approximate the teaching of Paul as much as possible to that of Peter, there would have been some difficulty in discriminating between them, whereas the differences are palpable even in the forms of presentation. Nor are the speeches of Paul made up from his Epistles, since between these, also, there is evident distinction, together with essential agreement.

All the Epistles are not equally important as sources of doctrine. For this purpose, the Epistles to the Romans, Galatians, 1 and 2 Corinthians, Ephesians, Colossians, and with reference to the *parousia* 1 and 2 Thessalonians. The Epistle to the Philippians, being chiefly hortatory, is of less weight, and the pastoral Epistles are of still less, referring only to the idea of the church. The Epistle to Philemon may be excluded from the list of sources. The Epistle to the Romans is the most important. Though it does not contain the apostle's whole doctrinal system, it takes us at once into its centre. The other Epistles rank in importance in the order in which they are mentioned.

The genuineness of the Pauline Epistles has been so generally acknowledged that there is no need of discussing the question. Those on which doubt has been cast are, moreover, the least important for our purpose. The internal evidence is all in favor of their authenticity. Whatever differences of view exist may be explained by the different occasions of the Epistles. The criticisms are of too indefinite and altogether negative a character to be worth consideration. The Epistles are also so connected and necessary to a full development of Pauline doctrine, that we must accept them entire.

The Apostle Paul's Historical Position in the Apostolic Church.

In devoting himself to missions to the heathen, and insisting on the recognition of heathen converts independently of the law, he may certainly be regarded as introducing a new stage of development, but not as acting in opposition to the previous apostles, or as originating a new idea; since Peter made the first step in this direction. The idea already existed; but it required an advocate of the profound and earnest nature of Paul to clothe it, as it were, in flesh and blood, and establish it as the doctrine of the church, as we find it in the age of John.

We should expect that the man for such a task would

be called from the circle of Stephen; but, as Neander remarks, it was not from the soft shell of Hellenistic culture, but from the hard kernel of Pharisaism, that the new spirit was to take its form. In order that he might contend successfully against the mingling of the Jewish legal and the free Christian spirit, it was necessary that he should know the former by experience, as well as the latter. The dialectic taste acquired by him in his education to be a learned expounder of the law and tradition, adapted him especially to develop the fundamental verities of the gospel in their living, organic connection.

The manner of his conversion, its suddenness, and the presence of the Redeemer himself, must have exercised great influence on the general character of his teaching. The death of Stephen seems, according to the Acts, only to have driven Paul further from the kingdom. The moderation of Gamaliel can hardly, as supposed by some, have contributed to his conversion. But that there was some preparation is implied in his vivid description of such a state of mind in Rom. vii., which could not have been so vividly described had it not been personally experienced.

His declarations in Gal. i. 12, 16 show that he was conscious of having received his knowledge of the gospel, not from the instructions of the older apostles, but directly from the Lord himself. This is confirmed by 1 Cor. ix. 1 and the account in Acts; the divergence of the latter being not such as to excite any suspicion of its authenticity. All the statements evidently refer to an objective fact, and not to an ecstatic vision, especially as the latter would have had no weight with others as a divine call to the apostolic office.

The complete separation of his old and new life by his conversion led Paul to regard redemption, not as the perfection of Old Testament revelation, but as a specifically new element in the revelation of God in Christ. As it was dark in his life, so it was dark in the whole period of history, before this revelation. But his life previously was under

the law; the principle of salvation is therefore presented by him as in opposition to the law. As the law was inadequate to produce the new life, the Jews, equally with the heathen, are in need of a Saviour. His apostleship to the Gentiles is thus closely connected with the manner of his conversion. Prior to this he *must* have persecuted the church, because he regarded Christ as the destroyer of the law and ritual. Those expressions of Christ which intimated the abrogation of the law made the deepest impression on his mind. When he accepted Jesus as the Messiah, he also adopted this view. The truth came to him not fragmentarily, yet as a whole it was capable of organic development.

Did he moderate his views in the latter portion of his life? He expressed them differently, according to the different occasions of the Epistles, but in his later Epistle to the Philippians the distinction between the Jewish and Christian points of view is drawn as sharply as in his letter to the Galatians.

But it was necessary not only to found a church independent of the law, but to preserve a living bond of union between the new church from the heathen and the original Jewish church. Paul was the author of tendencies which might have led to irreconcilable divisions. One of his great aims, therefore, is to bring about a community of feeling by inducing the Gentile converts to aid the poorer members of the Jewish churches, and to yield to the requirements of the law whenever this could be done without the infraction of principle (1 Cor. ix. 10).

There is no ground, either in the Acts or the Epistles, for the hypothesis that Paul and the other apostles were not on a good understanding with each other. The difference of his mode of presentation and type of doctrine from those of others is made no secret of; and yet he knows nothing of any opposition between them which would prevent their cordial co-operation. He is certainly at one with them in his secondary endeavor to show the connection of the old and new covenants, and the paedagogic character of the former.

Articulation of the Pauline System of Doctrine.

In the well-known work of Usteri on this subject,¹ it is presented under two main divisions, the period *before Christ*, and the period *after Christ*. But, as Schmid remarks, this division is altogether too indefinite, and fails to distinguish any common fundamental idea. Schmid's own division of the Pauline doctrine is into *The want of δικαιοσύνη in all men*, and *The production of δικαιοσύνη by faith in Jesus Christ*. This is essentially correct; but in his treatment of section first, he introduces the new element of the *divine action with respect to the want of righteousness*. Since the fundamental thought of the Pauline doctrine is that the righteousness which is striven for in vain on the legal point of view is freely bestowed in Christ, we have rather to present in our first section the doctrine that *the law cannot procure the righteousness which avails before God*, but in the second that *man obtains it by faith in Christ*. Thus a fundamental idea, the idea of δικαιοσύνη, is common to both sections. The object of endeavor is presented as the same under both dispensations; but the manner of attainment is different. All single doctrines adjust themselves naturally about this central point. In the first section, we have the anthropological elements, with a full development of the doctrine of sin; in the second, the Christological or soteriological.

The Fundamental Idea,

as given above, is not peculiar to Paul, but is found in the Gospels as presented by our Lord, and has its roots in the Old Testament. It is certainly most prominent in the Epistles to the Romans and Galatians, where Paul expresses it most explicitly. The greater prominence of the idea of life in some of the later Epistles is quite in accordance, as will be seen below, with the fundamental position of δικαιοσύνη.

¹ Entwicklung des Paulinischen Lehrbegriffes.

Since in the Old Testament, as Schmid remarks, the one fundamental relation of man is his relation to God, and every other is derived from this, *δικαιοσύνη* in the Old Testament designates righteousness, uprightness, integrity towards God. In so far as the will of God is expressed in the law, it designates that condition in which a man agrees to the requirements of the law, and in this it is involved that man is able to regard himself as righteous, and that he is acknowledged by God to be a righteous person. *Δικαιοσύνη* thus designates the state of highest moral perfection. As the divine will is the norm for the human will, the *δίκαιος* is he in whom the relation of dependence on the divine will is adequately realized. The immediate consequence of *δικαιοσύνη*, according to Paul, is *ζωή*, and as these two ideas are thus closely related, sometimes one, sometimes the other, is brought into the foreground in the Pauline Epistles. As the consequence of sin is condemnation, which is death, so the consequence of *δικαιοσύνη* is *ζωή*; and as the idea of death comprises at the same time moral and physical corruption, so the idea of life, according to the conception of Paul, comprises all salvation, both subjective and objective.

Paul distinguishes a twofold *δικαιοσύνη*, *ἰδία δικ.* (Rom. x. 3), and *δικ. θεοῦ* or *ἐκ θεοῦ* (Phil. iii. 9), or *ἐνώπιον τοῦ θεοῦ* and *παρὰ τῷ θεῷ* (Rom. ii. 13; iii. 20). The former being such as man may attain by his own efforts; the latter expressions designate such as is attributed to man by God. The law may conduct to the former, but not to the latter. That righteousness alone has any value which is acknowledged as such by God, and he can acknowledge that only which proceeds from him, which is *ἐκ θεοῦ*. There are two ways in which one may strive after *δικαιοσύνη*, one in which the divine acknowledgment is obtained as the reward of merit; the other in which he despairs of bringing any merits before God, and expects *δικ.* from the divine grace alone. The two methods exclude each other. Paul had tried them both, and his doctrine is thus closely connected with his experience.

SECTION FIRST. — By the Deeds of the Law no Man can be Justified before God.

The Universality of Sin in the Human Race.

The idea that all men are wanting in righteousness before God is found in the other apostolic doctrine, but is expressly developed only by Paul. He treats it in the Epistle to the Romans as a matter of experience, leaving it to the conscience of each to include himself in this experience. The Jews and Greeks being the representatives of the human race, the case of all must be that of either the one people or the other. He begins, in his demonstration, with the heathen, as the proof was easier in their case than in that of the Jews; their sin exhibiting itself generally in more striking forms.

In order to prove that this want of righteousness is a guilty one, the apostle refers back to a state in which even the heathen were in possession of a real knowledge of God. Heathenism is not a lower stage of religious development, but real perversion and extinction of the religious consciousness; and this presupposes an original possession of the truth (Rom. i. 18). All that might be known of God the heathen had known; their knowledge resting on God's own revelation of himself in his works and in the human conscience. From these the divine omnipotence and deity (*δύναμις* and *θειότης*) might be known, but not without an original God-consciousness. But the *καρδία*, the centre of spiritual life, being estranged from God, this higher knowledge, which the heathen once had, has been gradually suppressed, and their present condition is one of complete but guilty ignorance of the divine will, which must result in the prevalence of sin and idolatry. Paul does not mention the influence of evil spirits in producing this state of things, evidently because he would restrict himself to the realm of experience. If the word *δαιμόνια*, in 1 Cor. x. 20, 21, is to be understood, not in the Hellenistic, but the usual New Testament sense, of evil spirits, it would follow that Paul

shared the opinion of the Jews of idols, as evil spirits which could procure the worship of men. It would then be implied in 1 Cor. viii. 4; x. 19, that he denies reality to the idols only *as such*. Nothing, however, prevents us from understanding *δαιμόνια* in the usual Hellenistic sense; and since, as is clear from *δεισιδαιμονεστέροις* (Acts xvii. 22), he uses this word in this sense, and since the passages above cited most naturally lead to the view that he ascribed reality to the idols only in the conception of the heathen, we cannot regard it as certain that Paul shares the view designated.

The speeches of Paul in the Acts agree with Rom. i. as to the ability of the heathen to perform the task required of them (Acts xvii. 27), the original communion of man with God, and consequent sin of his ignorance, and that, notwithstanding their perversity, God has repeatedly manifested his goodness to the heathen (Acts xiv. 17. Compare Rom. ii. 4).

Paul does not hold that sin has destroyed all susceptibility of the divine among the heathen. He supposes such a susceptibility to exist, though slumbering, as he ascribes to the heathen the possibility of a relative fulfilment of the law (Rom. ii. 14, 26), and a striving after union with God as lying at the foundation of their worship of the one unknown Supreme (Acts xvii. 23), and finds some germs of truth even in the folly of heathen wisdom and poetry (Acts xvii. 28).

The Jews also have no righteousness before God. They also are the objects of his wrath. The possession of the law makes no difference in their relation to God, but increases their guilt, as it is not, like the law in the heart, exposed to the disturbing influences of sin. Sin being thus the reigning principle in all men, all differences vanish in view of the ideal of righteousness.

Sin as Bias. While James and Peter restrict their view to actual sins, Paul refers to the sinful state lying back of all sinful desires and actions. He comprises both *actual* and *habitual* sin under the word *ἀμαρτία*. Man finds this evil propensity within him on the first awaking of his moral

consciousness (Rom. vii. 9) ; it is this which radically determines his whole inner life, which opposes his fulfilling of the law, and frustrates all his higher resolutions.

The Seat of Sin is, according to Paul, the *σάρξ*. We must distinguish the physical and ethical ideas of *σάρξ*, explaining the latter by the former, and by the trichometrical division of human nature into *σῶμα*, *ψυχή*, and *πνεῦμα*, which is found in some passages of Paul's Epistles. *Σάρξ*, in the physical sense, designates primarily the matter of which the *σῶμα*, which is organized *σάρξ*, consists ; but in a wider sense comprises both *σῶμα* and *ψυχή*, and is opposed to *πνεῦμα* (2 Cor. vii. 1). Since the idea of the sinful is closely connected with the idea of the earthly and perishable, *σάρξ* derives its ethical sense from its physical. According to Paul, sin has deeply penetrated into the present physical organism, so that motives to sin continually proceed from it, and *σαρκικός* may be regarded as equivalent to sinful.

It must not, however, be supposed that Paul attributes sin to the present *corporeity* of man. This would be inconsistent with Christ's assumption of a human body and the destination of the body to eternal glory. It might be ascribed to the unrestrained dominion of the sensuous over the spiritual part of man, which is charged against man as guilt, and for which he is subject to punishment. But the antithesis of *σάρξ* and *πνεῦμα* is not identical with this opposition of the sensuous and spiritual in man. *Σάρξ* has a more comprehensive reference than to the sins which spring from the bodily nature. Sin, in its highest forms, is found in spirits which have no bodies. There is a *σοφία σαρκική*. Paul even ascribes an ascetic tendency to the *σάρξ* (Col. ii. 18, 23), and regards the deepest root of evil as confidence in one's own strength, and in striving after *ἰδία δικαιοσύνη*. He refers mainly to those sins which spring from the senses, because these are manifest even in a regenerate person, and because they were most prevalent in his day.

Death the Recompence of Sin.

All the evil which God has connected with sin is included in death. The idea is a comprehensive one, comprising spiritual, physical, and eternal death.

The first element is *spiritual deadness* — *spiritual misery*, which is inseparably connected with sin (Rom. vi. 16; vii. 10; viii. 8; 2 Cor. ii. 16; iii. 6). This is that condition in which the moral impulses in man are extinguished, and the higher life is suppressed by the lower. The idea does not necessarily include conscious unhappiness. It is capable of degrees. The extinction takes place gradually. During life there is a possibility of restoration; but if a man perseveres in sin to its close, the capacity for good becomes totally extinct, and the condition of eternal death is entered upon, to which Paul refers in 2 Cor. ii. 16, in the words *εἰς θάνατον*. This is the perfect form of the spiritual death already begun, and is the second element in Paul's conception.

The third element is physical death, the violent separation of soul and body. That Paul regarded this as the immediate consequence of sin may be seen from the reference of Rom. v. 12 to the representations of Genesis, and from 1 Cor. xv. 21, 22; Rom. viii. 10. It is the feeling of guilt which gives death its terror (2 Cor. v. 4), but it does not follow that Paul regarded only the peculiar manner of death as the consequence of sin. Man is not necessarily mortal, but the fact of death is due to sin. There may be translation without death (2 Cor. v. 4); there will be at the *parousia* (1 Cor. xv. 52).

Mortality as the consequence of sin is mirrored also in nature (Rom. viii. 19). *Κτίσις* alone cannot designate unredeemed humanity, nor can the apostle ascribe to this a longing from the beginning of the world for the consummation of God's kingdom; nor can he describe the fall as involuntary (v. 20), or the redemption of the heathen as taking place at the same time with the glorification of the

sons of God (v. 21), without mentioning the conditions. It is certainly the teaching of Paul that nature needs a purification, as well as man; for such a present condition of nature is alone suitable for sinful man as mirrors his own internal dissension.

The Origin of Sin and Death.

From the whole tenor of Rom. v. 12-21, compared with 1 Cor. xv. 21, it follows that Paul regards the universal dominion of death (and sin) as the consequence of the sin of the first man. The transgressions of individuals cannot be regarded as the primary cause of death in man; since death takes place in those whose moral consciousness has not been awakened. Paul traces not only actual sin, but the *habitus* from which sin proceeds, to the sin of Adam, and in Rom. vii. 7, he designates this predisposition as *ἀμαρτία*.

Paul does not expressly state the nature of the connection between the first man and his posterity; but it is evident that, as sin is predisposition, it could not have spread from the force of example, but from the natural increase of the human race. Is the sin of the first man, according to Paul, reckoned by God to all others as guilt? This would be the case, if all men took part in it. But the grammatical impossibility of that rendering of the words ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἡμαρτον on which this view is founded follows from the fact that, even if it were possible to take ἐφ' ᾧ for *in quo*, it must be referred to the nearest subject, *θάνατος*, and not to the remote, *ἐνός ἀνθρώπου*. Moreover, if according to verse 13, the imputation of actual sins to the heathen must be restricted, because they were not in possession of the Mosaic law, certainly no imputation of a sinful bias derived from Adam can be spoken of as guilt.

According to Paul, then, the first original cause of the death of all men is the sin of Adam; the secondary cause, the sinning of the men themselves. All men having strengthened their sinful bias by the concurrence of their

will, they may account death as the punishment of their own transgressions.

Sin entered *humanity* only by the sin of the first man. It was already present in the universe; and there is a close connection between the sin of man and the sphere of evil lying above humanity. Though not in the first part of Romans, the apostle refers to this connection frequently elsewhere. He designates by an expression borrowed from Jewish theology all those relations which are not penetrated by the relation to God as *αἰὼν οὐτος*, concerning which all that is doubtful is whether this period extends to the second, or only the first, advent of Christ. As there are passages favoring both views, we may perhaps combine them. The *αἰὼν* begins to cease with the first advent, but does so entirely only with the second. It is dependent on a super-terrestrial kingdom of evil, all of which is also dependent on one higher spirit, who is the wicked one, *καὶ ἐξοχόν*. This kingdom of darkness is also called a kingdom *of the air* (Eph. ii. 2) and *in heaven* (vi. 12), which expressions are evidently not to be taken literally.

The Law and Sin.

When the apostle speaks of the inability of the law to produce a new life, he refers primarily to the positive Mosaic law, and to this in its whole circumference. For he makes no sharp distinction between the ritual and ethical parts of the law. He sometimes refers more particularly to one than the other; but it is not to be supposed that in denying a justifying efficacy to the law he means simply the ritual. He places by the side of the Mosaic law the moral law written in the heart, as essentially of the same import. It is owing to the obscuration of this that the Mosaic legislation confers so great an advantage on the Jews over the heathen.

In denying justifying efficacy to the works of the law, Paul understands, not those works which the law requires, but those which it is able to produce in man in his state of

sin. The gospel is not a new law, but a new power. The incapacity of the law to justify is due to the evil disposition of man. In Rom. vii. 7 sq. the apostle distinguishes two stages in the moral development of the unregenerate life — a state of comparative innocence, in which man, being ignorant of the higher moral norm, is not conscious of the slumbering evil within him; and the state in which the latent depravity is roused and strengthened by the application of the law.

The first object for which the law was given is the *knowledge of sin*, not in that degree in which the heathen possess it, but a deeper, more penetrating knowledge (*ἐπίγνωσις*, Rom. iii. 20). The second object is regarded by Paul as the multiplication of particular transgressions of the law. This is the actual result of its prohibitions, and is regarded, according to the teleological manner of the scriptures, as the object of the law. The disease of sin is more easily cured when brought to outward manifestation. The third object, *a reaction against sin*, appears to be in some contradiction to the second. It is, however, the rendering of the passage (Gal. vii. 19) best suited to the context. The law as a *παιδαγωγός*, by the terrors of divine punishment, hinders man somewhat from abusing his freedom. This limiting effect is seen in the superiority of the Jews over the heathen. But had this been its only effect, man might have been led into self-delusion as to his real condition, whereas, by producing outward transgressions, it brings to light his inward depravity, and shows its own inefficiency as a means of justification. The *provisory* character of the law clearly follows. Bringing men into bondage, it awakens in them a longing for deliverance, and prepares the way for a new economy (Gal. ii. 19).

The legal relation of man to God is not the original. The *promise* has the priority, and the possession of the promise is the greatest advantage which distinguishes the Jews from the heathen (Rom. iv.; Gal. iii.).

SECTION SECOND.—Man is Justified before God only by Faith in Christ.

The Fulness of Times. The Person of Christ.

The redemption of humanity by Christ is the goal of all previous history. The heathen were prepared for this event, though in a less effective manner than the Jews (Rom. ii. 4; Acts xiv. 17). The manner of this redemption, however, though intimated in prophecies, may yet be said to have remained hidden in the divine counsel till the appearance of Christ.

With regard to the *person* of Christ, we may distinguish between the doctrine of Paul's earlier and his later Epistles, not, however, so as to find any contradiction between them, as some have done. The Christology of the earlier Epistles is simply less developed than that of the later. In the former, the Deity of Christ is nowhere explicitly stated, but is frequently implied. He is distinguished clearly from other men, as having assumed only the *ὁμοίωμα* of the sinful *σάρξ* (Rom. viii. 3), and as being perfectly sinless (2 Cor. v. 21; Rom. v. 19), and from the first man as being *ἐξ οὐρανοῦ*, and being, instead of a *ψυχὴ ζῶσα*, a *πνεῦμα ζωοποιοῦν* (1 Cor. xv. 45–47). The essential equality of Christ with God is implied in the designation of Christ as *the Spirit* (2 Cor. iii. 17). The use of the word *ἐξαπέστειλεν* in Gal. iv. 4 is also significant, and the contrast of his conditions of poverty and riches (2 Cor. viii. 9). In 1 Cor. viii. 6, a participation in the creation of the world is ascribed to Christ, and in 1 Cor. x. 4, in the conduct of the Jewish people.

In the later Epistles to the Philippians and Colossians, the Christology is much more developed. In Phil. ii. 6, 7, Paul distinguishes the condition in which Christ was in perfect dependence on God from that in which he was in full possession of the divine power and glory, which, like his being rich (2 Cor. viii. 9), must have been before his incarnation, as expressed also in Col. ii. 9. As, according to the last passage, Christ was already equal to God, *εἶναι ἴσα θεῷ*

must refer to his recognition and adoration on the part of all creatures, and it will be preferable to render οὐχ ἀρπαγμὸν ἡγήσατο as Schmid does, *he did not regard the εἶναι ἴσα θεῷ as what he wished selfishly to retain for himself*. In the passage where Paul has most developed his doctrine of the person of Christ, he designates him as εἰκὼν τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ ἀοράτου (Col. i. 15), which must be understood not of the historical Christ, but of his condition before his appearance in the flesh, as Paul does not speak of the former till verse 18. The conception is that God himself, being invisible, becomes manifest to the world in Christ. This is also the idea expressed in σωματικῶς, Col. ii. 9. The fullness of the Deity took upon it a definite form in the Son. By προτότοκος πάσης κτίσεως also we are to understand, with Schmid, that this absolute image of the invisible God in an absolute manner opened the path of life for the whole creation. It does not indicate his relation to God as the first being created by him. It is further explained by ἐν αὐτῷ ἐκτίσθη, which denotes that he is the ideal ground of all existence. It is common to both the earlier and later Epistles that Christ is apprehended before his appearance in the flesh as *not* a creature. It would then be perfectly consistent for Paul to speak of Christ directly as God; and it is most probable, though not certain, that he does so in Rom. ix. 5. The only other passage to which we can appeal is Tit. ii. 13, on account of the absence of the article before σωτήρος and the primary reference of ἐπιφάνεια to Christ, were not the designation of Christ as ὁ μέγας θεός evidently un-Pauline.

When Paul speaks of the incarnate Christ, he distinguishes the condition of *perfect dependence on God*, in which Christ renounces the possession (not merely the use) of the divine power and glory, and that in which he has returned to this possession (2 Cor. xiii. 4). The first reaches its acme in the death, the second begins with the resurrection, of Christ. He also refers to a third condition, — that before his incarnation. The state after his exaltation to the Father is dis-

tinguished from this, in that his human nature then takes part in his divine glory (Phil. iii. 21), and that he is then confessed and extolled as the Author of a new life (Phil. ii. 9-11). It is noteworthy that whenever Paul sets forth the human nature of Christ, he always intimates at the same time his *divine dignity*. So in Rom. i. 3, 4; viii. 3; Phil. ii. 7, 8.

The Work of Christ. His Death and Resurrection.

By Christ the *δικαιοσύνη*, which could not be effected by the law, is to become the actual possession of humanity. As man, being unable to fulfil the law, is exposed to the *wrath* of God and its consequence — death (Eph. ii. 3), the work of Christ is to *afford the propitiation demanded by the law*, and to *communicate a new life*. Both sides are set forth by Paul as the effect of the *death* of Christ, to which the resurrection is supplementary. The *prophetic office* of Christ is left quite in the background. It is, indeed, doubtful if Paul once mentions it, as Eph. ii. 17 may be referred to the preaching of the apostles.

Paul does not regard Christ's *perfect fulfilment of the law* as substitutionary. He always refers the forgiveness of sins to his death. The one act of righteousness (ἐν δικαίῳμα), in Rom. v. 18, is evidently also his self-sacrifice. The view of the substitutionary character of Christ's *sufferings* is not peculiar to Paul, nor his view of his death as the *blood of the covenant* (1 Cor. v. 7; xi. 25). The first is found in Peter; the latter in the synoptic Gospels. But the idea of an expiatory sacrifice is peculiarly Pauline, though he only mentions it expressly in one passage (Eph. v. 2).

As death is the punishment of sin, the expiation of sin can be accomplished only by one in whom death is not the consequence of his own sin, freely submitting to it. In so far as Christ, the representative of entire humanity, bore this suffering, his suffering may be regarded by God as that of entire humanity. In so far as he suffered the punishment of sin did he offer the expiation demanded by the law. It

is, however, presupposed that men themselves appropriate the substitutionary sufferings of the Son of God, and break off from their whole past life of sin. In Rom. viii. 3, which contains essentially the same thought as Gal. iii. 13; 2 Cor. v. 21, sin is said to be "*condemned*", i.e. destroyed, viz. by the forgiveness of sins, *in the flesh*, i.e. by the sufferings of Christ in his human nature. In Rom. iii. 25, which is the chief passage containing Paul's doctrine of the death of Christ, the idea is expressed most definitely that the sufferings borne by the Son of God at the same time manifested the divine holiness (righteousness in the wider sense). In the period before Christ man's sins had not been fully punished; such a manifestation of holiness was therefore necessary. It is also shown how in the work of redemption his holiness was in harmony with his love.

The Atonement. While ἀπολύτρωσις in the narrower sense designates only the deliverance from the guilt of the old life, the idea of καταλλαγή includes also the inauguration of a new relation to God. God, not Christ, according to 2 Cor. v. 19, is he who reconciles humanity to himself. But καταλλαγή is further, as Schmid remarks, "an application of the objective occurrence to the believing subject." The man who appropriates the atonement has thus renounced his enmity towards God. According to Paul's teaching, this change in the relation of man to God presupposes a change in the relation of God to man; otherwise he can ascribe no objective reality to the *wrath* of God. The *love* of God was previously restrained by sin, now it can be freely communicated to man.

By the death of Christ *the law is abrogated*, both in its ritual and ethical parts; not, however, by being made void, but by being fulfilled (Rom. iii. 31). It is clear that with respect to the ethical part, the abrogation is of the form, not of the substance. Its fulfilment is now first become possible (Rom. viii. 4). The motive for this is no longer taken from the letter of the law. The expiation required having been made, the law can no longer exclude from communion with God.

The effect of Christ's death is regarded by Paul as not merely the *forgiveness of sin*, but the *destruction of its power* in man. The transition of man from his state of sin is due to the life-communion with Christ, which is the result of faith in his death and participation in his expiatory sufferings.

The prominence of the *resurrection* in Paul's doctrine may be ascribed to the deep impression made on him by the appearance of the risen Lord at his conversion. He regards it primarily as the divine confirmation of the atoning death of Christ — the guarantee that it is accepted (1 Cor. xv. 17; Rom. iv. 25). As Christ, moreover, always acts as the representative of humanity, believers, by virtue of their communion with him, will partake in his resurrection and in the blessedness and glory of which it forms the commencement. With Christ's resurrection is inseparably connected, in Paul's view, his exaltation to the Father; and with this his sending of the Spirit and bestowal of gifts (Eph. iv. 8). As the Head of the church his constant mediation is necessary; the appropriation of his atonement by mankind being also due to his intercession (Rom. viii. 34).

In tracing redemption to a divine *Trinity*, Paul is distinguished from Peter in that in his doctrine he proceeds from an *economic* to an *immanent* Trinity (2 Cor. xiii. 14; 1 Cor. xii. 4-6; Eph. iv. 4-6). As Neander remarks, it has essentially a practical and historical basis. It is in a practical religious way, through the mediation of redemption by Christ, that we obtain the idea; but it is not simply a trinity of revelation. Paul refers to the immanent relation of the Son to the Father, in Col. i. 13, 15, where he calls him the Son of his love, and his exact image. The Spirit is also spoken of in the same connection with the Father and the Son, and personality is ascribed to him, in 1 Cor. xii. 11, "as he *will*." In 1 Cor. ii. 11, also, the Spirit of God is distinguished from God himself.

Redemption and its Appropriation.

Paul speaks of redemption as both present and future.

Believers are now sons of God, and yet their sonship is a subject of hope. According to Gal. v. 5, this is the case even with the perfection of *δικαιοσύνη*. Present salvation consists in the forgiveness of sin and the communication of a new divine life.

The *appropriation* of redemption is represented by Paul as due to divine grace. The divine activity is so emphasized as apparently to exclude the human. Man's part is, however, necessarily inferred from the other teachings of the apostle. He sets forth the divine operations in order in Rom. viii. 29, 30. He further distinguishes sanctification from justification in 1 Cor. i. 30; vi. 11.

Election. Paul teaches with special emphasis that the redemption of Christ is for all men, without distinction. The final cause of the failure on the part of some to obtain it is to be found in the divine counsel. Some are eternally chosen and predestinated to salvation; but no decree of reprobation is mentioned, unless the hating of Esau, in Rom. ix. 13, be thus interpreted. Paul's doctrine of predestination, however, cannot be that man's sin is included in the divine decree; for this would contradict his entire teaching elsewhere as to God's judgment and punishment of sin. It is evident that Paul regards the election of believers as conditioned by a foreseen moral susceptibility, as he finds the final ground of the rejection of the Jews in their unbelief (Rom. xi. 20), and designates this unbelief as guilty (xi. 18-21). This statement is not refuted by the hardening of man being regarded as a divine act, and not mere permission of sin; for it always presupposes obstinate unbelief. Nor can an appeal be made to Rom. ix. 16, since, in accordance with Paul's teaching elsewhere, it refers only to that perverse behavior of man in claiming justification as the result of his own performances. It may also be questioned whether such a statement as that in Rom. xi. 32 can be reconciled with a doctrine of unconditional predestination.

Calling is the realization of the eternal counsel in time. It comprises the offering of salvation on the part of God,

and its actual acceptance on the part of man, which is also traced to divine influence. *Called*, in the Pauline sense, are those only who have really accepted the divine call in the preaching of the gospel.

Justification is the immediate consequence of such a believing acceptance of the gospel (Rom. viii. 30). The declaration of man as righteous in the juridical sense, and the production of righteousness by the Holy Spirit are two ideas so distinct that they cannot possibly, as Lipsius thinks,¹ be designated by Paul in the same words and at the same time. To take justification in the latter sense is to confound it with sanctification. That it is to be understood in the juridical sense is evident from its antithesis being condemnation (Rom. v. 18; viii. 33), from Paul himself explaining *δικαιοῦν* by *λογίζεσθαι εἰς δικαιοσύνην* (Rom. iv. 3, 5, 6), and from the additions *παρὰ τῷ θεῷ, ἐνώπιον τοῦ θεοῦ*. In this sense, also, it is used in the Old Testament, in the discourses of our Lord, and by James. The Pauline idea of justification does not comprise the relation of sonship in believers, for this presupposes the operation of the Spirit of God in the heart, of which forgiveness of sin is the condition. It is true that faith is ascribed to the act of God; but this must be regarded as distinct from the progressive influence of sanctification.

Sanctification, as distinct from justification, is the communication of divine power for the production of a new life in man, which necessarily presupposes on the part of man the consciousness of his new relation to God. The act of justification is a single one; but, as sin is not wholly destroyed, it has to be continually appropriated anew, and so the communication of the Spirit is constantly renewed; every further communication, however, depending on the use made by man of the power already granted him. By the abuse of the means of grace he may lose the new life altogether. It is the Spirit who produces consciousness of forgiveness from which springs that grateful love towards

¹ Die Paulinische Rechtfertigung's Lehre. 1853.

God which is the soul of the whole Christian life. The Spirit is thus the sure confirmation of the expiation effected by the death of Christ — the seal and pledge, and, with reference to the perfection of God's kingdom, its *first fruits* (Rom. viii. 23).

Faith.

Paul presents a much profounder development of the idea of faith than the other apostles. When he distinguishes (Rom. iv.) the faith of Abraham from that of believers in Christ, it is only as differing in the object, not in subjective character. Faith is not perception by the senses, for it relates to the supersensuous; nor is it intellectual cognition. It is founded in the love towards God still lingering in sinful humanity, and has its seat in the heart. It is not historical credence, but such a trust in God as triumphs over outward appearances and inward doubts, and can therefore be ascribed to Abraham, although he was a sinner (τὸν ἀσεβῆ, Rom. iv. 5). In faith man opens himself to the reception of a new life, which is gradually but surely perfected. In anticipation of this future perfection, faith may then be accounted unto him for righteousness.

Faith, as peculiarly Christian, consists, according to Paul, in this — that man, overcoming the doubts of divine grace which spring from the consciousness of guilt, feels that his sin is expiated by the death of Christ, and, the wall of separation between himself and God being removed, he is received into the relation of sonship. It presupposes despair of rendering one's self acceptable to God by his own merits, which proceeds from a *change of mind*, and leads to a real possession of new life in communion with Christ.

When Paul makes justification depend on faith in opposition to works, he has primarily in view the works of the law. Faith which does not *work* by love has no value in the sight of God (Gal. v. 6). Still it is faith as apprehending the divine grace, not as the root of the new life, which is said to justify. Even the works of faith are imperfect, and therefore inadequate to satisfy the demands of the law.

According to the two objects of faith, the death and resurrection of Christ, two sides of the idea are to be distinguished. The former is the ground of justification; the latter of the living communion with the risen Saviour, which is represented in different forms, but always as internal and immediate. From Rom. viii. 10, 11 it is, however, plain that this vital communion with Christ is regarded as the same with the indwelling of the Holy Spirit.

As Christ is made to men not only righteousness, but wisdom (1 Cor. iv. 30), and as the treasures of wisdom and knowledge are hidden in him (Col. ii. 3), Paul mentions *gnosis* in distinction from faith. It is the product of the new life, and thus has its root in faith, but also exercises a purifying and animating influence over these (Col. i. 9, 10; Phil. i. 9). Faith constantly needs enlightening and purifying; so there is no period in the early life of believers when knowledge has become perfect.

In 1 Cor. xiii. 13, Paul speaks of love as greater than faith. By this we are not to understand that the former is the root of the latter, for, as love in its peculiar Christian sense is produced only by the love of God displayed in the atonement, the reverse is the case. The same relation is borne by faith to hope. These three comprise all the virtues of the Christian life (Col. iii. 14; Gal. v. 14; vi. 2; Rom. xiii. 9, 10). All increase of this life depends on the increase of faith (1 Thess. iii. 10; 2 Thess. i. 3, 11; 2 Cor. x. 15). As the power of sin is not altogether destroyed by the new creation, there is danger even of believers returning again into bondage (1 Cor. ix. 27; x. 12); but there is a state of perfect maturity to which they attain by continued purification of the new life (Eph. iv. 13, 14). Thus the *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ*, which is at first only a pronouncing just, becomes at last complete deliverance from sin, and perfect dominion of the divine principle.

As, according to Paul, to live under sin and under the law are identical conceptions, with the destruction of sin the law also is abrogated; not, however, in its eternal ele-

ments. It is now, indeed, fulfilled ; but, as the new life is not produced by it, this is spoken of as in opposition to life under the law, and its works, notwithstanding their imperfection, are regarded as *good* works.

The Kingdom of God. The Church.

While the church consists only of redeemed men, the kingdom of God, according to Paul, includes the higher world of spirits, and continues after the second coming of Christ. It is also invisible, while the church is visible. Paul distinguishes two invisible kingdoms — that of darkness and that of light. By his redemption man is brought out of connection with the former into connection with the latter. The spirit of Christ being a spirit of love, its possession brings believers into communion with each other, and forms them into the body of Christ. All members must possess this spirit, though not all in the same degree. Notwithstanding all individual differences, the church is but one. The apostle knows of but *one* temple of God, *one* body of Christ, *one* bride of the Lord. But this unity is purely internal (Eph. iv. 4-7). It is the basis of the church's development, but is also (vs. 13) designated as the object towards which it strives. The church is holy ; but it does not therefore follow that it consists only of those who are perfect, but of those in whom dwells the Holy Spirit. In 1 Tim. iii. 15, the church is called the "pillar and ground of the truth" The infallibility here ascribed to it does not imply that of all its members, but the higher illumination of their minds. This holy church is also *universal*, comprising all, without distinction of age or condition. Those who are excluded from it are so by their own fault. The church is ever developing, and therefore in the present state never possesses the fulness of Christ's Spirit. There is further an incongruity between the empirical character of the church and its ideal, in that some are connected with it who have never received the spirit of the new life, or through unwatchfulness have lost it. And this incongruity Paul repre-

sents as unavoidable in the present conditions of the church's development (2 Tim. ii. 10, 12). Paul does not himself distinguish between an inner and outer circle in the church, though such a distinction seems to be required, probably because it was of less importance in the apostolic age than at present.

The gifts of grace are various in different members; but, all being the products of the same Spirit, they are in subordination to the unity of the church, and are thus promotive of the church's interests (1 Cor. xii. 4-7). As the Spirit is, according to Paul, the glorifying principle of humanity, these gifts are the natural endowments of each, but purified from sin and exalted by the new life.

The church is distinguished from the kingdom of God by its visible means of grace, viz. *baptism* and the *Lord's supper*. Paul does not expressly distinguish these from all others; but such a distinction seems to be justified by 1 Cor. x. 2, 3 (and perhaps xii. 13). *Baptism* is the means of regeneration through the reception of the forgiveness of sins. It is connected with the impartation of the Spirit (Tit. iii. 5); it introduces to communion with other members (1 Cor. xii. 13), and with Christ himself (Gal. iii. 27). As faith is elsewhere represented as the condition of this communion, and faith presupposes a change of mind, a change of mind, in Paul's view, is always presupposed in baptism. In the apostolic age, baptism itself was a crucial test of a man's faith; it was not therefore necessary to dwell particularly on its conditions. The *Lord's supper* is not mentioned so frequently by Paul as baptism. It is connected with the forgiveness of sins in 1 Cor. x. 16. It is a grateful remembrance of deliverance by the death of Christ from the bondage of sin (1 Cor. xi. 24, 25); but, not merely so, it is also the repeated appropriation of the forgiveness of sin. It, as well as baptism, has a special reference to the *communion of believers* through the death of Christ. It is altogether foreign to Paul's doctrinal conceptions that either the rite of baptism or the supper has

any unconditional efficacy. According to 1 Cor. xv. 50, flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God; it is the Spirit alone which gives life (Rom. viii. 11).

The Consummation.

Individual believers immediately after death enter into a fuller and closer communion with the Lord than is possible here; but the perfection of this communion is attained only when the kingdom of God is consummated. This will be the case at the second coming of Christ; this, then, forms the centre of Paul's eschatology. It is evident that when he wrote his earlier Epistles he still cherished the hope that he would be alive at the second coming (1 Thess. iv. 15; 1 Cor. xv. 52). In the later period of his life he became convinced that he would not survive the *parousia*, and therefore turned his attention more to the condition of believers intervening between their death and the final judgment. The importance which he ascribes to the second coming might lead us to suppose that he regarded the intermediate state as one of imperfect communion and entire incorporeity. In the Epistles to the Thessalonians he comforts those who were troubled about the condition of the dead by reference to the *parousia*, not to the glory on which they would enter immediately after death. In passages like Rom. viii. 10, 38; xiv. 9, it is, however, implied that the communion with Christ is uninterrupted by death. In Phil. i. 23; 2 Cor. v. 8, Paul expresses his own expectation of such a communion in a higher degree. It is, therefore, its perfection which he connects with Christ's second coming.

The same may be understood concerning the spiritual body. In 2 Cor. v. 1, it is implied that this body is possessed by believers on their resurrection, though not perfected till the *parousia*. In 1 Cor. xv. 35-54, Paul sets forth the unity of this body with the present, as well as its diversity from it. It is the *σῶμα*, not the *σάρξ* and *αἷμα*, which is glorified (vs. 50).

The second advent will be sudden and unexpected; there

is, however, preparation for it in the course of development of the kingdom of God. The conversion of the Jews is to precede it, and may be recognized as a sign of its nearness (Rom. xi. 15). The forces which are hostile to the kingdom will be conquered only by Christ himself at his coming (1 Cor. xv. 24). Previous to this these forces will make a last determined effort against the kingdom, under the leadership of a single personality who is designated Antichrist (2 Thess. ii. 3). Paul seems to have understood by this some power existing in his time, the full revelation of which was then hindered; but to what power he refers we have no means of determining.

As in 1 Cor. xv. 23 the *parousia* is only the initial point of Christ's activity in the consummation of his kingdom, there will be some time intervening between it and the end. In this period will take place the conquest of all his enemies and the final judgment. Does Paul regard the work of redemption as concluded when all without distinction have become partakers of eternal life? Or does he teach that a part of mankind, persistently rejecting the divine grace, will be thus finally excluded from the kingdom of God? The judgment presupposes the existence of both classes of men. But, in accordance with Paul's doctrine, a further development may take place subsequent to the judgment. In Rom. xi. 32, what is primarily said of nations appears to be extended to individuals. The object declared in Phil. ii. 10, 11 seems to be designated elsewhere as to be actually attained in the future (1 Cor. xv. 22; Rom. v. 19). The doctrine of the restoration of those who did not believe in Christ during their earthly life is certainly not distinctly and expressly taught, but only intimated, and it is not difficult to perceive the divine wisdom in not having granted us a fuller revelation on this subject. If it be objected that such a view of restitution must include wicked spirits, the passage Col. i. 20 may be referred to, where Paul apparently speaks of these as to be "reconciled," a term applied by him only to those who have been alienated by sin and guilt, not

to those who are simply imperfect. As Neander remarks: "A magnificent prospect is thus presented of the final triumph of the work of redemption, which was first opened to the mind of the great apostle in the last stage of his Christian development by means of that love which impelled him to sacrifice himself for the salvation of mankind."¹

The seat of the consummated kingdom of God Paul regards as the glorified earth (Rom. viii. 19-22). As the body of man is not to be completely destroyed, but to be glorified, so with this terrestrial κόσμος. The relation of believers to God, as long as sin is not yet destroyed, is only through the mediation of Christ; but after they are glorified into his image, this mediation is no longer necessary, and Christ will give back to God the power which he received for the redemption of humanity and the establishment of the divine kingdom (1 Cor. xv. 28).

ARTICLE VII.

RECENT THEORIES ON THE ORIGIN OF LANGUAGE.

BY REV. JOHN O. MEANS, BOSTON HIGHLANDS.

How did man first come to speak? Was it instinctive and spontaneous, as soon as he was fairly afloat? Or was there a prolonged period when man was mute, or uttered inarticulate animal cries, from which he slowly learned to speak? If he learned, who taught him? Did he teach himself—invent speech by the natural exercise of his faculties working upon the materials around him? Or did some superior teach infant man at first, as subsequently some superior has taught every infant who has learned to speak?

How he came by the marvellous possession of language is one of the most interesting and important, as it is one of the

¹ History of the Planting of Christianity, Vol. i. p. 531 (Bohn's ed.).

most difficult, questions which science is trying to answer. New significance attaches to the various theories now, because of the direct bearing of them upon the larger problem of the origin of the human race, and its antiquity which are the problems of to-day. Those who hold that language is of purely human invention assume vast antiquity as indisputable; and if their view is correct, it is, in turn, a specific and conclusive proof of vast antiquity of the race. Then, as to the origin of mankind, the theory that we came up into the possession of language out of a mute state is a weighty contribution to Mr. Darwin's doctrine. In fact, Professor Whitney, one of the most recent and able supporters of this theory, scarcely disguises his leaning to Darwinism.

Scientific men do not pretend to have reached solid conclusions on this subject. We are as yet in the region of speculative theories. With one voice the eminent philologists confess that their investigations do not reveal the origin of language. Some of them honestly declare that linguistic researches never can reveal the origin; that this necessarily lies beyond the scope and outside the range of purely philological inquiries; that, however they push towards the beginning, touch it they never can. Ernest Renan places it among the things which are ante-historical, and which must remain so. Max Müller declares that it is not for the philologist to pronounce upon the point, and proposes to take no definite ground himself. Professor Whitney says that, so far as any decision can be reached, the decision must be upon general considerations and analogies. While speaking thus, however, so fascinating is the question that no philologist is content to pass it by. Neither of these scholars refrains from arguing, and that dogmatically, in favor of his own theory. It is in a special treatise bearing the very title of "The Origin of Language," and devoted to the discussion and determination of this question, that M. Renan declares that the origin lies beyond the range of

¹ De L'Origine du Language. Par Ernest Renan Membre de L'Institut, (3me ed.). Paris, 1859.

historical scrutiny. Max Müller¹ in two of his most important volumes employs argument and ridicule to overthrow one theory and set up another. Professor Whitney,² in turn, in an able chapter of his admirable work, endeavors to demolish the theories of Renan and Müller, and to set up again that which they imagine they have demolished.

There are two possible methods in which primitive man may have come into possession of speech: He may have been taught it by some supernatural communication, interference, or provision special to this end; or he may have acquired it in the natural outplay and movement of his own faculties. The first method is discarded by the most recent writers. Differing among themselves, they are agreed in antagonism to anything properly supernatural in the commencement of speech. Most of them recognize divine supervision and providence, so far as endowing man with needful faculties and surrounding him with appropriate materials and motives for speech, while they deny a divine origin in any special sense. By nothing more distinctly miraculous than breathing and eating, constructing a house to shelter him, and wearing cloth to cover his body—in some purely human method—they severally maintain that language originated.

We will endeavor very briefly to state the theories by which, from the purely human plane, it is attempted to account for the first speaking of mankind, and what may be said for and against them severally.

We shall do well to begin with a sharp discrimination of the precise point of inquiry.

The question is not what is the origin of any one speech or language now in use. It is generally agreed that all existing languages are the results of growth and development; that, however they have come to differ, all can be traced up to three or two stocks, and possibly to one stock or family. Even Renan, who is singular in maintaining

¹ Lectures on the Science of Language. By Max Müller. London. 1861. Second Series. London. 1864.

² Language and the Study of Language. By Wm. Dwight Whitney. New York. 1868.

that the primitive speech was not one homogeneous language, or a few such languages, but manifold heterogeneous dialects; that dialects are not offshoots from uniformity, suckers, deteriorations, but the original stocks, which in process of ages have grown together and built themselves into a certain uniformity of structure, through the impact of historic movements,—Renan agrees with all others that there are certain germs or roots from which all tongues have grown. For instance, *day*, *dawn*, and their compounds, evidently have one origin, and may be easily traced back to it. The English *day*, moreover, is the German *tag*, the Latin *dies*; and we can still further track out these and other words in our modern tongues to a common Sanskrit home. If thus we should take the more than hundred thousand words in Webster's Dictionary, and reduce them to their primitives, the vast volume of English words would shrink as the mist shrinks in the sunlight. It is marvellous how small is the number of primitives in all languages. Hunt down the multitudinous winged words, four-footed beasts, and creeping things, which constitute the languages in possession of all the tribes of earth, past and present, and we find less than five hundred words, all told. There are but four or five hundred elements of all speech, "nuclei of gradual accretions," "entities representing a few of the most sensible phenomena in ourselves and nature." Now, what we wish to ascertain is, where these entities came from, how they became accepted as signs of thought and things. Whoever first spoke used, not necessarily these bald roots of speech, but possibly modifications of them, or of something like them. The question is: How did he happen to do it? How did his fellows come to understand him?

Still further, it is not about the faculty of speech, but the fact of speech, that we are in debate. It is conceded that man has a faculty of speech; that is, he is so constructed that he is capable of speech in appropriate circumstances. But what sets this speech faculty in motion? How and why did it come to utter certain articulations, and not others?

and how did the articulations of one man become comprehensible to another man?

There are two theories which propose to explain this on the purely human plane; in fact there are three, but the third is simply a combination of the two, and as the two are inconsistent with, and even antagonistic to, each other, the mixture of them, which Farrar attempts, is self-destructive.

The two theories have received, each from the friends of the other, the descriptive and felicitous nicknames, one, of the "ding-dong" theory, the other, of the "bow-wow and pooh-pooh" theory.

Both, as has been said, admit the divine origin of language in a general way, but deny it in any special sense — deny any distinctively supernatural interposition in it; maintain that the origin was wholly by natural processes. One theory, however, and here begins antagonism, holds that speech was by a spontaneous and unconscious effort; the other, that it was a conscious and voluntary contrivance to serve an end. One holds that it was preceded, at least need have been preceded, by no savagery of mutism; the other holds that man gradually came to speak, and probably after long pupilage in mutism. The ding-dong theory scouts the notion of a convention or agreement by which certain sounds were accepted as signs of thoughts and things, and maintains that thoughts and things echoed in sounds which of themselves and instinctively were intelligible to man primeval. The bow-wow theory scouts the ding-dong notion that sounds of themselves express sense, and maintains that by hearing and mimicking sounds in nature, and by instinctive cries, men came to an understanding by which they accepted certain sounds as signs for purposes of communication.

Let us hear now more particularly what each theory has to say for itself.

First in order is the ding-dong theory, which owes its present form to Professor Heyse of Berlin, whose lectures have been published since his death by Dr. Steinthal, who

has also himself defended it in several learned works.¹ It is adopted essentially by Max Müller and Bunsen,² and, with qualifications, by Ernest Renan, and it has leaked somewhat into R.W. Emerson's philosophising and that of Dr. Bushnell, and many others.

"There is a law," we are told,³ "which runs through nearly the whole of nature, that everything which is struck rings. Each substance has its peculiar ring. We can tell the more or less perfect structure of metals by their vibrations—by the answer which they give. Gold rings differently from tin, wood rings differently from stone; and different sounds are produced according to the nature of each percussion. It was the same with man, the most highly organized of nature's works. Man in his primitive and perfect state was endowed not only, like the brute, with the power of expressing his sensations by interjections, and his perceptions by onomatopoeia. He possessed likewise the faculty of giving more articulate expression to the rational conceptions of his mind This faculty gave to each conception as it thrilled for the first time through the brain a phonetic expression." Farrar translates more literally as follows:⁴ "At the origin of humanity the soul and the body were in such natural dependence that all the emotions of the soul had their echo in the body, principally in the organs of respiration and in the voice. This sympathy of soul and body, still found in the infant and the savage, was intimate and fruitful in the primitive man. Each intuition awoke in him an accent or a sound." The theory is thus aptly called the ding-dong theory. It represents man as originally a kind of bell, and when an idea struck him, naturally he rang.

¹ Heyse, Prof. K. W. L., *System der Sprachwissenschaft*. Berlin. 1856. Steinthal, Prof. H., *Der Ursprung der Sprache*. Berlin. 1858.

² *Outlines of the Philosophy of Universal History, applied to Language and Religion*. Vol. ii. London. 1854.

³ Max Müller, *Lectures, First Series*, ix. (English ed.). pp. 369-371.

⁴ F. W. Farrar, M. A., late Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge. *An Essay on the Origin of Language, based on Modern Researches, and especially on the Works of M. Renan*. London. 1860. p. 48, and *passim*. Chapters on Language. London. 1865. p. 248, and *passim*.

"We wonder," says Professor Whitney, "it was not added that, like other bells, he naturally rang by the tongue."

Ridiculous as it sounds under the stroke of such an assailant, however, the theory is not to be dismissed without careful examination. In fact it is only a fresh statement of the notion which Plato entertained, and which in some form has prevailed from the earliest times. Words have been regarded as the types of objective realities; not only as signs of things, but as in some way partaking the nature and expressing the character of the things themselves. Man has been supposed to be so adjusted to nature that phenomena mirror themselves upon the soul; conceptions are the reflection of realities and, of course, precisely correspond to them. Bunsen and Max Müller call words phonetic types.¹ Renan characteristically plays with this theory somewhat warily and hesitates to adopt the precise statements of Heyse or Steinthal. Yet Renan perceives that it is not answering the question as to the origin of speech to say in general that nature impresses its character upon the delicate organization of primitive man, but that it must be shown how this impression takes the form of articulate sound. Just here is Heyse's modification of the other theories; and Renan is compelled to declare that nature produces an echo in the soul, which is returned in words.²

It is made a strong point of the ding-dong theory that speech was not in any sense the result of convention, or of slow attainment after prolonged fumbling in the dark. It was spontaneous, and without conscious intention. Man had no season of mutism. As soon as he came to full development he spoke.

But the objections to the theory seem to be overwhelming.

To begin with, there is no such nice adaptation of body

¹ "The mouth is the primitive phonetic telegraph. Words express not the subjective impressions, the affections of the mind, but the qualities of things." Bunsen, p. 132, 137.

² Les hommes primitifs, — trouvaient en eux-mêmes un écho secret qui répondait à toutes les voix du dehors, et les rendait en articulations en parole." pp. 142, 143.

and soul to nature that echoes of nature resound from the soul. The savage and the infant do not show any such thing to be true. Thus the theory falls to the ground at once. Its fundamental basis is an assumption of a physical condition which is open to inspection; and inspection does not show any such condition of things. So far as a negative can be proved, it proves the negative of this assumption. "New cognitions and deductions thrill through the brains of men without setting their tongues swinging." An infant cries if a pin pricks it, and it cries if it is hungry, and both cries are alike; the cry because of a hurt is not distinguishable from the cry because of hunger. There is no quality in the sound which corresponds to the specific sensation, emotion, or thought. No one can pronounce, when he hears "an infant crying in the night," that it is "an infant crying for the light"; so far as the voice indicates, it may be an infant crying for the lactary.

Then, in the second place, if it be proper to say in a figurative sense that sensations echo themselves in the body, it is not specially the voice and organs of speech which vibrate, but it is rather the whole frame which responds. According as different objects affect us we scowl, we shrug our shoulders, we laugh, we shudder; the voice gives almost the least emphatic echo of emotions.

Still further, if words are the echoes of things, and the soul rings under sensations and perceptions, it is evident that there should be but one language for mankind. Renan anticipates this difficulty, and endeavors to meet it by saying that it is owing to difference of organization, of climate, and outward circumstances, that the same thought or emotion produces different echoes in different races. But, as the elder critics were wont to say, this explanation is more ingenious than solid. If it could be proved that the internal structure of man changes with climatic changes, still, tribes living in the same climate, and having the same organic structure, speak languages unintelligible to each other.

If there was nothing else against it, it would be fatal to

this theory that it assumes a condition of things to have once existed which does not now exist, and of whose existence we have no proof. The theory concedes that this sensibility of the soul by which primitive man created language is now lost. "Among the early races," says Farrar,¹ almost literally translating from Renan, "there was a delicate tact, enabling them to seize on those attributes which were capable of supplying them with appellatives, the exquisite subtilty of which we are unable any longer to conceive." Renan distinctly claims that the power to create language was exceptional; that humanity in those far distant ages was subjected to influences which no longer bear upon it.² To the question, Why, if man once invented language, he cannot now? he adds: "The reply is very simple: because there is nothing more to invent—the era of the creation has passed." The reply is very simple!

The whole theory breaks down at this point. For it is agreed among scientific thinkers, if anything is, that if we undertake to explain events by natural causes we must not recognize any agencies or influences as previously operating which we cannot see to be now operating, nor assume that formerly nature and the world were governed by laws different from what they are now. To say things were once different, and that cause and effect were not as now, is to say there were once miracles. When we are rigorously excluding the miraculous, then we are bound to explain things by such causes as are now discoverable. If we are to show how man invented speech, we must take man as he actually is, as we see him, enveloped in the laws now surrounding him, not man of an imaginary structure and in imaginary circumstances. In assuming that in primitive times man was peculiarly constituted, and so enabled to construct language, this theory confesses that it cannot explain the origin of speech by any causes which science can recognize;

¹ "Origin of Language," p. 68.

² "L'humanité à ces époques reculées, était soumise à des influences qui non plus maintenant d'analogues, on qui ne saurait plus amener les mêmes effets," p. 238; also, pp. 243, 246.

that it must go out of the range of the present laws of nature to solve the problem ; in a word, that while volubly denying the miraculous, it is endeavoring to take refuge behind a clumsy disguise of the miraculous.

Finally, if it could be proved true in every other particular, the ding-dong theory would not explain the origin of language — it would simply explain the origin of words. Let it be granted that words are the soul's echoes of sensations and perceptions ; words by themselves are not language. There must be connection and relation of words. Renan himself confesses that sounds no more constitute language than sensations constitute man.

Spiritual, imaginative, beautiful as the ding-dong hypothesis seems in many aspects, it must be regarded as an ingenious speculation without a shadow of fact to substantiate it.

The bow-wow and pooh-pooh theory, which stands in sharp antagonism to it, has unquestionably the advantage on the side of natural phenomena and also on the side of logic. Professor Whitney states it, and maintains it with great ability. Farrar in his two volumes also supports it ; but he fastens it on to the previous theory without seeming aware that the two positively contradict each other. Wedgewood is much more scholarly and acute in his contribution to the hypothesis.¹

The bow-wow dogma speaks for itself thus :

The earliest names of objects and actions were produced by imitations of natural sounds, which is styled Onomatopoeia. Animals were named from some characteristic feature ; the dog was called a bow-wow ; the voice of the wind was imitated in an utterance which was finally accepted as the word "whistling" ; the movement of water suggested imitative sounds like rippling and plashing, and these sounds became words to represent these movements ; the explanations and interjections we utter when excited, the ohs and ahs, the poohs and pshaws, contributed other elements. Such were the germs of language.

¹ On the Origin of Language. By Hensleigh Wedgewood. London. 1866.

In proof it is alleged that words are now made in this way ; that it is the natural and easy and practical method in which strangers communicate with each other. An Englishman in a Chinese eating-house, ignorant of the celestial dialect and prone to indulge his carnal appetite, points with his finger to the savory dish from which he is making a hearty meal, and gesticulates the interrogative to the waiter, "quack-quack?" The waiter gives the pleasant and natural response by a significant shake of the head and the exclamation "bow-wow."

The theory, as has been said, denies that speech was spontaneous and instinctive, affirms that man learned to speak because he found it necessary. He felt his way towards it by slow degrees. He consciously contrived language. With faculties appropriate and sounds suggestive, he constructed the marvellous instrument. There may have been, probably there was, a season of mutism before he groped his way to articulate speech.

Undoubtedly many words in all languages may be traced to the onomatapoetic, or to the interjectional principles ; but these principles do not seem adequate to explain the origin of speech.

The origin of *all* words is not thus accounted for. No one pretends that words expressive of moral convictions and the like can have originated from exclamations, interjections, or imitations of natural sounds. The first condition of a true theory in science is that it include all known facts. When Newton guessed at one of his great laws, some phenomena, as then observed, could not be reconciled to it and were not satisfied by it. At once he set the hypothesis aside ; it was not large enough to cover all the phenomena, therefore it could not be the right one. It was only when it was found, years afterwards, that the facts had been incorrectly reported, and that they were accounted for by the hypothesis, that Newton promulgated it, and the world received it as true. It is not enough for Professor Farrar to say : "Almost all words may be thus explained." The

fact that certain classes of words do not admit of such origin must set the theory aside.

Moreover, the arguments urged in its favor do not seem fairly to prove it. Professor Whitney says:¹ "Nineteen twentieths of the speech we speak is demonstrably, in this sense, our own work. Why should the remaining twentieth be thought otherwise?"

It is just this last twentieth, or rather this first twentieth, that is perplexing. Because, with languages to start upon, and with the raw material of words to work up, men modify and mould them into new forms, it by no means follows that it is equally easy to originate a language with no intelligible words and with no common speech to serve as a basis of mutual understanding and communication. It is generally conceded that there are certain elements of speech out of which all languages have come. All changes have been simply as to form. The number of these elements has neither been increased nor diminished. No new radical has been added, so far as we can perceive, any more than new matter has been added to the created universe. All that has taken place is merely development from these elemental forms. Now Professor Whitney is hardly justified in asserting that "the power to develop is one in essential nature with the power to originate." It is *essentially* a different power. "The origin of language is divine," he says, "in the same sense in which man's nature, with all its capacities and acquirements is divine." Is not precision of thought and statement lacking here? A careful discrimination surely must be made between capacities and acquirements. Would Professor Whitney maintain that, since a man's acquirements depend upon his own efforts, therefore his original capacity depends upon himself? "It is but childish philosophy," he declares, "which can see no other way to make out a divine agency in the formation of language than by regarding that agency as specially and miraculously efficient in the first stage of formation of language. We may fairly compare it

¹ p 400.

with the wisdom of the little girl who, on being asked who made her, replied: 'God made me a little baby so high' (dropping her hand to within a foot of the floor), 'and I grew the rest.''' We accept the comparison. Because the child grew as to nineteen twentieths of her body, does it prove that she originated the other twentieth? No more does it follow that, if it can be proved that man made nineteen twentieths of his speech, therefore he originated the germinal twentieth, out of which all the rest has grown. It is the germ, not the body, of language we are trying to account for.

We are also reminded¹ that God did not build houses and make clothing for man, but gave him capacities for handicrafts, placed him where necessity urged him, and where materials abounded, and he clothed and housed himself; therefore he was left to himself in manufacturing speech.

This comparison of language to carpentering and brick-making and tailoring — strangely belittling — misses the point in the same way. Did man originate the clay and the fibrous material for his houses and his clothing? Did man create the germ of the tree out of which he contrived to supply his wants? The question of the origin of language is: Who made the raw material, and then wove it into the garment of intelligible speech?

This hypothesis, like the ding-dong theory, simply accounts for the origin of words, not of language. Let it be granted that the sound of rustling leaves suggests the word "rustling," and that interjections express emotions, that ah! means pain or pleasure. Words must be linked together to make language. The intention of joining them and the comprehension of them as related to each other is necessary to constitute language. It is pithily said that language begins where interjections end. They are only the outskirts of speech.

Moreover, for the construction of language out of words gathered from sounds of nature there must have been something like a convention to agree upon certain signs for

¹ Whitney, pp. 402, 403.

certain sounds. But the notion of any such convention, or of anything approaching it, is utterly inadmissible.

On the ding-dong theory, words express, as Bunsen phrases it, the qualities of things. What thrills through one mind, of course, thrills through all minds. Thus the word which echoes the thought is mutually intelligible to all. Unfortunately for this theory, as is the case in regard to so many other points of Bunsen's speculative and confident dogmatizing, the assertion is not true. It is a groundless assumption. Words have no such expressive quality. When one man frames a word, there is no guaranty that it shall be intelligible to another man. Men must mutually agree that a certain articulation shall be the sign of a specific thing. A Frenchman and an Englishman hear a musket discharging. As the sound "rings in" upon Johnny Crapo, he exclaims: "Pouf!" When the report rattles through John Bull's head, he roars out: "Bang!" The same noise, the same sensation and conception, find utterance in words so dissimilar. Now which shall stand for the sound of a musket — pouf, or bang? It can only be amicably arranged by a conference of the two powers for mutual agreement. But if men can already communicate sufficiently to agree upon the meaning of sounds, and to attach signs to sounds, they do not want language; they can hold intercourse well enough without. They are doing already as precise and difficult a thing as they can ever do with language itself. There is no process so complicated and requiring such nice instruments as to construct a language. Those who can communicate well enough to construct it can communicate well enough to dispense with it.

"Speech," Professor Whitney well says,¹ "is not a personal possession, but a social. What we may severally choose to say is not language, until it is accepted and employed by our fellows. The whole development of speech is wrought out by the community. That is a word, and only that, which is understood in a community. Their mutual under-

¹ p. 404.

standing is the tie which connects it with the idea. It is a sign which each one has acquired from without, from the usage of others." Now, then, how is it conceivable that, without the use of language, this mutual understanding can be arrived at? He speaks of two persons as mutually devising language. Devising, in this sense, is inventing. But invention is a solitary act, and must be. Two inventors, having no language as a medium of communication with each other, cannot bring their minds into contact, and help on towards a common invention. One man may invent a part of a machine; another may take up this invention and advance upon it; but each invents alone. Suppose one is devising language, how, without the use of language, is he to tell his companion how far he has proceeded? Gesture cannot tell him; for the very point is to make sound a sign of gesture. To imagine that he can signify sound by gesture, is to imagine that he has already done the thing he is seeking help to do. How can his companion, without language to take up and forward the invention, make out mutually intelligible speech?

Speech, it is conceded, is a social possession and a social product. Sounds, no matter how intelligible as signs of ideas to an individual, are not language, unless they are signs of the same idea to other persons. As there is no inherent quality in the sounds, making them instantly and inevitably intelligible to all, they can gain meaning only by common agreement. But how can people agree upon significations of words, when such a thing as a word is what as yet nobody knows, and such a thing as signification what nobody as yet understands?

The bow-wow theory, like the ding-dong, is not framed in accordance with the recognized methods of scientific investigation. That method is to observe how phenomena now take place, and conclude that the same phenomena formerly took place in the same way. Here is the phenomenon of language, of the origin of language. Men come into the world in-fants — speechless. They have faculties of

speech; the world "rings in" upon them sensations; perceptions "thrill through" them. But the only way in which speech ever originates is by the communication from without, by the teaching of a superior. A child only speaks as it is taught. Left alone, it never speaks. It does not imitate the sounds of nature; it imitates the sounds of its teachers. A Greek infant brought up in an English family does not speak Greek, but English. Language is acquired when taught; that specific language is acquired which is taught. What reason to think it was not so always? The only reason is the assumption that there was a time when there was no one to teach the first infant. But was there ever such a time? Was there no being capable of teaching primitive man?

If we follow out rigidly the method which science applies to all other questions, we must conclude that the first man was taught speech by a superior. It is admitted on all hands that every one since the first has come in possession of language in this way. To say that the first man did not, to say that he constructed it, made it out of nothing, made it out of bow-wows and pooh-pooohs, is renouncing science and following guesses. What right to say his case was exceptional? What reason for guessing that he did not begin to speak as all others have?

The conclusion seems inevitable that these recent theories, which assume to be eminently rational and logical, are utterly inadequate to explain the origin of language. The first, at the very outset, departs from the scientific method by an *a priori* speculation; which speculation not only is not supported by facts but is contradicted by them. The latter, which sets out to be rigidly scientific, at the last step, when the real difficulty is reached and first begins to press, leaves the method of science and betakes itself to a guess.

Are we, then, to fall back upon the supernatural theory? Is not that still less defensible?

Whether or not the supernatural theory be true is of no consequence, so far as these other ones are concerned. The

naturalistic theories so far brought forward seem clearly to be failures. Without undertaking to maintain the supernatural origin of language, however, it may be proper to say some things about it, and let them have what weight they deserve.

Undoubtedly the form in which the view is stated may beget a prejudice against it which a modification of the statement would possibly remove. When it is baldly said that God revealed language, that a voice from heaven told man what to say, one may be reluctant to assent to the statement. But put the matter in another form, and no theist need hesitate, if need be, to admit that it is possibly true. As thus: God made man capable of speech, placed him where it was needful, amid sights and sounds designed to furnish materials of language. Having done this, he taught the infant man how to use his faculty, gave him the germs of language, assisted him to connect words and things, as a father now teaches his child. The first man was taught by a superior intelligence, as every other man is. There was no superior man. God took it upon himself. It was *dignus vindice nodus*.

Concede that there is a God, and that he can communicate with man, and all difficulty seems to vanish. Imagine God at man's creation taking him into his own companionship, conversing with him, teaching him; concede, as the Christian believes, that God has really come thus directly into speech and hand-grasp with man, and does not the difficulty vanish?

It is unscientific to believe that man was once gifted with a marvellous faculty of speech-creation which is now lost. It is equally unscientific to believe that man, as he now is, with no teaching from a superior intelligence, learned by his unaided struggles to frame words and sentences. Science looks at phenomena as they are. Science asks: How have men begun to speak, so far as is known? The answer is: By being taught by a superior. Has any one ever been known to begin in any other way? No. Has ever any one origi-

nated speech from his own faculties? No. "Then," says Science, "the inference is that the first man did not. The only logical inference is that the first man was assisted to speak by a superior intelligence, by living long enough in his society, and learning as a child learns."

We do not undertake to say that this is demonstrably certain. It may be true.

The fact of human language, the origin of which does not seem to be accounted for on any other scientific basis, becomes thus, perhaps, in turn, an intimation that there is some being superior to man — an intimation that man is the child of God, and was once under the direct and special pupilage of his Father.

ARTICLE VIII.

NEW STUDIES IN EGYPTOLOGY.

BY JOSEPH P. THOMPSON, D.D., LL.D.

It is a token of the progress of Egyptology as a science, that materials for the prosecution of this study are now selected and classified with almost the precision with which the geologist arranges his cabinet. Papyrus rolls no longer lie hidden in the archives of museums as mysterious treasures, but are grouped under titles and classes, according to the text, the period, or the subject-matter, so far as these can be deciphered or conjectured; monumental inscriptions are no longer copied at random, as curiosities of the past; but such as possess some intrinsic value, or promise some addition to our knowledge of Egyptian history and life, are transcribed with care, or even photographed, and thus laid before the learned world for a comparison of dates and references. Such materials have been greatly multiplied by the patient and judicious labors of Dr. Johannes Dümichen of Berlin, who spent the years from 1862-1865 in the study of monuments in Egypt, Nubia, and the Soudan, and again in 1866 took the lead of an archæological and photographic expedition to Egypt, appointed and equipped by the king of Prussia. To him we owe the discovery and transcription of the important tablet of Sethos in the temple of Osiris, at Abydos, which gives an almost unbroken list of the legitimate kings of Egypt from Menes to Sethos I., the builder of the temple.¹

Dümichen has already published the following works as contributions to Egyptian studies. *Bauurkunde der Tempelanlagen von Dendera*; these records of ancient architecture were found in an inner secluded corridor of the temple: they cover nineteen plates, large quarto. *Geographische Inschriften altägyptischer Denkmäler*, in two large volumes, each containing one hundred plates of hieroglyphic inscriptions, with an explanatory text. This forms a valuable supplement to Dr. H. Brugsch's great work on the Geography of the Ancient Egyptians. *Altägyptische Kalenderinschriften*, a folio of one hundred and twenty plates. *Historische Inschriften*, in two volumes, folio; the first containing the triumphal record of the contest in the fourteenth century B.C. between the Egyptians and the Libyans and their allies, the inhabitants of the coasts and islands of the Mediterranean; the triumphal gate of king Rameses III. in the temple of Medcenet Habou; king Rameses III. with the captive Amaru and Libyan princes, on the door of the treasury in the temple of Medcenet Habou; the treasury of Rampsinit in the same temple; the sacrificial offering for a deceased

¹ See *Bibliotheca Sacra* (1867), Vol. xxiv. p. 774.

Egyptian queen in the temple of *Der-al-bacheri*: part second contains eighty plates of pictures and inscriptions, partly historical, partly geographical and mythological. *Altägyptische Tempelinschriften*, one hundred and sixty plates, folio, from the temple of Horus at Edfu, and the temple of Hathor at Dendera. *Die Flotte einer ägyptischen Königin*, with thirty-seven folio plates, illustrating the naval marine of Egypt in the seventeenth century B.C. *Der ägyptische Felsentempel von Abu-Simbel und seine Bildwerke und Inschriften*. These works, it will readily be seen, lay before scholars a great variety of rich material, well classified for purposes of historical and archaeological study. And in addition to this library of monumental data, Dümichen has begun to publish the results of his last expedition in a series of elegant royal quarto volumes, under the title, *Resultate der auf Befehl Sr. Majestät des Königs Wilhelm I. von Preussen nach Aegypten entsendeteten archäologisch-photographischen Expedition*.

The first volume of this work has appeared, and contains numerous plates, large quarto. Several of these exhibit scenes taken from the pyramid graves at Saqara, and like all the mural pictures and inscriptions in the tombs, they illustrate the manners and customs of Egyptian life by representations of the occupations and possessions of the deceased. In one is given a list of the various offerings of food and drink provided to accompany the deceased; another gives a graphic picture of boats propelled by oar and sail, and conveying live-stock, merchandise, and treasure; an inscription states that the deceased was a certain *Sehmer-ua*, superintendent of all the royal farming and fowling, and also of the sacrifices, and the adjudicator of complaints addressed from the whole land to the heart of his lord — apparently a prime minister having a vice-royalty like that of Joseph. Of his wife it is said, that she was loved and honored by her spouse, and was “sweet as the palm in her love to him.” The deceased is further said to have superintended the erection of certain royal obelisks, to have been a member of the royal cabinet, present at all its sessions, and to have assisted as counsellor in framing and promulgating the royal decrees. This important and powerful functionary flourished under king Keka, whose name in Manetho’s list occurs between Sahura and Neferarkara of the fifth Dynasty.

Another tomb belonged evidently to a religious functionary, Ptahsepses by name, who is described as high in honor with the king, the director of the religious festivals, and prophet of Ptah, Horus, Tat, and other divinities.

Several plates illustrate the tomb of Ptahhotep of the fifth Dynasty, with pictures of his flocks and herds; of fishing, fowling, and the chase; of music, dancing, wrestling, and other athletic sports; of whatever can suggest a life of wealth, ease, and pleasure. Animals both domestic and wild, are introduced in great numbers, and in every conceivable attitude — in the act of copulation, suckling their young, attacking their prey, or roughly sport-

ing together. From these delineations, some of which are made with evident skill and care, Professor Dr. Robert Hartmann, the learned African traveler, has prepared a valuable essay on the Zoölogy of ancient Egypt. Dümichen's plates furnish him specimens of the baboon of tropical Africa (*Cynocephalus Babuin Desm.*, and *Cyn. Hamadryas Desm.*); the gepard (*Felis jubata Schreb.*) depicted most accurately in its characteristic features, and enumerated among the treasures of the king, having a strong resemblance to the jaguar of Brazil; the leopard and the Sennar lion; several varieties of the hyena — one with a short bull-dog-like muzzle, broad, pricked-up ears, high chest, and low rump, a long bushy tail, reminding one of the prairie-dog, the lycaon of the Greeks (*Canis pictus Desm.*); another suggests the krokottas of Diodorus (*Hyaena crocuta Zimmern*). Prairie-dogs both tame and wild, and greyhounds abound in these pictures; in one vivid scene the herdsman is about to let loose his dogs upon a Sennar-lion that has attacked one of his cows. Of antelopes there is a great variety; from the fine large water-buck of the white Nile, to the delicate, tame gazelle. Neat cattle also abound; especially a small animal with short head, straight nose, short crescent horns, high withers, full upper thigh, normal joints, broad, flat knee, and stout shin-bone. Cattle with long, twisted horns are also common. In one scene a cow in the act of calving is deftly assisted by the herdsman. The stag, the jackall, the genet, the hedgehog, the ichneumon, are all represented in these wall-pictures. Among birds, the crane, the stork, the heron, the swan, geese, and ducks are conspicuous. Dr. Robert Hartmann has also furnished to the *Zeitschrift für Aegyptische Sprach-und-Alterthumskunde*, a valuable list of the fauna of ancient Egypt, as pictured upon the tombs, or described in the hieroglyphics.¹

In one of Dümichen's volumes is a series of plates representing the whole process of slaying an animal for sacrifice — a duty distributed among several priests.

Dümichen's works are particularly rich in illustrations of the marine of ancient Egypt; there being in all upwards of two hundred representations of vessels of all kinds, pleasure-boats, freight-boats, ferry-boats, river-boats, with and without rigging, and sea-going craft of various descriptions — the whole covering the period from 3000 B.C. to 1400 B.C. Dr. Bernhard Graser, an expert in all matters of ancient marine, has worked up these materials in an elaborate and instructive essay.

While the monuments yet standing in Egypt are thus made to contribute to the elucidation of her ancient life and history, the treasures of Egyptian literature in the museums of Europe are in like manner spread before the learned world. The museum of Turin, which furnished the first copy of the "Book of the Dead," is rich in papyri that have not yet been deciphered. Messrs. F. Rossi of Turin and W. Pleyte of Leyden, have

¹ *Zeitschrift* for January and March, 1864.

undertaken jointly the publication of these in numbers; M. Rossi executing the fac-similies, and M. Pleyte furnishing a commentary upon the text. The Turin collection was made by Chevalier Drovetti, a native of Piedmont, who for twenty years was consul-general of France at Alexandria, and had opportunity to gather these treasures (in 1820) before the Nile valley was rifled for the museums of all Europe. It contains the famous papyrus of the kings, so valuable for the methodical arrangement of the dynasties of the old empire, and the judicial papyrus, an account of which was given in the *Bibliotheca Sacra* for July 1869.

The first number of M. Pleyte's republication contains an interesting papyrus of the time of Rameses II., being the report of a superintendent of public works upon the progress of the temple of Amun at Thebes. It describes the provisioning of the laborers, the transportation of stone by water, under guard, and the details of the building. Another papyrus contains a list of gods and goddesses, kings and princesses, useful for comparison upon points of chronology.

But the chief interest of the collection thus far is in a series of hymns of the nineteenth and twentieth dynasties. One of these is put into the mouth of a king, as an address to the divinity who has crowned him head of Egypt and prince over all the world; it recites the piety of the king, and his devotion to the service of the gods, but contrives to mingle with this the praises of the monarch himself in the splendor of his wealth and power. Another of these hymns is especially in honor of Rameses III. — a sort of deification of that sovereign. A third is a highly curious Litany in praise of Thot, as the queen of night, who averts the terrors and disasters that darkness would cause to heaven and earth. Fragmentary as are these papyri, and imperfect as is the reading of the text, they nevertheless promise a rich addition to the materials for the reconstruction of old Egyptian literature and history.

While perhaps the majority of Egyptologists devote themselves to deciphering hieroglyphics, a few are making the hieratic a specialty, and a third class direct their studies to the demotic. A new laborer in this last department is Dr. August Eisenlohr, of Heidelberg University, who has just published an analytical interpretation of the demotic portion of the Rosetta stone.

The popular language of ancient Egypt, through the affinities of the Coptic, will yet prove a valuable auxiliary in the interpretation of her monuments. Thus the science of Egyptology is expanding upon every side; but we await with impatience the appearance of Mariette-Bey's full report of his explorations and discoveries upon the site of ancient Memphis.

ARTICLE IX.

ASSYRIAN STUDIES — TEXT-BOOKS.¹

BY REV. WILLIAM HAYES WARD.

It is a remarkable fact that Germany, which so generally leads the scholarship of the age, should in the investigation of the Cuneiform texts be considerably behind both England and France. It is true that Grotefend in 1802 made some shrewd guesses, and Rask and Lassen thirty years later conjectured the meaning of a few more words in the Persian column of the Trilingual Inscriptions; but it is due to Sir Henry Rawlinson, Dr. Hincks, Edward Norris, and Fox Talbot in England, and to Burnouf, De Sauley, Oppert, and Menant in France, that we can record such substantial advance in deciphering these remarkable relics of antiquity.

The first stage in the investigation of an unknown tongue has been passed. We have mainly recovered the alphabet of these three languages of the Behistun Inscriptions, so far as their characters can be called an alphabet, and two of them are translated with grammatical precision, though it is perhaps too much to say this of the second column, called by writers the Median, or Scythic, or Accad. When we pass from these Behistun Inscriptions to others, we find an immense mass of epigraphic remains, for the most part in the language of the third column, the Assyrian and Babylonian. We use both terms as the inscriptions are subdivided into two classes varying to some extent in grammar and alphabet, according as they are found in the region of Nineveh or of Babylon. As these remains have been discovered mainly by English and French explorers, and have been deposited in the museums of London and Paris, it is not strange that these countries have taken the lead in their translation. In this country so little has been done, that the slabs covered with inscriptions have for years attracted ignorantly curious eyes in the rooms of Amherst and Williams Colleges, and of the New York Historical Society, and other cabinets. Not one has had a wedge translated as yet.

¹ Duppe Lisan Assur. *Éléments de la Grammaire Assyrienne* par Jules Oppert. Seconde édition considérablement augmentée. 16mo. pp. 150. Paris: A. Franck. 1868.

Exposé des Éléments de la Grammaire Assyrienne, par M. Joachim Menant. 8vo. pp. 392. Imprimé par ordre de S. M. l'Empereur, à l'Imprimerie Impériale. 1868.

Assyrian Dictionary, intended to further the study of the Cuneiform Inscriptions of Assyria and Babylonia. By Edward Norris, Hon. Ph.D., Bonn, Honorary Secretary of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland. Part I. Quarto. pp. 382. London: Williams and Norgate. 1868.

It is not our purpose to detail the steps of progress in conquering the details of the Assyrian grammar and vocabulary. Of course in the early stages each investigator was obliged to make and publish his own alphabet and dictionary as he went along. In 1851 Rawlinson published a list of two hundred and forty-six characters in connection with his translation of the Behistun inscription; and four years later De Sauley published a lexicon of the language, so far as it had then been deciphered. The first complete grammar was the work of Oppert, and published in 1860. Five years before, Dr. Hincks of Dublin had published a paper on Assyrian Verbs; and six years later he published some specimen chapters of an Assyrian grammar. Dr. Hincks's work was partly controversial, attempting to defend against Oppert the occurrence in Assyrian of a preterite or, as he called it, a "permansive" tense, and also of a present or "mutative" tense of the simplest conjugation, besides the more common imperfect or future of other Semitic languages. Hincks's scheme of these tenses (changing the order of the persons) was as follows:

<i>Singular.</i>	Permansive.	Aorist.	Present.
3 m.	pagil	ipgul	ipaggil
3 f.	paglat	tapgul	tapaggil
2 m.	pagilta	tapgul	tapaggil
2 f.	pagilti	tapguli	tapaggili
1 c.	paglaku	apgul	apaggil
<i>Plural.</i>			
3 m.	paglu	ipgulu	ipaggilu
3 f.	pagla	ipgula	ipaggila
2 m.	pagiltunu	tapgulu	tapaggilu
2 f.	pagiltina	tapgula	tapaggila
1 c.	pagilnu	napgul	napaggil.

This aorist form is admitted by all scholars to be correct,¹ and it will be seen how similar it is to the Hebrew imperfect, though it is yet nearer to the Chaldee and Syriac, and, if we overlook some variations in the first vowel, is precisely the same as in Ethiopic. But the "Permansive" and "Mutative" tenses of Hincks the French grammarians reject altogether. Oppert says they are "*une pure fantaisie.*" Dr. Hincks was confident that he had found a first person singular permansive form *paglaku* corresponding to the Ethiopic, but the single word *us-bak-ku*, on which he founded this form, was differently read by Oppert.

Oppert's Grammar is a compact little volume, printed throughout with the Assyrian forms in Hebrew letters instead of cuneiform characters. Not only is this easier printing, but the language is better adapted to this method than to the syllabic style, which was borrowed from a non-Semitic

¹ Except that Oppert says in the last edition of his Grammar that the first person, pl. should be *nipgul*. Menant retains *napgul* in his Grammar.

language. This plan also brings out very clearly the correspondence of Assyrian with cognate tongues, and makes the volume valuable for reference to scholars who do not care to master the fearful Assyrian alphabet.

Menant's Grammar, "printed by order of the Emperor at the Imperial Press" is much more magnificent in style, being a large octavo volume, and with every Assyrian word or syllable expressed in its native wedges. It opens with twenty-six pages of "syllabary" or alphabet, and we are then told in a closing note that "this list is not complete." We are sorry to see that he arranges the second table, consisting of syllables with two consonant sounds, in the order of the Hebrew letters, as this would make it very tedious for a student beginning the language to discover any unfamiliar sign in this vast labyrinth. Norris has done better in his dictionary in arranging both compound syllables and ideograms in arbitrary order, depending on the style of the wedge with which they begin. On the other hand, Menant's plan of putting throughout his syllabary the Ninevitic and Babylonian forms in distinct columns has a decided advantage. In the second part of Menant's Grammar he gives us a valuable chrestomathy. Eleven specimens of Assyrian texts are given, some of them of considerable length, and embracing Behistun, Ninevitic, and Babylonian forms, accompanied by an interlinear translation into Latin letters, and also an interlinear Latin translation, and followed by a transliteration into Hebrew letters, and a French translation. Following this is a grammatical analysis. This seems to leave nothing for the student to ask.

Crossing the channel, we meet the first elementary dictionary of any completeness yet published; though this volume finishes but the first seven letters of the Hebrew alphabet. And we are instantly struck by its moral difference of tone, and charmed by its modesty. The two French writers are pretentious and dogmatic. They assert too often as facts what are little more than conjectures. They generalize faster than their inductions will warrant. But the constant confessions of ignorance in Mr. Norris's volume prejudice us in his favor. In his remarkably modest preface he gives to Sir Henry Rawlinson the credit of having taught him all that he knows of Assyrian, and this first instalment of the dictionary shows that, though he began the study of the language at a late period of life, and with an inadequate knowledge of the other Semitic tongues, he has proved himself no dull scholar. Before publishing this book he was known to scholars from his connection with Rawlinson in the preparation of Rawlinson and Norris's Historical Inscriptions of Assyria, of which one volume was issued in 1861, and a second in 1866, and also by some independent investigations of the Median or Accad, the second in order of the trilingual inscriptions.

One of the most difficult tasks in beginning the study of Assyrian is to learn the alphabet. The Ethiopic has a syllabic alphabet, but it is an easy one, consisting merely of slight variations of the Semitic letters as

they are connected with the several vowel sounds. But here we have no normal consonant letter to form the basis of the syllables, but they are denoted by the most arbitrary signs. Very seldom do two syllables closely related have similar characters to represent them. Thus the characters for *pa* and *pu* are utterly diverse, and *pa* and *ka* would not end with the same sign. The cases are very few where a connection can be traced, as, for example, in the character for *ya* which combines those for *i* and *a*, or in those for י, ם, and ש, which are remarkably similar.

Mr. Norris gives one hundred and twenty-eight different characters in his "ordinary alphabet" for simple syllables consisting of a single consonant and vowel, one hundred and forty-two characters which represent syllables (like *kal*) with two consonants, and then a third table of one hundred and thirteen "ideograms," that is, characters which represent a word. But let not the student imagine that when he has mastered these three hundred and eighty-three characters, and scores of others given by Menant, he is all ready to transliterate an Assyrian text into English or Hebrew letters. These tables do not pretend to be complete, and he will find many of the forms so variously given in the monuments according to their age, or the caprice of the scribe, that these tables will be but a partial guide. Besides, imagine his confusion when he finds that a single character is at times used for half a dozen different syllables! Nothing else could so discourage a student, or seem to throw doubt on the whole results thus far obtained. Thus the regular form for *ab*, according to Norris, may also represent *ap*, *be*, *ne*, *ta*, *ku*, or *bil*, while that for *ul* may also be read *ut*, *pa*, *ta*, *tam*, *yom*, (יִם, a day) or *samas* (שָׁמַשׁ, the sun). The polyphony of this last character is yet more bewildering as given by Menant, thus: "*ut*, *ud*, *ut*, *tam*, *tav*, *par*, *sap*, *lih*, *bus*, *bus'*, *pus*, *pus'*, *samas*, *yum*"! The cause of this curious complication is found mainly in a fact which sadly disguises the Assyrian language as written. The arrow-head syllabary, which was originally contrived to represent words, as was also the Egyptian and the Chinese, was contrived to meet the wants, not of the Assyrian, a Semitic language, but of a Turanian language, a sort of Tartar or Turkish tongue, and which we call indifferently Scythic or Median or Accad. Its alphabet is not adapted to spell Semitic words. Its phonology is quite diverse. An Accad dental or palatal might correspond to a whole class of Semitic letters, while no Accad form would be adequate to express a Semitic א or ע. It is not strange then, if we find, especially in the earlier inscriptions, character twelve of Norris's "ordinary alphabet" representing either ג or ך or ך. For the same reason a character which had a definite meaning and pronunciation in Accad would retain its meaning, but change its sound when used in writing Assyrian, just as we write *e.g.*, but pronounce it, "for example," and no longer *exempli gratia*. Thus one combination which in Accad reads *adda*, father, may in Assyrian read *abu*, אב, father. Another may read

either Accad *han*, or Assyrian *nun*, both meaning "fish." Scores of such cases could be given. Thus among compound syllables, character forty-six may be *dan*, *kal*, or *lib*; forty-seven may be *rid*, *sid*, *lak*, or *mis*; and sixty-five is given as representing *ban*, *kal*, or *qaq*; while in other places Mr. Norris transliterates it by *epus*, a stem of the same meaning as *ban*, *בָּנָה*, and meaning "to make."

Of course it is very difficult to collect a complete list of characters, and Mr. Norris does not pretend that this is complete. We notice a few variations or omissions collated from the body of his dictionary, and which could easily be greatly increased by comparison with the original printed texts. For we notice that he generally gives in his examples quite different forms from those which we find in the texts to which he refers. On p. 32, l. 4, a character is given for *gu* differing from either of those in the table. On p. 28, l. 12, is a character for *va* not in the table. Character thirty-three for *ha*, Hebrew *ה*, is quite as often given with the angle and wedges transposed. A very common form for *lu* is omitted, cf. p. 10, l. 1. The single perpendicular wedge is frequently used for *an*, especially when a preposition, but is nowhere found in the tables, though it is also in very frequent use as a determinative, meaning "a man"; and is regularly put before names of men. Character sixty-nine denoting *ša*, Hebrew *ש*, is given differently p. 37, l. 15, and character seventy-nine for *qi*, Hebrew, *ק*, has one less wedge in several places where it occurs; and the first of the two characters for *ru*, varies from what it is ever given in the body of the dictionary. Of course we do not expect that every little variation of the monuments should be given in the alphabet, though this is desirable, but when it is the rule to modify the epigraphic form to accommodate the printing, the young student does want to find in his alphabet the same forms as given in the other parts of his dictionary.

In the second table, that of compound syllables, we notice that a form for *nun* is omitted, which we find employed p. 4, l. 4; also the character for *mil* which is identical with one given for *is*. Number fifty-eight varies from what is meant for the same p. 39, l. 8; and a form for *had*, *pa*, should have been given after number sixty-five. Number eighty-five, pronounced *gab*, we find p. 28, l. 13, without the angle; and after number ninety-one we miss the character generally pronounced *me*, but sometimes *sib*. Number ninety-eight is given as pronounced *mat*, *kur*, *lat*, or *sat*, but on p. 35, it twice represents *din*. So number one hundred and three is given as *sah*, but on p. 38, l. 9, and in many other places, it is *tir*. The character for *lu* which we mentioned as omitted from the first table is also lacking in the second, where it should appear as corresponding to *lim*, cf. p. 11, l. 5.

We notice the omission of several ideograms from the third table, as that for *Assur*, cf. p. 40, l. 14; the determinative for "man," already mentioned, that for *bit*, a house; that for *rab*, great; that for the God, *Yav*; that for *eli*, upon; that for *kima*, like; that for *aḫu*, brother, and that for *Babel*.

The character for "evening" (no. 20), transliterated in the table by *nikrut* and *aibi* is given as *ah*, p. 24, meaning "side." Number sixty-three given as *mas*, male (though we know of no authority for giving this suspiciously Latin sound to the character), is also made on p. 39 to represent *susi*, sixty. Number one hundred and seven is given somewhat differently in every place in which we have noticed it in the dictionary, as also by Menant. We have noticed scores of such cases.

Turning to the body of the dictionary we have noticed some minor errata, such as *abunanis*, p. 8, l. 25, where the arrow-heads read *abubanis*; *munnaptu* for *munaptu*, p. 36, l. 19, and *Muraziru* for *Muzaziru*, p. 47, l. 28; but there are many more cases where the inscriptions are correctly enough transliterated into English letters, but the tables do not allow the transliteration. Thus, in the last line but one of p. 20 we find *tukmate*, but all the help a student could get from the tables would make it plainly *iz-lal*. So on p. 81 we find "Elam" according to the transliteration, which is really a translation into Assyrian; as the wedge can be made to read nothing but *Numma*, the Accad equivalent. A student needs to look to his tables for such words which are written in the Anarian Accad language, but which are pronounced in the Semitic Assyrian. Besides this, there is not a page but contains instances of characters used which are not in the tables, or which differ, more or less, from those there given. And yet if these so flexible letters puzzle the student, how much more would they have puzzled him if Mr. Norris had printed his Assyrian texts just as they are given in Rawlinson's published inscriptions? In comparing the two we notice a great many cases where not merely the slight variations of scribes are corrected, who often added small wedges in complex forms, but other characters are often substituted where they are supposed to have the same power. This strikes us as ill judged.

But the greatest deficiency is one which was to be expected in the author, and the foundation for which he frankly confesses. We constantly feel the lack of the aid which might be drawn from foreign languages. Mr. Norris tells us in his preface that his knowledge of the Semitic languages is confined to a superficial acquaintance with Hebrew, and, though we are thankful enough to get this volume even with this drawback, it would have been much more valuable if Rabbinic, Arabic, Syriac, and Ethiopic, as well as Hebrew, had been searched for corresponding roots. A newly discovered language like this, depends for its illustration almost wholly on these correspondences; and not a few errors have been made from ignorance of other Semitic tongues. We recall a case of this in one of Mr. Talbot's papers in the *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, in which he translates an Assyrian word by "small," comparing the Hebrew צָעִיר, but says that the final *r* has been dropped as in "Zacchaeus" which was no doubt from the same root. The slightest available knowledge of Hebrew would have prevented this blunder, and if he had taken the trouble to turn to the kin-

dred Syriac version he would have found Zacchaeus represented by ܙܚܝܐ, while for ܙܚܝܐ we have the entirely different forms ܙܚܝܐ and ܙܚܝܐ. Zaccheus received his name in his "pure" infancy, and did not wait for it till he had reached his "small" stature. As a striking example of this failure to adduce cognate forms in other languages, the reader will notice the word *gimir*, all, the whole, which Mr. Norris illustrates simply by the words, "Hebrew גִּמַּר, to gather." Not only is this meaning at least rare in the Hebrew word, but we actually have a Hebrew גָּמַר, to complete, Chaldee ܓܡܪ, and Syriac ܓܡܪ of the same meaning, besides other languages, and such common Rabbinic forms as גָּמַר and גָּמַר meaning "wholly," "entirely." So Norris tells us under *gini*, enemies, p. 185, that he knows no similar word in any cognate tongue, but Syriac ܓܢܝܐ, to accuse, is not far out of the way. Under *tamsil*, p. 276, he cites the Ethiopic *itmasal*, it is like, but quite ignores the Hebrew and the Rabbinic מָשַׁל, to be similar, of which *itmasal* is an inflectional form.

The most difficult stumbling-block for an Assyrian scholar is the confusion between Assyrian and Accad words. It is discouraging and deceptive to look for Semitic analogues, when the word may not be Semitic at all, but Accad. No doubt there are scores of such errors in this volume; but this Accad is but poorly understood as yet, and scarce any living man, unless it be Sir Henry Rawlinson, is very competent to distinguish between words of the two languages as they occur together; and it is a sad loss to this study that he has given so much of his time to political labor, that he has not been able to publish what he has learned, and much of his knowledge will die with him. No man in this country is competent to pronounce a judgment on these distinctions, and it is with diffidence that we suggest that *dannu*, strong, notwithstanding its Assyrian termination, is connected with the Accad *dan*, which has a similar meaning as shown by the expression *ha dan*, meaning "water great," i.e. a flood; and also by the noun *dan*, used in the Syllabary as Accad equivalent for the Assyrian *illu*, a warrior, just as we translate ܩܒܝܪ, a mighty man. With the word *dannu*, Mr. Norris compares very doubtfully the theme ܕܢܢ, which, however, seems to be used in Semitic languages only of judgments and laws, and never of "strong," walls or towers. Were we required to compare some Semitic word, we should suggest whether the ܕ of ܕܢܢ, lord, ܕܢܢ, foundation, is not prosthetic, leaving a root *dan* which could have no more probable meaning than "strong."

These volumes suggest as fruitful themes the discussion of the entire development of Assyrian studies, of the character of the language as compared with other Semitic tongues, of the additions made by Rawlinson,

Hincks, Oppert, Menant, and others to our knowledge of ancient history, and of the bearings of all these investigations on scripture. These important topics we can only indicate. It is sufficient now to say that these grammars and this dictionary, with all their guesses and inevitable mistakes, have put the next generation of Assyriologists under deep obligations.

ARTICLE X.

THE TOPOGRAPHY OF JERUSALEM.

BY REV. JOHN FORBES, LL.D., EDINBURGH.

The reperusal, in the third Quarterly Statement of the Palestine Exploration Fund, of the views of Lieut. Warren on the site of Mount Zion, which I had only cursorily glanced over in the *Athenaeum*, when on the continent this autumn, and away from my books, has set me to re-examine the Topography of Jerusalem. This subject cannot but be interesting to the countrymen of Professor Robinson, whose "*Researches in Palestine*," gave the impulse to all the investigations of recent times; and I beg a little space in the *Bibliotheca Sacra* to assist in dispelling an error now become almost inveterate, and which, by placing Mount Zion on the southwest, instead of the northwest mountain, as advocated by Lieut. Warren, has introduced inextricable confusion into all our inquiries. The correctness of his view seems demonstrated by the happy reconciliation which it effects of all the statements in the Bible, the First Book of Maccabees, and Josephus.

Josephus's general description of Jerusalem is as follows (*Wars*, v. 4. 1): "The city was built, one part facing another, upon two hills, separated by an intervening valley, at which, over against each other, the houses ended. Of these hills the one bearing the upper city was much the higher, and in length more straight. The other hill, called Akra [the Citadel], and sustaining the lower city, was crescent-shaped. Over against this was a third hill [Mount Moriah], by nature lower than Akra, and formerly separated by another broad valley. But afterwards in the times when the Maccabees ruled, they filled up the valley with earth, with the view of connecting the city with the Temple; and working down the height of Akra, they made it lower, so that the Temple might appear above it."

I would humbly submit the following inferences as strictly deducible from this description, and from our other sources of information; numbering them for the sake of distinction and ease of reference, should any of them be called in question:

1. There can be no dispute which is the higher and which the lower city; that on the southwest hill being still about eighty feet higher than the one north of it, according to the Ordnance Survey Plan.

2. There ought never to have been a question whether the Tyropoeon valley after coming opposite the Temple hill turns to the west. To separate the two hills, there must have been an intervening valley. Wherever therefore its place may eventually be found, whether, as Robinson thinks, in the direction of the Jaffa gate, or farther to the north, the Tyropoeon, which skirts the pseudo-Zion on the east, must have turned westward, and joined the valley on the west side of Jerusalem.

3. Thus alone can the "crescent shape" be given to the hill on which the lower city stands.

4. Our next question is: Which of these cities was the City of David, and contained the stronghold of Zion connected with it? From Josephus (Ant. vii. 3. 1, 2 — quoted below, see No. 5), notwithstanding he never mentions Zion, and even gives the name of the City of David to the whole of Jerusalem, the legitimate conclusion, I believe, is that which Lieut. Warren has drawn — that Zion, "the citadel out of which David cast the Jebusites," was in the lower city. Still the conclusion may be evaded, as has so generally been done, by maintaining that by the citadel is meant the higher city, and that it was that which David "joined to the lower city, and made it one body." The conclusion, however, at which Lieut. Warren aims, comes out with unanswerable clearness from a comparison of 1 Mace. i. 30-34 with Joseph. Ant. xii. 5. 4.

The account in Maccabees of the capture of Jerusalem by Antiochus Epiphanes and his army is as follows: "He fell suddenly upon the city, and smote it very sore. And when he had taken the spoils of the city, he set it on fire, and pulled down the houses and walls thereof on every side. Then builded they the *City of David* with a great and strong wall and with mighty towers, and it became a stronghold (an Akra, εἰς ἄκραν) for them. And they put therein wicked men, and it became a place to lie in wait against the sanctuary." Compare also chap. ii. 31, where the City of David is expressly distinguished from Jerusalem: "The host that was at Jerusalem, in the City of David"; and again chap. xiv. 36.

This, in the corresponding passage of Josephus (Ant. xii. 5. 4.), is: "When he [Antiochus] had pillaged the whole city, he burned down the finest buildings; and when he had overthrown the city walls, he built the stronghold [τὴν ἄκραν] in the *lower city*; for the place was higher, and overlooked the Temple; on which account he fortified it with high walls and towers, and put into it a garrison of Macedonians; and the impious and wicked part of the [Jewish] multitude dwelt in it."

The author of the Maccabees places the Akra of the Macedonians, in the *City of David*; Josephus, in the *lower city*. The inference is unavoidable, that the City of David and the lower city are synonymous;

and, since Zion formed part of the City of David, that Zion is to be sought for, as Lieut. Warren has placed it, in Akra, or the lower city.

5. The connection, however, between the stronghold of Zion and the City of David must be more clearly defined.

The southwest hill being undoubtedly the higher of the two hills, and, if we compare it as a *whole* with the other, the stronger and more inaccessible from the deep valleys that surround it on all but the north side, it has been hastily concluded that the stronghold of Zion must have stood there. Now, however, that we find from a comparison of Maccabees and Josephus that its site was in the lower city, we are forced to the conclusion, since it was the most impregnable part of Jerusalem, that within the lower district of the city rose a towering eminence somewhat similar to the Castle Rock in Edinburgh, which by its precipitous sides had bidden defiance, till the days of David, to every effort of the Israelites to dislodge the Jebusites from its stronghold, and even for some time to David himself after he had taken the lower city, just as the Castle of Edinburgh continued to hold out against Prince Charles Edward after he was in possession of the city. The expression, "Nevertheless David took the stronghold of Zion; the same is the city of David" (2 Sam. v. 7), must not mislead us to suppose that the stronghold formed the whole of the City of David. It might very naturally by metonymy give its name to the whole of the lower city, just as the Abbey of Westminster has given its name to the district of London in which it stands. Even in scripture we have plain intimations of the mount and stronghold of Zion being distinct from the City of David. David, we read, at first "dwelt in the fort" itself (2 Sam. v. 9), but afterwards built a separate house for himself (v. 11), which was still in the City of David (2 Chron. viii. 11). The distinction between Zion and the City of David is further intimated by the notice in 2 Sam. v. 9; and 1 Chron. xi. 8, that David "built the city round about, even from Millo and inward," in order to make the fortifications of the city somewhat more worthy of the all but impregnable fortress which he had taken. The version, however, of these words by Josephus, (Ant. vii. 3. 1, 2, now that it has been shown that his Jebusite citadel was not in the higher city) removes all ambiguity: "so David took the lower city by force, but the citadel (*ἀκρά*) held out still. . . . When David had cast out the Jebusites out of the citadel, he made buildings round about the *lower city*; he also joined the citadel (*Akra*) to it, and made it one body."

The citadel in the lower city, which Josephus calls the *Akra*, must not be confounded, as several authors have done, with that in the higher city, which Josephus (Wars, v. 4. 1) calls the watch-tower (*φρουρίον*), evidently from the superior height of the mountain giving a more commanding view of an approaching enemy.

6. The name of *Akra*, here applied by Josephus to the stronghold of Zion, is the word uniformly applied by him (with the exception quoted

below), and by the author of the Maccabees, to designate the stronghold of the Macedonians, erected to overawe the temple. Is it not, then, the natural inference, that the original hill-fort of Mount Zion, occupied from the earliest times to dominate the lower city, is the same rock as that which, dismantled probably during the Babylonish captivity, Antiochus refortified for his Macedonian garrison? He would certainly select the strongest position which he could find; and it will scarcely be maintained that there were two such strongholds in the lower city. Nay, so pre-eminent was this fortress that Josephus on one occasion (*Ant.* xii. 6. 2) calls it "the *Acropolis* of Jerusalem" too, i.e. of the whole city; and such was its height and magnitude, that when the Maccabees gained possession of it, it took the people of Jerusalem three years' hard labor, working day and night, to level it, and join it on to the Temple mount, by filling up part of the intervening valley.

There would thus be no confusion in Josephus's employment of the term Akra, as asserted by some writers. The Akra of the Jebusites taken by David was still the same Akra which was occupied by the Macedonians; and which by a very natural metonymy gave its name to the district of the city in which it was situated, as Zion had done previously.

7. We have now a simple solution of two main difficulties which have hitherto perplexed all inquirers.

The first of these is: How came Mount Zion and the Temple mount to be so identified as to be used synonymously in scripture, if Mount Zion was, as the prevalent theory holds, on the west side of Jerusalem, while the Temple mount is on the east, and separated from it by a deep ravine? Lieut. Warren seems scarcely aware of the value of his conclusion as a reply to this difficulty. He dwells on what he places as the title to his paper, "The comparative *holiness* of Mount Zion and Moriah," and considers that the earlier holiness ascribed to Mount Zion from the presence of the ark would still continue to attach to it even after the transference of the ark to Mount Moriah, and satisfactorily accounts for the blending of the two names in the *poetry* of later times, while in *prose* they were kept distinct.

But how account for the *prose* use of Zion in 1 Macc. v. 54; vi. 62; vii. 33, etc., to denote the Temple mount alone, exclusive of any other part of the city, even of the Macedonian Akra itself? Had Zion been where the fancy of the monks and pilgrims of the Middle Ages has placed it, it seems altogether impossible to account for the real Zion, had such it been, losing suddenly its proper name and transferring it to another mount on the opposite side of Jerusalem, and separated from it by a deep intervening valley. But assume that Mount Zion was so close to the north-west corner of Mount Moriah, as according to Josephus's description of the Macedonian Akra to "adjoin to, and overlook the Temple" (*Ant.* xii. 9. 3; compare also 1 Macc. xiii. 52), and all difficulty disappears. To the

eye they would seem almost to form one continuous line; and when Mount Zion, once so holy, had now been desecrated by the long occupation of Macedonian idolaters, and was at length razed to the ground and obliterated; and the very site on which it had stood joined on to Mount Moriah, the name with it would most naturally be transferred to the sacred Temple mount, and by a patriotic writer like the author of Maccabees, be refused in his narrative to the desecrated citadel, to which up to that time it had properly belonged.

8. The second difficulty which has occasioned so much perplexity to commentators: How could Mount Zion be said in Psalm xlviii. 2, to be "on the sides of the north," in like manner disappears.

9. Finally, let me advert to a point to which attention has scarcely been drawn: To which of the two hills or cities of Josephus does Ophel belong? To one or the other of the two it must be annexed, unless we would add a fourth to the three hills of Josephus. To the pseudo-Zion it cannot be annexed without breaking the continuity of the Tyropoeon, which he states formed the separation between the two hills. To Akra, or the lower city, it must be united, if the crescent shape attributed to Akra is to be completed. After the addition of Mount Moriah to the lower city, these, with Ophel, would appear to the eye to form but one mountain or ridge, and consequently would all be reckoned, as by Josephus, the lower city. It is doubtful, however, whether a branch of the Tyropoeon ever ran so far northward (as is represented in the small plan on the collecting cards of the Palestine Exploration Fund) so as to join the depression that comes down from the Damascus gate, and whether there was not rather from the first a narrow ridge connecting Ophel to the lower city, and which passed to the west of the Temple area, skirted by the Tyropoeon on the one side, and by a valley between it and Mount Moriah on the other.

By making Ophel part of the City of David, we have an explanation of two passages in Nehemiah which seem not to admit of any other conclusion. In giving the detail in chap. iii. of those who repaired the walls, Nehemiah names in order, passing from west to east, verses 13-15, the valley [of Hinnom] gate, and "one thousand cubits on the wall from this the Dung gate," and then "the gate of the Fountain." This, he says, "Shallun repaired, and the wall of the Pool of Siloah by the king's garden, and unto the stairs that go down from the *City of David*," ver. 15. We are now, therefore, while still in the vicinity of the Pool of Siloam, quite close to the City of David, "at the stairs that go down from it." This is confirmed by the words immediately following: "Nehemiah repaired unto the place over against the *sepulchres of David*." And that we are now entering upon the wall that surrounded *Ophel*, which adjoined to the Temple, and was the residence of the priests and other servants of the Temple, is evident from the succeeding list of those who repaired the walls: "the Levites," ver. 17, one of whom had to repair "unto the door of the

house of the high priest," ver. 20 ; " the priests of the plain [of Jordan]," ver. 22 ; " the Nethinims," ver. 26 ; and the rest of " the priests repaired every one over against his house," ver. 28. Of these it is expressly said, ver. 26, that " the Nethinim dwelt in Ophel," and ver. 27, that " the Tekoites repaired even unto the wall of Ophel." It seems impossible to evade the conclusion that Ophel formed part of the City of David.

But should any doubt remain, it will be removed by comparing the account of the dedication of the wall in Neh. xii. Two companies started from about the middle of the western wall and met from the opposite sides in the Temple. Of the company which went " on the right hand toward the Dung gate," ver. 31, it is said, that " at the Fountain gate they went up by the stairs of the City of David, at the going up of the wall above the house of David, even unto the Water gate eastward," ver. 37. From this it is evident that immediately on passing the Fountain gate, they were in the city of David, for they ascend " the stairs of the City of David," and pass " the house of David," and proceed onwards till they reach the Water gate of the Temple.

It may be remarked, by the way, that this very passage is a sufficient proof that the higher city on the west hill is not the true Zion ; for had " the stairs of the City of David " led up to it, the wall and the company that followed its course must first have turned back westward to ascend it, then have descended again down the steep ravine of the Tyropoeon, and after crossing it have ascended again Ophel before they could reach the Temple.

The same conclusion, that Ophel formed part of Akra, seems to follow from two passages in Josepus's Jewish Wars. In vi. 6. 3, we read : " The Romans set fire to Akra, and to the place called *Ophlas* ; at which time the fire proceeded as far as the palace of Queen Helena, which was in the middle of Akra." And again, in vi. 7. 2 : " On the next day the Romans drove the robbers out of the *lower city*, and set all on fire as far as Siloam." The obvious inference is, Siloam being at the south extremity of Ophel, that Ophel must have formed part of Akra, or the lower city.

It would be an interesting subject of investigation for Lieut. Warren to ascertain whether any traces are still to be found near to Siloam of " the steps that led up to the City of David." " The sepulchre of David," too, must be sought for in the same vicinity — not, it seems reasonable to suppose, literally in the city, so as to defile it, but cut into the solid rock beneath it, and entering in from the valley.

ARTICLE XI.

NOTICES OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

A. GERMAN WORKS.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION.¹ Our readers will probably be best satisfied if we mainly content ourselves with indicating as completely as possible the subjects discussed in the two volumes of this new work on what is termed the Philosophy of Religion. The First Book is superscribed *The Essence of Religion*. Part First treats of the Essence of Religion as a Human Relation: 1. The Psychological Essence of Religion in and by itself: *a*. History of the psychological idea of religion; *b*. Closing critique and result. 2. Relation of Piety to other Functions of the Soul: *a*. Faith and knowledge; *b*. Relation of moral practice to piety. 3. The Fellowship of piety: *a*. The rise of Pious associations; *b*. The manifestation of pious communion in cultus, prayer, etc. Part Second treats of Religion as a Divine-human Relation (the Metaphysics of Religion). 1. God and the World: *a*. Proof of the existence of a personal God; *b*. Relation of God to the world. 2. Man: *a*. The beginnings of humanity; *b*. The goal of humanity (proofs of immortality). 3. Divine Revelation: *a*. Positive development of the idea of divine revelation; *b*. Critique of the dogmatic ideas — miracle, prophecy, revelation. The Second Book is superscribed *The History of Religion*. Introduction — Mythology. Part First: Heathenism. 1. Immediately Natural Religions: *a*. Of the type of dependence (Semitic or Egyptian); *b*. Of the type of freedom (Arians in India and Germany); *c*. Appendix on Feticism. 2. Cultivated Natural Religions: *a*. Of the type of freedom (Greeks and Romans); *b*. Of the type of dependence (Chinese). 3. Religions of the Supernatural: *a*. Brahminism and Buddhism; *b*. Parseeism. Part Second. 1. Judaism: *a*. Præ-Mosaic period and Mosaism; *b*. Prophetism. 2. Islam: *a*. The founder of Islam; *b*. The theology and mysticism of Islam. 3. Christianity: *a*. The preaching of the kingdom of heaven by Jesus; *b*. The beginnings of Christian doctrine.

We do not agree with the views of the author in many respects; but his work seems fitted to be very serviceable. The student will find collected together what he would personally have had to seek for in many separate works. We need scarcely say that the subject is one in all its branches that deserves the very careful attention of all who desire to meet the problems now presenting themselves on every hand to the religious teacher.

¹ Das Wesen der Religion: von Otto Pfeleiderer. Leipzig: Fues Verlag. 1869.

THE RESURRECTION OF CHRIST.¹ This defence of the veritable resurrection of Christ contains five sections, headed respectively: 1. The Antagonists; 2. The Testimony of Holy Scripture; 3. The Testimony of the Christian Church; 4. The Testimony of the Consciousness of Christian Piety; 5. Modern Views of the World and Miracles. The first section reviews the principal attacks from the Jews and the Docetæ down to Holsten, including especially Peter Annet, Bahrdt, Venturini, Brennecke, Paulus, Hase, Schleiermacher, Spinoza, Woolston, Strauss, Schweitzer, Max Perty, Ewald, Renan, Noack, Schenkel, Baur. Schenkel receives a very sharp castigation, which he well deserves. The writer says: "he has succeeded in combining in his *Charakterbild Jesu* what one would have supposed impossible of combination; namely, such diverse modes of explaining the Evangelical narratives as the literal, the naturalistic, the mythical, the allegorical, the sober, and the sentimental rationalistic."

The work does not seem to us to be one of a specially vigorous character; but it supplies a lack that has hitherto existed. As, further, its tone and tendency are satisfactory, we recommend it to the attention of our readers. There is not another recent monograph of any extent on this subject, so far as we are aware. One of the most striking brief apologies for the resurrection of Jesus is, a lecture delivered by Professor Beyschlag of Hall, some years ago.

ESCHATOLOGY.² A small book on the "Last Things," by Dr. Hermann Gerlach, late Privat-Docent at the University of Berlin. It embraces the following points: the Eschatology of the evangelical confessions; of the doctrinal works of the seventeenth century; of Schleiermacher; critical comparison and examination on death; Eschatological principles; state after death; intermediate state; resurrection of the flesh; final judgment; end of the world; eternal blessedness; eternal misery.

In the section on the intermediate state Dr. Gerlach speaks as follows: "As all men will be judged according to their unbelief or faith in Christ" (not according to their good or evil works) "all men must at some time or other have the gospel preached to them. Now it is clear that there are millions who have never had an opportunity of hearing about Christ. If *all* men are to be judged immediately after death, it is impossible for any who die ignorant of Christ to be saved. But this, in our view, is opposed alike to the Bible and to our religious feelings; for God wills that *all* shall be helped. We modify therefore the received doctrine as follows:

¹ Die Auferstehung Jesu Christi von den Todten nach ihrer Thatsächlichkeit und ihrer Bedeutung für den christlichen Glauben dargelegt von K. F. T. Greiner. Karlsruhe: F. Gutsch. 1869.

² Die letzten Dinge unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Eschatologie Schleiermachers nach der Lehre der heiligen Schrift. Von Dr. H. Gerlach. Berlin: W. Hertz. 1869.

those who die in conscious faith or unbelief in Christ, will be judged in the very moment of death, and will accordingly at once enter the state of blessedness or of misery; but for those who die without having heard of Christ there must be a place beyond the grave where the opportunity will be afforded them of a free and conscious decision for or against the gospel." This is one of the modes of solving the awful problem, what is to become of the hundreds of millions who have never heard, and never will hear, in this life about Christ. If we must choose, we fancy we should prefer it to the annihilation theory. The Universalistic view is utterly suicidal.

THE DOCTRINE OF PRAYER.¹ This little book is not new, for it was published in 1860, but it carries out so very remarkable an idea that we cannot help introducing it to the notice of our readers. The nine chapters into which it is divided are headed as follows: 1. The derivation of prayer from the nature of man; 2. Man praying has his archetype in the Triune God; 3. The reception of man into the movement of the life of the Trinity, or prayer in its historical progress; 4. The contents of prayer; 5. The hearing of prayer compatible with the predeterminations of God; 6. Charismatic prayer; 7. Prayer and moral work; 8. Common prayer; 9. The prayer of the perfected.

The following passage will give an idea of the scope of the discussion. "The movement of the divine life separates into three persons and three different spheres, then returning enriched into the unity of one will. God determines himself into three persons; but this self-determination involves also a being determined so far as the distinct persons act on each other. By the incarnation of his Son, God took up the life of the world into this his supra-mundane life, God determined the God-man; but was also determined by his prayers. Finally he gave his Holy Spirit to men, who as belonging at once to God and man, may also be termed divine-human. By this Spirit man is received up into the movement of the life of the Trinity, and enters thus into that relation of God to himself, by virtue of which he determines and is determined. God determines man by his Holy Spirit; but when man prays in the power of the Spirit, he determines God to corresponding actions and hearings. God determines himself by implanting a new principle in man, in order that man may determine him by means of his prayers. It is not the task of one who prays to conform his prayer to the once-for-all decided will of God; but to immerse his Ego ever afresh into Christ and his Spirit, in whom God has set himself over against himself, has entered into human growth and thus made it possible for himself to carry out the eternal will of his love in effects of prayer and hearings, which correspond to each other. This

¹ Die Lehre vom Gebet aus der immanenten und ökonomischen Trinität abgeleitet von Dr. R. Löber. Erlangen: Deichert. 1860.

divine-human growth, this action and reaction between God and man is no mere seeming ; prayers do not run parallel with the self-realizing pre-determinations of God ; but they have an original power of their own, and draw a God-vanquishing force from the Son and Spirit who dwell in the world." Dr. Löber's speculations are as warm as they are subtle, and we are sure no reader will fail to derive stimulus and quickening from studying his book, however much he may differ from his methods of investigation and solution.

HISTORY OF SOCIETY.¹ Dr. Rossbach, the author of this work, is probably a Roman Catholic. The present volume, of what promises to be an extensive undertaking, is entitled *The Aristocracy* ; and treats of the history of nobilities among the cultured nations, especially among the Romans, Greeks, and Germanic people. He seems to regard a nobility as a necessity to society in its highest state ; and remembering that he demands in it the combination of the ideal and real, of intelligence, self-sacrifice, and honor, as well as wealth and outward culture, perhaps one would not raise many objections. Unfortunately, however, the nobilities have rarely been distinguished for aught but external polish, social influence, and great wealth ; neither their moral nor intellectual eminence has on the whole been specially remarkable. The history here delineated contains much to interest.

ON RICHES.² This is a German translation of a French work, by Charles Périn, entitled "*De la Richesse dans les Sociétés chrétiennes*," in two volumes, and written from the Roman Catholic point of view. In seven chapters, the writer discusses : 1. Riches and their connection with renunciation in Christianity ; 2. The production of wealth ; 3. Trade and Commerce ; 4. The limits of production ; 5. The distribution of wealth ; 6. Misery, its causes and cure ; 7. Christian Love. Three appendixes treat of the History of Communism, of Socialism, German Handicraft ; and of the principle of joint property in land as developed among the peasantry of Russia.

Böhringer : *The Church of Christ and its Witnesses*. A new edition of a very useful work on Church History in the form of Biographies. This present volume treats of Clemens Alexandrinus and Origen.

Haneberg : *The Religious Antiquities of the Bible*. Second edition of the work entitled, *Hand-book of Biblical Antiquities*.

Lotze : *Microcosm*. A new edition of the well-known work of the philosophical Professor at Göttingen.

¹ *Geschichte der Gesellschaft*. Von Dr. J. J. Rossbach. Würzburg : Stuber. 1868. Price, 1 Thaler.

² *Ueber den Reichthum in der christlichen Gesellschaft*. 2 vols. Pustet. 1868. Price, 2½ Thaler.

Schwarz: History of the most recent German Theology. The fourth enlarged edition of this clever, well-written, but sneering and destructive book.

Thomas Aquinatis: Summa Theologica diligenter emendata, Nicolai, Sylvii, Billuart et C. J. Droux notis ornata. Editio iv. 8 vol. Luxb. Brück. 6 Thalers.

Lauth: Moses, the Hebrew, set forth for the first time after two papyrus documents in the hieratic character. Leipsic: Brockhaus. 4 Thalers.

Zöckler: Primitive History of the Earth. Six Lectures by the well-known Professor Zöckler, on the position of the earth and the human race in the cosmos; the creation of the unorganic part of the earth; the creation of the pre-human organisms; the creation of man; the unity of the human race; the age of the human race. Professor Zöckler seems to think that the fishing and hunting tribes whose remains are found in Europe and Asia, and which have given rise to the designation, age of stone, "age of bronze," and so forth, were the descendants of Cain; and that there is no difficulty in reconciling the chronological data acquired by the discoveries bearing on this subject, with the chronology of the book of Genesis.

B. ENGLISH AND AMERICAN WORKS.

THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. By John Bascom, Professor in William's College, author of "Political Economy," "Philosophy of Rhetoric," "Aesthetics." 12mo. pp 345. New York: G. P. Putnam and Son. 1869.

This compact volume, though of unpretending, almost obscure, appearance externally, is a fresh, original, and suggestive contribution to our American treatises on mental science. It starts forth with the following important postulates: "The mind has direct intuitive knowledge, which is ultimate, admitting of no further explanation than that involved in the very act of knowing"; "There are different kinds of knowing, each independent of the others": "We have as many intuitive faculties as we have distinct forms of primitive knowledge"; "What is conceded at one point must be fully conceded at all points." These postulates have their influence on all these pages, and play an important part in accomplishing what the author mentions as "one of the chief labors of the philosopher," "to keep independent faculties, so recognized on adequate grounds, from devouring each other."

The field of mental science is outlined here with a sharpness and clearness worthy of special attention. This definiteness in outline is owing to the peculiar and original conception which Professor Bascom gives of consciousness. Consciousness has been spoken of as an act and as a faculty of the mind. It is here spoken of as a regulative idea, like the idea of space, the necessary condition of all mental phenomena. All

material bodies, we say, are in space. We cannot think of body without thinking of space in which that body appears. So consciousness is the "unique realm — cut off from every other" — in which the field of mental science lies. This realm is an independent one, we may say a stubborn one. In thus sharply and distinctly and prominently giving the idea of consciousness, the author deems that he has erected one more strong barrier against those materialistic explanations which just now are so rife and so persistent. In the light of this conception, these vaunted explanations have the odium which properly pertains to any one who is guilty, *ὡς ἀλλοτριοεπίσκοπος*, of intrusion into another bishop's diocese.

The general divisions of the field thus defined, are the simple ones now almost universally current among those who belong to the intuitional school. We note the following special points, which are either new in treatment, or from the emphasis noticed in their statement, might be said to be favorite positions of this author. Consciousness, in harmony with the conception just mentioned, is affirmed to be no more an intellectual act than it is a feeling, which affirmation is quite opposite to that of Dr. Porter in his "Human Intellect," and to that of mental philosophers generally. Consciousness is not intellect, nor feeling, nor will, but the condition for all these. Yet, is it not in apparent inconsistency that consciousness is afterwards described as an inner sense, and included under that division of the intellect? The region of which Hamilton and others have spoken as the region of sub-consciousness is ruled out, as one of fancies and myths. So, of course, the theological inference is, that it is not supposable that one may sin, or may have sinned, below consciousness, nor that sin can be transmitted from parent to child. It cannot properly be said that we perceive the external world, much less that we are conscious of such a world. We perceive what is subjective only. Under the idea of causation, we infer the existence of an external source of our subjective impressions. Our belief in the outward world is a necessary result of various processes of our judgment. The commonly accepted division of the qualities of matter under primary and secondary is shown to be an error. For extension is not a quality of matter at all, but its antecedent condition under the necessary idea of space. Solidity, though a quality of matter, is an inference under the idea of cause: neither extension nor solidity are perceived. The regulative ideas of reason are said to be eleven, and are enumerated in the following order. Six of them pertain to matter, though having application also to facts of mind, as existence, number, space, time, resemblance, and causation; five of them are applicable only to facts of mind, and are named consciousness, beauty, right, liberty, and the infinite. The idea of truth is resolved into that of resemblance; a resolution which admits of question, as it seems to us. The policy of explaining away any one of these ideas by other notions, as, for instance, of reducing the idea of right to the idea of obligation of pursuing the happiness or blessedness

of being, is in this volume sturdily resisted. The exposition of the feelings and of the will occupies much the smaller portion of the book. The distinction between "vital action anticipatory of volition" and the true volition is brought out firmly. We like also this distinction drawn between primary volition, very commonly called choice, and secondary volition. The former "determines upon a series of acts in reference to an object or end to be reached by them"; the latter simply "regards the performance of these acts thus determined on." Freedom is properly predicated of the former only, and of it in virtue of the moral nature, which furnishes the alternative for choice. Our author contends earnestly against the notion that the will always does yield to the strongest motive.

The air throughout this discussion is wholesome and bracing. The book is not an accumulation of chips from the workshop of a Professor, but the production of one who has investigated these topics simply from the love of them. The style cannot be called remarkable for its quality of conveying with utter simplicity and clearness the thought of the writer to every possible reader. Professor Bascom is obliged to educate his own readers. But the style is sometimes startlingly clear; as by a flash the good thought reveals itself at once. The author writes with energy and with rare and delicate imagination. We have marked many passages along these pages, in which beauty and force of expression are blended with the subtlest insight and the finest sense of analogy between the fields of the material and the mental world.

THE SCIENCE OF THOUGHT: A System of Logic. By Charles Carroll Everett. Boston: William V. Spencer. 1869.

This is a work fitted to interest those thoroughly conversant with mental philosophy. Most others would find it abstruse and unsatisfactory. The style is often easy and clear, but occasionally technical and obscure. The first title conveys the better idea of the work. It has very little in common with formal logic. It has to us the great merit of being truly metaphysical — resting on the basis of pure thought, and wrestling manfully with the difficult problems of mind. The book is one of power, and there are many bright and happy things in it. We are, indeed, ready to regret the necessity of saying anything further, knowing that we cannot justify any criticism within the limits of a book-notice.

The work is systematic in form, more so, we think, than in thought. It is philosophical in tone and method of expression; more so, again we think, than in real substance, solidity, and coherence of principle. Its first division is into three Books — the material of thought, the forms of thought, and the limits of thought. The first book, on the material and relations of thought, is subdivided into positive, negative, and negation of negation. This is language not well fitted to convey any clear idea; nor does the substituted form, static, dynamic, and organic relations, altogether re-

move the difficulty. We are at a loss to see how an organic relation can be opposed to a static and dynamic one. Further subdivisions partake of this obscurity. Under positive relations we have quality, quantity, limit. The word "limit," as opposed to "quantity," imparts no well-defined idea. The language by which it is expounded seems to us very general and vague: "To everything there is placed a limit, within which it is confined. If it passes this limit, it ceases to be what it is. A quality tends to become its opposite when it passes beyond its limit." These assertions hardly convey a definite notion, when applied to material things and qualities, as rock, earth; hardness, fluidity.

The following passage seems a thing of words, rather than ideas; and we instance it because there are many others like it; "It [our developed reason] affirms absolute truth, absolute goodness, and absolute beauty. There cannot be three absolutes; therefore these three, each taken in its completeness, are one. From these all begin, and with them all end. This is the *a priori* proof or recognition of God."

This and like laxity, either of thought or of conveying the thought, mar the conception and execution of the work. Yet the careful reader will find a reward for his labor, and we gladly commend the work to patient scholars in philosophy.

CLASSICAL STUDY: Its Usefulness illustrated by Selections from the Writings of Eminent Scholars. Edited, with an Introduction, by Samuel H. Taylor, LL.D., Principal of Phillips Academy. 12mo. pp. 415. Warren F. Draper. 1869.

Dr. Taylor has certainly done excellent service to the cause of good learning in the preparation of this volume. It is a collection of extracts, varying much in length, from Essays and Addresses by some of the most distinguished scholars in our own country and in Europe; including under the term "scholars," not merely those who are such in the technical sense but politicians and lawyers. These extracts have no other unity than that which consists in their earnest advocacy of the study of the Classics. In the catalogue of those whose works are thus laid under contribution we find the names of Professor Thiersch of Germany, Professors Jones, Whewell, Payne, Conington, Goldwin Smith, and Mr. John Stuart Mill, of Great Britain; Presidents Felton, McCosh, and Brown; Professors Edwards, Porter, and Sanborn, Hugh S. Legaré, William H. Gardiner, Philip H. Sears, and Dr. George B. Loring, of this country. Prefixed to the work is an Introduction of thirty-one pages by Dr. Taylor. In this, after glancing at the history of the controversy relative to the worth of classical studies, the writer brings forward the testimony of a large number of eminent scholars and teachers both in this country and in Great Britain; then several reasons are given with a view of accounting for the fact that the rich benefits of classical studies are not more frequently attained.

The principal question discussed in this book is that of the relative position to which classical studies are entitled in an educational view, and the ground assumed is that this position is a central one. It is taken for granted that the stage of primary education has been successfully passed, and that that course of education is to be pursued which will best fit the pupil for that vocation to which, when the time for decision comes, he will choose to devote himself. The value of classical studies is compared with the study of our own and of other modern languages, with mathematics and with science; and it is shown, we must think, conclusively, that in relation to what ought to be regarded as the chief purpose of education — the discipline of the intellect — no study can be considered as of equal, still less of superior, value to that of the Classics. But the Classics do not merely serve as an excellent mental discipline; it is successfully shown that even in reference to the subordinate aims of education, such as the acquisition of knowledge, the cultivation of the taste, the imagination, the memory, the reasoning powers, and the faculty of analysis and nice discrimination, no study can supersede that of the Classics; that the statesman, the lawyer, and the theologian can by no means afford to dispense with that culture of which classical studies are, in all points of view, the most efficient instrument.

The superiority of the Classics to the English, and other modern languages, in a course of education is very vigorously, and we think, successfully, argued. The man, who would pursue with most success the study of the laws and forms of language in general must give his attention, first of all, to that of the Greeks and Romans; and inasmuch as the modern languages are to a very great extent based on the Greek and Latin, the thorough mastery of the latter would seem to be indispensable to anything like a minute and accurate acquaintance with the former. In short, the case of the classical against the modern languages is very clearly made out.

We are glad to see that an excessive value is not claimed for classical studies. It is not maintained by any means that they ought to have exclusive possession of the educational field; mathematics, science, modern languages, have their worth very fully appreciated.

The question of the proper place to be assigned to classical studies in a course of education is sometimes misapprehended. The advocates of these studies do not assert that they will qualify a man for any particular vocation in the absence of the special training which that vocation requires; nor that one should consecrate himself almost exclusively to these studies, who is ambitious to write plays like those of Shakespeare, or an allegory like the *Pilgrim's Progress*, or scientific treatises like the *Principia* of Newton and the *Mécanique Céleste* of our own Bowditch, or to acquire fame as an inventor like Arkwright and Whitney and George Stephenson. But the question is, what is the mode of training best fitted to qualify those who have during youth the time necessary to any systematic and thorough training for the different pursuits, professional, civil, or even mercantile

and mechanical, to which inclination or circumstances may afterwards direct them. Regarded in this aspect, the Classics are not in any danger of being displaced from the lofty position they have hitherto held, if the matter is to be decided under the influence of candor and good sense.

Dr. Taylor merits, without question, the gratitude of all lovers of good learning for having collected these Papers. Their influence cannot be otherwise than powerful and salutary.

THE LIFE OF DANIEL WEBSTER. By George Ticknor Curtis. Vol. I. New York: D. Appleton and Co. 1869.

From 1813, when Mr. Webster first entered Congress, down to 1852, when he died, few men in our country exerted so powerful an influence on the public thought, few occupied a position so commanding, or spoke with so much authority on the profoundest questions of municipal or constitutional law, or the grandest problems of public policy. In his will Mr. Webster appointed Mr. Everett, Mr. Ticknor, President Felton, and Mr. Curtis his literary executors. Two of these have since passed away. Mr. Ticknor was unwilling to attempt the labor of writing the Life of the great Statesman, and all the materials were consequently passed over to Mr. Curtis, who has just completed the work. Seventeen years have now passed since Mr. Webster's death; the angry feelings of the hour have been soothed, and we can judge more wisely and fairly of opinions and events than might have been possible a few years since. The first volume of the Life brings the narrative down to the year 1838, but this covers some of the most important judicial and forensic triumphs of Mr. Webster. The argument in the Dartmouth College case, in the case of Gibbons *vs.* Ogden, in the defence of Judge Recott, the orations at Plymouth and on Bunker Hill, and the Eulogy on Adams and Jefferson, the speeches on the Tariff and the Bank, and in reply to Hayne, all come within this period. The work is written calmly and almost judicially, without exultation where strong enthusiasm, at least, would be pardonable, and with an evident purpose of fairness and truth. Mr. Ticknor has contributed some interesting reminiscences of various parts of Mr. Webster's career, and the whole great life stands now complete before us, a most valuable contribution to private and public history. We are almost sorry that the volumes are to be sold, at present, to subscribers only. The second volume will appear shortly.

THE EPISTLE OF PAUL TO THE ROMANS. By J. P. Lange, D.D., and the Rev. F. R. Fay. New York: Charles Scribner and Co. For sale in Boston by W. H. Piper and Co.

"The Epistle to the Romans is the Epistle of the Epistles," says Dr. Schaff, the general editor of this series of commentaries. In this he only echoes and re-affirms the words of many profound biblical students. Luther

called the Romans, "the chief part of the New Testament, and the purest gospel," and Coleridge speaks of it as "the most profound work in existence." It is proof enough of this that the more we ponder upon the words the more full of thought they seem, and that all the commentators do not begin to exhaust the "bursting fulness of the meaning."

The Commentary is preceded by a General Introduction to the Epistles of Paul, and a Special Introduction to the Epistle to the Romans. Under the former, the writer treats successively of the life of Paul, of which he gives quite an extended narrative; the Epistles of Paul, the character of the Pauline Epistles, the Pauline theology, and the literature on the Epistles and on the theology of Paul. The special introduction treats of Rome and its significance, the Roman congregation, the authenticity and integrity of the Epistle, the occasion, purpose and contents of it, the place and time of the composition of the Epistle, the meaning and import of it, the contents and divisions, and the literature on the Epistle. More than fifty pages, closely printed, are occupied with the discussion of these themes. The value of this portion of the volume would be materially enhanced by an index or table of contents. The Commentary itself is marked by the same fulness, both exegetical and homiletical, which has characterized the previously published volumes. The labors of the editors and translator (Rev. Dr. Hurst,) must have been very great. "Upon no other book," Dr. Schaff tells us, "except Matthew and Genesis, has so much original labor been bestowed." One naturally turns to chap. v. 12-21; he will here find the general fairness and fulness of the Commentary well illustrated in this difficult portion, and will also be gratified here and elsewhere by the very suggestive remarks interspersed by Dr. Schaff. The general literature on the chapter is also brought into service, so that one has the leading opinions of many Commentators on different parts of the chapter. This is true also of the whole Commentary.

We regret that a large number of Book Notices which were prepared, are unexpectedly omitted for want of space. We can only give, therefore, the titles of many books which we had expected to notice at length. Some of the Notices will appear in the next Number.

From Robert Carter and Brothers we have new editions of several works of established character and permanent value, at greatly reduced prices:

Mosheim's Ecclesiastical History. Translated by Dr. James Murdock. 3 vols. 8vo. 1869.

The New Testament, translated from the Syriac-Peshito Version, by Dr. James Murdock. 8vo. 1869.

Kitto's Bible Illustrations; or, Original Readings on Sacred History, Biography, Geography, Antiquities, and Theology. 4 vols. 12mo. pp. 3432. 1870.

Paul the Preacher; or, a Popular and Practical Exposition of his Discourses and Speeches as recorded in the Acts of the Apostles. By John Eadie, D.D., LL.D. 12mo. 1870.

D'Aubigne's History of the Reformation in the Time of Calvin. Vol. 5th. Autobiography of F. W. Krummacher, D.D. 8vo. (just published).

The public are greatly indebted to the enterprise of Messrs. Charles Scribner and Company for a large supply of very valuable standard and popular works — some of them at very low prices. They send us:

Stanley's History of the Jewish Church. (New ed.) 2 vols. 8vo. 1870.

Stanley's History of the Eastern Church. (New edition.) 1870.

History of the Church in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries. By

Prof. K. R. Hagenbach, D.D. Translated from the last German ed., with additions, by Rev. J. F. Hurst, D.D. 2 vols. 8vo. (just published.)

The Life of Joseph Addison Alexander, D.D., Prof. in the Princeton Theol.

Seminary. By Rev. H. C. Alexander 2 vols. 8vo. (just published.)

Studies in the Gospels. By Archbp. Trench, D.D. 8vo. (just published.)

Bible Animals; being a Description of every Living Creature mentioned in the Scriptures, from the Ape to the Coral. By Rev. J. G. Wood, M.A., F.L.S., etc., author of "Homes without Hands," etc. With 100 new designs. 8vo. pp. 652.

History of Rome. By Theodore Mommsen. Translated by Rev. W. P. Dickson, D.D. 4 vols. Vol. I. just published. 12mo.

Ancient States and Empires; for Colleges and Schools. By John Lord, LL.D., author of "Old Roman World," etc. 12mo.

History of England, from the Fall of Woolsey to the Death of Elizabeth.

By James Anthony Froude, M.A. 12 vols. 12mo. (4 vols. published.)

From Roberts Brothers we have received:

The Writings of Madame Swetchine.

Primeval World of Hebrew Tradition. By Rev. F. H. Hedge, D.D.

Two Letters on Causation and on Freedom of Mind in Willing, addressed to John Stuart Mill. By Rowland G. Hazard. 12mo. Boston: Lee and Shepard.

Chase and Stuart's Classical Series. 4 vols.; viz: Caesar, Virgil's Aeneid, Cicero's Orations, and Horace. Philadelphia: Eldridge and Brother.

They also publish the Model Etymology, by A. C. Webb.

Our Home Physician; a new and popular Guide to the Art of Preserving Health and Treating Disease. By George M. Beard, A.M., M.D. 8vo. pp. 1066. New York: E. B. Treat and Co.

Classical Baptism; An Inquiry into the Meaning of the Word ΒΑΠΤΙΣΜΑ as determined by the Usage of Classical Greek Writers; and An Inquiry into the Usage of ΒΑΠΤΙΣΜΑ and the Nature of Judaic Baptism, as shown by Jewish and Patristic Writings. 8vo. Both vols. by Rev. James W. Dale, D.D. Philadelphia: William Rutter and Co.

THE
BIBLIOTHECA SACRA.

ARTICLE I.

PSYCHOLOGY IN THE LIFE, WORK, AND TEACHINGS
OF JESUS.

BY REV. OLIVER S. TAYLOR, BROOKLYN, N.Y.

WE use the term "psychology," as derived from *ψυχή*, to denote the science of the human soul. For a long time this word was nearly monopolized by certain quacks in philosophy and phrenology; and not until comparatively a recent date has it been redeemed from its ambiguous meaning, to stand henceforth with its near kindred, "physiology"; the two together embracing the material and immaterial parts of man.

We may look upon the adoption of this word into the technology of science as evidence of the enlarged and extended sphere of human investigation in the things of the soul.

This study has found its limits in days past just on the borders of its most interesting and vital workings. While the human intellect and the will have been the subjects of most careful and elaborate scientific inquiry, we wonder to see how little, comparatively, has been written respecting those remaining operations of the soul which are not included in these departments. The emotions, impulses, affections, sensibilities — whatever we call that in our inner man which is not intellect or will — have been deemed, apparently,

beyond the reach of accurate human knowledge; and only a small portion of this field has been called *terra cognita* of philosophy. While some few minds have advanced a short distance into this unknown wilderness, it remains true that there is yet very little knowledge of any order prevailing in the most spontaneous movements of the soul. It is to this hidden part of man, this *terra incognita*, the term psychology has most commonly been applied, and so it has come to mean more of mystery than knowledge.

But it is to be believed that even in this part of God's handiwork, where all seems so fitful, disorderly, unconnected, there yet may be discovered the elementary forces which are working, like all God's instituted powers or forces, in a perfectly uniform order. To discover these forces, and take observation of this order in the deep involuntary movements of the soul, is the work yet to be done in perfecting the science of psychology.

Lest these remarks seem to ignore what efforts are made by ordinary scholars in this department of science which we now call defective, we may verify them by one or two references. Examine "Haven's Mental Philosophy," a common text-book. To the discussion of the intellect he devotes three hundred and fifty pages, and to the sensibilities only one hundred and fifty. And, aside from this difference in quantity, there is no such rigor of analysis applied to the sensibilities as to the intellect.

And, whatever text-books have been used, college students will find, by reviewing their study of these departments in mental science, a like disproportion in the attention given them. The ideas, memory, imagination, perception, have engaged many times the study required respecting the affections, propensities, and emotions. And in the history of this science we find that very many philosophers have attempted to become masters of intellectual phenomena who have written not at all respecting the feelings. How much more abundant are treatises on the intellect than treatises on the sensibilities! How much more thorough study has

been given to the processes of perception and reasoning than to the processes of affection and desire! How much more familiar to the student is the subject "Origin of Ideas," than "Origin of Emotions"; "Increase of Knowledge," than "Increase of Affections"; "Sequence in Thoughts," than "Sequence in Propensities"; "Capacity of the Memory," than "Capacity of the Desires."

These latter themes have been made altogether secondary in the common study of phenomena of the soul. In real importance, however, they stand by no means in a secondary place, but rather in the first place, so far as pertains to human welfare, or to wonderful and interesting phenomena for the philosopher. For down in this part of the soul are found the springs of human action, the activities which determine the grade of a man's being, the precedent conditions of both intellectual and will activity. Our propensities are the motives which induce us to exert our intellectual powers, and our intellectual powers are but the instruments by which we attain the ends towards which our propensities urge us.

"Reason the card, but passion is the gale."

In one sense, the two phases of soul-action called intellect and will can hardly be said to rank as co-ordinate with the one we contrast with them. They are rather instrumental or subordinate to its tendencies and workings.

We speak of a *motive power* in man. Something which moves his thought and his will, as if these in themselves had not power of action or motion. And in some sense this is true. There is, indeed, an interaction. Thought reacts on the heart to arouse its feeling, and the will may control these spontaneous forces in a degree. It is difficult, indeed, to draw the exact line separating these departments. But still we are conscious of something down deep in us, some movings or acting forces, which are as the elementary activities of our most real self; something which originates not at all in our will, and which is in but a partial degree subject to it; something which is as the steam power for impelling our thought and will.

It is not needful here, nor anywhere in this discussion we now open, to speak much of the vexed problem, "the freedom of the will," — how the will is related to the motivations of which we speak. But it may be observed that it takes but little space to tell all we seem to know on this point. After all the investigation we have had, with attempted arguments and analyses, we may sum up the whole matter by saying: *We know we are free by the simple testimony of our consciousness.* And all elaborate attempts to increase the force of this conviction, so simply secured, tend rather to weaken it. There is in us some power of self-control, which our inner vision sees; and the connected truth, that therefore we are responsible beings, is just about as simple in its foundation. This, we say, is about the full substance of all learning in this subject.

We recognize, in connection with the phenomena of the soul, called the will or volition, that there always is a preceding motive — some spontaneous force, or forces, called a bias, propensity, hunger; and in some accordance with this motive does the will finally turn or act. In what sense this motive determines the will, or whether in any at all, and where exactly the motive power ends and the will power begins, are questions not as important as the observation that some motive always goes before the will, and by affecting the motive we affect the will; so that, whatever importance there is in having a right will, the only way to make it right, or to work at it, is through the motive. There is a relation of antecedent and consequent here, apparently as uniform as if fixed or connected by some necessary force. Still, we do not call it such. It is only *certain, uniform*, not, necessary. But a *certain* uniformity in antecedent and consequent is as perfect a ground for science as a necessary uniformity between the two. And, in all practical working, we may treat the will *as if* fixed in some necessary laws, though we know the seeming necessity is but a certainty.

The will, then, is affected only through the motives preceding it, and the will affects itself only by working

on itself through these preceding forces or powers, called spontaneous.

The will is but one spontaneous elementary force among several others in the soul, and so does not originate the others, but simply has over them some control.

These statements go to show that the great problem of righteousness in the soul, which some seem to limit to the narrow workings of the one force in us called our will, has a vital connection with, yea, is determined by, the conditions precedent to the will. Say what we may of the upright purpose being all that God requires, we know there is no getting the purpose to be upright, righteous, and stay thus, except by first securing a certain right, or not improperly called "righteous," order in those propensities and affections — all that combine to make the motive power antecedent to the will. If we say that righteousness lies wholly in the will, then we must say the conditions of righteousness, without which it never did exist, lie wholly back of the will in that mechanism of the soul which we call motive. Here is the determination of character. The perfect man has not simply a right purpose, but also has every inclination turned toward inciting the will to a right choice. The problem of righteousness, therefore, pertains more to the motive forces of the soul than to mere will-phenomena.

There is, then, we conclude, some nature, some organism, some elementary powers of spontaneous production in that part of the soul we now distinguish from intellect and will; and originally in their ideal condition some order prevailing in the same, well arranged for certainly securing the right action of the will and highest exercise of the intellectual powers, and also the perfect condition of the physical structure through which all these immaterial powers operate.

Here, we claim, is a department of psychology, a lawful field of scientific inquiry, not yet investigated with a zeal and success proportionate to that which has been given to other departments of the mind, or even to that given to the human body.

There is no proposal in this Essay to attempt this full work, or even to begin it, in the sense of analyzing these elementary powers and presenting an exact contribution to science; but we are interested merely to inquire if we may know anything of *that order in these powers which would prevail in a perfect soul*, and anything practical as to *how such order may be secured*. Who will teach us in this branch of psychology?

The thought we have in mind now to express is, that Jesus Christ is the one authoritative Teacher in this science. His life presents to us the one example — call it phenomenon, if you will — of the perfect order we seek. His teachings reveal to us the knowledge which came from his consciousness of the order in his own experience, and from his familiarity with the first ideal of God in creating man. And his work in the healing of men's souls and bodies reveals some workings and order in the mind by which alone the healing of men's souls and bodies may be continued. And, need we say, it will be no derogation from the dignity of Christ's mission to show its harmony with the order of God's working in the soul, even with that operation of natural law which makes up the constitution of the soul. There is in some minds a limited view of Christ's mission, and of all divine working, which excludes them from any and every order which seems secured in nature. It is said to be evidence against God's leading Israel when we attend to the knowledge of geography and of heathen religion which Moses used. And if the wind and tide could be proved favorable for the parting of waters through which Israel passed, this would make that wonder less divine. So, if one attempts to show the natural order which Christ obeyed, and the conformity of his life with some uniform working which he found existing, then will certain minds complain of an infringement of his divinity. These think that God can show himself only by coming in some strange, mysterious way — in some place out of nature, different from any order known, or even unknown. Disorder, or absence

of uniformity, seems to be the essential for a divine manifestation.

We believe this to be the definite spirit which Jesus rebuked when he said: "An evil and adulterous generation seeketh after a sign." "Except ye see signs and miracles, ye will not believe." It is a mark of spiritual blindness if one finds no manifestation of the divine in the order of his working which he has fixed and followed in his creation and providence. And this is the wonder of the incarnation,—not that some human form appeared more unlike man than like him, not that the Son of Man comes into life wholly outside of law and common order. He was conceived and born of a woman, and passed through the varied stages of infancy, childhood, youth, to manhood. Here is natural order; and this is a type of his inner life, of the order which prevailed in the movings of his soul, in the workings of his mind and will and heart. His experiences in emotions, impulse, holy purpose, were secured, or they occurred, in the order which in the beginning God fixed as the ideal of a perfect mind.

For, like all things made, this soul of ours must have had some pattern first in God's ideal. Man's soul first existed as an idea, or conception, in God's mind. There were arranged its parts and their relations, some order to prevail in the constitution to be made. This order, then, is God's order. This law, which is the simple, natural law of the soul's constitution, is the law of God securing that perfect thing to be a human soul.

Here we see instituted some new forces, and an order for their working, which may become the subjects of study for angels or for men. Here was first devised the pattern of a perfect man. Now, when Jesus came to fulfil a heavenly mission he did not come out of this order. His perfect life will be according to this first perfect ideal in God's mind. The workings of his affections and emotions, his will and judgment, will be not a revelation of some new order which God has devised for this special mission, but only a true

archetype of that divine ideal which was in God's mind when creating man.

Thus we do not see all the glory of the manifestation of God in this man Christ Jesus, in that he comes as a new species, a new creation, a new combination of spiritual forces, distinguishing him from all human kind, from the order of man, as it prevails, in every perfect specimen. But it was the glory of Jesus that he fulfilled and showed in archetypal form, in a true embodiment, the divine ideal of the soul's constitution, the order which God arranged to prevail in the perfect human spirit.

Instead, then, of its being a derogation from his divinity to study and emphasize his obedience to natural law, this is just the glory of his mission—that he succeeded in manifesting from his own perfect life, to a world of souls all out of order, damaged and disordered by sin, a perfect example of what a soul is when in true natural order.

Here, then, we have a conjunction of Christ's mission and person with the world of scientific investigation. For science has to do with all the elementary powers or forces in nature—to discover them, and find the order of their operation. Wherever there is an instituted force, with some uniform working, we have an object for the philosopher's attention. The perfect philosophy or science lies in the mind of God, in the order by which he worked in his creation. Whatever best reveals this has an appropriate place among the objects of scientific study.

Since, then, we have in the man Jesus of Nazareth the full revelation, even an embodiment, of the Creator's device respecting the perfect man—a complete example of the true order of the soul's operation, there is no other life so worthy as this of the philosopher's attention. And, since Jesus knew what was in himself—the order of his own life, his teachings respecting soul-life are authoritative in the science of psychology.

Thus would we present Jesus Christ as the great Teacher of psychology. We are wont to give him the first place as

a Teacher of God. None but himself had seen the Father, and could speak so familiarly of him. Are we wont to give him the same exalted position in revealing the things of the soul. In theology and psychology alike Jesus is the Divine Teacher.

And now we come to the main subject of our inquiry —

The Teachings of Jesus respecting the Perfect Soul-life.

To present these, as near as possible, in some system, we shall observe:

- I. The Condition of the Will — *in perfect harmony with the will of God*: “Thy will be done on earth, as in heaven.”
- II. The Motive power which secures this Holy Will — *a passionate affection for God*: “Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart and soul and mind and strength.”
- III. The Source or Way of coming for this Motive power — *a faith in spiritual realities which doubts not*: “If ye believe, and doubt not.”
- IV. The Order of the Emotions — *blessedness*, as proclaimed in the beatitudes.
- V. As a Result of the above Spiritual Order we see secured — *the highest condition of the intellect and physical frame*.

I. Christ teaches that in the perfect soul the will is in complete harmony with the will of God. This was the great aim in his mission — to restore the reign of heaven on the earth, which is simply securing the will of man in the control of heaven. This is his ideal of righteousness, or true holiness, — when on earth is done the will of God as it is done in heaven.

We can appreciate some reasons for this aim. The soul, as we have noticed, is something created. It existed first in the idea of God's mind, then was made after that device. There is necessarily some order prevailing in all things made. There was an order God devised for the working of the

perfect soul — some one way in which it would find most life and peace and joy, as there is but one order or combination of parts which will secure from the body perfect health. Now, it is clear that any departure from this divine order must affect the whole soul. It cannot be the same when out of order as when in order. And how more exactly state that order than by referring to the will of its Maker. He who made the invisible powers of men certainly knows how they should go, how move, what order is their highest condition. Thus to do God's will is surely to restore all the workings of the soul to that condition which he first devised for them to follow. A more perfect ideal we cannot conceive.

And this was the meaning of Jesus in the words he most used to express the object of his mission. He came preaching the "kingdom" or "reign of heaven." He sent his disciples to preach or proclaim the "kingdom" or "reign of heaven." And this is the "reign of heaven" — God's ideal restored in the soul — God's first devised order again established; disorder, disease, deficiency, all removed, and the soul's powers moving according to its first divine constitution.

II. But it is a point of greater interest to discover the motive power which is sufficient to fix the will in this divine order.

Jesus unfolds this in those two commandments which are the summary of all the duty of man: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, with all thy soul, with all thy mind, with all thy strength." "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." "On these two commandments hang all the law and the prophets." This last verse may be interpreted as asserting or implying that obedience to all the law and the prophets is dependent on this prior condition of the affections. There is no other way of securing this obedience; and this order of love will never fail to secure it.

And here let it be observed that this law, like all others which God reveals, is but a statement of that order which he arranged in the beginning for the soul's activities. It is not simply some decree or edict of a governor, given by

virtue of his power to command; but, with all this, it is but a repetition by this Governor of the innate law which he first devised for the soul's action. As if we should suppose the heavenly bodies to become possessed of a human power to hear and to obey, and God should give them commands respecting the relations they should hold to each other. These commands would be in part but a transcript of the law of gravity. The natural law of gravity—that force now acting in these bodies in an order fixed from the beginning—would then be proclaimed with the authority of a sovereign Ruler. Should the material world become possessed of will and judgment, so as to need counsel and control, the laws divine for such a kingdom would be the perfect natural philosophy. One edict would be a transcript of the order in the force of gravity; another would be that in cohesion; another, that in capillary activity. God had first fixed this order for the rule of matter; and if he would do aught to enforce his will, he would simply confirm the order first established. He could not have one order fixed in the nature of things, and a different order to apply from without. So of the command of love for the soul which we notice. It originated in the first arbitrary device of God in making the soul. From him alone did come its parts and their relations. He put them together. He measured and established each elementary force of impulse, desire, and emotion. He arranged what should precede, what follow; what should be of chief importance, what in second place; what powers should rule, and which should serve.

Here, then, in the beginning, we see God making his laws, and binding them on or in the soul, in some other way than by appeal to the will and judgment. He could not work without order or law in the soul any more than he could fix the planetary system without order. And when this last created thing is made, man in the image of God, and the free-will creature stands in need of receiving some law by which to guide himself, what could our Maker do but repeat to him the law of his own being? Certainly God himself

could be honored in this part of his creation in no higher way than by following the order which he had first contrived ; and so his laws and commandments are a simple statement, with authority, of that inner order of the soul's being. This first and great commandment is but a transcript of that order of *love* which was instituted for the soul's healthful working.

The question we ask, then, how bring the will of man, of the creature, into harmony with the will of God, or the order of its creative design, is answered in this commandment of *love*. Supreme love to God is the force or motive power which alone will secure this order of the will. We are aware that such reasoning uses the word "love" to mean something different from *will* power ; even those forces of impulse and desire and involuntary cravings which precede the will's working. This, we believe, is the scripture meaning. It is not the common meaning of the word "love" to refer chiefly to the choice or purpose of the soul. Something deeper than this is meant. It hints of the involuntary affections, passions, longings, emotions—all this deep mechanism of impulse that arises apart from choice. These springs of voluntary action are something distinct from that action.

So, if we should interpret this supreme love to mean simply a supreme purpose—exalting, in the meaning of the term, the voluntary over the involuntary workings of the man—we should still have those involuntary workings to study under some other term. In a word, there is need of some law to give us the divine order which must precede a righteous choice ; and if we deny its statement in one commandment, we simply must seek it elsewhere.

We believe this order is under this term "love." The first and great commandment from our Lord applies to the soul's deep, hidden, involuntary forces, in inclination, desire, spontaneous hungering. The commandment proclaims that these are to be fixed on God with all intensity—with all the heart and soul and mind and strength. This is the

motivity arrangement God first devised to secure the reign of his will over man's will.

And now we propose to the scientific man, who talks of *phenomena* and the *order of nature*, to let into his mind the idea of a soul which is possessed of this strong love to God, and carefully to observe what order would prevail in all its parts — how it would be affected in thought and emotion and choice, from God and nature and its own self workings. Here is a problem for the psychologist. Let him reason out the state of that soul which loves God with all the heart.

The expression in this commandment is intense. It is no less than the language of *passionate affection*. The strongest love of lovers cannot exceed "all the heart and soul and mind and strength." Perhaps no impulse or soul-force is a better example of strong affection than that we see in lovers. We may shape our hypothesis under this analogy. Let us suppose a heart to come into such an affection for God as we see in man and woman for each other. Behold what such love has wrought! What suffering has it not endured? What obstacles has it not overcome? In what discouragements has it not hoped? What sacrifices has it not made, even laying one's life and being upon the altar? Behold, we ask, the power of a strong love. How it affects and controls the whole being, commanding, energizing, inspiring, changing weakness to strength, bringing knowledge out of ignorance, device and labor out of weakness, securing joy where once was pain, and pain where once was pleasure. It enters in to revolutionize all the man — his soul and body, his will and emotions, his appetites and intellect. Every part is energized to a wonderful activity and attainment.

And there is in God's being what will more forcibly affect the soul when its love is fixed on him. Then is secured a hungering for his presence which is a felt uneasiness in the soul till gratified, like the pain of separated lovers. Then is felt a thirst for some expression of his love in response, some assurance of his favor and acceptance. Then God's will need not come as a command, but the one loving needs only

to learn it that he may have the joy of doing God's desire. The actions are no more marked by that special feature called obedience, but are simply the spontaneous efforts of one whose great joy is in pleasing him. Like the reveries of the lover, in which the automatic movements of the thought-power turn, as if drawn, to the object of affection, so the involuntary movements of the thought turn, being drawn, to God; more force being needed to withdraw them from him than to engage them with him. For here, in God is the soul's joy, its meat and drink, its breath and motion; not merely is, but known to be and felt to be, so entirely that pain is experienced by the separation from him as surely as one will suffer from hunger when deprived of food. As there is no substitute which we can provide for the true lover in place of his heart's choice, so there is no substitute for God we can furnish to make the soul which loves him with full passion contented, or even comfortable. All the world is less than husks for its appetite or nourishment.

Our Lord refers to the order of the soul's workings when in this strong affection, in those wonderful words: "If any man come to me, and hate not his father and mother and wife and children and brethren and sisters, yea, and his own life also, he cannot be my disciple" (Luke xiv. 26). And again, "Whosoever shall lose his life for my sake and the gospel's, the same shall save it."

Let one conceive of the strength of love here implied, when, should his own kindred, or even his own life, hinder its service for the one loved, these kindred and one's own life, instead of tempting him to turn aside for their interests, would rather be hated for their opposition. A love so strong that love of life is all absorbed in it, no longer stands in the way of any service due, even if that life must be risked or sacrificed. This is the meaning of "losing one's life to find it." It is to come into a condition of such disregard for it, compared with the will of God, that one in a sense loses his valuation of it: as the parent holds his money for nought when weighed against his life, or his family's welfare.

Other scripture, setting forth this same intensity of motive on the soul, we may quote: "Who, for the joy set before him, endured the cross, despising the shame." Of Moses we read: "He esteemed the reproach of Christ greater riches than the treasures of Egypt." In Revelation, we read of the saints: "They loved not their lives unto the death." Again of Jesus's words: "He that loveth father or mother more than me is not worthy of me; and he that taketh not up his cross, and followeth after me, is not worthy of me." All these so-called requirements of self-crucifixion, self-annihilation, are but results which spontaneously appear when one's soul is fixed in passionate affection. That love once possessing the soul will act out itself in just these ways, according to a uniform psychological working.

Continuing our analogy with human affections, we may bring from words of Shakespeare some which will help explain these intense expressions of Jesus, or rather, we might say, these expressions of intensity in affection. And, if the case of love we quote seems to have impurity mingled in it, this will not vitiate the citation for our reasoning; since we study simply the workings of the soul when cherishing its strongest love. For illustration, we want instances in which strength, intensity, of love is chiefly manifest; and the object of it matters little. Since the kind of love we notice is marked with the highest intensity we see in human hearts, we may learn from this intensity without thinking of the impurity attending it. When Romeo was in the garden holding converse with Juliet, she says:

"How cam'st thou hither, tell me? and wherefore?
The orchard walls are high, and hard to climb;
And the place death, considering who thou art,
If any of my kinsmen find thee here."

Rom. "With love's light wings did I o'er-perch these walls;
For stony limits cannot hold love out;
And what love can do, that dare love attempt.
Therefore thy kinsmen are no let [hinderance] to me."

Jul. "If they do see thee, they will murder thee."

Rom. "I have night's cloak to hide me from their sight;
And, unless thou love me, let, let them find me here;

My life were better ended by their hate,
Than death prorogued, wanting of thy love."

Jul. "By whose direction found'st thou out this place?"

Rom. "By love, who first did prompt me to inquire.

He lent me counsel, and I lent him eyes.

I am no pilot; yet wert thou as far

As that vast shore washed with the furthest sea,

I would adventure for such merchandise."

And again, after Romeo had murdered Tybalt, and the word of punishment was brought him that he was banished from Verona, where lives the one he loves, he responds:

"Ha! banishment? Be merciful: say — death!

For exile hath more terror in his look,

Much more than death; do not say, banishment!

"There is no world without Verona's walls,

But purgatory, torture, — hell itself.

Hence-banished is banished from the world;

And world's exile is death; then banishment

Is death misterm'd.

"'Tis torture, and not mercy. Heaven is here

Where Juliet lives."

Again, when with her till the song of the lark, and the first dawn's ray reminded him he must flee, or be discovered and die, he says:

Rom. "I have more care to stay than will to go.

Come, death, and welcome! Juliet wills it so."

And when Juliet was counseling with the friar how to avoid being married to Paris, as her father decreed:

Jul. "Oh, bid me leap, rather than marry Paris,

From off the battlements of yonder tower;

Or walk in thievish ways; or bid me lurk

Where serpents are. Chain me with roaring bears;

Or shut me nightly in a charnel-house

O'er-covered quite with men's rattling bones."

This picture from Shakespeare we present as exhibiting the psychological phenomena of love -- an order in the working of motives like to that indicated in the words of our Lord, when he enjoins us to call not our life dear unto us in comparison with the end of pleasing him. We behold how the greatest self-denial is a spontaneous result from the working of a passionate affection.

Our thought is, if we look on the human soul with the simple interest of a philosopher in the phenomena to be seen or to be produced, and ask: How can all its energies, its love of kindred, of self, of life, its aversion to toil, to suffering, and death, — its every latent and moving power, — be subordinated to the work of righteousness, we have a sure answer: Simply introduce into that soul a passionate affection for God, and the whole work is accomplished. All the free and spontaneous powers are then but servants to do God's will.

III. Our next question will be: How secure this strong love which shall work with such a power of passion. To do this may seem as much like moving a mountain as is the proposal to hate one's own kindred and life.

The answer of Jesus to this question is: "If ye have *faith*, and *doubt not*, ye shall say unto this mountain, Be thou removed, and it shall be done." Here is the condition precedent to that energizing, all-prevailing motive which we have noticed — a faith in spiritual realities which rises into absolute, certain conviction — in which is *no doubt*. This is the philosophy of Jesus.

We can give no better illustration of the working of the soul in such a faith than that which is given to explain the motive power in the life of Moses: "He endured as seeing him who is invisible." The conception is, of a mind on which spiritual things operate the same as do objects of sense.

We know that things of sense produce in our minds a *faith* in which is *no doubt* — a conviction of their existence which is unto certainty, constancy, and sure control. I have no doubt respecting the fire which I see in my stove. I never fail to believe it, though it comes in my way, in contact with my sense of sight or feeling, a hundred times. I never attempt to take up the live coals with my uncovered fingers. However much I want them, or whatever hurry I am in, I touch them not with my hand. After gaining the knowledge of the properties of fire, one will render complete obedience to the law of safety which forbids putting his hand in it, though he live fourscore years. He will never fail to believe

in fire — in its presence and harmful properties. He will never fail to discern it when it comes in relation to his senses. He will not once refuse to obey the law of safety. Behold here a law which has an absolutely certain control over our conviction and will. It is the same with all objects of sense.

And it cannot be said that our wills are not free in this conformity to law. I am as free to put my hand in the fire as I am to take with it what is not mine own. A free will is in no more necessity to obey sense-convictions than it is to obey spiritual convictions. Every man is free to plunge the knife to his own heart, or to eat poison as food, or to play with vipers. But in this freedom there is an almost uniform refusal to disobey the law of safety.

And more, it is a *free* obedience we here see. Not a conformity rendered unwillingly, only after some extra inducements brought on to the will, but without a thought of any contrary act, without an instant of hesitation, and almost without exception in the whole race, we see this sense-law obeyed. Free obedience, constant obedience, universal obedience.

And be it observed, this control of the senses is wrought through *a conviction which doubts not*. The sense-object could not control us, except by this instrumentality. There is a time in the infantile history of the soul when these objects occasion no such conviction in it. The first process in sensation is said to be simply a subjective one. The mind comes to a faith in objects outside of itself only by education. It is not instinct. The infant will put his hand in the fire, once or twice, till it comes to believe by experience in the existence and effects of fire. In a word, we cherish a kind of *faith* in all perception. Conviction, belief, is an integral part in the work of our senses. For take it away, and we no more obey the same laws. Remove feeling from the hand, and then it is by no means sure not to handle the iron which may burn and destroy it. Remove vision from the eye, and the man will walk off precipices. The sense-world in this case is in the same relation to the

man's welfare; but by imperfect senses he loses the ability to gain the *faith* in it which *doubts not*, and so is continually violating the law of safety. We see, then, even in the operations of sense, the controlling power over the soul is the faith which doubts not.

And further, we see this faith controlling the soul, even if it be utterly unfounded. Convince me fully that a bridge is safe, then will I drive across it, though, in fact, it lets me through. Convince me it is not safe, and then, though it be sound and strong, I go not on it. See, then, the controlling power is this faith, conviction.

Now, this was the philosophy of Jesus: "If ye believe, and doubt not, then will the mountains remove," the impossible work in spiritual matters will be accomplished. So educate the inner sense to discern spiritual objects, as the outer sense perceives matter, with a faith which doubts not, and one will find his being rendering obedience to spiritual laws with the same certainty and constancy which he now manifests with the laws of the sense-world. It is through this faith which doubts not, the certain, surely impelling motive comes, — be it pertaining to a law of the visible or invisible world.

Here we see the meaning of the word "faith" as used in the eleventh chapter of Hebrews. We see an explanation of the motive power which was operating in those who "subdued kingdoms, wrought righteousness, obtained promises, stopped the mouths of lions, quenched the violence of fire, escaped the edge of the sword, out of weakness were made strong, waxed valiant in fight, turned to flight the armies of the aliens." The simple explanation was, they endured like Moses, "as seeing the invisible." They believed, and doubted not, in all God's word and works, and so wrought all these wonders.

We have noticed in the sense-world how free and spontaneous is our obedience to the laws of safety. This implies a perfect order in all the involuntary movements of desire and affection which go before the volition. There is a free obedience, and there is a forced or unwilling obedience.

The difference lies in the mechanism of motive which is the condition precedent to the will's action. Free obedience implies harmony and consent, homogeneous tendency, in all the automatic movements of thought, desire, and affection. It requires that the nature or organism be exactly strung, if we would have harmony in action of the will with all parts. To accomplish this there is need of some power that can reach further than the voluntary part of man's mind. The secret relations of organic parts, the hidden mechanism of nature, the very conditions of elementary movements in the heart, must be reached and affected. It is the office of a faith which doubts not to accomplish this. It does not reach immediately unto the will to control it as by subjugation, but it affects, first of all, the soul's movements which go before and have relation to that will.

Or, changing the form of our thought, when we come to cherish a faith which doubts not in God and his divine working, then the loveliness which is in him, the supreme excellence and wisdom, embracing and securing all good, for ourselves and for the world, become so related to our whole being's powers that our adoration and desire and affection are all drawn unto him. He becomes and remains to such a faith "the Chief among ten thousand, and the One altogether lovely." Then our affections rise out of any dull or lukewarm state, and become inspired, energized, to be that passionate love which we have noticed in the first and great commandment.

If we notice the things spiritual to be believed in order to secure this perfect control and affection, we shall find them very simple: "I, the Lord, will never leave thee nor forsake thee." "I am on thy right hand, that thou mayest not be moved." "Ask what ye will, and it shall be done unto you." "He that hath seen me hath seen the Father." "The Lord withholdeth no good thing from him that walketh uprightly." "Take no thought for the morrow; for the morrow shall take thought for the things of itself." "If any man lack wisdom, let him ask of God, who giveth to all men liberally, and it shall be given him."

It may be said that a faith which doubts not the truths proclaimed in these declarations would secure the soul in as free and uniform obedience and love to God as is the obedience we render to laws of bodily safety. From what we know of order in the soul's workings, we should cherish a certain expectation that such a faith would be a sure antecedent to the results named.

Take that truth of divine care over each individual, as taught in God's notice of the falling sparrow, and his counting the very hairs of our head. Let us suppose a person to accept this truth with a faith which doubts not, and then discern the temper of mind which would result. Be careful, in the hypothesis, to distinguish the condition of *no doubt* from the common dim ideas and convictions respecting the same declarations. "No doubt" implies absolute certainty. The soul has come beyond discussion, inquiry, and examination of evidence, beyond possibility and probability, into the region of certainty — certainty full and fixed. "No doubt" is a conviction which no sense-evidence can surpass. I have the gold in my hand to purchase this day's bread; I have the promise of God as the security for the morrow. If in "no doubt," I am as sure of the provision for to-morrow as I am that my gold will help me through this day. And could I in any way manage to start a fear lest my ten-dollar gold piece would not provide for my dinner? Could I even by device bring on to my mind a shadow of such a fear? No more could one fear or tremble for the morrow, if his faith in God's promise has come to "no doubt." The door is shut and bolted against every intruding fear. Not one *can* enter. It is a vain profession for those to make who are subjects of anxious care, that they nevertheless believe without doubt in God's care. It cannot be. As well declare that a man who still breathes is dead, as that a soul which believes without doubt is in fear and trembling. There is no such possible order in soul-experience. Fear and trembling may consist with some degree of faith, in which doubt is mingled, but never

with the faith which "doubts not." Behold, then, what peace prevails by doubting not. The whole thought-process is revolutionized in every person so believing. A new force has come into his soul; a new power is reigning over him, and commands a silence among all the fears and foregoing thoughts which were wearing and fretting away his life. That soul does rest—not *may* rest, but *is* resting. It *cannot* be disturbed. Such is the result from doubting not in divine care.

And who can begin to appreciate the complete remedy in this teaching of Christ for ten thousand ills of the soul? What philosopher, what inventor has ever revealed a principle or a new force which will begin to compare with this precept of Jesus in its bearing on the welfare of burdened, heavy-laden man.

Let us observe, further, how adapted and powerful is this "faith which doubts not" to cleanse the heart from its deep-seated corruption. Here is a man subject to the passion of anger—excessive irritability. He comes to see how entirely opposed is this spirit to the precepts and example of Jesus. He sees also how it bears on his own person, to degrade and bring into disrespect. But, no matter what the considerations, he becomes eager, intensely eager, to be healed of his sin. He tries again and again the power of a good resolution and a strong purpose, but in vain. The sin is more than in the will. Its beginning is down in the soul, beyond the reach of his resolutions. Its risings come more as the blood flows through the veins; he cannot control them. Prayer, purpose, consecration, shame, penitence, intensity of desire, do not dry up the fountain of these evil risings. Long-continued efforts of this kind result only in slow progress in that direction.

Here, now observe, is a very problem in psychology. How reach these secret places whence rise the first movements towards irritability? Effort after effort has failed. The work seems like the moving of a mountain. Jesus now comes in with his principle: "Verily I say unto you, that

whosoever shall say unto this mountain [of constitutional irritability], Be thou removed and cast into the sea; and shall not doubt in his heart, but shall believe that those things which he saith shall come to pass, he shall have whatsoever he saith."

We now make another hypothesis. Let us suppose this kind of faith be introduced into the diseased mind, and reason to the results which would be produced by it. Observe there is *no doubt*. The man asks God to take away his irritability, and, having asked, believes *it is done*. God *has* taken it away. If there is no doubt, then he is just as sure of it as if he had lived ten years, in all manner of provocation, and had not once been impatient. Yes, just as sure of it as if he had from infancy been meek and quiet by nature, and never known irritability. For there is no surety beyond no doubt. Think, then, of the joy that comes into this man's soul. For he believes that he has conquered his sin, which shamed him in the presence of God and of man. He has slain the chief enemy of his life. He sees him, or, at least seems to see him, lying dead before him. He will never be assaulted by him again. He will never again be taken captive. What rapture will fill his mind! What thanksgiving will be offered by his lips! What fears will be removed as to this sin in time to come! How ready he will be to assume new responsibilities! He will tell of his grace; he will rejoice others with his good news; he will magnify without limit the grace of God.

All these results, and many more, will flow from the simple faith which doubts not. And who can discern in this new hope and joy, and praise — this public committal — this new position of responsibility, all the many adaptations to heal the disease which was in the soul? Who can tell the reach of such a triumphant experience as the faith which we have supposed would secure? It would certainly affect many involuntary emotions of joy and desire. It would touch new impulses. It would open to freedom new affections. And can we believe that all this inner working, so life-

giving and inspiring, would leave unaffected that diseased part where irritability grew? Could this heart be the same, after such a flood-tide of heavenly joy, as it was before?

And then, bring into the account that condition of *positive expectation* in which the soul is fixed. Some of the emotions we have noticed may pass away; but if the faith has no doubt, there will be fixed an expectation never more to sin in this way. There will be a confidence as to the future which will rule all one's plans and fix all one's hopes. The whole being's activities will be set on the new plane of assumed victory over the sin. And we now behold what psychologists freely acknowledge to be a power which affects both the soul and body, namely, confident expectation. No matter how it is secured or brought about, when there comes to pass this mental state of *confident expectation*, we have a familiar force brought into the soul. This is recognized in medical science. It reaches even to the nervous and muscular system of the body. It affects uniformly the powers of nutrition and secretion; and there is evidence that it has wrought changes in the very organic structure. By the power of this confident expectation disease has been healed, as by a miracle. This accounts for many wonderful cures in the Romish church which pass for miracles. There is no doubt that many chronic diseases have given way at the graves of their saints, because they visited them with the *confident expectation* that they were to be healed. And this was doubtless, in part at least, what Jesus required in his healing, when he demanded *faith in himself*. By this requirement he brought into his service the healing forces which such a faith or confident expectation has connected with it.

We see, then, included in this faith which doubts not, a force which is familiarly recognized in medical and psychological science as capable of very vital results. We see its workings in the deep, involuntary parts of the body, begetting life or death; and our reasoning is: Can we doubt that it

also has a reach down into the organism of the soul? Is it not even more probable that a psychical cause will work effects in the soul than in the body? So do we present what at least is strong probable evidence that the mountain of innate corruption in the heart may be reached by this new force which Jesus proclaimed — a *faith which doubts not*.

And, be it observed, our reasoning thus far is in a mere hypothesis. For the sake of discerning effects or changes in soul-phenomena, we have simply supposed the introduction of a certain force. If the hypothesis was one of simple invention, it would have weight as being well adapted to a great want in man arising from his sin and disease. Says a philosopher: "Every hypothesis which gathers in, accommodates, and assimilates all the facts of the subject, does in this test give the most satisfactory and convincing evidence of its practical truth." And when we consider that the very words of this hypothesis are taken from the lips of Jesus, is it not strong evidence that the meaning which we have given them is the very truth which he would proclaim — that here, in this perfected faith, is a new force capable of healing our souls, by reaching not the will only, but also their organic parts.

How soon one may exercise such a faith, and what is the process by which the soul attains to it, are questions naturally suggested here, but not in the limits of our argument. We gain the position desired, if we make it clear that this faith which doubts not, whenever and however secured, is the sure way for the coming of God's power into the soul to secure it in love and obedience.

The life of man's soul and body was made to exist by a faith which doubts not in our divine relations, in the great truths of God, Christ, and immortality. Here is the one essential power for controlling the man, and by separating him from this by unbelief, we remove him from that one relation and life-giving connection which alone can keep him from disease and death.

IV. And now we come to notice the *order of the emotions*

which prevails in that ideal condition of the soul which Christ presented.

From what has already been said, any observant mind must be prepared for something here quite peculiar. A soul which is so radically revolutionized in all its hidden workings of impulse and affections must present a new order of happiness and woe. And we find this new theory respecting our emotional experience propounded in the beatitudes and woes of the Sermon on the Mount. Has any sceptic or infidel, who has sought to find in ancient philosophers some likeness to the moral precepts of Jesus, ever discovered any words comparing with these Beatitudes: "Blessed are the poor." "Woe unto you that are rich now." "Blessed are ye when men shall reproach you and cast out your names as evil for the Son of Man's sake. Rejoice, in that day, and leap for joy." "Woe unto you when all men shall speak well of you." It is enough to quote these two. Certainly this is a new philosophy. How strange a theory respecting happiness and woe!

The principle taught in these Beatitudes is that emotions of joy and sorrow are mostly mental products. They depend far more on the thoughts, expectations, fears, hopes, purposes of the mind than on the outside world. What are called bodily sensations of pain or pleasure make up a very small part of the joy or grief of men. It is the hope or fear of these things that determines the great amount of emotional experience in the race. Add to these our disappointments and successes in plans cherished, and the estimation and affection we receive from others, and we nearly complete the ways in which emotions come. If a man has abundance, but from some false estimation believes he has not, then his abundance is made nought. If one lives in fear of poverty most of his days, then, though he finally commands his millions, his former fear has made certain an experience of grief. So if he expects abundance with confident hope, then, though he finally come to poverty, he has had the reward of abundance from his abundant hope.

And it deserves to be noticed that, while Berkley was in error in denying any outside world, they are as much in error who seem to see the objective world working its results in our emotions without the agency of some subjective or psychical co-operation. A fear that is all imaginary is just as painful as one which is stirred by a very sight of evil. A misinterpretation of providence which views approaching blessings as afflictions will make the life so mistaken just as painful as if evils, instead of blessings, were coming. A false estimation, which would call gold-dust simple earth-particles, would make the man possessing them as poor in emotion as if he owned only a little dirt.

Such observations confirm the principle that most of our joy and sorrow are results from psychical states. True, these psychical states may be dependent on some outside conditions; but still it remains that if there is disorder in the soul, all the perfection of the outer world could give us no joy. The outer world passes into the mind through the eye and the ear; and if these channels are destroyed, the outer world has no joy for the individual. So some condition in the world, or in God's providence, which is perfected for human joy by the very skill of the Creator, will be all nought to one who has disorder in his hopes and fears and his computations of what is excellent or worthless. Whatever, then, may be our dependence on the world without for joyful emotions, we are absolutely dependent on some healthful order in our souls that we may find joy and peace.

Probably there is no one subject in which is greater ignorance among men of all classes than this simple matter of joy and grief. We are continually misjudging one another in this respect. Many are in grief when others would congratulate them for their good luck, and many are in joy when others are giving them their pity. And no life has been more misjudged in this respect than that of our Lord Jesus. Far more pity and sorrow have been given him than his real inner life would incite. It is not probable that he

spent his days in such unhappiness as many imagine. Measured by his own Beatitudes — “Blessed are the poor; Blessed are the peacemakers; Blessed are the meek; Blessed are the pure in heart; Blessed are the persecuted,” — he is proved the most blessed man that has walked on the earth. Nor can it by any means be said that all these blessings pronounced pertain to a future state. Far from it. Purity of heart has the present vision of God. Persecution for righteousness sake secures one in a present kingdom of heaven. What amount of pain can we suppose Jesus experienced from the revilings and despisings of those haughty Pharisees, when he saw clearly and believed without a doubt in the full approval of his Father? This question is answered in the words “despising the shame.” The literal meaning here is: “thinking down upon the shame.” It was too far beneath him to affect his emotions. If a Newton, or a Bacon, should be charged with ignorance by a degraded rabble, how much would his susceptibilities be touched? When Socrates was convicted of crime worthy of death, what effect could the shame be supposed to have upon his heart, so conscious of innocence?

Here is the picture of Jesus’s mind. He saw continually his Father well pleased with him; saw all the shame in which he was as but a means or certain agency in the accomplishment of his great work — something of very vital service in his purposes; and thus, while others laughed at his appearance and work, he despised their laugh, and was rejoicing in the opportunity which their laugh was offering him for his success. And thus may we see how Christ was lifted above the shame of the cross. No deeper shame could then be incurred than that of crucifixion. It was the embodiment of all disgrace to die such a death. But we can now see that, if his faith apprehended with certainty a tithe of the glorious results from that seemingly cursed death which have since appeared, it was enough to make him insensible to any suffering from the mere shame of that curse. He, “for the joy set before him, endured the cross.”

In any apparently suffering circumstances we need to know what actuates the mind thus situated before we can determine how the emotions are affected. There is such an elevation of the soul by noble purposes, by devotion in some exalted work, by strong love for God himself and vital sympathy with him, as will indeed raise it above the world, in the sense of lifting it above the ordinary susceptibility to its pleasures and pains. This is the meaning of the apparent contradictions of reason in the Beatitudes. Jesus there teaches that in the true life is such an exaltation of soul as will directly *invert* the common order of emotions from the world.

When one's mind comes to cherish desires for holy living whose intensity of hunger is according to the worth of the object craved, then what are the discipline and sore trials which are a part of God's plan towards his success? They are no longer mere burdens and griefs to be shunned, but opportunities to be chosen and improved. Even persecutions for righteousness' sake are presented as occasions for joy. The supposition is that the cause of righteousness is very highly exalted in the mind of him persecuted; being the end for which he lives, to which he is ready to sacrifice all things. Such an one is in sympathy with the mission of Christ; and, being assured that persecution is helping on his most intense desires to fruition, even accomplishing very much in that direction — since suffering is a most effective agency — he finds very pleasure in suffering for Christ's sake.

And we have only to follow out this law of the emotions to its complete working, to see secured that heavenly condition of the soul in which God wipes away all tears from the eyes. For when our affections are rightly proportioned to the different objects presented to them — going out unto God the infinitely wise and good with that great volume which is due his being, even “with all the heart and soul and mind and strength,” and unto self and kindred and earthly good giving only that comparatively very small amount which is due their inferior worth, — and our faith discerns

with clear and full conviction all changes in these infinitesimal things of this world as occurring according to the good pleasure of God — nothing out of his plan, nothing apart from his love, — then will our satisfaction, yes, our delight, in God's pleasure go before, and prevent any tears from what the worldly mind calls losses. Then the very fountain of tears is dried. The soul is above the world of grief in which it has before lived. Then is the serenity and joy of God's heart shared in his creature man. Thus shall we all have our tears wiped away, whenever and wherever we come to love him aright.

V. It will be apparent that this order of the soul's affections and emotions which we have presented furnishes the conditions for the very highest intellectual development. Every observer in the culture of these faculties knows the efficacy of a strong impulse in securing discipline or increase of knowledge. The results of one's efforts with his mind depend not upon the time he spends, nor the will-effort he puts forth. He needs a deep interest, which will absorb his energies in this work. How often the student in college, under the enforced discipline to which he submitted because he must, has shown but small attainment or intellectual grasp; but as soon as he comes out into duties which engage his life interests, where his daily bread, his standing in his profession, his honor and ambition, are at stake, he suddenly displays a power of mind which astonishes. And it is the testimony of professional men that when under the incitement of great interests dependent on their efforts, they sometimes accomplish more in two weeks than they will again in months under more ordinary motives.

There is a degree of activity which comes from the will commanding the faculties to work. The power of attention is often noticed. But how much greater is the progress in the mind's work when the interest is so great as to beget an inability not to attend. When some concentrative power is furnished from another source than the will, when all the automatic force in the mind and heart tends towards the end in view, then is work accomplished.

The conditions of affection and emotion which we have shown would prevail in a *certain* faith, are a sure combination for the very highest impulse on the intellect. All the channels of feeling are opened for a flow into these faculties, awaking every dormant power, removing all apathy, stretching each organ to its fullest healthful action. We speak not of strain, or over-excitement. This would be guarded by the moderation or patience of the soul. But there would be no waste time, no waste energies, no engagement in worthless efforts, no service of the flesh, no indulgence which would make dull the reason or hinder in the least the action of the brain. Some noble purpose is in mind for execution; some rich reward is just before one. The work engaging inspires by its connection with God, angels, and a world's redemption. Here is a force beyond ambition, or avarice, or love of learning, or patriotism. It is equal to all combined in mobilizing every fibre of the brain, every part and energy of each intellectual faculty.

We have examples of this gain in intellectual stature, in the humble fishermen of Galilee, who believed in Jesus and became his disciples. They, whose words reached hardly beyond the lake in which they cast their net, came to speak so as to beget life, and now command the respect and attention of whole nations. Allowing room here for some special inspiration, we cannot hide from our minds the *orderly* conditions into which their faith brought them for highest growth of thought and reason. For what study so well adapted to expand the mind as the great purposes of God? What ideas take hold on the sublime and the grand as those pertaining to the infinite and the eternal? What self-interests so rouse the energies as our immortal welfare? For intellectual discipline, then, no subject or theme surpasses those which absorb the mind of him who believes in God and spiritual realities with that conviction which transcends doubt. The truth is, this is the condition devised in God's creative order for the activity and growth of mind; and only in this affection and faith will man ever know his intellectual ability.

One more subject demands notice here, which is, the relations of this perfected soul to our physical frame — the relations of psychology to physiology.

It seems to be a question with some whether the soul rules over the body, or the body over the soul. Does the condition of the soul determine the vigor of the body; or is the soul wholly dependent for its feelings and vigor on bodily conditions? If we grant, as we must, some mutual action and reaction, some mutual dependence, it remains a subject of interest which is the ruler — which reigns over the other. Melancholy is said to be produced by some deranged organs of the body. But how came those organs deranged? Did not some disorder in thought and emotion precede and cause that physical disorder? Can it be denied that, even in this case, the soul's order was first deranged? So insanity is produced by some defect in nutrition or secretion. But who can tell what the soul's feelings may have done to produce this defect? Where lies the first antecedent — in soul or body? Whether we settle this, or not, it is a truth in medical science, to which we have briefly referred, that the vital operations of our physical system are intimately connected with our emotions, our convictions, our thought-activity. The investigation of this relation by scientific men has revealed some order prevailing which is now followed as established medical knowledge. We quote from Carpenter's *Human Physiology*:

“The influence of particular conditions of the mind in exciting, suspending, or modifying various secretions is a matter of daily experience. The lachrymal secretion, for example, which is continually being formed to a small extent for the purpose of bathing the surface of the eye, is poured out in great abundance under the moderate excitement of the emotions, either of joy, tenderness, or grief. Violent emotion also will suspend the salivary secretion and the gastric secretion, as is evident from the well-known influence it has in dissipating the appetite for food, and in suspending the digestive process when in active operation. A cheerful

state of feeling, on the other hand, seems to be decidedly favorable to the performance of the digestive process, and exerts a beneficial influence, as to both quantity and quality, on the secretions of the gastric fluid. The indulgence of melancholy and jealousy produces a decidedly morbid effect by disordering the digestive processes, and thus reacts upon the nervous system by impairing its healthy nutrition."

"Again, the influence of *expectant attention* in modifying the processes of nutrition and secretion is not less remarkable. It seems certain that the simple direction of the consciousness to a part, independently of emotional excitement, but with the *expectation* that some change will take place in its organic activity, is often sufficient to induce such an alteration, and would probably always do so if the concentration of the attention were sufficient. It is to such a state of fixed attention, with implicit confidence, that we may fairly attribute most, if not all, the cures which have been worked through what is popularly termed the 'imagination.' These cures are real facts, however they may be explained; and there is scarcely a malady in which amendment has not been produced, not merely in the estimation of the patient, but in the more trustworthy opinion of medical observers, by practices which can have no other effect than to direct the attention of the sufferer to the part, and to keep alive his confident expectation of a cure. It is unquestionable that in all such cases the benefit derived is in direct proportion to the faith of the sufferer in the means employed; and thus we see that a couple of bread pills will produce copious purgation, and a dose of *red* poppy syrup will serve as a powerful narcotic, if the patient have entertained a sufficiently *confident expectation* of such results. This state of confident expectation, however, may operate for evil no less than for good. A fixed belief that a mortal disease has seized upon the frame, or that a particular operation or system of treatment would prove unsuccessful, has been in numerous instances, there is no reason to doubt, the direct cause of a fatal result."

Read now, in connection with these principles of medical science, the words of the great Healer of men: "If thou canst believe, all things are possible to him that believeth." "According to thy faith be it unto thee." "If thou wilt believe, and doubt not." "All things which ye ask in prayer, believing, ye shall receive." "The prayer of faith shall save the sick." We reason, if any words are capable of expressing definite, confident expectation, such as is referred to in our medical quotations, do not these which our Lord so often used? And how universal was his requirement of faith, whether he would heal soul or body!

Let us advance another hypothesis: Suppose it to become prevalent in men's minds that these words of our Lord mean what on the face of them they seem to—that God has instituted an order in his new dispensation of healing the sick by the prayer of faith—that the invalid may look up to God for help with the definite expectation that he will hear and answer the desire. Suppose such an interpretation to gain the conviction of men, so that they believe in it as they do in forgiveness of sins; so that the word would of itself, by virtue of its own simple authority, command the faith: then what a healing power would be established among believers! According to science, such a conviction, no matter how produced, has an orderly result for amendment in every kind of disease; and there is here a seeming ground on which to rest such a faith. Indeed, we can hardly form any idea of a faith in God which doubts not, that would not sometimes lead the soul into this very condition of confident expectation as to bodily ailments. Even if it be a mistake so to read the word—a species of superstition,—it seems impossible that there could exist that spiritual intimacy with God which all acknowledge these words must mean, without at times a lapsing into the belief "Perhaps this Saviour and Healer of my soul is just as willing to heal my body. I will try him by praying for the same." Such reasoning would command a degree of expectation, if not that which doubts not; and we can easily see how a person in

great need could increase the reasoning unto full and certain hope. Then, however this confident hope is reached, even if it be a superstition, it has its effect on the body's disease. Is it an extravagant suggestion that possibly the church has lost, by its unbelief, a healing power which God has offered suffering man, through the work of Jesus, to be his as an abiding relief?

But, even if such suggestions be considered wild, we cannot avoid the conviction that the new emotional order in the soul of one who believes without doubting, and who loves with all the heart and soul and strength, is one which will have an incalculable influence on the body. If anger, jealousy, melancholy, fear, grief, are surely working morbid results on the powers of nutrition and secretion and on the nerves, what a cause for disease, then, do we find in these so common sins and disorders of the soul! Who can compute the momentary workings of these evil emotions? Call them but slight droppings, if you will; but what results will come from drops falling, moment by moment, for years on delicate structures. Behold how sin works disease in the human frame, directly by its emotions.

And then turn to the graces of faith which are a recognized part of a Christian life. What a cheerful, serene spirit must result from a belief in the sparrow's God! How exempt such an one from fear and anxiety, and supported in the peace which passeth all understanding! And if such emotions, according to medical science, are good preservers of the flesh, and healthful for the ailing nerves, see what a medicine for the body they are continually breathing who do so trust in God.

What more potent prescription for bodily health could be given than that catalogue of the fruits of the Spirit: love, joy, peace, long-suffering, gentleness, goodness, faith, meekness, and temperance. Every one of these has a direct relation to a healthy physical frame. By living in the spirit of holy faith and love, not only are we breathing in continually some heavenly atmosphere for the invigoration of the soul,

but all this soul-vigor has a bearing directly on the well-being of the body.

Our conclusion is, that in the life and teachings and work of Jesus Christ we have revealed the true psychology ; and in this soul-order we see also the all-important condition of a healthy physical frame. Jesus was the perfect man ; and his teachings and work are God's gift unto fallen man for the restoration of both his soul and body to that perfect order devised in the first plan of the Creator.

ARTICLE II.

A FOURTH YEAR OF STUDY IN THE COURSES OF THEOLOGICAL SEMINARIES.¹

BY JOSEPH COOK, RESIDENT LICENCIATE IN THE THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY, ANDOVER.

A FOURTH year of study has already been added to the instructions of the Princeton Theological Seminary. The distribution of the new space, as now for two years announced in the catalogue of the institution, is made by dividing the time almost equally between the exegetical, the doctrinal, and the historical departments. It would be unbecoming in me to endeavor to suggest in detail the methods of arranging a fourth year of study in a theological course, for minuteness on this point would be both officiousness and presumption. It is not at all necessary to my aim that I should do so. For the sake of distinctness, however, I will say that the fourth year I would ask and defend should have these characteristics :

It should be for some, not all, theological students ;

Preaching by students should be allowed in the fourth year, but not in the first three years to students who enter the fourth ;

¹ An Oration at the United Anniversaries of the Society of Inquiry and of the Porter Rhetorical Society, of Andover Theological Seminary, August 5, 1868. The orations on this occasion were by members of the graduating class.

The larger portion of it should be devoted to perfecting the work on the most important topics of the doctrinal department ;

It should include space for a larger attention to the applications of exegetical learning, metaphysics, history, and physical science to the current forms of infidelity ;

It should give enlarged instruction in respect to all the methods of practical religious effort ;

It should be made thorough by including severe examinations.

I think it not too much to say that the church is weak because it is fed on guesses. The scepticism of the land fattens on the crudeness of the pulpit. I remember that I speak to-night within sight of the grave of Moses Stuart. It were well if I could emulate, even if it were but feebly and far off, his candor ; for nothing which concerns a great theme, however remotely, is well treated by evasion.

There are topics inherently so important that no mistake concerning them can be so small as not to be colossal. And yet, on such topics, the fact of a revelation, the Deity of him from whom all the years of time are numbered, the mysteries of election, fate, and free-will, we, to whom a college course gives hardly a trace of theological instruction, and who now know that our knowledge of theology derived from other sources previous to our studies here was superficial and fragmentary to a sometimes ludicrous extreme, are asked to form opinions in a course of three years investigation, one year of which is devoted to exegetical, and one to historical and rhetorical branches ; the third year broken by permitted absences for preaching, not absolutely excessive, indeed, since they are an important method of training adopted by one of the most important departments of the course ; but which are relatively excessive, because, in a course of but three years, they are necessarily premature, since they are such as to reduce the whole term of study, in

respect to the matter to be preached, practically to two years and a half: and, on the basis of this amount of attention to what are assuredly the most difficult and awful of the problems the human mind is permitted to reach, we are asked to commit ourselves, in effect for life, to certain opinions, and to go out and stand beside the pillows of the dying, and put beneath them those opinions, not as guesses, but as proofs. An honest man recoils when so much is asked of him. It is by no means expected that in three years we can master the whole range of theology. But we are expected to have mastered its strategic points. On these we are officially asked, in wholly informal and definite terms, before examining councils, to express what we hold for ourselves, not what we have been taught. Upon these greatest points, at least, which, however, cannot be explored to the bottom without an examination of very nearly all the rest, we, as educated men and future public teachers, are called to express independent opinions. We are expected to become so clear as to be in no sense uncandid. It is expected that we will do this in the training of nine months special doctrinal study, and in the collateral reading of perhaps four months more. We do not do it. We cannot do it. And yet this is the most accredited entrance to the ministry. The greatness of the topics of theology ought to secure their thorough treatment. The greatness and difficulty of the topics of theology are the first argument for an extension of the term of professional theological study. I claim a fourth year of study in the courses of the theological seminaries, in order that we may have time to be honest.

One hundred years ago our colleges were, in effect, theological schools. Theology was then a prominent portion of the college course. Dr. Bacon goes so far as to say incidentally, in an historical address, that at that period all the studies of college were as much subordinated to theology as those of a theological seminary now are.¹ The conse-

¹ Commemorative Discourse at the Semi-Centennial Celebration of the Found-

quence was that all liberally educated men, as such, had then some knowledge of theology. Their interest in properly theological study often continued into years long subsequent to those of their instruction in college. When, for example, President Willard, in the year that Jonathan Edwards was ordained at Northampton, published two hundred and fifty lectures on the Shorter Catechism, the subscription list for the work contained the name of nearly every civilian of note in New England. But the structure of college courses is now wholly changed. To give room for science, theology was little by little crowded out into pastor's classes, and into such private theological schools as those of Bellamy, Smalley, and Emmons. At the opening of the century the change was nearly complete. Andover Theological Seminary then sprang up, and it is the true continuation of the Harvard and Yale of our fathers. The Christian evidences and ethics are, indeed, yet taught in college, but so hurriedly as to make little impression upon any except those who have a peculiar taste for them, or anticipate study in a professional theological course. Once out of college, those students who pursue law, medicine, art, science, or literature, become absorbed in their special fields of investigation. Once in their professions they are still more absorbed. It is sometimes loosely said that no lawyer in full practice ever reads a book. Only those few who have a taste for theological study ever take it up. More than half of ordinary college classes understand metaphysics too poorly ever to be able to take up the severer forms of theological reading. The result is, that, while in the days Edwards all liberally educated men, as such, had some knowledge of theology, now no liberally educated man, as such, has necessarily any knowledge of it. The knowledge of theology, as a system, is confined to those who study theology professionally. That ground of sympathy between other professions and the ministry, which used to proceed from theological training in
ing of the Theological Seminary at Andover, by Professor Leonard Bacon.
Memorial of the Celebration, p. 74.

common up to a certain point, is swept away. The pulpit, however, must adapt itself to miscellaneous audiences. It must meet the average wants of collections of men whose education and social position are the opposite of homogeneous. In nine cases out of ten, the preaching of the pulpit is not intended to meet the wants of the best educated. But lawyers and physicians, who did not acquire interest in theology in college, are not likely to have it awakened and sustained, except by a pulpit that they can respect. The consequence of this whole state of things is that some of the classes in society, best educated in every other respect, are the least well educated in regard to theological truth. I mean no disrespect to members of the honorable professions of law and medicine, when I say that these classes constitute the best materials society contains for the formation of crude parties in theology. The natural want of intellectual sympathy between the various ranks of educated men who were formerly, but are not now, educated in theology, and that one rank which is now so educated, is my second argument for an extension of the term of theological study. That want of sympathy can be removed only by making the education of the latter class so thorough that it shall be fit for leadership. It must at sight be trusted as having the qualities fit for the leadership of educated men.

Side by side with the transference of all theological study from the colleges to the theological schools, and partly on account of it, there has arisen a very general disuse of home religious instruction. The practice of catechizing children has fallen into desuetude, even in New England. We have transferred the religious education of children, not always with advantage so far as its doctrinal portion is concerned, to Sabbath-schools. From both these circumstances, and from the vast increase of the circulation of books and newspapers, and the absorbing drill of American political and industrial life, distracting attention from that kind of reading, even of the Bible, to which our fathers were accustomed, it has resulted that the theological education of the mass of

the people is not as good as it formerly was. I do not think the ministry of the present day less well educated than that of fifty years ago, or of the days of Edwards; but I think that, while the secular education of the people has vastly risen since the latter period, their theological education has declined. It is trite to speak of the immense increase of the means of information, and of the possession of it, among the masses of the people. The world has long believed in the sword. It is at last slowly coming to believe in the school. Let us hope that, in a third great stage of advance, it will believe in the church. At present, however, we are only at the stage of belief in the school, which is replacing the old power of the sword by that of the spelling-book. The lecture system has undoubtedly had an important influence, in wide portions of the United States and Great Britain, in raising the popular standard for the discussions of the pulpit by familiarizing common audiences with good speaking. The introduction of railways has given to many rural populations such opportunities of visiting cities as to induce in them the intellectual tastes of the city. At this moment there are in New England, according to an authoritative statement, more than twenty large churches which are without pastors, because unable to find men so variously trained as to meet their wants. The vast advance in the secular intelligence of the people is my third argument for an extension of the term of professional theological study.

But a fourth, and a more important one, is the fact that the information of the people in regard to theological and religious, has not kept pace with its advance as to secular, truths. Without this distinction of its two parts, the growth of knowledge among the people might seem to have utterly inexplicable relations to the religious phenomena of the times. The world is, indeed, becoming more enlightened, but not with equal rapidity in all respects. The disparity between the degrees of advance of secular and religious intelligence is a fearful gap in the joints of the harness of truth, at which, as I hope soon to show, scepticism strikes.

In the midst of all these changes, and favoring them, another has occurred, the most important of our century — an incalculable advance of physical science. But the method of science is the inductive. That is the method of caution. It is the sceptical method. The deductive method, which reasons from general principles to particular facts, has largely prevailed in metaphysics and theology. But the inductive reasons from particular facts to general principles. Its whole procedure is to the last degree rigorous. Its merit is its sceptical spirit. Its tendency is to induce a sceptical spirit in all forms of investigation. But this method has been successful. In science the sceptical method has been the successful method. The results of science prove its right to homage. The world believes in that which bears fruit. Science bears fruit, of which Pacific railways and Atlantic cables are really not the greatest. The result of the successes of science is, that it is more and more demanded that all subjects be treated in the scientific method. The time has come when the people begin to make this demand. God forbid that they should not make it, and more and more! Science, as defended by its less thoroughly cultivated votaries, has many faults. It sometimes makes arrogant claims. But it has one righteous thing in it. That is the love of clear ideas. The holy and intense creed which has for its tenets reverence for proof, clear ideas at any cost, and obedience to known truth the organ of spiritual knowledge, will live. It will go through the centuries of coming time without wreck. I believe that the love of clear ideas and impatience of their opposite, which characterize the educated mind of the present age, are as truly a pentecost from the divine hand as if evidenced by tongues of flame. The gauntlet is at last thrown down.

“Doubts, to the world’s child-heart unknown,”
writes the devout Whittier,

“Question us now from star and stone;
The power is lost to self-deceive
With hollow forms of make-believe.”

Faith and science challenge each other to the death. I see herein promise, not of destruction for either, but of reinforced and mutually harmonious life for both. The questions which the progress of science raises, the progress of science will answer. It will do so, not to the detriment, but to the coronation, of fundamental religious and Christian truth. The progress of science is not feared, but desired, by the soundest supporters of theological learning. It is the doctrine of science itself that what we so vaguely call natural law is the method of action of the Infinite Will constantly upholding all the properties it has created in matter and finite mind, and is demonstrably God's present and omnipresent Thought.¹ To speak literally, without exaggeration, he who touches a natural law touches the live lightning of a perpetually present Sinai. Science, against its choice, will show that every natural fact is, in the strictest sense, a religious fact. Startling us in some past years, it has been blindly bringing us to this great result. The eve of an unexpected time I believe to be at hand, and its dawn now more than broken in the best educated minds, when faith will make science religious, and science make faith scientific. The Word and the Works must flow together after 1900. I think I hear that yet unrisen storm of good already sing in the wind. But we have even now reached a time when it is plain that all topics must be submitted to the scientific method, and theology with the rest. The fact that the time has come, or is near at hand, when the philosophical relations of the doctrines, as well as the doctrines with their scriptural proof, must be more or less

¹ Professor Benjamin Peirce, *Analytical Mechanics*, chap. i. sec. 2, "The Spiritual Origin of Force." Professor L. Agassiz, *Essay on Classification*. W. R. Grove, *Correlation of Physical Forces*. Professor Francis Bowen, *Metaphysics and Ethics*; *Lowell Lectures*, pp. 71-172. Professor James McCosh, *The Method of the Divine Government* (American edition), pp. 86, 106, 80, 90, 95 note. *Collected Works of Dugald Stuart*, edited by Sir William Hamilton: *Active and Moral Powers*, Vol. i. pp. 49-51, 354; and Vol. ii. pp. 24, 27-30, 173, 190. Professor Michael Farraday, *The Conservation of Force*. Sir J. F. W. Herschell, *Outlines of Astronomy* (American ed.), pp. 233-234.

preached to the people, is my fifth argument for a fourth year in the courses of theological schools. The preparation to do this work well cannot be adequately made without an increase of the term of theological study. The present courses were founded when to teach the scriptural proof of the doctrines was the result chiefly aimed at. This must constantly be aimed at, and more and more closely. I plead for a fourth year, in order that there may be more space for exegetical training in theological schools; but the philosophical relations of the doctrines, from the point of view of natural, as well as of revealed, theology must be mastered also. Infidelity has assumed forms among many portions of the people which cannot be approached by proof texts.

The diminution of theological training, the diffusion of secular intelligence, and the growth of the scientific spirit, causes of which the operation has just been noticed, have given peculiar power to those forms of modern scepticism which use as their weapons science and polite literature. That infidelity is a greater danger to-day than at any previous period, is an assertion I do not make, or believe. But I believe it to be a greater danger now than at any recent period, in respect of the masses of men, as distinguished from scholars. Deism in the last century did not direct its appeals largely to the people. Even Strauss, in this century, wrote his first *Life of Christ* solely for scholars. The battle then was waged for the possession of the minds of educated men. But now the battle is waged for the possession of the minds of the people. Strauss writes a popular *Life of Christ*, and so do Renan and a score of others. Questions of exegesis and philosophy, formerly discussed in Latin, are now discussed, and are likely to be so more and more, in the popular forms of the literature of each nation. When the battle was for the possession of the minds of scholars, one or two arguments from scholars, like Butler's *Analogy* and Paley's *Evidences*, were sufficient to save the cause of truth in that field. But when the battle

is for the possession of the minds of the people, the truth must have many defenders, or the truth will inevitably suffer on that different field. The exigences of Christianity in the last century and in this not only differ, but differ chiefly, in the fact that then the battle was for the minds of scholars, and now is for the minds of the people. Great defenders of the truth were needed then. Now, at least, able ones are required. Then, but a few were necessary. Now, a host are needed. This host must be the ministry. The power over the masses, as such, given to modern forms of scepticism by the peculiarities of the century, is my sixth argument for an extension of the professional courses of theological study. The ministry must be able to do thoroughly for the people in a popular way in this century what Paley and Butler did thoroughly for scholars in a scholarly way in the last.

As compared with its influence in the Puritan age, the power of the pulpit, it must be admitted, has undergone a very considerable reduction in recent history, except so far as it depends upon its rendered reasons. The causes of this diminution are included substantially in the decrease of popular theological training, and the growth of secular knowledge and of the scientific spirit, which have been noticed, and in the political changes which have come upon the world, everywhere loosening, and in wide portions of Christendom destroying, the connection of church and state, and giving, in many cases, with the freedom of religious worship, freedom of religious discussion. The circumstance that the power of the pulpit has been greatly diminished, except so far as it depends on its rendered reasons, gives great significance, however, to what otherwise would have comparatively little — the current and chronic criticisms of the pulpit by the more educated and the less educated alike. The badness of sermons is the ground which the people secretly allege for their now somewhat notorious demand for their shortness. "It is no longer sarcasm," says an editor of the *North American Review*, "to use the phrase 'pulpit

argument' for weak reasoning, and 'pulpit rhetoric' for a feeble and stilted style." A church, says the same authority, is very generally "a simple assemblage of persons, gathered to go through with certain formal ceremonies, the chief of which consists in listening to a man who is seldom competent to teach."¹ At this the most scholarly of the Boston newspapers claps its hands, and says that, if the North American will write like that, it will have influence, and that the force of its remarks is not in their novelty, for they contain nothing which is not said by our most thoughtful preachers on every proper public occasion. In England, among the Independent denominations, the subject of the improvement of theological education is now attracting much attention. The London Times, in noticing this fact, said recently that men every day enter the English establishment destitute of theological knowledge and of practical experience. It proposed that every candidate for the position of an incumbent be examined, as a pre-requisite to his receiving it, in one good English text-book in theology, like Pearson on the Creed, and in one introduction to the scriptures.² I think it a question whether the average of sermons are more dull than the average of congressional speeches. But, whatever reduction we may make in the force of these criticisms, the fact that they exist, and are chronic, is an argument for increased thoroughness in theological education. We have made them too frequently ourselves to deny their justice now that we are coming within their range. Moses Stuart, who lies in that grave, once said that forty or fifty students at the seminary every year failed utterly in the exegetical studies, from having been educated in a slovenly manner in the Greek.³ Had he taught doctrinal theology, what would his priceless candor not have said of the deficiencies of students in metaphysics and logic, and of the consequent undermining of their entire education in the

¹ C. E. Norton, North American Review, April, 1868.

² Bibliotheca Sacra, Vol. xxiv. p. 533.

³ Biblical Repertory and Princeton Review, Vol. xxxiv. pp. 641, 642.

proof, and even in the accurate statement, of Christian doctrine. The most disastrous criticism of the pulpit is that it skips difficulties. One would be inclined to mitigate the severity of this criticism, if he did not find a similar remark true of many theological text-books, and of some recent ones, on which students are fed. A student, passing out of Mill in political economy, and Hamilton in metaphysics, into theology, is astonished, whatever the ability of monographs on particular doctrinal topics, to find that there are no text-books in theology of as much ability as those to which he is accustomed in other branches, as inferior to theology as chaff to pearls. But the time has come when it will not do for the pulpit to skip difficulties. The current and loud and standing criticisms of the pulpit, by both people and ministry, are my seventh argument for a fourth year of study in theological schools. There are wide classes now too little informed in theology, and too thoroughly filled with the pride of the scientific method, or of the literary spirit, to believe the pulpit completely honest when it goes outside of the field of merely natural theology. The skipping of difficulties brings swiftly the charge of disingenuousness; and that charge hangs, invisible, in the secret thoughts of men, over more pulpits to-day than we are aware, a Damocles sword.

The wants of faculties in respect to a fourth year of study in our theological schools arise from the omission or hurried treatment at present of important topics for want of time. Of the nine crowded months usually devoted to the whole range of the system of Christian doctrine, not fully two, in most cases, can be given to natural theology. We want an Introduction or Encyclopedia of Theology, such as is given so carefully in the theological courses of the German universities.¹ It is omitted for want of time. It is only a few years since the history of Christian doctrine obtained a place in some of our theological seminaries; and a distinguished professor of it not long since said that there is

¹ *Bibliotheca Sacra*, Vol. i. pp. 735-767.

no time to teach church history in a theological course. Everything is hurried; and this at a time when scholars are impatient of other than a scientific treatment of any topic, and most of all of the most important. The omission or hurried treatment of important topics for want of time in our present courses of theological study, is my eighth argument for a fourth year in the courses of theological schools. It is not to be forgotten for a moment that one of the greatest obstacles in any seminary to the growth of enthusiasm in theological study is the suspicion, on the part of some portion of the pupils, of controversial disingenuousness on the part of the teacher. This suspicion arises, in scores of cases, from the treatment of great topics being condensed almost to the point of obscurity for want of time, and the teacher so being misapprehended. I believe that this obstacle can be effectually removed only by requiring severer examinations of the students, on the one hand, and by giving more time to the teacher, on the other; so that the professor's views, whether accepted or rejected, may at least be understood.

The industry of a large portion of German students in the last years of their courses at their universities is everywhere noted. But it is an industry arising from the pressure of the German state examinations. The regulations of government, which make success in these necessary, not only to honor in scholarship, but to entrance on a profession in any quarter of Germany, are the spur of the German student. If in a theological course, he must pass three years in theological study at a university before he can be permitted to preach. His examination before the commission of the government at the end of the three years is in ecclesiastical and doctrinal history, philosophy, ethics and theological literature, and the exegesis of the Old and New Testament, as well as in systematic and symbolical theology.¹ Matthew Arnold, in his recent work on the Schools and Universities on the Continent, says that the examination includes three

¹ Professor Edward Robinson, *Biblical Repository*, Vol. i. pp. 414-419.

or four days of paper work and six or eight hours of *viva voce*.¹ If the student fails in this examination, he may be admitted to a second; but if he fails there, he can be admitted to no other, and there is no avenue by which, in any part of Germany, he can enter his profession. At the end of three years from the first examination, every candidate is examined again, as severely as at first, and upon additional topics, and is then capable of being chosen to the pastoral office. If within a year he is not so chosen, he must undergo a third examination. These examinations are not forms. In 1828 the examining committee at Halle were Gesenius, Weber, Wegscheider, Thilo, Marks, Fritzsche, and Tholuck. One out of every six applicants was rejected. The regulations now are not less severe than at that date. The inferiority, in respect of intellectual thoroughness, of American theological education, as compared with German, is my ninth argument for a fourth year of theological study. Let us not be deterred by the ill effects which the connection of church and state in Germany has caused from seeing the benefits which the intellectual thoroughness it has required would produce in our own country, divorced from that connection, and united with a Puritan piety, in which our theological students, as a mass, probably surpass the German as much as the German ours in intellectual thoroughness.

It is plainly impossible to introduce this degree of thoroughness by crowding more instruction into the present three years. Sir William Hamilton announced, before being elected professor at Edinburgh, that, if elected, he should require severe examinations. Tuesday and Thursday of each week he devoted to these; Monday, Wednesday, and Friday, to lectures. Suppose that the examinations at the close of the terms in our theological seminaries were made as severe, in proportion to the extent of study they represent, as those which the German theological student must pass. I greatly misjudge if the mass of our students would not

¹ Schools and Universities on the Continent. By Professor Matthew Arnold. London. 1868. p. 231.

themselves be gratified by having their examinations made as severe as those of Sir William Hamilton, or of Germany. At Baliol College, in Oxford, Sir William Hamilton, according to a custom which allowed students to profess authors on which they were willing to be examined, professed on his entrance all of Aristotle and Plato, with their principal commentators, and sustained an examination on them. Suppose that the students in our theological seminaries were allowed, at the end of every term but the last of their course, to profess, in a similar manner, books collateral to the studies of their regular course, and to pass a public examination on them. The effect might be, without distracting men from the lines of thought adapted to their individual wants, since each would select his own authors, to stimulate private reading to greater thoroughness and extent, and discriminate the industrious from the idle. I think the examination would be far from unpopular with students. It would require no endowment for its foundation. Lectureships, too, are not yet so far multiplied as to burden the three years, and might be at least twice as numerous before we should attend from four to six lectures a day, as some of the German students do. But, make the most of the present time, and the German intellectual thoroughness cannot be attained in it. At every point beyond the degree of labor usually performed by the most industrious men of a college class, there would be danger of breaking down the health of many students. The impossibility of so improving the present course of three years as to make it meet the wants of the churches and of theological faculties and students, is my tenth argument for an extension of the term of study in theological schools.

The objections, on the part of the student, of want of time and money for four years' theological study, ought to be met by the personal argument on the reaction of crudeness upon the individual character. I stand aghast whenever I think of this. I believe it safe to say that no temptation is ordinarily so great to a young minister as that to push expression of opinion beyond clear belief, and of

emotion beyond its actual possession. He has honest belief and honest emotion. But he is in a position where his success depends on expressing both strongly. One of the deep secrets of the soul is that an affection is deadened by being expressed more strongly than it is possessed. This law is as true of religious affection as of any other. But men, little by little, allow themselves to preach without clear thought. Emotion never rises higher than conviction. By a fixed law of the mind it is prevented from rising higher. If it be forced higher, it is not emotion, but affectation. Men's convictions are not clear, for their grasp on Christian doctrine is not thorough. Their emotions are, therefore, vacillating. But the latter must not appear to be such. Little by little the want of clear thought leads to want of honest emotion. Then, little by little, the expression of emotion is pushed beyond its possession. The reaction is horrible. A drop of cant in the veins sickens the whole moral system. In time, the man's style degenerates, and becomes monotonous, spiritless, toneless, aimless, perfunctory. And, as pushing the expression of emotion beyond its possession reacts and produces cant, so pushing the expression of conviction beyond its possession reacts and produces scepticism. Thus intellectual crudeness, and the necessity of teaching publicly laid too early upon a man, undermine ministerial conscientiousness. The reaction of crudeness in professional theological study upon personal character is my eleventh argument for a fourth year in theological schools. The addition of a fourth year will greatly lessen this danger. Obstacles from want of time and money, urged by the student as impeding entrance on a fourth year of theological study, are not to be compared with the danger of becoming disingenuous through crudeness, a hypocrite in a holy place, a cup of silver filled with putrid wine. I want no pulpit that is not built of rendered reasons. I am sure I had rather die an infidel than not die honest.

Lectureships have been numerous founded in three of the four leading American theological schools within the

last few years. They indicate that the direction in which the schools are moving is toward more thorough scholarship. By the inauguration this day of an honored professor, one seminary has organized a short course. It appears to me incalculably needed; and yet its very existence is one reason for a longer course to balance any effect the former may have in lowering the standard of the churches. The wants of our people are very diversified, and so should be the education of their teachers. The long course for their teachers is more needed by vast portions of our population than the short course is by other portions for theirs. One seminary has opened a fourth year. My last argument for a fourth year is, that one has already been organized in one of the foremost American seminaries, and that it falls in with a tendency to increase the thoroughness of theological education exhibited by the others.

The first objection to a fourth year is, that if one is organized students cannot be induced to remain at the theological schools to use it. I have spoken to-night wholly from the point of view of a student, in order that I might rebut this objection. Of the opinions of the faculty of this seminary concerning a fourth year, I know absolutely nothing, except that one member has incidentally declared himself in favor of it; and I have preferred to know nothing of those opinions, in order that I might speak representatively for students. I have no reason to believe that I am alone in wishing a fourth year. I do not expect that students who, without a fourth year, might go to Germany to study after their theological course, would be prevented from going by the addition of a fourth year; but the fact that many now do take up further study abroad, and that more would but for the distance and expense of the opportunity, shows that further study would be pursued at home, if sufficiently attractive facilities for it were presented.

A second objection is, that a man grows faster and more healthfully in a parish after three years' study, than by

remaining a year longer in a preparatory course. In reply, I need only say that the healthful time for leaving the nest is when we can fly, not before, not later. I have endeavored to show that at the end of three years our wings are not, and cannot be, quite trustworthy for so grave a voyage as that through the regions of truth which lie between two worlds. It were different if we were to fly alone; but we are asked to fly as guides to whole flocks of souls, some of the members of which, alas, have no eyes but ours. We are advised, many of us, to go abroad. How is such advice consonant with the theory that a man grows most healthfully in a parish after three years preparatory study? The collision of mind with mind among students is the confessed advantage of the method of theological instruction by seminaries above that of more private classes. This is never so great as after men begin to form independent opinions. They are not prepared to form these until the three years' course is nearly completed. The fourth year would contain more of this benefit than either of the others.

It ought ever to be remembered that we belong to a decimated generation. The graves on which our nation cast flowers a few weeks since are a majority of them of men under thirty-five years of age. We are but a remnant; but, as such, there ought to belong to us a heroic work. It is but a little while from now to the roll-call after the battle. We shall soon hear again the voices of those who have already laid down their lives that the dolorous and accursed ages might a little change their course. If we could hear them now, I think they would be found exhorting us not to go with bow and arrow, when we might go in full modern armor, into life's intellectual and moral Waterloos. Let us, the remnant, sell our lives as dearly as they sold theirs. Let us insist that our equipment be equal to that which will certainly be possessed by the enemy.

ARTICLE III.

DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY.

BY REV. EDWARD ROBIE, GREENLAND, N.H.

THERE is in the sacred scriptures a doctrine of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost. This is freely admitted, even by those who deny the doctrine of the Trinity, as commonly received by the church. The *Christian Examiner*¹ for March, 1860, says: "We wish it understood, once for all, that we are not arguing against the Trinity, as conceived by the early church, and expressed in the so-called Apostles' Creed. Our polemic relates solely to an ecclesiastical and metaphysical tri-personality — a philosophem of after ages. A triad of Christian sanctities — Father, Son, and Holy Ghost — is one thing; the doctrine of tri-personality, whether true or false, is another and a very different thing. We use this word [Trinity], in deference to ecclesiastical custom, to denote the aboriginal Christian doctrine of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, i.e. of a God self-revealing in his Word, and self-communicating by his Spirit. The universal prevalence of the doctrine itself in the early church is patent to every student of ecclesiastical history" (p. 238). Again: "We shall have failed to make ourselves understood, and shall deem ourselves unfortunate, if in these criticisms we have seemed to impugn the Christian doctrine embodied in the 'Trinity.' It is only the forced construction of that doctrine in the Constantinopolitan creed, and the claim that any construction of it, by any council or creed, is of evangelical and binding authority, against which we protest. The belief in the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost embraces and oecumenizes Christendom in one confession. The confession is common; the interpretation of it must be

¹ No. cexviii. Art. vi. Dr. Huntington on the Trinity. Reprinted for the American Unitarian Association in "The New Discussion of the Trinity."

left to the individual mind and heart. We would not be supposed to think lightly of its import. To us it is the sum and summit of Christian truth. We see in it that which specifically distinguishes our religion from all antecedent and contemporary faiths; exactly defining it against polytheism, on the one hand, and Hebrew and Arabian monotheism, on the other. We see in it the sublimest and completest theory of God — a God whose nature is neither diffracted by multiplicity, nor yet concluded in singularity; who is neither the unconscious All of pantheism, nor the insulated Self of Judaism; a God whose essence is not to be sought in lone seclusion, but in everlasting self-communication; whose being is a unit, and yet a process — a process of which the two associated names, Son and Holy Ghost, are the august terms and the perfect method; a God who allies himself with finite intelligence by the co-eternal, mediating Word, and reflects himself in human nature and enchurches himself in human society, by the ever-proceeding, sanctifying Spirit. So believing, we also join in the reverent and dear ascription: ‘Glory be to the Father, and to the Son, and to the Holy Ghost; as it was in the beginning, is now, and ever shall be, world without end! Amen.’” (pp. 266, 267.)

In a sermon on Matt. xxviii. 19, and published for the “American Unitarian Association,” Dr. Orville Dewey says: “The great, original, and peculiar creed of Christianity is the doctrine of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost. For the *unity* and *spirituality* of God are not the peculiar teachings of Christianity. They had been taught in the Hebrew system. But that God, the Infinite Being, is our Father; that Jesus Christ is the highest Son of God, the highest manifestation and image of the Divine; and that there is a spirit and power of God manifested in the world and in human souls — these are the strong reliances, the supporting pillars, of our Christian faith.”

James Freeman Clarke, in his work, “Orthodoxy, its Truths and Errors,” published by the American Unitarian Association, says of the doctrine of the Trinity: “Rightly

stated, it would bind together all true religion in one harmonious whole; comprehending, in its universal sweep, everything true in natural religion, everything true in reason, and uniting them in vital union, without discord and without confusion. Every manifestation which God has made of himself in nature, in Christ, and in the human soul, would be accepted and vitally recognized by Christianity, which comes not to destroy, but to fulfil. The doctrine of the Trinity would be the highest form of reconciliation or atonement — reconciling all varieties in one great harmony — reconciling the natural and supernatural, law and grace, time and eternity, fate and freedom" (p. 430). "We conclude, finally, that no doctrine of Orthodoxy is so false in its form, and so true in its substance, as this. There is none so untenable as dogma, but none so indispensable as experience and life. The Trinity, if truly received, would harmonize science, faith, and vital piety. The Trinity, as it now stands in the belief of Christendom, at once confuses the mind, and leaves it empty. It feeds us with chaff, with empty phrases and forms, with no real inflowing convictions. It seems to lie, like a vessel on the shore, of no use where it is, and yet difficult to remove and get afloat; but when the tide rises, and the vessel floats, it will be able to bear to and fro the knowledge of mankind, and unite various convictions in living harmony. It is there for something. It is providentially allowed to remain in the creeds of the church for something. It has in itself the seed of a grand future; and, though utterly false and empty as it is taught and defended, it is kept by the deeper instinct of the Christian consciousness, like the Christ in his tomb, waiting for the resurrection" (p. 439).

We would not presume to expect, by this present Essay, to harmonize existing differences on the subject of the Trinity. On so great a subject harmony can be secured only by allowing a large liberty of private judgment. It involves such a complexity of truths, boundless in their length and breadth and depth and height, that finite minds may well

agree to differ in their views of it, simply because none of them can by any means take in the whole of it. No form of words ever made, or yet to be made, can contain the whole truth of the Trinity. It is related of Augustine that, after having spent three days and three nights meditating upon the Trinity, he fell asleep, and dreamed that he was walking by the seashore. He saw, in his dream, a little child dipping water from the sea in a shell, and pouring it into a hole in the sand. "What are you doing there, my little one?" said Augustine. The little one replied: "I am going to put the ocean into my hole." "You cannot do that, my child," said Augustine. The child replied: "Neither can you, holy father, understand with your finite mind the mystery of God."

Nevertheless, it is a want and demand of every thinking mind to put the contents of its faith into doctrinal form. The word of Anselm, with regard to the atonement, applies also here: "As the right order requires that we *believe* the deep things of Christian faith before we presume to discuss them with our reason, so it seems to me a neglect if, after we have been confirmed in the faith, we do not study to understand what we believe."¹

Some have expressed the opinion that it is impossible for the human mind to go any further in the knowledge of the Trinity than it has already gone — that the Nicene Creed and the kindred so-called Athanasian Creed (*Symbolum Quicumque*), the product of centuries of thought, contain all that can be said on this fundamental doctrine of Christian faith, and that it is presumption to expect any clearer or completer statement of it. Probably, in some respects, the *Symbolum Quicumque* can never be surpassed. It is unsurpassedly technical, and in its continued balancings of assertions and negations is a

¹ Cur Deus homo? Liber i. Cap. ii. "Sicut rectus ordo exigit, ut profunda christianae fidei *credamus*, priusquam ea praesumamus ratione discutere; ita negligentia mihi videtur, si, postquam confirmati sumus in fide, non studemus, quod credimus, intelligere."

most marvellous instance of dialectic skill. But it has never satisfied all who have desired to receive the scripture doctrine of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost. And what sense or reason is there in supposing that the Christian church can make no advance in knowledge of divine truth beyond that attained in former generations? The volume of revelation, like the world of nature, is an endless unfolding of God. The truths of revelation, like the laws of nature, are the same from age to age; but there is continual progress in man's knowledge and interpretation of them, and application of them to the uses of life. What this or that man has written about nature, or any law or power of nature, may be completely known; but nature herself is inexhaustible. So what this or that man, or any company of men, may have written or taught respecting any truth of revelation may be completely learned; but the utmost study will never exhaust what is to be learned of the truth itself. The truth of the Trinity is the same now that it ever was, and ever shall be, world without end; but our knowledge of it, we hope, is not thus unchangeable. It would be strange to suppose that, if Athanasius or Augustine had continued to live to this day, with their powers of thought unimpaired, they could have now no richer or clearer view of this great mystery of the Trinity than they had when they composed the writings on the subject which have been transmitted to us. How unreasonable, then, to limit our views of Christian truth to forms and statements made hundreds of years ago! Systems of theology drawn up in former generations, true and useful as they are and always will be, are yet not now sufficient to express what may at present be known and felt of the truth of God; and no system of human construction can ever, completely and for all time, compress within its bounds the fulness of truth which God has revealed.

In its historical development in the church, the doctrine of the Trinity grew out of the doctrine of the Divinity of Christ. The early Christians almost universally worshipped

Christ as God.¹ Their prayers and hymns are adorations of the Lord Christ. Their reverent love centered in him. He was their life, their light, their strength, their joy, their all in all. And it was with respect to the relation of him whom they thus worshipped to the one only living and true God that doctrinal discussion among them first began. It arose, not from metaphysical speculation imported from without, but from a devotional necessity in their own hearts; not from Platonic philosophy, but from the demands of Christian experience, in its inseparable connection with the teachings of the sacred scriptures. And so now it is the practical interests of Christian experience, in their connection with the great facts of redemption, that prompt inquiry into this subject. The Christian heart feels that the Christ it adores, and from whom it has received forgiveness of sins, is not a mere creature, however exalted, but is the very brightness of God; and that the Holy Spirit, who reveals Christ to us and forms Christ within us, is not an impersonal influence, but an ever-present Comforter and Friend, in whom we have communion with God and with all who love God. Here there is manifestly some sort of threeness in the Divine Being. The Christian heart also and equally demands the Divine unity. The problem is, to harmonize these demands.

It may help us to receive the doctrine of the Trinity, if we consider separately the doctrine of the Father, the doctrine of the Son, and the doctrine of the Holy Ghost.

We believe in the Father. This name of *Father* is the name which Jesus utters more frequently than any other, and indeed almost always, when speaking of God. "I thank thee, O Father, Lord of heaven and earth." "Even so, Father." "All things are delivered unto me of my Father, and no man knoweth the Son but the Father; neither knoweth any man the Father, save the Son and he to whomsoever the Son will reveal him." "Neither in this mountain, nor yet at Jerusalem, shall ye worship the Father."

¹ For abundant proofs of this, see Shedd's *History of Christian Doctrine*, Vol. i. p. 262. Liddon's *Bampton Lectures*, Lect. vii.

“I will pray the Father for you.” “Holy Father, keep through thine own name those whom thou hast given me,” *et passim*.

The name of Father, as applied to God, primarily denotes his relation to the only-begotten Son, Jesus Christ, our Lord. And only as a result of this primal relation to Christ, and of Christ's union with men, is he Father of the children of men. Not as our Creator and Preserver is God called our Father and we his children; for he is the Creator and Preserver of the beasts of the field, the birds of the air, and the fishes of the sea; and yet he is nowhere called their Father, as he would be if creation by his hand constituted this relation. Neither is God called our Father because he hath made us spiritual beings, immortal souls, capable of knowing and loving him; for so are the angels in heaven, and yet never is God called their Father.¹ But this name of Father is given to God, primarily, because of his eternal relation to his Son Jesus Christ our Lord; and he is our Father solely because of the union of our humanity with the only-begotten Son. Christ is the Son of God, and God his Father, by nature and essence and from all eternity; we are the children of God, and God our Father, not by nature, but by adoption in Christ his Son.

To enter into the nature of this relation which God as Father sustains to the only-begotten Son would be to anticipate what may more properly be said when we come to treat of the sonship of Christ. Neither is it for mortal tongue to say, nor for heart of man to conceive, what this relation may be. But the scriptures here and there give us glimpses into its nature, and show that its essential element is *love*. “Father, thou lovedst me before the foundation of the world.” “I have declared unto them thy name, and will declare it, that the love wherewith thou hast loved me may

¹ Angels are called “sons of God,” Job i. 16, and probably Gen. vi. 2, in order to *distinguish* them from the children of men, and not as possessing a spiritual nature which men have in common with them, and by which they might be filiated to God.

be in them, and I in them." The repeated testimony from heaven respecting Christ is: "This is my beloved Son." "The Father loveth the Son." He is "his well-beloved," "his dear Son" (Col. i. 13), literally, "the Son of his love," as though the communication of himself in the fulness of his love were the origination of the Son before all worlds. It shows the love there is in God, as the essence of his being, that from all eternity he has such an object of love in his Only-begotten. And it shows, also, the infinite grace bestowed upon the sinful children of men, that through Christ they are made the children of God, and so share in the love which the Father feels for his well-beloved and only-begotten Son. "Behold, what manner of love the Father hath bestowed upon us, that *we* should be called the sons of God." "We are heirs of God, and joint heirs through Christ." "Heirs of God, through Christ." If we are Christ's, God loves us in his Son. We are "accepted in the beloved." Believing the love which God has for his Son, and believing that through Christ we are become the children of God, we may catch some glimpse of the depth of grace and height of privilege granted to us, in that we may call God our Father. Though sinful and fallen, weak and helpless, yet through the only-begotten and well-beloved Son of God, that dearest object of his love, we too become the objects of his Fatherly love. In the relation we sustain to his Son we have the pledge of his everlasting love. We know that nothing shall ever separate us from the love of God which is in Christ Jesus our Lord. He will surely redeem us from all evil, and bring us into the perfect blessedness of his house in heaven. Whatever we ask of him in the name of his Son, we ask of him as also our Father. Had we any due sense of the unspeakable loving-kindness which this name of Father imports, the joy of heaven would even now fill our hearts.

Aside from Christianity, God is nowhere known as Father. Though in Greek and Roman literature the name is given to the supreme divinity, yet it is no expression of what the Christian means by that name. Homer's oft repeated

“Father of gods and men” is, at the best, a title of honor. In the Old Testament there are bright fore-gleams of its Christian meaning, as we might expect to find in a preliminary revelation of the coming Christ. Still, the full and complete revelation of the Son was needed, to show unto us the boundless fulness of love and truth contained in this name of Father. “My Father and your Father,” said Christ once and again to his disciples, i.e. “your Father, because my Father.” Well may this be the first article of the Christian faith: “*We believe in the Father.*”

We believe also in the Son. As the fatherhood of God primarily denotes his eternal relation to the only-begotten Son, so the sonship of Christ primarily denotes his eternal relation to the Father. We admit, of course, that one reason why the title “Son of God” is given to Jesus Christ, is because his human nature was begotten of the Holy Ghost, and miraculously conceived in the womb of the Virgin Mary, according to the word of the angel: “Therefore that holy thing which shall be born of thee shall be called the Son of God.” But we are now considering his eternally divine nature, as he is in the blessed Trinity; and this name of Son belongs to him eternally, without beginning of days or end of years. The term “Father everlasting” has for its necessary correlative, “Son everlasting.” If one is real, the other is real also.

What, then, does the name “Son,” as given to the Lord of glory, import?

1. It denotes some sort of derivation or emanation from the Father. This appears, both from the name itself, and from the testimony which our Lord himself gives of his relation to the Father. A son is begotten of his father. Christ is the Only-begotten of the Father—born, not created; *the first-born before every creature.* In the Nicene Creed he is declared to be God of God, Light of Light, very God of very God. “Of” here denotes “derivation from.” This, too, accords with the testimony which Christ himself gives

us of his dependence on the Father. He everywhere speaks of the divine life, wisdom, and power which he claims to have in himself, as the gift of the Father: "As the Father hath life in himself, so hath he given to the Son to have life in himself." The glory of his pre-existent state he declares to be the gift of the Father: "The glory which I had with thee before the world was, for thou lovedst me before the foundation of the world." His present and future dominion, as Lord and Judge of all, is the gift of the Father: "The Father hath committed all judgment unto the Son."

Not only the name "Son," but also the other appellations given to Christ to express his relation to the Father, imply some manner of derivation from the Father; such as: "the Word," "Image of the invisible God," "Brightness of the Father's Glory," "Character or Impress of his Person." A *word* comes from him who utters it; an *image* has its origin in that of which it is an image; *brightness* is a radiance of glory; *character* or *impress* is a copy of that of which it is the character or impress. If we compare the nature of God to light or fire, the Son is light of this light, fire of this fire. How the Son is derived from the Father, we cannot tell, we cannot—in this world, at least—conceive. The sonship of Christ is his relation to the Father; the fact of which is declared, but the genesis of which is not for us to know. Let us rather imitate the moderation of Cyril of Jerusalem, who said: "It is enough for us that God hath begotten a Son. Let us check ourselves from wishing to know the inconceivable. Christ himself said: 'He that believeth on the Son hath everlasting life,' not, He that knoweth how the Son is begotten of the Father."¹

We may, perhaps, illustrate the eternal or timeless relation of the Son to the Father by the relation of moral law to the Author of law. God did not create moral law, any more than he created his own being; yet moral law is derived from God, and resides in God, and is eternally dependent on God. Moral law is as eternal as God himself; yet it

¹ Quoted by Neander, *History of Christian Dogmas* (Bohn's edition), p. 299.

does not, and cannot, exist separate from, or independent of, God. It has its source and seat and strength in the bosom of God forever, from eternity to eternity. So God did not create the Son; but the Son is derived from the Father, and is in the bosom of the Father. The Son is as eternal as the Father; but he can do nothing of himself; his whole being and working is in and of the Father; and whatsoever things the Father doeth, these also doeth the Son likewise.

It was this truth of eternal sonship that saved the early church from the feeling of any conflict between the full and proper Divinity of Christ and the strictest monotheism; between the fullest and heartiest worship of Christ, and the worship of the one only living and true God. Everywhere, with few insignificant exceptions, the early Christians, both Jews and Gentiles, worshipped Christ as God; but nowhere was there any question whether the Divinity of Christ conflicted with the unity of God. The reason was, they worshipped Christ as the Son of God, the effluence of God, the brightness of the Father's glory, the visible image of the unseen Divinity. The denial of the eternal sonship makes the doctrine of the Trinity no easier to human reason, and far less helpful to devotion.

2. The appellation "Son of God," as applied to the Lord of glory, denotes sameness of essence with God. "We must abstract," says Neander, speaking for Athanasius, "from the expressions 'Son of God' and 'Begotten of God' whatever belongs to sensuous relations, and then there remains to us the idea of unity of essence and derivation of nature."¹ At first view, the derivation or generation of the Son from the Father seems inconsistent with his full and proper Divinity; but, so far from its being so, it is in his derivation or generation from the Father that his full and proper Divinity consists. We need not here repeat the standard arguments for the Divinity of Christ, but would only touch upon some of those that are found in this name of "Son." Take the formula of baptism: "Go, teach all nations, bap-

¹ History of Christian Dogmas, p. 296.

tizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost; and lo, I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world" (Matt. xxviii. 19, 20). Here Christ puts himself in a line with the Father and the Holy Ghost, and in so doing declares himself to be of one nature with them. To suppose that mention is here made of the Father as God alone, of the Son as a servant of God who began his existence in time, and of the Holy Spirit as an impersonal influence, is quite senseless. The Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are the one God in whose name we are baptized. The argument would be less conclusive, if it read: "in the name of God, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost." But the collocation of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost shows a oneness of nature in the Son with the Father and with the Holy Ghost. Imagine Matthew to have written: "Baptizing them in the name of the Father and of Matthew and of the Holy Ghost"! Imagine any other name than that of him in whom dwelleth all the fulness of God!

"All things are delivered unto me of my Father, and no man knoweth the Son but the Father; neither knoweth any man the Father save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son will reveal him. Come unto me, all ye that labor and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest" (Matt. xi. 27, 28). Here Jesus declares that in the Son are depths of being and of wisdom as in the Father, and that the Son is the only medium of the knowledge of the Father to the children of men, the only Source of grace and truth, the only Giver of life and peace. Could any created being, however exalted, thus speak of himself, or promise to do all this for us? Only he who is of one nature with the Father could thus reveal the Father, or give abiding rest and peace to the soul of man. In pouring out our hearts' desire to the Lord Jesus Christ as the Son of God, we know that we are worshipping the brightness of the Father's glory, the express image of his person, the very nature and substance of God. We worship the Father in the Son, and the Father seeketh such to

worship him. That he might find such to worship him, he hath revealed himself in his Son.

“As the Father hath life in himself, so hath he given to the Son to have life in himself” (John v. 26). This “life in himself” Christ has, so that he can say of himself: “I am the Life”; “I am the Resurrection and the Life; he that believeth in me, though he were dead, yet shall he live; and whosoever liveth and believeth in me shall never die.” As the Father is the source of life, so also is the Son. He is not only the source of natural life,—not only created the world of nature and keeps it alive,—but is also the source of spiritual life—breathes upon his disciples, and says: “Receive ye the Holy Ghost.” He gives eternal life. This life-giving power in the Son shows his oneness of essence with the Father.

Our Lord defended his miracle of healing on the Sabbath-day, by saying: “My Father worketh hitherto, and I work. Then the Jews sought to kill him, because he said that God was his Father, making himself equal with God” (John v. 17, 18). On another occasion, he said: “I and my Father are one.” Then the Jews took up stones again to stone him; “because,” said they, “thou, being a man, makest thyself God” (John x. 30–33). His explanations did not remove from their minds the idea they had inferred, but only served to strengthen and confirm it. Instead of saying one word to refute or correct their interpretation, he goes on to repeat and develop it. He declares such a union of the Father and the Son, such a dwelling of the Father in the Son and of the Son in the Father, as implies not only a oneness of will, but a oneness of nature and of life-giving power. Did our Lord mean no more than to say: “I will only what the Father wills,” the sense would, indeed, be most worthy of him who came not to do his own will, but the will of the Father that sent him, and who said: “I do always those things that please him.” But, considering that the discourse is about giving eternal life and insuring eternal protection to his people against all their adversaries,

his words seem to mean more than this, and to claim the possession of qualities of being which, though given to him, are the same as those of the Father.

And who but one in whom is the very essence of Divinity could say: "If ye had known me, ye should have known my Father also; and from henceforth [i.e. as soon as your eye is open to know who I am] ye know him, and have seen him; He that hath seen me, hath seen the Father"? (John xiv. 7, 9.)

Doubtless there is a sense in which the Son, even in respect to his divine nature, is inferior to the Father. "My Father is greater than all"; "My Father is greater than I." (John x. 29; xiv. 28.) The superiority of the Father is in his being the Unbegotten, the Underived, the Unoriginate. There is perfect fulness of Divinity in the Son; but all is derived from the Father. There is the same divine nature in the Son as in the Father; but it is communicated from the Father. The Father is the fountain of the Divinity which is in the Son; but this does not in the least degree diminish aught of the reverence, honor, love, and trust which are due to the Son as to the Father. The Son, as the very name imports, has the ground or the cause of his being in the Father; but he is the eternal image of the Father, in whom the infinite, invisible One reveals his being and his glory, even as in the radiance of the sun the invisible light is manifest which enlightens and enlivens all. In him dwelleth all the fulness of God, and, worshipping him, we worship the Father in him.¹

¹ We are most carefully to avoid any such view of the generation of the Son from the Father, or his dependence on the Father, as would in the least degree infringe upon the truth of his Divinity. The name "Son of God" imports one as well as the other. It clearly imports both. The Nicene Council declared both the eternal generation of the Son from the Father and his consubstantiality, or sameness of essence, with the Father. They must accordingly have understood one expression in a sense consistent with the other. And we have seen that the testimonies which Christ gives us of himself teach us both his true and proper Divinity, and his entire, eternal dependence on the Father.

In respect to eternal generation, we are utterly to exclude all notions of time. We are prone to think of it as something already taken place and finished in

3. The Son is the Mediator between the Father and all created things. All that the Father does, he does through the Son. By him he made the worlds (Heb. i. 2). It is the Son who says: "I am Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the ending, the first and the last" (Rev. i. 8; xxii. 13). His being the first, the Alpha, the beginning, refers to his being before all created things, and the source of all created things, as explained in Isaiah xlviii. 12, 13: "I am the first, I also am the last. Mine hand also hath laid the foundation of the earth, and my right hand hath spanned the heavens. When I call unto them, they stand up together." His being the last, the Omega, the ending, implies that at the end all created things shall lie submissive at his feet, and his kingdom rule over all. "All things were made by him, and without him was not anything made that is made" (John i. 3).

In like manner, the *preservation* of the world is mediated by the Son. He is the *bearer* of the whole system of creation, "upholding all things by the word of his power" (Heb. i. 3). "In him all things consist," or hold together (Col. i. 17). He is the Mediator of all life. In him whatever lives was made alive, and is kept alive (John i. 4). He is the Logos, or Mediator of truth and of spiritual illumination to the rational creation, the Light of the world—the true Light which lighteth every man,—and without him not any knowledge of God is possible to man (John i. 1, 4, 9; Matt. xi. 27). Finally, the Son is the Mediator of atonement, reconciliation, and redemption to a world that had fallen away from God, and found itself in a condition of sin and death. The Father sent the Son to be the Saviour of the world (1 John iv. 14), "who of God is made unto us wisdom and righteousness and sanctification and redemption" (1 Cor. i. 30). And this redemption he accomplished by leaving the glory which he had with the Father before the world

an anterior age infinitely remote; whereas it is no more a thing of the past than of the present or future, and is even so much present and future as past. It is timeless, but none the less real.

was, entering as man into the world of men, suffering death in order to blot out our sins; and, having returned to the Father, and being again glorified in heaven, he sends forth the Holy Spirit to give life and light to men, and to raise them from the darkness and death in which without him they would have remained forever bound. He it is that baptizeth with the Holy Ghost. By his union with humanity he becomes the fountain source of spiritual life to the children of men. From his glorified body flow streams of living water to all who believe in him (John vii. 38, 39).¹

4. The Son is Heir of all things and Lord of all. "All things were created by him and for him" (Col. i. 16).

¹ This passage is commonly understood, not of a stream of the Holy Spirit which flows from Christ upon believers, but of such a stream as flows from believers upon others around them, and upon whom they thus exert a saving and life-giving influence. The thought is in itself a true one, perfectly accordant with numerous other passages which speak of a power of life communicating itself from the church and from individual believers, making them to be channels of divine life unto others, and which would be more and more manifest did believers themselves draw more deeply from the primal fountain of life, which is Jesus Christ. But several commentators, as Bengel, Hahn, Stier, maintain, with apparent reason, that this is not its primary meaning. The Old Testament scriptures referred to (Ez. xlvii. and Zech. xiii.) foretell of a stream of living water which in Messianic times shall flow forth over all the earth from the temple of the Lord; and the temple, while symbolic of the church, is more particularly symbolic of the body of Christ. The Spirit dwells in, and flows from, his glorified body. The thought is rather of a receiving of the Spirit from Christ on the part of believers than of an outflow of the Spirit from believers upon others. Jesus says: "If any man thirst, let him come unto me; and whoso believeth on me, let him drink; for to me belongs what the scripture says of the stream which in the times of the Messiah shall flow forth from the temple of the Lord, 'Out of his belly shall flow rivers of living waters.' And this spake he of the Spirit which they that believe on him should receive." But, in either way of understanding it, it clearly sets forth Christ as the fountain source of the Holy Spirit. Believers become channels of this divine influence only as they first receive it from Christ. And the apostolic writings everywhere set forth Christ as the Giver of the Holy Spirit, and by the Spirit imparting gifts to men. From him goeth forth the Spirit of God into all the earth (Rev. iii. 1; v. 6); "the seven spirits of God" denoting the one Spirit in the completeness and perfectness of his manifold operations.

When it is said that the Son is the Mediator of the Holy Spirit, it is, of course, implied that the Father is the primary cause of the coming of the Spirit and of all his workings among men. As whatsoever the Father doeth he doeth through the Son, so likewise he sendeth the Spirit only through the

All things are destined to be subject to him; all spheres of created being to be united under him as their one head (Eph. i. 10); and all the fulness of the universe to dwell in him (Col. i. 19). The church is called "the fulness of him that filleth all in all" (Eph. i. 23), because the redemption of the church by the Son is the filling out of what was lacking to make all things, visible and invisible, subject to him as Lord of all.

It is as the vicegerents of God on earth that in the Old Testament rulers and kings are called sons of God, and even gods (Ex. xxii. 28; Ps. lxxxii. 6). They bear this title, because they administer their office in the name and authority of God. Now, if earthly kings are called sons of God and gods in the scriptures, and this scripture appellation of kings has a meaning which cannot be broken or explained away, much more is this title due to him who in his very essence is the Son of God, to whom is committed all rule, authority, and power, who is King of kings and Lord of lords.

To the Son, then, we bow the knee in devoted love, obedience, prayer, and praise. He is our Lord, and we worship him. The Father is the primal Fountain of all; but the Son is the only Mediator between the Father and all created existence. No man cometh unto the Father but by him. He it is with whom we have to do. He is upon the throne. Earthly empires pass away; but of the Son it is written: "Thy throne, O God, is forever and ever" (Heb. i. 8).¹

mediation of the Son. Would we receive the Holy Ghost, we must look to him who baptizeth with the Holy Ghost.

In the Epistles, more than one hundred and fifty times there is a joint mention of God the Father and of Jesus Christ his Son as the fountain source of grace, mercy, and peace, and all the blessings of salvation; thus teaching us that these blessings come to us only through the mediation of the Son, and also that our thoughts and affections should ascend through the Son to the Father Almighty.

¹ In his exceedingly able and eminently thoughtful work, "Reason in Religion," Dr. Hedge, after explaining the rise and establishment in the church of the doctrine of the Divinity of Christ, its necessity for people just emerging from the darkness of polytheism, its fitness to satisfy the craving desire of the soul for some definite idea of God, says: "St. Paul foresaw this approaching deification of the Son of man; divined its reason and necessity in the counsels

And we believe in the Holy Ghost. It remains that we briefly set forth this third tenet in the doctrine of the Trinity. In respect to the relation of the Holy Spirit to the Father and the Son, or to the Divine Being *ad intra*, the scriptures tell us much less than of his work *ad extra*, or his relation to created nature and the souls of men. In relation to the Divine Being, the Spirit of God is the vital energy of his entire being—that by which he knows himself, is moved inwardly, and acts outwardly. The Holy Spirit is the Divine self-consciousness; “For,” says Paul, “what man

of God and in the wants of the church; and so announced that Christ ‘must reign till he hath put all things under his feet.’ But, casting his inspired glance along the line of the ages, he foresaw that this deification would be temporary, and so predicted ‘the end, when Christ shall deliver up the kingdom to God, even the Father, and the Son also himself be subject unto him that put all things under him, that God may be all in all’” (p. 258). Admitting this to be a true interpretation of history and of prophecy, it must also be admitted that, for the present at least, the Son holds the place of God over all the children of men, and that it is the duty of all men now to worship and adore him as on the throne of God. The Father hath committed all rule, authority, and power unto the Son, in order that all men should honor the Son, even as they honor the Father. He is our God now, if not through endless ages. The predicted end, when Christ shall deliver up the kingdom to the Father, has not yet arrived, and will not arrive until the history of the world in its present organization has come to an end. Until then, our Unitarian brethren might unite with us in the acknowledgment and worship of the Son as God over all; and unless they do this, they resist the counsel and ordinance of the Father.

Dr. Hedge says: Paul “foresaw this deification would be temporary, because no created or generated being can hold forever the place of the Supreme, by whose will alone he can hold it at all.” We admit that the Arian idea of “created” Divinity, which is now held by scarcely anybody, is entirely inconsistent with the doctrine of Christ’s eternal supremacy; but the Orthodox view of “generated” Divinity is perfectly consistent with it; for in this view the Son is of one and the same nature eternally with the Father, and his relation to the Father such that his full Divinity is in perfect accord with the strictest unity of God. The worship of his name with all our hearts is no infringement upon that worship which is due to God alone. For us creatures he is certainly God, for the world was made by him, is ruled by him, and by him all things consist.

And the want of the soul that is satisfied for the present in the Divinity of Christ is no temporary want, but an unending necessity. The human race will never outgrow it in this world’s history; and the closing book of the Bible, which gives us a picture of the heavenly and eternal world, does not authorize us to suppose that the “deification” of the Lord Jesus Christ is any “temporary” arrangement, but is as eternal as the throne of God and the Lamb.

knoweth the things of a man, save the spirit of man, which is in him? Even so the things of God knoweth no man, but the Spirit of God" (1 Cor. ii. 11). And as it is by his spirit that man works both within and without, so, following the analogy suggested by Paul, it is by his Spirit that God works both within and without. It is of his external working that the scriptures chiefly instruct us, and with which, of course, we have chiefly to do. The Spirit is called Holy, not so much because of his essential quality, — for so the Father and the Son are holy, but because of his special operation in making holy the hearts of men.

In relation to the created universe, the Holy Spirit is God present in his works, constantly sustaining the life and movement of nature, constantly sustaining the life and movement of the human spirit, and more especially effecting and completing in the hearts of men, and in the whole world, the work of redemption of which Christ laid the foundation in the sacrifice of himself.

It would make our Essay too long properly to set forth the scriptural proofs of this statement. Neither is it here necessary. The idea pervades the Bible that the life of nature is owing to the continual presence and agency of the Spirit of God (Gen. i. 2; Job xxvi. 17; Ps. civ. 30; Matt. vi. 30; x. 29). Also, that the life of man and all his powers of understanding and reason are dependent upon the same divine presence and agency (Gen. vi. 3; Ex. xxxi. 3; Job xxxiii. 4; Acts xvii. 28). And without the renewing of the Holy Ghost, even the sacrifice of Christ would not save us. Without a divine power working in the soul, no child of man would be rescued from the captivity of sin, or the kingdom of God established in the world (Zech. iv. 6; John iii. 5; xvi. 8). The gift of the Holy Ghost is the completion and seal of redemption. Our hope for the church and the world is, that there is a Holy Ghost — that there is a power abroad among men which is not of man, but of God, to keep his people steadfast in the faith, and to subdue the world to the kingdom of his Son. Our assurance for the complete

triumph of righteousness in the world is in the presence and power of the Holy Ghost.

Very many of the passages of scripture which speak of the Holy Spirit, or of the Spirit of God, might possibly be understood of an effluence of life and power proceeding from God ; but they all harmonize perfectly with the idea of the personality of the Spirit, and some of them cannot easily be interpreted in any other way. According to the teachings of the Old Testament, the Holy Spirit is God himself, considered as present in his works, whether in nature or in the heart of man. David prays : “ Cast me not away from thy presence, and take not thy Holy Spirit from me.” And again : “ Whither shall I go from thy Spirit ? or whither shall I flee from thy presence ? ” The parallelism, in both instances, showing that the Holy Spirit is a present God, or God present with us. In the New Testament the same view is presented, excepting, as was to be expected, that in the New Testament it is the Lord Jesus Christ who by the Holy Spirit is present in the church and in the hearts of his people ; present also in the world, directing and controlling all events for the promotion of his kingdom. And even with regard to the Old Testament prophets, who spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost, it was the Spirit of Christ within them which testified beforehand the sufferings of Christ, and the glory which should follow. So intimate is the relation of Christ and the Holy Spirit, as set forth in Christ’s own words, in his farewell discourse to his disciples, that some persons have thought them to be identical — have believed that the Holy Spirit, as promised by Christ, is no other than the glorified Christ himself in the hearts of his people. In his promise of the Comforter he said : “ I will not leave you comfortless ; I will come unto you. It is expedient for you that I go away ; for if I go not away, the Comforter will not come unto you ; but if I depart, I will send him unto you. A little while, and ye shall not see me ; and again, a little while, and ye shall see me, because I go unto the Father.” And when he ascended

into heaven, and disappeared from their sight, he said: "Lo, I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world."

But, while these declarations assert the closest relationship between Christ and the Holy Spirit, it is Christ's own words which most plainly declare the distinct personality of the Spirit. Their relation seems to be this: The Holy Spirit comes to earth to complete the work of redemption which Christ in person had begun; to be to his church and to his disciples everywhere what Christ himself would have been had he continued to be bodily and visibly present, yea to be far more than Christ would have been, had he continued to be bodily present; to dwell in their hearts, a living presence in their souls. Doubtless it was an object of earnest desire to the disciples to have their beloved Lord always visibly present with them. But this was manifestly impossible, if they would go forth and carry his gospel into all parts of the world. When they separated one from another, some of them must lose him out of their sight. So long as he was bodily present on earth, he could be seen only by a few. Only from his throne in the heavens could he be seen from the four quarters of the globe. Therefore it was expedient for them that he should go away, in order that, instead of seeing him in a bodily form before them, they might know him as a spiritual presence within them always and everywhere. To use words which, seemingly contradictory, are yet true, he left them that he might the more intimately and really be with them. By his ascension into heaven he laid aside the limitations of his bodily presence, that he might forever and everywhere be present in their souls, the Spirit of holiness and power, truth and life. But he declares the Holy Spirit to be *another* Comforter, distinct both from himself and from the Father, one whom the Father will send in his name, who shall teach them all things, and bring all things to their remembrance, whatsoever he had said unto them; shall reprove the world of sin, of righteousness, and of judgment, guide his people into all truth, and glorify him in their hearts and in all the world. What can be more personal than a being constantly

present with us and within us, teaching and guiding, aiding and comforting us? And what can be more divine than one who is able to accomplish all that is ascribed to the Holy Spirit? Nevertheless, he is God subjectively, rather than objectively; he does not speak of himself, but of Christ; takes of the things of Christ, and shows them unto us; shows us the glory of the exalted Christ, as he now is upon his throne, far above all heavens, yet ever present with us, as the sun is present with us in a cloudless sky at midday.

This is the Comforter whom Christ promised to his disciples. As such, he appeared to them on the day of Pentecost, filling their minds with the light of truth, their hearts with the fire of love, and enabling them to speak with a power that their adversaries could neither gainsay nor resist. As such, the Comforter now pleads the cause of Christ in the world, dwelling in the hearts of all believers, shedding abroad within them the love of God, and uniting them in one communion with their glorified Lord, and with one another in him and for him. As such, the Comforter, who is the Holy Ghost, will continue to subdue and reconcile rebellious hearts unto God in the name of the glorified Son, until the kingdoms of this world are become the kingdom of our Lord and of his Christ; for this kingdom shall be established, not by might or power of man, but by my Spirit, saith the Lord.

We believe that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost are one God, and that each is worthy of the honor, love, and trust which are due to God alone. Holding fast to the unity of God, we believe also in the Deity of Christ and the personal presence of the Holy Spirit. Now, we want a word to express both the threeness and the oneness of the Divine Being, and we use the word "Trinity." We want, also, a word to express the threefold distinctions revealed in the Divine Being, and we find no better word than that of "persons." We believe that in the unity of God there is a trinity of persons. We are ready, however, with Calvin, to give up this form of statement, whenever a better one shall

be devised. "These words," says Calvin, "have not been rashly invented, and we should beware lest we be convicted of fastidious temerity in rejecting them. I could wish them, indeed, to be buried in oblivion, provided this faith were universally received, that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are the one God, and that, nevertheless, the Son is not the Father, nor the Spirit the Son, but that they are distinguished from each other by some peculiar property."¹

A common objection to the use of the word "persons" to express the distinctions of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost is, that it implies there are three Gods; but how far such a thought, or suspicion, was from the minds of those who first adopted it is evident from the fact that, when the Greek word *πρόσωπον* (Latin, *persona*) was first proposed to express this distinction, it was rejected by many writers of that age, as favoring too much the Sabellian view.² God is revealed as three, and yet one. What shall we call these three? We admit the poverty of language on so great a theme; and doubtless the church will continue to labor for some more complete and satisfactory formula to express the acknowledged scripture truth that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost are three, and yet one. But we do not see that the expression "three sanctities,"³ or any other that has been suggested, is better than "three persons"; or that

¹ Institutes, Book i. chap. xiii. § 5. "The definition of Tertullian does not displease me, that there is in God a certain distribution, or economy, which makes no change in the unity of the essence" (Ibid. § 6). "I am exceedingly pleased with this remark of Gregory Nazianzen: 'I cannot think of the One but I am immediately surrounded with the splendor of the Three; nor can I discern the Three but I am instantly carried back to the One'" (Ibid. § 17).

² Hagenbach, History of Doctrines, § 95. Twisten on the Trinity, Bibliotheca Sacra, Vol. iii. p. 762. This shows how strongly the patristic writers held these distinctions to be real and eternal, and not merely modal, temporary, or apparent. Still, they were very far from that "conception of three blank persons which now claims to be the Orthodox view." Modern theologians have "so made the personal the only distinction as to merge the relationship, the subordination, of the hypostases into a blank tritheism, easy of conception numerically, but far more difficult for the reason."—Taylor Lewis in American Theological Review, Vol. iv. p. 124.

³ Christian Examiner, No. ccxviii. art. vi.

a "triad of sanctities" is a more pleasing or satisfactory formula than a "trinity of persons."¹

Various analogies to the threefold distinctions of the Divine Being are thought to be found in the world of nature and in the mind of man, such as: substance, constitution, function; water, fountain, stream; fire, light, heat; intellect, affection, will; and many others. These may be useful to some degree in aiding to apprehend the doctrine. One mind will be more aided by one analogy, and another by another. They serve to show that there may be a unity of essence together with some sort of threeness in the mode of existence or of action; and possibly, in the progress of science, physical and metaphysical, we may yet see a trinity in nature and in the human spirit. Perhaps no object in nature is better fitted to represent God than light. Though one of the earliest of God's creations, and one with which we are most familiar, yet with regard to its real essence philosophers are still much in the dark. The light itself we do not see, but only the light of light: so God himself we do not see, but only God of God. The sun we do not see, but only the splendor proceeding from the sun: so the Father we do not see, but only him who is the brightness, or radiance, of the Father's glory. In addition to the splendor of the sun, there is an illuminating and calorific power belonging to it, and yet distinguishable from it. Without the influence and reception of this illuminating and calorific power we could not perceive the splendor

¹ "It is the part neither of good nor of learned men, captiously to reject these words; for in every science it is allowed to scholars to use certain technical terms, even if those terms are nowhere used by others outside that science. Since, then, theology is a science, it will be allowed to theologians also to use technical terms. It is unfair to repudiate words and signs when the things signified by them exist. But the things do exist in the holy scriptures; yea, words plainly equivalent are found. And, as Cicero says, 'We ought to be easy in the use of words if we agree in the thing itself.'" Keckermann, quoted by Schweizer, Glaubenslehre, Vol. ii. p. 139. To this it may be replied that the word "person" is not peculiarly a technical or theological word, but one frequently used in common discourse. Perhaps it would have been better simply to have Anglicized the Greek word *ὑπόστασις*, which, however, is translated "person" in Heb. i. 3.

of the sun, or know the hidden light revealed by that splendor: so the Spirit of God reveals the Son of God, and the Son of God reveals and glorifies the invisible Father. He who receives not the quickening influence of the Spirit does not know the Son, and so does not see in the Son the eternal Father in his boundless grace and truth.¹

But the doctrine itself rests upon the sure testimony of the word of God, and is itself the primal foundation of the great facts of Christianity — atonement for sin by divine sacrifice, and regeneration of the soul by divine influence. Only a divine Saviour could make atonement for sin; only a divine Spirit can give life to the soul dead in trespasses and sins. Hence the doctrines of atonement and regeneration rest upon the doctrine of the Trinity, and stand or fall with it. It is a doctrine of the New Testament more than of the Old. Nevertheless, it did not appear in the Christian church as something altogether new, but by that law of development by which what is concealed in the Old Testament is laid open in the New. It pleases God by means of historic facts to communicate his eternal truth to the world. The doctrines of scripture are given us mostly by historic mediation, and the facts of the divine plan of redemption were essential to the full revelation of the doctrine of the Trinity, and the proper use of it for life and salvation. Still, there are numerous and clear intimations of this mystery in the Old Testament, and evident preparations for the revelation of it. It has been common, of late, to laugh at the argument drawn from the plural name of God, and from the words of God, when he said: “Let *us* make man”; “Man is become as one of *us*” (Gen. i. 26; iii. 22; xi. 7; Isa. vi. 8); but the

¹ This analogy is carried out more at length in Hahn's *Lehrbuch des Christlichen Glaubens*, § 55. He closes his illustration with a thought well to be remembered: “In our search into the mysteries of the Divine Being we discern the limits of our range of thought, and it becomes us, for the sake of the indubitable truth of what may be known in revelation, to cherish a childlike faith even in the incomprehensible, until by the continued and united exercise of inquiry and of faith, we become ripened for that higher degree of knowledge which is promised us in the future world” (1 Cor. xiii. 9 sq.; 2 Cor. v. 7).

best explanation of this usage is found in the doctrine of the Trinity ; in that fulness of life and action in God which the Trinity reveals.¹

Traces of a similar view of the Divine existence are found in some of the pagan mythologies and in the Platonic philosophy ; but a slight examination of these is sufficient to show that the church did not derive her doctrine of the Trinity from them ; while, at the same time, the fact that the sublimest philosophy ever constructed by the mind of man approaches so nearly to this doctrine shows that it is not as repugnant to reason as its opponents have sometimes alleged. Neither do these pagan or philosophic trinities militate at all against the Christian doctrine ; but rather are like mock suns in the heavens, which do not disprove the existence of the real sun, but only show there must be a real sun, without which they could not appear.

¹ Delitzsch, explaining the meaning of the two names of God, אֱלֹהִים and יְהוָה, says of the first : "Revelatio mysterii trinitatis pro hujus nominis explicatione habenda est." And of the name "Jehovah," as denoting God ever present in human history for purposes of salvation, he says : "Incarnatio pro nominis יְהוָה explicatione habenda est, nam qua de causa et quo consilio Deus in Vetere Testamento Jehova nuncupetur, in facie Jesu Christi elucescit." The reason why God is called Jehovah shines forth in the face of Jesus Christ.

In the appearances of God to the patriarchs and prophets a distinction is sometimes made between God and the person speaking ; though the latter assumes the name and attributes of God. (Gen. xvi. 10, 13 ; Exod. iii. 2, 4 ; xxiii. 20 sq. ; Ps. cx. 1 ; Zech. iii. 2.) Divine attributes are ascribed to the coming Messiah (Isa. ix. 6 ; Jer. xxiii. 6 ; xxxiii. 16 ; Micah v. 2) ; also, frequent mention of the Spirit of God (Gen. vi. 3 ; Exod. xxxi. 3 ; 1 Sam. xvi. 13 ; Isa. lxi. 1 ; lxiii. 10 ; xlviii. 16). These passages, taken together, contain the Trinity germinantly. The doctrine could not well be more clearly revealed in the Old Testament, chiefly because the time for the full revelation of it was not come, but partly because of the strong inclination of the Jewish people to polytheism. It could be safely revealed only to those who were well confirmed in their faith in the one only living and true God. Yet the apocryphal writings of the Jews show that their sacred books suggested to them thoughts of personal distinctions in the Divine Being, and awakened inquiries which find their satisfactory solution only in the completed revelations of the New Testament. (See Book of Wisdom ix. ; x. ; xviii. 14, 15 ; Ecclesiasticus xxiv. 3, 8, 9, 10.) The word, or wisdom, going forth from God is personified and invested with the attributes and functions of Divinity. What was for them a personification only of creative wisdom, love, and power, in the revelation of the New Testament becomes embodied in Jesus Christ.

The doctrine of the Trinity is eminently a practical truth. It is essential to the true spiritual worship of God. We worship the Father, through the Son, in the communion of the Holy Ghost. In every true conception of God two ideas are involved, both of which are essential to true spiritual worship, but either of which, taken separately, is insufficient, and tends to error. These ideas are: First, the infinity or incomprehensibleness of God; and secondly, his personality, or individual relation to every praying soul. In prayer we know that we are addressing the Infinite One, who filleth immensity, and whom we with our finite minds cannot comprehend; and, if we dwell on this idea alone, we are in danger of coming to the conclusion that it is impossible for us to have any real or true knowledge of God; or of falling into the pantheistic error of supposing that God is a boundless substance, of vital power, but without personality, or conscious sympathy with man. But the revelation of the Father in his Son Jesus Christ saves the soul from this dismal wandering into shadowy abstractions, and gives us a definite object of thought and of worship. God, the Father invisible, shines upon us in the face of his Son Jesus Christ. The craving desire of every worshipping soul after some definite idea of God is completely satisfied in the knowledge of him in whom dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead bodily. And in the worship of God as manifest in Christ there is no danger of our reducing God in our thoughts to the dimensions of mere humanity, as there might seem to be in dwelling exclusively upon the revelation of God in the form of man. There is no danger of forgetting his immensity, or of making him appear too much like one of ourselves; for, while in Christ we behold God in the limits of personality, we also see such boundless fulness of divine life, love, and power as commands the utmost reverence, adoration, and worship of which our souls are capable. It is the Christian doctrine of the Trinity that enables us to hold fast the truth contained in both of the required views of God, and at the same time saves us from the error that might easily arise

from dwelling exclusively upon either. It secures both the infinity and the personality of Deity.

“Likewise the Spirit also helpeth our infirmities.” None can pray as they ought, except moved by the Holy Ghost. Did not the Spirit prompt us to pray, we should never pray.

“Prayer is the breath of God in man
Returning to its source.”

It is the vibration of the divine Spirit in the soul of man. He who desires to pray has already received the movement of the Spirit of God in his soul. He who sighs to God: “Oh, my Father,” may hear in his sigh the voice of the Father, saying: “Oh, my child.” The same divine Spirit which originates the desire communicates also the blessing desired, speaking within the soul with the voice of a comforter, companion, and friend, and uniting the soul in tenderest sympathy with all who love and worship the same God and Saviour. The Holy Spirit unites us with God and with one another, pours into our hearts that communion of love in which the Father and the Son are one. And this is the communion of the Holy Ghost.

Thus the doctrine of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, satisfies the deepest wants of the soul. Never so much as in prayer do we feel our need of the presence and aid of the Holy Spirit; never so much as in prayer do we see the glory of our Lord Jesus Christ, and rejoice in his mediation with the Father. The doctrine is essential to Christian life and worship, and is, we trust, acknowledged in reality by many who are thought to deny it. It is the one faith in which we are baptized, and in which we are blessed. And the whole church is one, now and forever, in the unity of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost.

ARTICLE IV.

THE YEAR OF CHRIST'S BIRTH.¹

BY REV. THEODORE D. WOOLSEY, D.D., PRESIDENT OF YALE COLLEGE.

WITHIN a few months two German scholars of note have written on the Chronology of the New Testament — the one, Professor Wieseler, of Greifswald, a theologian; the other, A. W. Zumpt, of Berlin, a classical scholar, eminent for his archaeological researches. Wieseler's work is a supplement to his well-known "Chronological Synopsis," and in regard to the date of our Lord's birth takes substantially the same ground with that work, and with an Essay of his on the Chronology of the New Testament, which appeared in the twenty-first, or third supplement, volume of Herzog's Encyclopedia, in 1866. We will go no further into his views at present than to say that he places the birth of Christ in the early months of 750 u.c., a short time before the death of Herod, and that he explains Luke ii. 2 as meaning that the taxing there indicated took place before Quirinius was legate in Syria. This explanation we hold to be entirely indefensible, as we have endeavored to show in another place. It is, indeed, a convenient solution of a serious difficulty; but we are compelled to reject it as philologically untenable.²

Zumpt's work (*das Geburtsjahr Christi*) is wholly devoted to the investigation of the year of our Lord's birth. He adopts the view which many have espoused, since San Clemente's work, *de vulgaris aerae emendatione*, appeared at Rome in 1793, that Christ was born in the year 747 of Rome, that is, between two and three years before the death of Herod. We propose in this Article to give a report of

¹ *Das Geburtsjahr Christi. Geschichtlich-Chronologische Untersuchungen von A. W. Zumpt: Leipzig. 1869.*

² See *New Englander* for October, 1869, pp. 677-680.

the arguments of this learned scholar, and to subject them in a few points to a critical examination.

The early Christian writers had no traditions touching the birth of Christ. Their statements rest on calculations made by themselves, or derived from their predecessors, which are overthrown, for the most part, by better ones; and even Tertullian, who has preserved a very important account of the date of the taxing, falls into error when he discusses the chronology of our Lord's birth for himself. But there is an independent tradition of the date of Christ's death, which, as we shall hereafter see, has a bearing on the question of the nativity.

The arguments thus all turn on the meaning and comparison of passages in the Gospels, and the main question is: How can they be synchronized with the known history of the times? One fact in particular, the death of Herod, may be said to have been determined beyond doubt. An eclipse of the moon and various other proofs evince that this event occurred in the spring of 750 u.c. = 4 B.C., before the pass-over. Thus we have the lowest possible limit of the nativity which can be made to harmonize with the narrative in Matt. ii. It is also certain that, at the death of Herod, P. Quintilius Varus was the emperor's legate in Syria, as he had been from some time in 747 u.c. Whatever explanation we give to passages in the Gospels, we must regard this presidency of Varus to be as well ascertained as almost anything in Roman history.¹

One of the most important texts, Luke ii. 2, is chosen by Mr. Zumpt as the starting-point in his discussion. Christ was born at a time when a census required his parents to go to Bethlehem to be registered, and Quirinius, as *ἡγεμών* in Syria, had the oversight of the census. But Quirinius was legate in Syria upon the banishment of Archelaus, in the year 759 u.c., or 6 A.D., when a census attended with serious insurrections, to which Luke refers in Acts v. 37, was carried on. Here, then, instead of light we have a difficulty —

¹ Compare *New Englander*, u. s. pp. 683-686.

one of the most important difficulties in the chronology of the New Testament. Was Quirinius legate in Syria twice? Was there a transaction deserving the name of an *apographe* before that of 6 A.D.? Or is the careful Luke, whose accuracy closer acquaintance with ancient times and places is making more and more evident, guilty of a very gross error in chronology, of a confusion of dates six or nine years distant from one another; nay more, of a confusion inconsistent with his own statements, that Christ was born in the days of Herod (Luke i. 5), and that he was about thirty years old in the fifteenth year of the emperor Tiberius?

In regard to the first point — to an earlier legation of Quirinius than that of 6 A.D. — it is unnecessary to review the arguments of Mr. Zumpt. They are substantially those which he first gave to the public in his *Commentationes Epigraphicæ*, in 1854, and of which we have given a full account elsewhere.¹ The arguments are drawn from notices of this man which show that he was in the East at the right time to hold the office in question; that his subjugation of a restless tribe in or near Cilicia, with the triumphal *insignia* granted to him on that account, prove him to have been the emperor's legate, and to have held office in Syria, and in no other province, and that a gap occurs in the list of Syrian legates just at the right place, where his name can be inserted. He was also, as we learn from Tacitus, a *rector* of the young Caius Caesar, who went into the East to manage affairs in Armenia in the latter part, it is probable, of 753. Zumpt contends that, while holding this office of rector, Quirinius was also legate of Syria. This is by no means clear to us. We incline more to the opinion that he followed Quintilius Varus when he left Syria, in 750 or afterwards, and that he held the province when the emperor's grandson was sent to Armenia, upon which he became a rector of Caius, and that all other power ceased in those parts excepting that which was delegated by the young Caesar. But this point in no

¹ New Englander, u. s. pp. 686-697.

manner affects the main question, which may now be regarded as well established.

There is another argument, drawn from an inscription which Zumpt rejects, and which Mommsen, with a number of others, supports. A mutilated marble, belonging to the time just succeeding those of Augustus, records the honors of a person who had been that emperor's Syrian legate twice. Only two persons could have such a story told of them. Zumpt appropriates the inscription to C. Sentius Saturninus. But his argument is weak, as he has to assume, without the slightest support from facts, that Sentius was president of the province even before he was consul. Accepting, as we do, the reference of the inscription to Quirinius, we have a corroborative argument which adds strength to Zumpt's main proposition.

Quirinius is spoken of by a later Latin writer, Florus, as having gained victories worthy of a triumph over certain African nations. This Mr. Zumpt refers to a time after his consulship, when he could, according to Roman usage, receive the proconsulship of the Roman province of Africa. But if we explain his efficiency in Africa, as Mommsen does, of a time before his consulship, when, as a man of praetorian dignity, he might be intrusted with the province of Crete and Cyrene, every event recorded of him will be clear, the order observed by Tacitus in the leading passage concerning him (*Annal.* iii. 48) will be undisturbed, and the inscription will be brought into harmony with the words of the historian. Thus he was in Cyrenaica before 742 u.c.; he was made consul, on account of his vigor and military ability, in 742; he staid the prescribed time of five years in Rome, and served as proconsul of Asia (the Roman province so called) for one year, which was then the regular duration of office in a senatorial province; he succeeded Quintilius Varus in 750, or afterward, as emperor's legate; he became rector of Caius Caesar in 753 or 754, and, when Archelaus was deposed, in 6 A.D., or 759 u.c., was again deputed to the difficult office

of uniting Judaea with Syria, and bringing it more completely under Roman institutions.¹

But, admitting such a double legation, what are we to think of a census before the census of 6 A.D.? And how could Quirinius have been concerned in a census contemporary with Christ's birth? The second part of Mr. Zumpt's work is devoted to the solution of these questions (pp. 90-207).

Here the terms in which Luke expresses himself are indefinite: "in those days," "a decree," "the whole world," "taxed." In the first lies a certain vagueness as to the time when the decree was issued, and the word "decree" does not disclose of itself whether Augustus acted on his own authority, or with the consent of the senate. But, as the expression "the whole world" denotes at least the Roman world outside of Italy, including both the senatorial and imperial provinces, there must have been a consent of the senate to the measure. Further, the word "taxing," or *apographe*, has no exact meaning. The word ἀπογράφεισθαι, *to get one's self enregistered*, to which the active corresponds, denoting the action of the registering officer, sometimes, as in Acts v. 37, includes an estimate of property, and sometimes not; sometimes, and properly, it includes only a part of what went to make up a Roman census; while correct writers more readily denote a Roman census by τιμᾶν or ἀποτιμᾶν, and other words derived from them. Thus τιμᾶσθαι is properly to present an estimate of one's property, and τιμητής is a censor, and ἀποτίμησις is the act of taking the census or the census itself.

Of the original census, and of the censor, the most remarkable of the Roman magistrates except the tribune, it is not our purpose to speak. It is enough here to say that, from the time when L. Aemilius Paulus, the conqueror of King Perseus of Macedonia, in 167 B.C. = 587 U.C., brought an enormous amount of booty to Rome, the citizens were exempt from paying tribute, and the census began to lose its

¹ Compare New Englander, u. s. pp. 692-698.

importance, to which result changes in the military system contributed. Sulla, in the interest of the oligarchy, abolished the censorship; but it was ere long restored. Although the ancient functions of the censors seem to have been continued, such as to hold the census, to review the equites, to institute the lustrum, together with the regimen morum, including the lectio senatus, and with the care of the budget, the censors cease to have any great influence toward the close of the republic; and in the civil strife the office fell nearly into disuse. It was never revived, although some of its essential powers went into the hands of Julius Caesar and of the emperors.¹

Caesar seems to have contemplated a revival of the old census, and it is quite likely that he looked forward to a general system of taxation to be imposed, not on the provincials only, but on Roman citizens, and on Italy. Dion Cassius speaks of the *apographae*, "which he made as a censor" (xliii. 25) i.e., probably, which he commenced in his capacity of *praefectus morum*.² In his comprehensive mind there sprang up the thought of a survey of all the resources of the empire; but his death left this, with other great plans, incomplete.

It is now an admitted fact that, in the year of Caesar's assassination, measurements, or a general geographical survey of the whole empire, was undertaken, which took years for its

¹ After the year 70, B.C.=684 U.C., censors were chosen five times, but no lustrum was performed until the censuses of Augustus.

² In the Latin part of the Tables of Heraclea — which contain, according to A.W. Zumpt, the author of the work before us, an edict or law of Caesar, given out in virtue of his authority as *praefectus morum*, and according to Mommsen a *lex municipalis*, but according to earlier scholars, a *lex satura*, so called, or miscellaneous law,—the magistrates of the municipia and smaller places of Italy are told how to conduct the census within their respective jurisdictions. Compare Zumpt, p. 120; New Englander, u.s. p. 716, and p. 705, where Mommsen is cited. This law shows an intention, at least, as regards Italy, of carrying the census out everywhere in the communities which had received the rights of Roman citizenship. Zumpt says (p. 121), that "there is no doubt that the magistrates of the several communities inscribed strangers also in their censuses; but they were registered by themselves, for the uses of the communities where they resided, and the lists did not go to Rome."

completion, out of which grew the commentaries of Agrippa, which are often referred to by the naturalist Pliny, and after which a wall-map in the Vipsanian portico at Rome was constructed in the reign of Augustus. There is not the same evidence that a census of inhabitants went along with the surveys; nor dare we affirm that the ground-plots in the provinces outside of Italy were carefully registered and valued by the commissioners of the government. These surveys, though passed over in silence by all Roman historians, are now universally admitted to have taken place, on the authority of writers belonging to the fourth and fifth centuries.

The emperor Augustus made a census of the Roman citizens three times, as we learn from his own account of himself on the Ancyra marble, viz. 28 B.C. = 726 U.C.; 8 B.C. = 746 U.C.; 14 A.D. = 766 U.C. In mentioning his first census, he adds that he made a *lustrum*, after an intermission of that solemn sacrifice for forty-two years. When he comes to speak of the second census, and of the third, he says nothing of holding a census; but his words are: "*Iterum lustrum feci*," and "*tertium lustrum feci*." Upon this observable change of style Mommsen remarks, in his commentary on the marble in question, that Augustus, having fully indicated the fact in what he says of the first census, afterwards expresses himself more briefly. Zumpt, on the other hand, argues from the form of the words that no census of property was taken with the second and third lustra of Augustus, although on both occasions an enumeration was made of Roman citizens. And so much as this he establishes from Dion Cassius, that the censuses and the nominations into the senate mentioned by that historian are not connected in point of time with the lustra. But Augustus evidently considers the *census* and the *lustrum* to be parts of the same transaction, where he says on the marble: "*Quo lustro censa sunt civium Romanorum capita*," etc., or, "*capitum millia*."¹

¹ Zumpt's conjecture is, that as Augustus had now in effect a perpetual cen-

There is no evidence from any quarter — from the Ancyra marbles or from history—that these *censuses* extended beyond Italy, or included any besides Roman citizens. Huschke, who deserves great credit for his researches into the Roman census, and into the birth-year of our Lord, in vain attempts to turn these three occurrences into measures of the government extending through the provinces. And his attempts are equally fruitless to show the same from another passage of the marble, and from Dion Cassius. The first of these censuses ended so soon that it could not have been general over the empire. It is possible that the second of them was nearly the same in date with the first census under Quirinius in Judaea. But, supposing that there was a general census, we ought not to regard it as beginning or ending everywhere at the same time. It was general in this, that it was the carrying out of one system, and emanated from the counsels of one supreme authority; but many differences would characterize it in various parts of the world.

Further, the measures which Julius began, and Augustus pursued, for surveying the Roman world are not the “taxing of the whole world,” of which Luke speaks. All that can fairly be said is, that they may have been parts of the same plans. The surveys, as Zumpt remarks, were finished in 19 B.C. = 735 U.C., and Agrippa’s concern in the commentaries ceased in March, 12 B.C. = 742 U.C., when he died. Neither the time nor the purpose of the surveys, as far as we know it, establishes any immediate connection with the “taxing.”

What can be intended, then, by the evangelist when he speaks of a decree ordering a general census of the empire to be taken? Not that the principle everywhere was the same; for in Italy there was no direct tax, whether land or capitation tax, while in the provinces the object of the census was to levy taxes. Not that the time was the same; in the

social bureau, and that he might have ascertained the number of the citizens when he made the second and third lustra through the officials of the communities in Italy.

three first centuries there was no general census including Italy. The times for taking the census of Roman citizens were not regular, as they once had been, nor was this necessary, as there was now a perpetual bureau; but there was a necessity to know what resources the empire could depend upon through the provinces. But, notwithstanding all this, there was, in matter of fact, a general census, extending through the Roman world, wherever money could be collected according to law and usage.

Such a general census is nowhere mentioned by early writers, but it is not on that account to be denied. The ancient historians, as Mr. Zumpt remarks, regarded not only victories and enlargements of territory, but games, the erection of buildings at Rome, honorary decrees, everything, in fact, connected with politics, as far more worthy of mention than measures of administration, which in perfect silence affected the welfare of the state more than many battles. Why else did they omit to speak, as has been already noticed, of the great measurements of Augustus, which it took so many years to complete?

But it is necessary to sift the evidence for such a general census, since many defenders of the narrative in Luke — especially Huschke — have used weak arguments.

1. Passages drawn from the extant remains of the *scriptores gromatici*, or Roman surveyors, cannot pass for proof of such a fact.¹ In several places mention is made of one Balbus, who, by orders of Augustus, as the leading passage in the *Liber Colonarium* has it, “*Omnium provinciarum et formas civitatum et mensuras compertas in commentariis contulit,*” etc., or, as it is said by another writer, of a late age: “*jubente Augusto Caesare Balbo mensori, qui omnium provinciarum mensuras distinxit et declaravit.*” This surveyor, otherwise unknown, is spoken of as living in the times

¹ Compare New Englander, u. s. 704. The passages cited are to be found in Lachmann's *Gromatici veteres* i. 239 and in Pseudo-Boeth. *Demonst. artis Geometricae*. Mommsen's opinion on this point, and on the passage of Cassiodorus soon to be cited, has, perhaps, too much weight given to it in New Englander, u. s. 705.

of Augustus and Tiberius, and it is a mere inference when Mommsen thrusts him down to the reigns of M. Aurelius and Commodus. But by the provinces these late writers must denote, according to the expressions of their times, the regions into which Italy was divided under the empire, and "which continually approached in their administration to the form of the provinces" proper.¹ In these latter, says Zumpt, "such a land survey was not yet possible under Augustus. It may even then have been set on foot, but finished it could not have been, until after a long time, and by painful labor. At all events, it is made out that no evidence of a census of the provinces, undertaken by Augustus, can be drawn from the writings of the Roman surveyors."

2. A passage in the *Origines* of Isidore of Seville (v. 36, 4) is to this effect: "Aera singulorum annorum constituta est a Caesare Augusto, quando primum censum exegit ac Romanum orbem descripsit. Dicta autem aera eo, quod omnis orbis aes reddere professus est reipublicae." This late writer, as Zumpt remarks, took his expression "primum censum" from Luke; but "Romanum orbem descripsit" is to be ascribed to another source. But his statement is a confused one, and only proves the belief of the learned man from whom he drew it, that Augustus instituted important measures in regard to a general census.

3. The *breviarum imperii*, which Augustus left, and which was read after his death in the senate, does not prove that a general census had been taken. In this inventory were contained the "publicae opes,—quantum civium sociorumque in armis, quot classes, regna, provinciae, tributa aut vectigalia, et necessitates ac largitiones" (Tac. *Annal.* i. § 11). It certainly is consistent with such a census, and shows that a careful estimate had been made of the resources of the empire, founded on actual examination through all its parts. But such an estimate might have been made without a census, at least without one in the subsidiary kingdoms, like the realm of Herod.

¹ So Marquardt in Bekker-Marq. iii. 1. 65.

4. There is a passage of the learned Cassiodorus, minister of Theodoric the Great (Cent. vi.), which Mr. Zumpt regards as affording proof of a general census. It runs as follows: "Augusti siquidem temporibus orbis Romanus agris divisus, censusque descriptus est, ut possessio sua nulli haberetur incerta, quam pro tributorum susceperat quantitate solvenda. Hoc auctor geographicus redegit ad dogma conscriptum," etc. (Var. iii. 52). Here three things are mentioned: First, a careful survey of ground-plots, as for a land-tax; next, a census, and then a written description of these measurements. The information cannot have been drawn from the evangelist; for, while Luke speaks of an *apographe* of the parents of Christ, Cassiodorus speaks of a measurement of land, and states the reason for the measurement to be the regulation of tribute, of which Luke says nothing. It is, again, not suggested by the surveys which Julius Caesar planned, and with which Cassiodorus was acquainted, since these had nothing to do with the size of ground-plots, nor with a census, nor with the proportioning of tribute. It must be regarded as independent testimony, and is of great weight on account of the learning of the author. He was also in a situation to know what he affirms,—that the census-lists, much altered, no doubt, yet had come down in unbroken succession from the times of the first emperor. It would seem probable, then, that Cassiodorus had found in the work of some land-surveyor a statement like that which he makes; and the adverse opinion of Mommsen is to be rejected, which refers back this account to two sources—to the general census mentioned by Luke, and to a mistake of a late Christian writer in explaining the catalogues of divided lands in Italy as relating to the empire in general. Such is Mr. Zumpt's argument to show that this information is trustworthy. We confess, however, that we cannot receive it with full confidence.

5. Another evidence for a general census in the times of Augustus is found in a passage preserved by the lexicographer Suidas, under the word *ἀπογραφή*. We give it in

English: "The emperor Augustus, when he attained to supreme power, chose twenty men, excellent in life and morals, and sent them out over all the territory of his subjects, by whom he instituted censuses of persons and properties, requiring that a certain sufficient portion of the latter should be brought into the public treasury. This was the first census that was made, whereas his predecessors [the provincial governors of the republic] took all they could, so that the wealth of the affluent led to their public accusation." This account, says Zumpt, is definite, and, so far as we can test it, correct in the particulars. It separates the census described from that of the Roman citizens, assigns the system of taxation as the reason for it, confines the census to the provinces, and declares it to have been the first. It is not inconsistent with the statement of Cassiodorus, for the latter only notices the land-measurements, which were to serve as a basis of a land-tax; while Suidas speaks of the whole census, embracing land and persons.

This passage is received as testimony for what it contains by such archaeologists as Marquardt and Borghesi, and by other scholars.¹ It was, however, evidently written by one who was acquainted with the Gospel of Luke; for he uses the words *αὐτῇ ἡ ἀπογραφὴ πρώτη ἐγένετο*; and when mention is made of twenty men, the statement is questionable; for, although the senatorial provinces might be under the direction of this body of commissioners, the emperor's provinces, according to all analogy, would have the census taken in them by his legates.² The account, then, as we have it in the lexicographer, comes to us from a Christian writer of uncertain age, and not perfectly acquainted with Roman institutions. In the main, however, it must be regarded as historical.

Indirect proofs that such a general census was instituted by Augustus strengthen the somewhat doubtful evidence already given. If we go back to the times of the republic, we find that every province, as it fell under Roman control,

¹ Marquardt in Bekker-Marq. iii. 2, pp. 169-171.

² Vide *infra*. p. 303.

retained its old manner of tribute, excepting that the taxes were in general somewhat reduced. Such was the case with Macedonia, Illyria, Africa, Syria, Cilicia, Asia, and Gaul. On the other hand, in the age of the Antonines, a land and capitation tax, according to similar rules of valuation, and after the Roman usage that the property-holder had to give in a statement of what he owned, prevailed through the Roman empire. When did the change begin? Not under the Antonines, for Trajan before that time introduced the Roman census into conquered Dacia; and under Tiberius, thirty-six years after Christ, the Clitae, a tribe near Cappadocia, were treated in the same manner (Tac. Annal. vi. 41). A general system must have begun, then, at an early date of the empire, and in accordance with the other changes of administration in the reign of Augustus.

Again, as an exception to the ordinary rules in the provinces, certain colonies enjoying Italic right (*jus Italicum*) were exempt from land and capitation taxes. The exemption, being a privilege, shows that the rest of the population was subject to those burdens. "The history of this *jus*," says Zumpt, "we can trace back as far as to Augustus, who, in transplanting Italians into provincial places, wished to preserve for them the immunity which they had enjoyed at home. Hence under Augustus there were land and poll-taxes, the introduction and collection of which presuppose a provincial census."

Such a census Dion Cassius makes us acquainted with in Gaul, under Caligula (lix. 22). That emperor, having discovered, while gambling in Gaul, that his money was gone, called for the "grand lists" (*ἀπογραφάς*) of the people, ordered the wealthiest persons to be killed, and, on returning to the gamblers, said that, while they were playing for a few denarii, he had collected one hundred and fifty millions of sesterces, equal to six million dollars. Here lists of properties were already in existence. And that this came from Augustus is shown by the notices of the censuses held in that province while he was emperor. In 727 u.c. = 27 B.C.,

he is stated to have remained some time in Gaul. "And he had a census made there," says Dion Cassius (liii. 22), "and he brought their civil and political state into order." Another census was held in the same country seventeen years later, in which Drusus was active, and still a third was going on in 14 A.D. = 768 U.C., when Germanicus was commanding in the province.

And, if we were without notices of a general provincial census under Augustus, the probability of such a measure might be derived from the development of the system of taxation. The beginning of the plan, as Zumpt thinks, is to be assigned to the year 27 B.C. = 727 U.C., when a division of provinces was made between the senate and the emperor, which was the basis of administration for the next centuries. It was natural, at such a time, to take steps for the influx of revenues into the *aerarium* and the *fiscus*. The laws regulating such a measure would proceed from the senate, both because Augustus consulted them on all important measures, and because the senate directly managed its own provinces. As the result of the consultations, Augustus, then consul, would issue an edict, which is the *δόγμα* of which Luke speaks. The senate would appoint its own officers to take the census in senatorial provinces; hence what Suidas says of twenty commissioners — a number common enough — although involving a misconception, might be true, as far as a part of the empire was concerned.¹ And, as the senate then controlled ten provinces, two commissioners, answering to the two censors of old who presided over the taking of the census, might be sent to each. These were the old and quiet provinces; but the emperor's share of the Roman world would require longer time and more delicate management. Finally, the census of Gaul, commenced in the same year, 727 U.C. = 27 B.C., seems to confirm

¹ That the senate did not have the direction of the census in the imperial provinces, is shown by the legate of the emperor in Gaul taking this office upon him, and by the prohibition to enter the territory of Egypt which lay against all senators.

the date which Zumpt's ingenious combinations render probable.

The holding of a census in the provinces assigned to the senate, where, with the exception of provincial Africa, quiet reigned, and the relations to Rome were well established, must have been an easy work. But in the newly subjugated, and often restless, imperial provinces, where the legions were for the most part permanently quartered, the transition from old to new usages would be extremely difficult. It would be a work of time, intermitted, perhaps, for political reasons, and then resumed. It would be politic to delay beginning in some of the provinces. For the task there were needed vigorous and discreet men, invested with military power, and of higher rank, it might be, than the usual provincial governor. Thus, in 62 A.D., a census in Gaul was held by three consular men; while the three provinces into which Gaul was then divided were ordinarily governed by legates of praetorian dignity. This office of *legatus ad censum accipiendos* was quite an honorable one. In the time of Severus a special officer was sent out for this purpose, and the existing governor remained at his post; but before that time the ordinary governor seems to have been superseded.¹ The chief censors were aided by subordinates in the districts or counties. Thus Germanicus, in 16 A.D., deputed his legates on this errand, when busy with the affairs of Germany (Tac. Annal. ii. 6).

A census in the provinces needed to be repeated from time to time, on account of changes in the state of property, and relief could thus be afforded to proprietors whose lands had suffered from natural causes.² The intervals between two censuses were of indefinite length. The system required, according to Zumpt's view, a threefold bureau—one in each of the census-districts of a province, another at the

¹ Zumpt in the work before us gives a number of examples of such legates for taking the census. There is a collection of them in Marquardt (Bekker-Marq.), iii. 2. 172.

² Zumpt cites Ulpian in the Digest, l. 15, de cens. 1, 2, as saying, *vitia priorum censuum editis novis professionibus evanescent*.

capital of the province, and a third in Rome, where all the lists of the empire were deposited. A person employed in the census bureau at Lyons is named on an inscription; and the head officer at Rome is often mentioned under the appellations of *magister a censibus*, or *a censibus* alone, with whom *adjutores ad census* were associated. That the lists were deposited in one place of each province appears from the story already given of Caligula. That copies were deposited also at Rome, in a central bureau, is stated by more than one of the Christian writers; and Tertullian, at least, as a learned lawyer, with opportunities to know what was the usage of the empire, must be believed in this particular.

As to the mode of taxation in the provinces, we must not argue back from the usages under the Christian emperors to those of the early empire. In the later times, all land was divided into *juga* or *capita*, i.e. into plots not of equal extent, but of equal value — productiveness being taken into account. Each of these *juga* paid a certain amount of tribute. But Ulpian, at the end of the second century, in speaking of the *forma censualis*, says (Digest. l. 15, de cens. l. 4) that it requires the name of each owner of a piece of land, in what state and district it lies, who are the two nearest proprietors, the extent of land cultivated within ten years, etc. In short, the system follows the person; and we cannot suppose that such an inventory was in practice by the side of one founded on the division of lands into *juga*. And, as the jurists of Ulpian's age mention no other *forma censualis*, it must have come down from the times of the first emperors. The later mode of taking the census connected the taxes with the *capita* of land; the earlier, as in the proper Roman census, with *capita* of persons. In another respect, the earlier form resembled the original Roman one. The Roman citizens were required to meet at Rome, and give in their own estimates of their property, with other information touching themselves and their families; and exceptions to this were known only in the times of the later republic, when absentees were indulged to present their reports to

the governors of the provinces. In the provinces, also, "the tax-payers, gathered in appointed places, reported, first, their age and parentage, then made statements of their property, probably under the two heads of landed and movable property."

The taxes must be supposed to have been unequal for different kinds of property and in different parts of the empire. The direct taxes were divided into two classes — land-taxes and capitation-taxes. By the latter was intended a payment in proportion to an estimated income, or an income-tax. So Zumpt. Others make two kinds of capitation taxes — a levy on movable property, and a poll-tax. Appian states that this tax in Syria and Cilicia amounted to one per cent on the assessment, but was higher for the Jews, owing to their restlessness under the sway of Rome.

There yet remain to be considered important points respecting the subjection of the empire to a census: How far was it uniform, and was it extended to those subsidiary kingdoms, like the realm of Herod at Christ's birth, which were Roman dependencies, but not properly under provincial governors? In regard to the first point, we may remark that it took a long time before all the parts of the empire were brought under one common system, the recently subjugated or more restless territories being treated differently from others which would tamely submit to harsh or novel burdens. The Batavi thus furnished troops, without paying taxes, into the second century; and the Frisi paid a tribute of hides, which seems to have required the interference of no Roman official. At length, in 47 A.D. (Tac. *Annal.* xi. 19), on their being brought into complete subjection, their civil state was changed, preparatory, no doubt, to a fuller introduction of Roman usages.

In parts of the empire, as in Mauritania, Thrace, Asia Minor, and Syria, tributary kingdoms existed under Roman supremacy in the time of the first emperors. The most important of these princes was Herod the Great. The relation of such kings to Rome was not strictly that of vassals;

they were rather kings by sufferance, confirmed in their authority by the powers at Rome, endured until policy required their deposition, and forced, probably, in all cases to pay tribute. They were subjects, and were generally admitted to Roman citizenship. Archelaus, Herod's son, was deposed by Augustus; the king of Mauritania by Caligula. The kings of Cappadocia and Thrace were accused before the senate under Tiberius, and the king of Thrace banished. The relation of the Jews to Rome is shown by the oath of allegiance, which they were forced to take to Augustus, as well as to Herod (Joseph. Antiq. xvii. § 2, 4), about the year 747 U.C., and which six thousand refusing to take were mulcted in their goods, and in part lost their lives. Herod was placed under the supervision of the legate of Syria. Having obtained permission of the then legate Saturninus to go with troops outside of his country into Arabia, he incurred the wrath of the emperor, who wrote to him that he had treated him as a friend hitherto, but now would treat him as a subject (ὕπηκόω, Joseph. Antiq. xvi. § 9, 3). After the death of Herod, the legate of Syria, Quintilius Varus, considered it his official duty to quell disturbances in Judaea, and the same is true of other provincial governors. So that Judaea, in a certain sense, may be said to have pertained to the Syrian province, while yet the family of Herod reigned. Zumpt aptly compares the relation of these kings to the provincial governors with that of the *liberae civitates*, which enjoyed a certain self-government under local law, while yet they were parts of the several provinces.

If a census were held in such a subject kingdom, the Roman heads of the province, according to all analogy, would exercise control over the arrangements, would receive returns, and transmit them to Rome. Hence we have a right to say that Luke's words, "When Quirinius was governor of Syria," contain more than a definition of time; they denote that the census was taken by his authority; whether the subordinates were Romans or natives, whether he directly exercised control, or the territorial king took this duty on himself.

But is there any instance of a census held in such half-independent kingdoms by Roman authority? The instances which Huschke insists upon, and to which we have given weight in another place, are set aside as insufficient by Zumpt, and with good reason.¹ He, however, finds two examples to prove that a Roman census existed in such territory. One is drawn from Judaea, already brought under the Roman census, after the deposition of Archelaus. In 41 A.D. Agrippa, grandson of Herod the Great, united Judaea and Samaria to the rest of his kingdom. Three years afterwards he died. It is incredible that the obligations to pay tribute according to the earlier census ceased when he became king, and then revived at his death. Another similar instance he finds in Commagene where, P. Vitellius, legate of Syria, in 36 A.D., adjusted the relations to Rome, "and doubtless introduced the Roman census." Two years afterwards Caligula gave that territory to the former kings, with a part of the Cilician coast. But it is incredible that the Roman institution should have ceased on the accession of the new king; the more so, as maritime Cilicia must have been under the census before. Nor would the Romans have been willing to make the dependent kings popular by allowing them to lighten the tribute at will.

There is, however, a distinction to be made between a tax on Roman principles, and one conducted by order of the Roman government. When the emperor decided to make a census of the empire, there is no proof that there was a uniformity through the various countries in any respect. The inquiry, then, is open as to the mode of conducting the Jewish census. Here the census of Quirinius, in 6 A.D., may serve as our guide. He came, according to Josephus (Antiq. xvii. end; xviii. § 1, 1), to make a census in Syria, and appeared, also, in Judaea, which was now annexed to Syria, ἀποτιμησόμενός τε αὐτῶν τὰς οὐσίας, "and to sell the property of Archelaus," the banished king. The same cen-

¹ See New Englander, u. s. pp. 714, 715, and note on p. 715.

sus was now set on foot in Judaea and in the rest of Syria. The resistance made to it by Judas of Galilee shows that it was in some respects new, as well as that it was carried through in those parts of the old realm of Herod which were allowed to go to his sons. Judas and his followers, by their watchword, that God alone was Governor and Lord, and that the census was outright slavery, show that a new step was now taken by the Roman government. The same thing is indicated by the words of Josephus (u. s.), that the Jews in general could hardly endure, *τὴν ἐπὶ ταῖς ἀπογραφαῖς ἀκρόασιν*,¹ but were kept quiet by the persuasions of the high-priest Joazar, and that *ἀπετίμων τὰ χρήματα*.

What, now, was the innovation? It may have been that the census was forced through directly by the Romans, whereas their own rulers had the charge of it before. Or it may have been that only a poll-tax had been levied before, so that the new census meant a land-tax to the inhabitants of Judaea. The former is the view of Wieseler;² the latter of Zumpt. This learned antiquarian brings forward no direct arguments of weight to prove his point. The capitation-tax existed during Christ's ministry (Matt. xxii. 17), but could not have been founded on the census of Quirinius in 6 A.D.; for only landholders, or, at least, property-holders, were then registered, as the words of Josephus imply (Antiq. xviii. § 1, 1). We must go back, then, to the first census, which took place at the birth of Christ, to account for this tax. Such is one of his arguments. But what if such a tax had been in use long before?

Let us look here, for a moment, at the taxes in Judaea after Pompey's conquest. That general laid heavy burdens on the nation; but the rulers may have collected tribute in their own way, and paid it over to the proper Roman officers. And yet, soon after, when Gabinius had been in the East,

¹ The Latin version has "nomen descriptionis aegre audire voluerant," could hardly endure to hear the registration spoken of; but the sense must be that they found the hearing before a Roman magistrate on occasion of the registration, or returns of property, grievous.

² In his *Beiträge*, mentioned at the beginning of this Article.

Cicero speaks of his exempting *vectigales multos et stipendiarios*, i.e. persons obliged to pay direct and indirect taxes in Syria and Judaea (de Provinc. Consular. v. 10). Caesar, among other regulations touching the Jews, enacted, when dictator the second time (707 u.c. = 47 B.c.), that they should pay a tribute on behalf of Jerusalem — Joppa being exempted from the law — every year except the sabbatical one, and that they should pay in Sidon, every second year, one fourth part of what they had sown (the crops from seed sown, not the fruits from their trees). Besides which, the old tithes were to be paid to Hyrcanus and his sons. The first words are so understood by Marquardt and by Zumpt, as if but one tax, payable once in seven years, were intended. But they do not take *κατ' ἐνιαυτόν* into consideration, nor that two distinct acts are plainly denoted by *ὅπως τελῶσι* and *ἵνα ἀποδιδῶσι*. The sense can only be that which Wieseler gives (Beiträge, p. 77), that one tax, a poll-tax, it must be, was payable six years out of seven, and another, amounting to one quarter of the sown crops, once every seven years, in the second year of the sabbatical cycle. These taxes are said to be payable for Jerusalem, that is, Jerusalem was the political community with which all parts of the land were in union.

After Caesar, and while Antony controlled the East, there was much arbitrary exaction, and under Herod the payment of tribute to Rome seems to have been kept up. The taxes under Herod were much complained of, and after his death a Jewish embassy at Rome begged to be delivered from their sovereigns, and to be annexed to Syria, as if they expected milder treatment from the emperor's legates than from the family of Herod. The Jews, then, were used to poll-taxes, property-taxes, and tithes. It cannot be shown that the institutions of Julius Caesar, mentioned above, had been essentially altered.

There is another consideration against Zumpt's view, which is not without its weight. If the census was only a personal one, with no descriptions or lists of property, it could be taken in one place as well as in another. Why

subject a man in Galilee to the necessity of reporting himself in Judaea? We confess, then, that Zumpt's arguments at this point do not appear to us convincing. We conceive of the matter somewhat thus: A census was held in Judaea, as a part of a general system under native officers, and yet according to the orders of the legate of Syria. It did not respect real property, on which the Roman system of taxation chiefly rested, but persons and personal property. According to ancient Jewish usage, which, however, we cannot illustrate by examples, lists were handed in at the place of the origin of one's family. Hence the journey of Joseph to Bethlehem. If it should be said that this is mythical, the birth of Jesus at Bethlehem according to prophecy, when his parents were of Galilee, being to be accounted for, we can only reply, that the argument destroys itself; for myths run in the channels of well-known usages. Whether Christ, therefore, was born at Bethlehem, or not, the myth itself proves that the journey to Bethlehem for the purpose of being registered there, on which many stumble, is consistent with the customs of the age in which the myth is supposed to have its birth.

If it be said that the Jews, at the time when Christ was born, must have in a great measure lost the knowledge of their tribes, and other subordinate divisions, we answer, that this will seem more natural to us than to a nation which thought everything of descent. There are no facts, however, so far as we are informed, to guide our judgment. And yet, when we call to mind that the orders or courses of priests were kept up, that Anna in Luke belonged to the tribe of Asher, that Josephus in his autobiography refers to his family genealogy, and that the tradition of descent from David must have been received among Christ's relatives, as is shown by what Eusebius tells us of the grandsons of Judas, Christ's brother, and of Domitian's jealousy, on account of their being of David's line,¹ we may well accept the possibility that the family genealogies were general among the Jews.

¹ Euseb. Hist. Eccl., iii. § 20. From Hegesippus.

That Mary went with Joseph in order to be registered, is probably, but not certainly, the meaning of the evangelist. Her going may be illustrated by what Ulpian says in the Digest (l. 15; de Cens. 1. 3), that in Syria men from fourteen and women from twelve, and until sixty-five, were subject to a poll-tax.¹ In the census of 6 A.D., as Zumpt remarks, there was no need of any one besides the head of the family being present to give in the returns of property. No one else appeared before the censor at Rome.

The conclusions we have reached thus far may be expressed in the following summary: That the text in Luke denotes that a census was taken in Judaea when Quirinius was governor of Syria; that he was emperor's legate in that province twice—the first time in, or soon after, 750 u.c.; that the policy of the empire under Augustus, and a variety of facts, look towards a general provincial census and a common system in all quarters; that the later writers, who alone speak directly of such a census, and who are received as testimony by the best archaeologists of the day, are supported in what they say by various considerations, although if they stood alone we must confess that we should not have attached much weight to their authority; that censuses, differing in some respects from one another, were going on, soon after the time when we may suppose the policy to have been settled and expressed in an edict, in many lands; that the subject kingdoms paid tribute to Rome, and the subject kings were rulers by Roman appointment, under the inspection of legates; that Judaea had long been taxed, and some kind of census can have been nothing new there; that Zumpt fails to show to our satisfaction that the registration at this time was simply for the purpose of a capitation-tax; and that, as to Joseph's going to Bethlehem to be registered, the fact must rest mainly on the authority of Luke, for we

¹ Ulpian's words are *actatem in censendo significare necesse est, quia quibusdam aetas tribuit ne tributo onerentur; veluti in Syriis a quatuordecim annis masculi, a duodecim feminae usque ad sexagesimum quintum annum tributo capitis obligantur. Aetas autem spectatur censendi tempore.*

possess scarcely any other materials from which to form a judgment.

These conclusions are always met by the suspicion that our authorities would have informed us of such a census had it been true. To this we have already replied. We only add, that Josephus is meagre through the ten years of Archelaus, and Dion Cassius deserts us at the epoch we are considering, through the deficiencies of his text; that the historians take little interest in measures of administration, especially in those which concerned the provinces; that Josephus, in the history of the Jewish war, makes no mention of so memorable event as the census of 6 A.D.; that, if the general measurements of the empire, a fact conceded by all scholars, are never spoken of by the historians, much more might a census, general in its plan, but extending through years and putting on new shapes in accordance with the nationalities affected by it, never appear among the recorded events of the age. Nor is this fact at all unique.¹

We cannot omit adding that the position of some critics is an unjust one towards the evangelist Luke. He is not on the stand to be convicted of falsehood if others do not mention what he narrates, but he is an independent witness. And the tendency of criticism is ever to put in a clearer light his accuracy in details. That such a writer should, as some of the looser critics think, have confounded the census of 6 A.D., ten years after Herod's death, with an event which he attributes to the reign of Herod, and in the next chapter give dates of our Lord's entrance on his ministry and of his age which require us to carry his birth back to the life-time of Herod, seems, to say the least, highly improbable.

We must speak of one point more, before closing this part of our subject, which relates to the first two of the three divisions of Zumpt's work. In what sense is the expression "when Cyrenius was governor of Syria" to be taken? It would most naturally be understood of his being the emperor's ordinary legate in that province, or it might be

¹ Compare New Englander, u. s. pp. 716, 717.

explained as referring to a special legation to take the census. We have already seen that the most important men of the empire were so employed, and this solution is approved by Cardinal Norisius, by Dr. Edward Robinson, by Meyer in his commentary, and others.¹ But, on the other hand, if this were intended by the evangelist, and he had completely accurate knowledge as to the capacity in which Quirinius served, we should rather look for ἡγεμονεύοντος ἐν Συρίᾳ, than for the words as they stand. The other explanation, which meets with favor from Zumpt, and which we have preferred in another place, has more to commend it. For we have now the fact established, which was unknown to the earlier scholars, that Quirinius was governor of Syria, or imperial legate, soon after Herod's death. This increases the probability that no special legation was thought of. But further, no reason appears why the usual presiding officer in Syria could not superintend a census which did not touch landed property, as easily as an extraordinary appointee.

But here a new difficulty arises. Quirinius began his first legation in Syria after Herod's death, and our Lord, according to the narrative in Matthew, was born some time before Herod's death. We know also, from Tacitus and Josephus, that Quintilius Varus continued in his legation through part of the summer of 750 u.c. which followed the death of Herod. At first view, therefore, nothing is gained for the defense of the credibility of Luke ii. 2 by the new light on the relations of Quirinius. We can only reconcile this fact with what Luke states on the supposition that the census began some time before, but was not finished until in or after 750 u.c.

Evidence for an earlier commencement of this census is found in a passage of Tertullian's treatise against Marcion (iv. 19). In refuting the position of the Marcionites that Christ was not really born, he has occasion to refer to the proofs of his birth. Here he says: "sed et census constat actos sub Augusto tunc (nunc in the mss.) in Judaea per

¹ Compare New Englander, pp. 698, 720.

Sentium Saturninum, apud quos genus ejus inquirere potuissent." In three other passages he speaks of this census. In one of them he has the words "de censu—quem testem fidelissimum dominicae nativitatis Romana archiva custodiunt" (adv. Marcion. iv. § 7). In the others (ib. iv. § 36, and adv. Judaeos, § 9) he has no doubt that the Jews were still divided into "tribus et populos et familias et domos," and that Mary was registered on the census books "apud Romanos." In these particulars, though he was a learned lawyer and lived in Rome part of his life, he might possibly be under a mistake. But when he appears to contradict the evangelist Luke, how could he be under any bias arising from his faith in the Gospel narrative? Nor can he have got at the date he assigns to the census by calculations, for he goes further back for the census than his own reckoning of the date of Christ's death would carry him. This information then is historical, and is justly regarded by the best modern scholars as of the highest importance. Its whole bearing will appear by and by. At present we content ourselves with remarking that, if Sentius left his presidency, as the coins of Quintilius Varus show, in 747 u.c.=7 B.C. or in the earlier part of the next year, and if Quirinius is thrust down to 750 u.c., or even later, the only way of reconciling Tertullian and Luke is to suppose the census to have moved slowly, or to have been for some reason or other intermitted, and to have been continued and closed by the active, vigorous Quirinius. This pointed him out as the proper person for taking the census of 6 A.D., and with reference to this work the very unusual step was taken of appointing the same man the second time governor of the same province.

Christ, then, was born when Sentius was legate of Syria, at the latest, in 748 u.c. or six years, and possibly earlier, seven or eight years, before the Christian era. He was born at the time of a census then begun, afterwards completed under the presidency of Quirinius. This is the important starting point of Zumpt in the more immediate inquiry into the date of our Lord's birth. The result is not new with him, but

has obtained extensive currency since San Clemente advocated it in 1792. Ideler the astronomer and chronologist, Hoeck the historian of Rome, to mention no others, have given it their support. If it should be found to harmonize best with other passages of scripture which with more or less definiteness afford us dates in our Lord's life, it would commend itself as historically true; otherwise we must try to find some other date for the nativity, or confess that the record affords us no means for a satisfactory solution.

In the first chapter of the third part of his work, Mr. Zumpt examines the relations of the narrative of the murder of the innocents to the Saviour's birth, and in the sixth or last the astronomical evidence given by the star which sent the wise men into Judaea. We shall consider these together, as they belong together. We are aware of the objections which may be brought against the historical truth of this account, but it is not our part to defend its credibility. We believe that the events suggested the use of prophecy and that prophecy did not shape and create the narrative. And the substantial truth of the account will perhaps best appear when we find that real events lay at its foundation.

The evangelist Matthew, who says nothing of the census nor of Joseph's having lived in Nazareth, but regards him as having the intention even when in Egypt to return to Judaea and not to Galilee, agrees with Luke in placing the nativity at Bethlehem. After the birth of Jesus (*γεννηθέντος*) magi from the East come to Jerusalem with the story that they had seen the star of the king of the Jews, and desire to know where is his birth-place. Herod after consultation directs them to Bethlehem, as being the place foretold by the prophet Micah; and having obtained in private exact information from them as to the time of the star's appearance, requested them to report to him what they should learn, that he too might worship the king. The star led their way to where the child was. Instead of returning to Jerusalem after having seen and worshipped, they went home another way, and Herod, on being mocked by them, killed all the children

in the district of Bethlehem that were under two years of age. Meanwhile Joseph, warned in a dream, fled with Mary and the child into Egypt; where he remained until after the death of Herod. But on his divinely directed return he went into Galilee to settle, because there he would be beyond the jurisdiction of Archelaus whom he dreaded.

The star spoken of, in this narrative of a highly popular cast, might be a star properly so called, or a comet, or a special meteoric body. But the circumstance that the star *προῆγεν αὐτούς*, until it stood over the place where Jesus was, would not apply to a star or a comet so well as to a body nearer the earth. And yet, if it should be found that there were remarkable appearances in the heavens, at the time to which on other grounds we might refer the birth of Christ, it would be fair to use such phenomena in our argument; and perhaps the argument would be the stronger if there were minor differences between the calculations of exact science and the tradition proceeding from uninstructed minds.

Ideler, in his well-known manual of Mathematical and Technical Chronology (Berlin, 1826, vol. ii. 399-410), has given a careful and extensive account of this "star," which he explains as the conjunction, or repeated conjunctions, of Jupiter and Saturn. If our limits permitted we should be glad to give in English the whole of his remarks on this subject; but we must content ourselves with an abstract of moderate length.

Kepler in 1603 and 1604 noticed this conjunction. In the spring of the latter year Mars came near to the two other planets, and in the autumn he noticed a body like a fixed star associated with the two planets "near the eastern foot of Serpentarius," and which after reaching a considerable brightness disappeared without a trace. He was led by this to reflect on the "star in the east," and in 1606 published at Prague a treatise¹ in which he expressed the opinion that this star denoted the conjunction of Saturn, Jupiter, and

¹ *De Stella nova in pede Serpentarii.*

some other extraordinary star, in regard to whose nature he does not go into particulars. Making the best calculations he could with the tables of that day, he ascertained three conjunctions of the two planets in 747 U.C. = 7 B.C., within the constellation Pisces, near to Aries. This rare conjunction in so important a part of the zodiac would, he thought, naturally excite the wonder of astrologers, particularly if an extraordinary star accompanied them, and they could hardly fail to look for some remarkable event. He was induced in 1606 by his calculations to write a treatise *de Jesu Christi, servatoris nostri, vero anno natalitio*, in which he advocated 748 U.C. = 6 B.C. as the true birth-year; and when this was attacked by Seth Calvisius in 1613, he published a more extensive and exhaustive work in its defence.¹

Kepler's views seem to have been almost forgotten, when Münter, bishop of Seeland in Denmark, revived them in 1821, having found a passage in Abarbanel's Commentary on Daniel which attaches great consequences to a conjunction of Saturn and Jupiter in the constellation Pisces. Schubert, of St. Petersburg, a little afterward, in his miscellaneous writings, says that he calculated the motions of the two planets, and found the results to be those mentioned by Münter in regard to a conjunction about the time of Christ's birth. Of these calculations nothing is known, and Schubert seems to regard Münter as the originator of the hypothesis. Ideler now looked into the matter, and we give his conclusions, reached with all care, according to Delambre's Tables of Jupiter and Saturn, in his own words: "The results are remarkable enough. The planets came in the year 747 U.C. into conjunction for the first time on the twenty-ninth of May in the twentieth degree of Pisces. They stood together at that time, in the morning sky, before sunrise, and were, as their ascending nodes lay in one and the same sign, only one degree distant from one

¹ *De vero anno quo aeternus Dei filius humanam naturam in utero benedictae virginis assumpsit*, Frankfort, 1613, of which Ideler says that in the main points of the investigation he left but small gleanings for his successors.

another. Jupiter passed by Saturn to the north; about the middle of September both came into opposition with the sun about midnight in the south, Saturn on the thirteenth, Jupiter on the fifteenth. Their difference of longitude was then one degree and a half. Both were retrograde, and were coming together anew. On the twenty-seventh of October a second conjunction took place, in the sixteenth degree of Pisces, and on the twelfth of November, when Jupiter was again moving eastward, there was a third conjunction, in the fifteenth degree of the same sign. In the two last conjunctions the difference of latitude amounted to only about one degree, so that for a weak eye the one planet came almost within the apparent disk (*zerstreuungskreis*) of the other, and hence the two might appear as a single star."

Thus wrote Ideler in his *Handbuch*, his principal work on Chronology, in 1826. Before his *Lehrbuch* appeared, in 1831, the calculations were revised, and the three conjunctions were determined to have fallen on May twenty-ninth, October first, and December fifth.

What adds interest to these remarkable results is the way in which Abarbanel speaks of this celestial phenomenon in its bearings on Jewish history. After saying that the most important of human events depend on the conjunction of Jupiter and Saturn, he adds that no such conjunction was more important than that which took place in the year 2365 of the creation, three years before the birth of Moses, in the sign of Pisces. This sign, he goes on to say, is the especial constellation of the Israelites. "Recently," he adds at the close of the passage [in the year 5224 of the creation, or 1463 of our era], "occurred one of the most momentous conjunctions of the two planets in Pisces, and it is not to be doubted that it will be equal [in importance] to that seen at the time of Moses, and will bring on the birth of the divine man, the Messiah."

We have no means of knowing how old this opinion was which Abarbanel expresses, nor is it likely that the Jews so interpreted the planets in Christ's time, for astrology was

discouraged and censured. Moreover the magi brought news to Jerusalem which disturbed the minds of men, so that they could not have attached much importance to such a conjunction before. But it is quite possible that in the home of astrology the appearance betokened a great event, and that the magi shared in an opinion pervading the East in regard to a king who should arise in Israel.

In applying this celestial phenomenon to the narrative of events, we may suppose the conjunction in May $747 = 7$, to have startled the magi, and set them in motion. They arrive at Jerusalem in the autumn. About the time of the second conjunction they are on their way by night to Bethlehem, and the "star" seemed to go before them, until it stood over the place where Christ was born. The birth, according to this arrangement of particulars, would be betokened in May, and they saw the infant in October, or about two years before the commonly received date of the nativity.¹

We are aware of the difficulties that attend this explanation. The text speaks of an ἀστήρ, not of an ἄστρον, in explanation of which Ideler's remark, that the planets were confounded in each other's rays, is scarcely satisfactory. Moreover, the explanation requires that the advance of the star before the wise men, until it stood over the place where the child was, be qualified very much to bring it down to scientific truth. In the narrative the impression on excited minds, rather than the real motion of the heavenly bodies, would thus be represented, — the subjective, rather than the objective.

An explanation given by Wieseler of these occurrences deserves brief mention here. The wise men were roused into expectation of some great event which was to happen in Judaea by the phenomena of 747. Still, for some reason, they did not go to Judaea until a few month before Herod's death. Then a comet, — the same that Pingré mentions as seen in China in the third or fourth year before our present

¹ We give here our own, and not Zumpt's or Ideler's, adjustment of the order of events.

era — guided them on their evening way to Bethlehem. Of comets described by the Chinese, Pingré mentions two, contemporaneous nearly with 750, the received date of our Lord's birth. One appeared about the vernal equinox in 4 B.C. = 750 U.C., in the head of Capricorn, and was visible seventy days. Another was seen in 4 B.C., or more probably in 3 B.C., in April or May. It appeared near Alpha of Aquila, to the north of a Chinese constellation which forms part of our Capricorn. "This comet," says Pingré, "if it appeared in the year 4 B.C. must have been the same with the first-mentioned comet assigned to the year preceeding."¹

The same difficulties press on this explanation which have been urged against the other, with the additional ones that the comet, considering the brief time of its appearance, could not well have been the star seen in the east; that if it appeared in 3 B.C. = 751 U.C., or even in the spring of 4 = 750, it was too late to be contemporaneous with an event occurring a number of weeks, at least, before the death of Herod; and that no reason can be assigned for the delay of the two years between the conjunction and the comet's appearance, before the wise men started on their journey.

The murder of the innocents, although not mentioned by Josephus, who doubtless has omitted to speak of many other crimes of Herod the Great, is supported by historical evidence, independent of the account in Matthew. The Latin writer Macrobius, of the fifth century, among other sayings of Augustus, gives us the following anecdote: "Cum audisset inter pueros, quos in Syria Herodes, rex Judaeorum, intra bimum jussit interfici, filium quoque ejus occisum, ait; melius est Herodis porcum esse quam filium" (Saturnalia ii. 4). Macrobius was probably a pagan,² and the story shows no dependence on the account in Matthew. He says in Syria, not in Bethlehem. A particular is added on which the point of the speech turns, which is not in the Gospel, and yet *intra bimum* clearly shows that the same fact lies at

¹ Cometographie, i. 281. Paris, 1783.

² See the proleg. iv. § 6, to the edition of Macrobius by L. Janus.

the base of both accounts. The speech is wholly in character for Augustus, and it is found in Macrobius in company with many other bon-mots of the emperor. We concede, of course, the possibility that a narrative in the Gospels in the course of time may have passed into general currency, and have coalesced with a joke of Augustus really uttered on another occasion. But such possibilities ought not to weigh against even a little historical evidence. We regard, therefore, the anecdote as confirmatory of the narrative. But we cannot go so far as Mr. Zumpt does, who, on the authority of the anecdote, believes that a young son of Herod was among the children slain at Bethlehem. We think it more natural to conceive of the anecdote as uniting together two events which had originally no connection, the death of a son of Herod and the slaughter at Bethlehem. And history here is impartial towards the claims of different years, for we have the death of Herod's son Antipater by Herod's orders, a little before his own death in 750, and that of his two sons, Alexander and Aristobulus, by his procurement, not long before Sentius Saturninus left his office of legate in 747.

But be all this as it may, the only bearing of this part of Matthew's narrative on the time of the nativity is to show that some time must have elapsed between that event and the death of Herod. The magi arrive in Jerusalem after the nativity, then succeed their stay there, the flight into Egypt, and the residence in that country. But how long a time was occupied by these events it is idle to conjecture and impossible to discover.

Mr. Zumpt, in another chapter, examines the subject of a general peace through the world in the time of Augustus, and its bearing on the question of our Lord's birth. Such a general peace is referred to by later Christian Fathers, and a tradition of the Latin church declares that Christ was born *toto orbe in pace composito*. San Clemente, having assigned the nativity to the presidency of Sentius Saturninus, uses this argument in deciding on 7 B.C. = 747 U.C., as the true birth-year. His views are given by Ideler, in his larger

work on Chronology (ii. 397-398). But the whole argument is a very weak one. The tradition itself seems to depend on a misunderstanding of the words "peace on earth," in the Gospel of Luke. There were three occasions on which Janus was closed at Rome during the reign of Augustus, or, to use the exact expression of that emperor, on the Ancyra marbles, "three times in my principate did the senate decree that Janus Quirinius should be closed." The first closure was in 725 U.C. = 29 B.C., soon after the victory at Actium; the second in 729 = 25; for the third a decree was passed in 744 = 10, which did not take effect on account of a rebellion of the Dacians. Zumpt holds that soon after that rebellion, on the return of Augustus to Rome, in the year 9 B.C., there was an actual closure. Mommsen, in his commentary on the above-mentioned marbles,¹—after remarking that if Augustus referred to this decree of the senate, which was hindered in its execution by the Dacian rebellion, he was not entirely honest in his statement, and thus deceives Suetonius, who repeats it, — says that he is inclined to believe the reference to be to a later decree. From the termination of the German wars of Drusus and Tiberius, down to the year 753 U.C. = 1 B.C., when C. Caesar went forth to the Armenian war, there was such a quiet of the Roman arms, that it seems as if Janus might reasonably have been closed. But the annals of Dion Cassius are deficient for 748-752, and the narration of the closure of Janus the third time may have fallen out of his text with other particulars. Add to this that Orosius cites Tacitus as saying that Janus was opened *sene Augusto*, which could not have been said, if Janus was opened a little after 729, and remained so until the death of Augustus. Perhaps Orosius is right when he says that Janus was closed the third time in the reign of Augustus in 752, etc. Thus far Mommsen. But this was after the death of Herod, and thus could by no possibility coincide with the year of the nativity.

The remainder of Zumpt's Essay is occupied with an

¹ *Res gestae divi Augusti*, comment, p. 32. Comp. Orosius, vi. 22, vii. 3.

examination of the dates in Luke iii. 1, 23 and John ii. 20, with an inquiry into the year of our Lord's death, and with an attempt to reconcile seeming contradictions in the chronology. In the chapter of Luke we have two dates—the *fifteenth year of Tiberius*, as the time when the “word of the Lord came unto John the son of Zacharias in the wilderness,” and in the words that “Jesus himself was ὥσπερ ἑτῶν τριάκοντα ἀρχόμενος,” etc., the statement that Jesus *was about thirty* when he began his public ministry. For the sake of completeness, two explanations of the first of these verses may be mentioned, not because of their intrinsic value, but on account of the standing of their authors. Difficulties of chronology force us, thinks San Clemente, to refer the fifteenth year of Tiberius, as several of the Fathers do, not to John's call into his prophetic office, but to Christ's suffering and death. Ideler justly calls this a paradoxical opinion, but leaves the decision of it to the interpreters of scripture.¹ It seems to us so impossible for any honest interpreter to hold this opinion that we will not spend time in refuting it. Wieseler, again (Synopse 196), refers the fifteenth year of Tiberius, and the thirtieth year of Christ's life, not to the beginning of John's ministry, but to his imprisonment by the tetrarch Herod. But this is in the highest degree arbitrary and unnatural. The sense, then, can only be that John began his ministry when Tiberius was in the fifteenth year of his reign; and the evangelist introduces John's imprisonment only to bring what he says of him to a fit close. The first year of Tiberius—taking it for granted, at present, that no other reckoning will stand—began at the death of Augustus, which occurred August 19, 767 u.c. = 14 A.D., and his fifteenth year began the same day of 781 = 28. If, then, Luke speaks with accuracy, John began to preach between August 19, A.D. 28, and August 19, A.D. 29.

¹ Handbuch, ii. 418, 419. Not having access to a copy of San Clemente's work, we get our notices from others. The arguments for this opinion are in a dissertation appended to his work *de vulgaris aerae emendatione*.

But what sense are we to attach to v. 23, which our translators render: "And Jesus himself began to be about thirty years of age"? Clearly there is something absurd in saying that a person began to be *about* such an age; and there is great harshness in taking ἥν with ἀρχόμενος, — not to say that to join the participle ὧν with this clause, instead of the following one, as if the sense were, "Jesus was beginning to be about thirty," is almost unendurable. The explanation now commonly received — that ἀρχόμενος denotes when he began his ministry — although itself not entirely free from objection, as we should look for some limiting noun with the participle, is by far preferable to any other.¹

Christ, then, was about thirty at his baptism. But how long this was after the beginning of John's ministry we have no means of ascertaining. From the narrative we may gather, with some confidence, that an interval of but a few months elapsed between the two events. It will be safe to say, that Christ was about thirty in the fifteenth year of Tiberius, or, at least, toward the latter part of it.

The passage in John ii. 20 we shall assume to mean, not that it took forty-six years to *finish* the Temple, from the time when Herod began its reconstruction — for it was not finished until years afterward — but that from the time when the reconstruction began until the date of Christ's visit to Jerusalem forty-six years had elapsed. As this is the received explanation, it will not be necessary to support it. Now, according to Josephus (Antiq. xv. 11, 1), Herod entered on this work in the eighteenth year of his reign. But there are two dates of the commencement of Herod's reign given by Josephus, who speaks of both in Antiq. xvii. 8, 1, where he says that Herod reigned "after he slew Antigonus thirty-four years, but after his appointment by the Romans thirty-seven years." The death of Antigonus, with the capture of

¹ Meyer's solution is, that the *office* of Christ, now having its commencement, is implied in the descent of the Spirit, and in the words, "thou art my beloved Son," in v. 20.

Jerusalem by Sossius, Antony's legate, occurred, according to the same author, when Marcus Agrippa and L. Caninius Gallus were consuls, 717 u.c. = 37 B.C. Clinton (*Fasti Hellen.* iii. 220) assigns the capture of Jerusalem to the end of 38 B.C.; but there is, we believe, no material disagreement among chronologists as to referring the real commencement of the reign to 37 B.C.¹ A difficulty is, indeed, presented by a passage of the Jewish War (i. 21, 1), where Josephus mentions the fifteenth year of Herod as the year when the rebuilding of the Temple was begun. No solution of the difficulty appears so probable as to suppose a mistake of the text, or of memory, in the last-mentioned work. This being admitted, the rebuilding began in 734 u.c. = 20 B.C., and forty-six full years from this time will reach into 780 u.c. = 27 A.D. But the narrative of Josephus (*Antiq.* xv. 10, 3) makes the emperor Augustus to have visited Syria "after the seventeenth year of Herod's reign had passed," and to have spent some time with Herod. Some time elapsed subsequent to his departure before Herod began the building of the Temple. Moreover, Augustus spent the winter of 734 = 20 in Samos, and could not have gone into Judaea before spring.² We may, then, place the commencement of the work on the new Temple, as Zumpt does, at the end of 20, or the beginning of 19 B.C. Forty-six years from this time will end in 27 or 28 A.D. If the Jews, when they said forty-six years, meant the forty-sixth, or forty-five and a part of another, the event could happen in 27 B.C., but not earlier.

We have here three vague expressions of time — the "fifteenth year of Tiberius," "about thirty years of age," "forty-six" years, or it may be the forty-sixth year, since Herod's Temple began, — not to speak of the uncertainty, as to the interval between Christ's baptism and his first subsequent passover at Jerusalem. But this is not the most

¹ Compare Clinton, u. s. under the year 4 B.C., Zumpt's work now reviewed, p. 252, Drumann's *Röm. Gesch.* i. 446.

² Compare Clinton, u. s., sub anno 20 B.C.

noteworthy point, when we compare the two evangelists. Luke places the beginning of John the Baptist's ministry after the nineteenth of August, 781 U.C. = 28 A.D., when the fifteenth year of Tiberius began, and John places the visit of our Lord at the passover, in the spring of the same year. But, if Christ was at Jerusalem, after his baptism, in the spring of 28 A.D., he must have been baptized in 27 A.D., and John the Baptist began his course still earlier in the same year. There is such a discrepancy between these accounts that they are not easily reconciled. Especially is that mode of reconciliation to be rejected which assumes that at the time of Christ's conversation, recorded in John ii. 20, there had been an interruption in the building of the Temple, allowing us to add one or two years to our reckoning.

The imprisonment and death of John the Baptist are thought by some to furnish reliable dates for our Lord's life. Mr. Zumpt proceeds to examine this point. The argument from this source is the following: The marriage of Herod Antipas *must* have taken place not long before John declared it unlawful. Then followed his apprehension and murder. Next, Antipas was defeated by Aretas King of the Arabians, and this the people regarded as a retribution for his treatment of John. The retribution *must* have occurred soon after the crime. But the defeat was in 36 A.D., therefore John was beheaded not a great while before that year. The assumptions here are so palpable as to take away all chronological value from the argument. The marriage may have occurred, and Mr. Zumpt tries to prove that it did occur, long before John came into the hands of Herod Antipas. And the retribution may have followed the crime after a long interval. The only safe conclusion is that of Ewald and Zumpt, that the Baptist's life needs to be determined by our Lord's death, and of itself furnishes no date on which we can rely.¹

¹ Among recent writers Keim uses and makes much of the argument spoken of in the text.

If the conclusions respecting the life and death of our Lord drawn from the story of John the Baptist are unsafe, we cannot regard as much safer one of Zumpt's arguments. It is drawn from the silence of the Gospels, especially that of Luke, in regard to legates of Syria during the public ministry of Christ. It is strange, he thinks, that Luke makes no mention of the provincial governor, when he speaks of princes in neighboring lands, and of the high priests in iii. 1; and there are other occasions when we might expect his name to be introduced. Now the fact is, that practically there was no president of Syria during a large part of the reign of Tiberius. Soon after 19 A.D. L. Aelius Lamia nominally held the office, but was detained in Rome, through the jealousy of Tiberius, until, in 32 A.D., L. Pomponius Flaccus took his place; he having been made praelect of the city. Pomponius died near the end of 33 A.D., when a new interregnum took place, until, in 35 A.D., L. Vitellius personally appeared as legate in the province. The Roman administration in the most important province of the empire was carried on through the interregna by the ordinary legates and helpers of the provincial governor. Now, Zumpt thinks that this absence of the governor of Syria will account for the silence respecting him, and will explain, for instance, why Pilate did not appeal to him when urged to condemn Christ. That event must have taken place, then, on or before 32 A.D. But all this is very unsatisfactory. The procurator had the *jus gladii*; what need was there of calling in or appealing to the governor or legate, who, although Judaea was now annexed to Syria, yet had little to do with its internal affairs, unless his military assistance was required? Felix and Festus did not appeal to the legate of Syria in the matter of Paul, nor is any legate of Syria spoken of in the Acts. In short, the argument from silence is peculiarly weak in this case, where we see no occasion for mentioning the Syrian governor, unless it be in Luke iii. 1; and if Zumpt's reason for his not being introduced there should be received, it would be little

to the point. If Lamia was then absent, the length of Christ's ministry and the time of his death remain uncertain.

All attempts to define the year of Christ's death from the number of passovers which he kept at Jerusalem, or from calculating in what year between 28 and 37 the day of passover fell on Friday, or on one of the last days of the week, Mr. Zumpt dismisses as leading to no certain result. There is, however, a tradition which, in common with many other writers, he regards as having a historical basis. The death of Christ was likely to be remembered, and to pass into tradition; for it was a great event to his disciples, and he had many of them. They might recollect when Pilate left his procuratorship, how many years had past since he condemned their Master. Some of them would be apt to remember in what year of the emperor it was, or in whose consulship; and some of them at an early date would be able to reduce it to chronological forms. It is all otherwise in respect to his birth, which, until he became known as a great teacher, few would inquire about, and the tradition of which would remain with his mother and with others unacquainted with history. They would know how old he was, but not in what year of Augustus he was born.

Now, there is such a tradition, or, at least, a mention of the year of Christ's death, found in many of the Christian writers, especially the Latin ones; the earliest of whom is Tertullian. In his treatise against the Jews (chap. 8) he is showing the fulfilment of the prophecy contained in the ninth chapter of Daniel, and has occasion, on this account, to enter into numerous chronological details. Of the death of our Lord he says: "*Hujus [Tiberii] quinto decimo anno imperii passus est Christus, annos habens quasi triaginta cum pateretur.*" And again, a little after, he adds: "*Quae passio hujus exterminii¹ intra tempor lxx. hebdomadarum*

¹ This word alludes to the Latin translation of Daniel ix. 1, 2, 21-27, which precedes the passages quoted. *Exterminii* means, the cutting off, i.e. by which the Messiah was cut off, as well as to the words of Psalm xxii. 17, likewise cited, "*exterminaverunt manus meas et pedes.*"

perfecta est sub Tiberio Caesare, Coss. Rubellio Gemino et Rufio [Fufio] Gemino, mense Martio, temporibus paschae, die viii. Calendarum Aprilium, die prima azymorum, quo agnum ut occiderent ad vesperam a Moyse fuerat praeceptum." This date is repeated by many Latin Christian writers, as Lactantius, Augustine, and Sulpicius Severus.¹ The Greek writers do not mention the consuls, the two Gemini, as they are often called; but Clement of Alexandria places the baptism and passion both in the fifteenth year of Tiberius, and Origen reckons forty-two years from Christ's death to the destruction of Jerusalem, which gives the same date; or rather forty-one years and six months carry us back from the latter event to the passover of the fifteenth of Tiberius. Other opinions we have no leisure nor occasion to unfold.

Now, the question may be asked: Was the fifteenth of Tiberius the result of calculation? Or was it a tradition that Christ suffered in this year? And were the consuls inserted by some one who found by a chronological process that they belonged to the fifteenth year of Tiberius, or at least held office during the latter part of it. Zumpt contends that the tradition started from the names of the consuls, and that afterwards the year of Tiberius was added. He tries to show—strangely, as it appears to us—that, in the first cited passage from Tertullian, the words "*hujus quinto decimo anno imperii passus est Christus*" refer, not to his passion, but to his humiliation, or, to cite his own words: "*In Tiberius 15 Regierungsjahre und selber ungefähr 30 Jahre alt habe er etwa am ende seines öffentlichen Lehramtes gestanden.*"² The fact that the date of the fifteenth year

¹ See Clinton *Fasti Romani*. i. 12, for copious citations.

² In another place, adv. Marcion, i. 15, Tertullian has these words, "*at nunc quale est ut dominus anno xii Tiberii Caesaris revelatus sit,*" that is, entered on his public ministry as the Messiah. *xii* is in all the codices. Tertullian must have reckoned back three years from the 15th of Tiberius, his date for the crucifixion, and allowed three years for the length of the ministry of Christ. In the present passage he seems to be following another interpretation of Luke. In this place there are other errors of calculation, as that Christ was born in the

of Tiberius is common to both Western and Eastern writers, while the consuls are not much, if at all, mentioned by the latter, shows that this was the earliest form of the tradition, if such it may be called, and the consuls would easily be added by Western Christians. But was this a tradition, or was it somehow obtained by a false interpretation of Luke iii. 1: "Now in the fifteenth year of Tiberius Caesar"? Without stopping to examine this question, we only say, that a tradition of such a year for Christ's death may have existed, that the tradition would encounter the date in Luke of the Baptist's entrance into his ministry, and make the duration of Christ's ministry very short; in fact, that there would thus be two dates for these two events falling within the same year — the one obtained from Luke, and the other from tradition — which clashed with one another, and subjected those who sought to reconcile them to most untenable explanations; such as the explanation, entirely contrary to the narrative of John, that Christ's work between his baptism and his passion only lasted one year. This will, at least, explain the perplexity of the church writers. Luke and the other evangelists should have taught them that, if John the Baptist began to preach in the fifteenth of Tiberius, and Christ was baptized some time afterward, and spent forty days in the wilderness before entering on his public ministry, he could by no possibility have suffered within the same year. Why, then, did they in great numbers assign this year to the passion? Clearly not because they found it in Luke iii. They would rather be led, on short reflection, to fix upon another year for that very reason. We conclude, then, that this date for the passion was a settled fact in their minds, which they derived from outside of the Gospel narrative, and attempted in vain to reconcile with the narrative itself. And it may be true that such a tradition respecting the year of the passion existed, while there was none touching

forty-first year after the year of Cleopatra's death. As she died in or near August 29, 724 U.C. = 30 B.C., forty full years extend to August 29, 764 U.C. The birth, then, is in 764 or 765 U.C. = 11 or 12 A.D.

the day; so that Tertullian may have drawn from calculation from some other source the wrong day, when he erroneously assigns that event to the eighth day before the Calends of April.

But, if Christ died at the passover in 29 A.D., and in the fifteenth of Tiberius, which ended August 19, 29 A.D. = 782, we fall into hopeless perplexity. According to Luke, Christ was baptized in that year, and thus his whole ministry could have lasted but a few months; at the most, about six. Clearly, therefore, the passion must be put forward, or Luke meant something else by the fifteenth of Tiberius than is usually derived from his words. So, also, if Christ was about thirty years old in 29 A.D., and was born, as is implied even in Luke's Gospel, during the life of Herod the Great, we have another, although a smaller, difficulty to meet. From the beginning of 750 U.C., when Herod died, to the beginning of 782 U.C. = 29 A.D., is thirty-two years; so that Luke ought to have said about thirty-two, rather than about thirty. And a third difficulty lies in the fact that, according to John's account, the first visit of Christ to Jerusalem is to be assigned to the spring of 27 or 28 A.D., that is, in either case before Luke makes even the public ministry of John the Baptist to have begun.

The solution of these difficulties Mr. Zumpt finds in a hypothesis first proposed by Nicholas Mann, Master of the Charter House, in London. He published his treatise first in 1733, in English, and then in Latin, in 1742, at London. The Latin title is: "*De veris annis Jesu Christi natali et emortuali dissertationes duo chronologicae.*" The hypothesis is, that an epoch for the reign of Tiberius, prior to that ordinarily followed afterwards, was in vogue, more especially in the Orient; and the points to be supported are, that such different dates for the commencement of the reigns of the two first emperors grew out of the nature of their power, and were in actual use; that a date some three years earlier than August 19, 14 A.D. is justified by the events of the time; and that we thus completely reconcile the various chronological indications which are in our possession.

Differences in counting the years of the emperor Augustus naturally arise out of the nature of his powers, which were an aggregation of powers formerly imparted to different magistrates. Thus he was invested with imperatorial, general, proconsular, and tribunician power; he was *princeps senatus*, *censor morum*, and had the title of Augustus conferred on him. These attributes came to him, not all at once, but one by one, and gradually. Moreover, events in his life which secured his power became convenient eras. As many as eight such ways of computing his reign have been traced.¹

There were the same reasons for variations in computing the reign of Tiberius. Power came to him, during the life of his step-father, by degrees; he succeeded to Augustus, by general consent, on his death, but was not confirmed in his government and honors until some weeks after that event. One such reckoning, departing from the ordinary date, is found on Egyptian coins, which count his years from 4 A.D., when he was adopted by Augustus and invested with the tribunician power for five years.² It must be admitted, however, that this is the only case of the kind known to us. If there were any others, they were soon abandoned for the reckoning which prevailed at Rome. There, as the government became established, and imperial power began to be looked on as a unity, the accession of an emperor on the death of his predecessor soon furnished a convenient and uniform date. Nor was it of much significance to the

¹ Clinton (*Fasti Hellen.* iii. 276) mentions five, and Marquardt (*Bekker-Marq.* ii. 3, 299), eight. These are, (1) from Julius Caesar's death; (2) from the first consulate of Augustus; (3) from his triumvirate; (4) from the battle of Actium; (5) from the conquest of Alexandria; (6) from Jan. 7, 711 U.C., when he took the title of *propraetor*, or from April 16, 711; (7) from the acquisition of tribunician power, June 27, 731; (8) from Jan. 17, 731, when he got the title of Augustus. The eras of Actium, and of his taking possession of Alexandria, rarely occur in Western documents, and the last naturally originated in Egypt.

² The coins which follow this way of reckoning do not call Tiberius Augustus, which title he did not receive until his step-father's death, and go no further than the tenth year, which was the year when he succeeded to the throne. *Eckhel*, iv. p. 50.

Romans that the man next to the emperor received an accession of dignity or authority. But in the provinces it was otherwise. Investment with proconsular power, for instance, might affect their welfare, and be a matter of interest to them, when it was not so in the central city. Hence such computations might readily spring up into use in the East, as we know it to have been true in regard to the reign of Augustus.

An occasion for such a computation was furnished in the latter years of Augustus, when by formal law Tiberius was made to have common control with the emperor over the provinces and the armies. He could have received without such a law, by mere action of the senate, tribunician power, and, as far as the senate's provinces were concerned, proconsular also; and the emperor could have made him his vicar in the provinces which he managed; but he now became, in fact, the emperor's colleague; not, indeed, as partaking in all the dignities and honors of the supreme head, but as fellow-regent with him over the provinces and armies. This did not affect Rome, but it exalted him in the provinces; and, if Egypt counted his years from the time of his adoption, and of his acquisition of tribunician power, with much more reason might this be an era to those who were deeply affected by it. But such a provincial computation might soon be thrust out of use by the date which prevailed at Rome.¹

¹ Tac. (Annal. i. 3) groups together what took place in the life of Tiberius at various times: "*filius, collega imperii, consors tribuniciae potestatis adsumitur, omnisque per exercitus ostentatur.*" He became *filius* 4 A.D., *collega* 12 A.D. See Nipperdey who remarks on Tac. Annal. i. § 10, that he received the tribunician power three times; first in 7 B.C., for five years, then in 4 A.D., for the same term, then in 9 A.D., as a perpetual dignity. Comp. Suet. Tib. 9, 16, and Velleius, ii. 103. Velleius, ii. 121, says, "*et [cum] senatus populusque Romanus, postulante patre, ut aequum ei jus in omnibus provinciis exercitibusque esset — decreto complexus esset, — in urbem reversus — egit triumphum.*" Suet. Tib. 21 says, "*ac non multo post, lege per consules lata ut provincias cum Augusto communiter administraret simulque censum ageret, condito lustro, in Illyricum profectus est. Et statim ex itinere revocatus jam quidem affectum sed tamen spirantem adhuc Augustum reperit.*" Suetonius either misconceived the order

The next inquiry is: When did Tiberius attain to this new dignity? The time is nowhere definitely stated, and must be ascertained by probable evidence. In the year after the defeat of Varus, or 10 A.D., he went to Germany, where he staid two years. Then he returned to Rome, and, after the passage of the law above mentioned, celebrated a triumph. Then he visited Illyricum, whence he was called, in the summer of 14 A.D. = 767, on account of the emperor's illness. He triumphed after the passage of the law, according to Velleius, and his triumph probably fell in the year 12 = 765; the day of it was January 16. Thus we may fix on the beginning of this year, as the starting-point for a mode of counting the years of Tiberius.¹

Let us suppose, now, that such a date was in use in the East, and that Luke adopted it. How will it accord with the other dates, which are more or less fixed in our Saviour's life. In the first place, as the fifteenth year of Tiberius in Luke now becomes 26 A.D. = 779, the interval between this date and the latter part of 7 B.C. = 747 is thirty-one years and some months, which would answer to Luke's "about thirty years of age." Then, from 26 A.D. to the spring of 29 A.D., the probable date of the crucifixion, two years and parts of two others elapsed, which allows time for the active ministry of our Lord after his baptism. Add to this that the difficulty growing out of John ii. 20 now disappears. Forty-six years reckoned forward from 734 U.C. = 20 B.C. brings us to 780 U.C. = 27 A.D., and thus the passover when Christ first showed himself in Jerusalem after the commencement of his ministry is made to follow his baptism.

of events or does not follow it, while Velleius, a contemporary, is good authority for stating that Tiberius did not return to Rome until after the passage of the law. The law was passed, as Zumpt makes probable, in 12, if not in 11 A.D.

¹ This year of the regency of Tiberius, 12 A.D., is also considered by Wieseler as the time from which Luke reckoned. 26 A.D. = 779 U.C., is, then, with him, as in Zumpt's scheme, the time of John's beginning his public ministry. His other dates are 749-50 U.C., in the winter between middle of December and end of February the time of Christ's birth; 780 U.C. = 27 A.D., in the summer, the date of his baptism; 783 U.C. = 30 A.D., Nisan 15 = April 7, the date of his crucifixion. Comp. his *Beiträge* at the end.

A hypothesis in history which is probable in itself, which agrees with known facts, and explains and reconciles contradictions, has a good deal of claim upon our acceptance. At the same time this hypothesis does not free us from painful doubt. Had there been extant one coin of some eastern city, which gave proof that the years of Tiberius were there counted from the year 12 A.D., the hypothesis would gain a strong degree of probability. At present, the chronology of our Saviour's life must remain a matter on which nothing positive can be affirmed; the gain of such dissertations as that we have noticed being to allay the scepticism, in regard to facts otherwise verified, which difficulties altogether unexplained leave in the mind.

ARTICLE V.

THE SILENCE OF WOMEN IN THE CHURCHES.

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THE true sphere of women we hold to be indicated in the scriptures; and their place, both in the state and in the church, will ultimately be determined by the principles disclosed in those scriptures. For he who created man male and female, instituted the laws of their relationship, and indicated those laws in his revelation to us for our guidance. If, therefore, we can attain unto a just apprehension of these laws in some, or in all, of their bearings, we can determine so far forth the will of God respecting the relation of the sexes in those particulars.

We propose, therefore, to examine the scriptures — which we hold to be our only infallible rule of faith and practice in such matters — respecting the growing practice in the churches of our land of inviting women to take an active part in the public worship of God, and even of allowing them, in some instances, to become ministers of the gospel

of Jesus Christ. We shall assume the inspiration and the textual correctness of the passages to which appeal will be made in this discussion, while we search, with all thoroughness and candor, after their exact teaching respecting the silence of women in the churches.

I. A positive limitation of some sort is put by the scriptures upon women.

In the curse pronounced upon Eve for the first transgression, it is said: "And thy desire shall be to thy husband, and he shall rule over thee."¹ The law of the whole animal kingdom — namely, that the males surpass the females in strength; the former being constituted thereby the natural protectors of the latter — is expressly affirmed of the human race. Sadly has the history of mankind, in all lands and centuries, proved the physical superiority of man to woman. For the woman has never been able, on an extended scale, to rule over the man, and to subject him to such bondage and wrongs as he, in most lands and ages, has inflicted upon her. Also, under the law as given by the hand of Moses, a restriction was placed upon the wife, which did not hold in regard to the husband. That restriction was extended even into matters of religion; and it found expression in such language as this: "Every vow, and every binding oath to afflict the soul, her husband may establish it, or her husband may make it void."² Here, in the gravest of all matters, the husband was armed with authority to confirm or revoke a religious vow and oath of his wife. In the new and final dispensation, it is still further declared, that "the head of every man is Christ; and the head of the woman is the man; and the head of Christ is God."³ "For the husband is the head of the wife, even as Christ is the head of the church. . . . Therefore, as the church is subject unto Christ, so let the wives be to their own husbands in everything."⁴

To these general statements of the relation of the woman

¹ Gen. iii. 16.

² Num. xxx. 13.

³ 1 Cor. xi. 3.

⁴ Eph. v. 23, 24.

to the man, there are certain specific prohibitions added: "Let your women keep silence in the churches; for it is not permitted unto them to speak; for it is a shame for a woman to speak in the church."¹ "Let the woman learn in silence, with all subjection. But I suffer not a woman to teach, nor to usurp authority over the man, but to be in silence."²

It would seem, from these general and specific declarations of scripture, that a limitation of some sort has been placed by the Creator upon the sphere of woman; and that her sphere, in consequence, if co-ordinate, is not co-extensive, with man's. Her sphere seems to have limitations which his has not.

It is worthy of notice, also, that this limitation is distinctly applied to woman, in contradistinction from man. In every passage which we have quoted, as in others also, which we might have quoted, the contrast is expressly made between the male and the female, the husband and the wife, the men and the women; thereby proving that the relative position of the sexes was in the mind of the inspired penman at the time.

In correcting abuses in the church at Corinth, Paul, in the fourteenth chapter of the First Epistle, tells the Corinthians who may take part in their worship; also how and when they may take part in it. He allowed the "prophets" to speak in the assembly, in turn, "by two, or at the most by three." He allowed those who had the gift of tongues to speak in the same order, provided there were present an interpreter; but, if there were present no interpreter to make known their utterances to the assembly, the speaker in an unknown tongue was prohibited from taking any active part in the worship. Then Paul, in contrast with these, forbids, without qualification, the women to speak in the assembly. Of course, then, those who were allowed to speak in order, "by two, or at the most by three," were men; in contrast with whom the women are commanded to "keep silence in the churches." The contrast in the other

¹ 1 Cor. xiv. 34, 35.

² 1 Tim. ii. 11, 12.

passage¹ is still more pointed: "I will, therefore, that men [*ἄνδρας*, excluding expressly the women] pray everywhere. . . . In like manner, also, that women [*γυναῖκας*, excluding men] adorn themselves in modest apparel. . . . Let the woman [*γυνή*, without the article, hence woman generically] learn in silence, with all subjection. But I suffer not a woman to teach, . . . but to be in silence." Men are to take part in the prayers and instruction of the congregation, "as distinguished from the women, who are to join in the worship in silence, and in modesty of dress and behavior." The contrast could not have been made stronger than it is here found to be. The limitation already pointed out is therefore expressly applied to women, without regard to age, or learning, or position — as women, in contradistinction from men.

II. This limitation, of whatever nature and extent it may hereafter be found to be, is not founded, as some other apostolic directions are, either on some present exigency, or social custom, or changing propriety; but it is founded on something as permanent as the relation of the sexes, and the fact of the first transgression.

On one occasion,² Paul advises against marriage: but, in doing so, he is careful of two things: First, not to give a positive command against marrying, saying: "It is good for a man to remain unmarried; . . . Yet, if their desires do not allow them to remain contented in this state, let them marry"³: Secondly, he is careful to limit his advice against marriage to the distress then present, or nigh at hand, saying: "I think, then, it is best, by reason of the trials which are nigh at hand, for all to be unmarried; [so that I would say to each]: If thou art bound to a wife, seek not separation; but if thou art free, seek not marriage; yet if thou wilt marry, thou mayest do so without sin."³ Should any one quote Paul's advice against marriage in order to

¹ 1 Tim. ii. 8-12.

² 1 Cor. vii. 1-10; 26-28.

³ Conybeare and Howson's Translation.

support some socialistic theory, it could be conclusively replied, that Paul limited his advice to the distress then nigh at hand, and that, even then, he did not prohibit, but expressly allowed, marriage to those who desired it.

Now, if Paul had in like manner founded his positive command, that women should keep silence in the churches, upon either existing customs, or some present exigency, or some other transient foundation, we could rightly argue, that, with a change in the reason of the command, the command itself is abolished; but, even then, the change in the reason of the command must be so great as wholly to destroy the force of the command. But we look in vain for any such transient reasons in the passages under consideration. On the contrary, the reasons given, the foundations laid, are as extensive, both in space and in time, as the existence of the human family, and as permanent as the law of the sexes. Addressing a church made disorderly through the Grecian fondness for speaking, which affected the women, as well as the men, Paul secures order by commanding the men to speak in turn for the edification of the church, and by prohibiting positively, expressly, repeatedly, and unqualifiedly, the women from speaking at all. He does not confine the prohibition to a particular church or country, present custom, or other temporary thing. The command, like the reason of it, is universal: "As in all churches of the saints, let your women keep silence in the churches, as also saith the law."¹ Silence in the churches is a part of woman's obedience or subjection, announced in the curse uttered at the gate of Eden by God upon woman. This reason, to which Paul refers, is as permanent and extensive as the race itself. Customs change, nations rise and fall; but, so long as man is made male and female, the reason of the prohibition exists unimpaired, and of course the prohibition itself abides in full force.

Again, Paul, writing to a minister of the new and better covenant, instructs him how he ought to behave himself "in

¹ 1 Cor. xiv. 33, 34, correctly punctuated.

the house of God, which is the church of the living God, the pillar and ground of the truth." In his directions to this pastor, he gives, as the reason why women should not be allowed to speak or teach in the churches: "For Adam was first formed, then Eve. And Adam was not deceived; but the woman, being deceived, was in the transgression."¹ The priority of Adam in the creation, and the fact that Eve was deceived, and was first in the transgression, are reasons, however explained, which no times, or dispensations, or anything else, can change. Manifestly, they are permanent and universal. They have nothing to do with usages, or customs, or times.

Let those who would remove this limitation of silence from women grapple with the reasons given for it by the inspired apostle. To avoid them, and to talk—however learnedly and truly—about changes in the customs of the age and the countries in which Paul lived and labored, is as relevant as to talk about the changes of the moon, and not a whit more so. It avails nothing to discount upon changes in something, upon which something nothing whatever has been founded. The prohibition of the apostle is not built upon the sand of custom, shifted hither and thither by the waves of time; but on the rock of man's creation and fall, which nothing can change or destroy. It is, then, not only idle, but silly in the extreme, to say that the sand has shifted since Paul founded his prohibition upon the rock.

III. The parts of public worship respecting which silence is enjoined upon women.

Is it not a little remarkable that the words usually translated in the New Testament "to preach" (*κηρύσσω*, "primarily, to officiate as a herald, to teach publicly, to preach," used sixty-one times, translated "to preach" fifty-four times; *εὐαγγελίζω*, "to bring good news, to announce glad tidings," used fifty-five times, translated "to preach" forty-eight times; and *καταγγέλλω*, "to bring word down to any one,

¹ 1 Tim. ii. 13, 14.

to announce, to set forth," used seventeen times, translated "to preach" ten times), — is it not strange, if preaching alone be prohibited, that neither of these words, which are used by the sacred writers, in almost every instance, to describe the act of preaching, are used in either passage where silence is enjoined upon women? Instead of these, words far more general and comprehensive are employed, including preaching as the genus includes its species.

In the passage in 1st Timothy, Paul uses a word which is never translated "to preach," but whose true signification is given in the authorized version, "to teach"; namely, διδάσκω, "to teach, to instruct," used ninety-seven times, and in every instance translated "to teach"; while in 1st Corinthians Paul makes the prohibition as sweeping as it is possible to make it, by employing a word (λαλέω, "to talk, chatter, babble"), which includes all kinds of speaking. It is translated "to preach" only six times out of two hundred and ninety-four times in which it is employed in the New Testament. Twice, in this passage, he uses the widest, most comprehensive of all terms, in enjoining silence upon women. It is certain, then, if anything can be made certain by the use of words, that teaching and speaking by women in the churches are expressly forbidden. But these include preaching, as the greater includes the less, the genus the species; therefore preaching is also forbidden to women.¹

¹ Should it be said that λαλέω, in 1 Cor. xiv. 34, 35, retains somewhat of its original signification, and that Paul, therefore, meant to forbid only all *babbling* and *bawling*, while seemly discourse was allowed to the women in the churches; then we reply: (1) *The usage of the word in the New Testament is conclusive on the point.* It is found two hundred and ninety-four times; four times it is translated by the verb "to utter;" six times, "to preach;" twelve times, "to tell;" twelve times, "to talk;" fourteen times, "to say;" and two hundred and forty-six times, "to speak." Two hundred and eighty-four times, apart from the passage in question, it refers to *persons* speaking; three times, Rev. x. 3, 4, to intelligible thunders, which John is forbidden to write; three times, Rev. xiii. 5, 11, 15, to the beast and his image, which blasphemed God; once, to the Law; and once to the blood of Christ, which speaketh better things than the blood of Abel. Of the two hundred and ninety-two times in which the word is used, apart from the passage in question, only once can it be rendered "babble," without violence; and even there it is extremely doubtful. Paul says: "When

They are not even permitted to ask questions in the churches; but, if they will learn anything, let them ask their husbands at home; ¹ “for it is a shame for women to speak [*λαλέω*, which includes all speaking, even the asking of questions] in the church.”

Is prophesying forbidden to women, the same as all other speaking? Let us appeal to the scriptures for the answer. “To prophesy is to act as prophet, to foretell future events, to predict; but often including, also, from the Hebrew, the idea of exhorting, reproving, threatening, or, indeed, the whole utterance of the prophets, while acting under divine influence, as ambassadors of God and interpreters of his mind and will.” “Specifically, it is used of the prophetic gift, or *charisma*, imparted by the Holy Spirit to the primitive Christians.” ²

This definition, be it observed, involves the idea of inspiration — a supernatural influence upon the mind of the prophet. But, as the words of Joel — “And it shall come to pass afterward, that I will pour out my Spirit upon all flesh; and your sons and your daughters shall prophesy.

I was a child, I spake (babbled) as a child.” (2) *The context is equally against such a meaning.* In 1 Cor. xiv. it is used several times of the gift of tongues which “no man understandeth” (v. 2): but this speaking was not *babbling* or anything of the kind; for Paul says (v. 5), “I would that ye all spake with tongues;” and, (v. 13) “Let him that speaketh in a tongue, pray that he may *interpret* ;” and again, (v. 18) “I thank my God, I speak with tongues (babble?) more than ye all.” (3) Neither Robinson in his *New Test. Lexicon*, nor any translation or commentary, that we have seen, gives such a meaning to the word in this passage. (4) Granting, however, that it might have this signification here, the command which must be held and treated as a command of the Lord, “Let your women *keep silence* in the churches,” covers seemly speech as fully as it does babbling.

¹ What if they have no husbands; or if their husbands are unable or unwilling to answer them? As the seclusive customs of those days have given place to better ones, if they cannot consult qualified and willing husbands to their satisfaction, it is perfectly proper for them now to ask their pastor, or the deacons of their church, or any Christian who is competent to instruct them. Only it must be done in private, and not in the public assembly. Besides, commentaries are now so common and cheap, that no pious woman need live long in doubt respecting either a point of doctrine or of practice.

² Robinson's *Lexicon*. See also Hackett on Acts ii. 17.

And also upon the servants and upon the handmaids, in those days, will I pour out my Spirit" — are popularly quoted as foretelling a time when all, male and female, should participate alike in the worship of God in the churches, it becomes necessary to examine carefully the scriptural idea of prophesying. For if the definition already quoted be found to be correct, then only those who have a supernatural influence of the Holy Ghost resting upon them can claim to prophesy at all.

The word translated "to prophesy" in the New Testament (*προφητεύω*, found twenty-eight times, and translated in every instance "to prophesy") is used in the following connections: once, of the rejected false prophets, who claimed to have prophesied in the name of Christ;¹ three times, by the soldiers who mocked Jesus;² five times, of the Old Testament prophets;³ once, of Zacharias;⁴ once, of Caiaphas the high-priest;⁵ once, of the Apostle John;⁶ once, of the two witnesses mentioned by John;⁷ ten times, of the *charisma*, or supernatural gift, as is proved by its close connection with the gift of tongues, which is admitted by all to have been a supernatural gift.⁸ Twenty-three, then, out of the twenty-eight times, clearly assert or imply a supernatural or miraculous gift of the Holy Spirit. Of the five remaining times, one refers to the virgin daughters of Philip,⁹ but in such connection as most naturally to imply a supernatural gift. For "a certain prophet named Agabus" is immediately introduced as predicting what should befall Paul at Jerusalem, which he could not have done without such supernatural gift. Two occur in Peter's quotation from Joel,¹⁰ which quotation he made to vindicate the apostles from the charge of drunkenness, and to account for the gift of tongues, which gift was then first bestowed on the church. Here Joel's prediction is expressly declared to have been

¹ Matt. vii. 22.² Matt. xxvi. 68; Mark. xiv. 65; Luke xxii. 64.³ Matt. xi. 13; xv. 7; Mark vii. 6; 1 Pet. i. 10; Jude 14.⁴ Luke i. 67.⁵ John xi. 51.⁶ Rev. x. 11.⁷ Rev. xi. 3.⁸ Acts xix. 6; 1 Cor. xiii. 9; xiv. 1, 3, 4, 5 twice, 24, 31, 39.⁹ Acts xxi. 9.¹⁰ Acts ii. 17, 18.

fulfilled in the bestowment of a supernatural gift, which continued for many years with the church, and which was imparted to women, as well as men. Only two passages now remain, in which prophesying is joined with praying: "Every man praying or prophesying, having his head covered, dishonoreth his head: but every woman that prayeth or prophesieth with her head uncovered dishonoreth her head."¹ Now, there is nothing here, or in the context, to indicate that the prophesying referred to was exceptional in its nature. The fact that the word is joined with praying furnishes no evidence against its being used in its ordinary sense. For the apostle may have used both terms to cover all parts of the service—what in the primitive churches was inspired, and what was uninspired—in order to show that the law of propriety applies alike to both kinds. Prophesying is never used in the New Testament for preaching, or for mere speaking in meeting, unless it be so used in the two instances last quoted; but the *usus loquendi* of the word is conclusive against an exceptional meaning in these verses.

The same conclusion is reached when we take the noun *προφήτης*, which is found one hundred and forty-nine times in the New Testament, and is translated in every instance, "prophet." It is used ninety-two times of the Old Testament prophets; seventeen, of Christ; eight, of John the Baptist; once, of Balaam; nine, of "a prophet," used indefinitely; five, of an order of ministries in the primitive churches, being found in the catalogue of "apostles, teachers, miracles, gifts of healing," etc.; seven, in the Apocalypse, of both Old and New Testament prophets; once, of the revelator's "two witnesses"; once, of a Grecian poet; while four times it is joined with the gift of tongues, in such manner as to imply a miraculous gift. In the remaining four passages, the presumption is certainly overwhelming that reference is had to a special miraculous gift.

Thus it is shown that in no one passage in the New Testament can either the verb *προφητεύω*, or the noun *προφήτης*

¹ Cor. xi. 4, 5.

be proved to refer to or to include ordinary preaching or speaking; but, in almost every instance, both the noun and the verb expressly involve the idea of a supernatural influence or miraculous gift. Of the passages which are less determinate in the use of these words, all but the one that refers to the Grecian poet harmonize perfectly with the idea of such supernatural power. Our translators so understood the words; hence, they never translated *προφήτης*, "a teacher, or a preacher, or an apostle"; but always "a prophet"; and *προφητεύω*, "to teach, or preach, or speak"; but always "to prophesy." There is perfect uniformity in the use of these words, both among the writers of the New Testament, and also among the translators of the authorized version. The definition, therefore, with which we started, is found to be correct. To prophesy involves the idea of a supernatural gift, a divine influence qualifying for the work.

Now God poured out his Spirit upon all flesh, so that men and women did prophesy in the primitive churches. And the question arises: Were those women who were endued with the supernatural gift of prophecy commanded to be in silence in the churches? This question is answered by Paul, in 1 Cor. xiv. The whole chapter is taken up in discussing the order of worship in the churches for the purpose of correcting certain abuses. The gift of prophecy is contrasted with the gift of tongues, and its superiority to the latter gift shown. Believers were to desire especially to prophesy, in order that they might edify the church. They were told in what order to exercise the gift in their meetings: "Let the prophets speak, two or three," that is, in turn, one after the other; while those who had the gift of tongues were ordered to keep silence, unless an interpreter were present to explain what they should say. Then, in the midst of these injunctions respecting the use of the supernatural gifts of prophecy and of tongues, Paul says: "As in all churches of the saints, let your women keep silence in the churches; for it is not permitted unto them to speak; for it is a shame for women to speak in the

churches." This is unequivocal and conclusive. In a discussion respecting prophecy and the gift of tongues, Paul forbids women to speak at all in the churches. Of course, then, he forbids them to prophesy and to speak with the gift of tongues in the assembly. If a woman had a divine afflatus, an inspiration of the Holy Ghost, qualifying her to prophesy or to speak with tongues, she was ordered to be silent in the churches; for "the spirits of the prophets are subject unto the prophets." Prophesying, then, as well as preaching and speaking, is expressly forbidden to women in the churches.

Are women forbidden to lead the assembly in the service of prayer? Prayer, in its nature, is different from speaking, preaching, or prophesying. "It is an address to God"; and in the offering of it there is no assumption of superiority over men. Hence, so far as the law of subordination or subjection is concerned, there would seem to be no impropriety in women's leading the assembly in this part of the service. Still, the passage in 1st Timothy seems to have prayer under discussion, as the one in 1st Corinthians has prophesying and the speaking with tongues. The passage opens thus: "I exhort, therefore, that, first of all, supplications, prayers, intercessions, and giving of thanks be made for all men [*ὑπὲρ πάντων ἀνθρώπων*] I will, therefore, that men [*τοὺς ἀνδρας*, excluding women] pray everywhere [*ἐν παντὶ τόπῳ*]. In like manner, also [that is, I will], that women [*γυναῖκας*, excluding men] adorn themselves in modest apparel," etc. Then he adds: "Let the woman [*γυνή*, "'a woman,'"; English idiom, 'the woman'] — Ellicott] learn in silence, with all subjection. But I suffer not a woman to teach, but to be in silence."¹

Is silence here enjoined upon women respecting public prayer? The answer to this depends upon the answer which we give to the following question, namely: Did Paul, in his argument, advance from prayer, first to the becoming dress and deportment of the women, and then to their silence;

¹ 1 Tim. ii. 1, 8, 9, 11, 12.

both forgetting the distinction he had made between males and females in the matter of prayer, and forbidding something of which he had not been speaking at all? Or did he retain the subject-matter in mind, namely, prayer, when he said: "Let the woman learn in silence," and then proceed from this injunction to another, "when he added: "But I suffer not a woman to teach, but to be in silence"? That the latter supposition is the true one, seems clear from the logical character of the apostle's mind, and from his use of the particle *δέ*, translated "but." Prayer "for all men" (*ὑπὲρ πάντων ἀνθρώπων*, for all, male and female) is required of men (*τοὺς ἀνδρας*, only males) everywhere (*ἐν παντὶ τόπῳ*); while women (*γυναῖκας*), in contrast, are required to adorn themselves becomingly, and to be in silence. Now, as nothing had been said about preaching, or prophesying, or speaking with or without the gift of tongues, or teaching, it seems logically conclusive that the silence enjoined in this passage upon women respected public prayer. Paul puts this, however, beyond question, by following the injunction of silence with the adversative particle *δέ*, which denotes "that the word or clause with which it stands is to be distinguished from something preceding. It thus marks a transition to something else."¹ "*Δέ* connects, while it contrasts, i.e. adds another particular different from what precedes. . . . Nor does it ever serve as a mere copula or particle of transition."² Had Paul meant precisely the same thing in the sentence introduced by *δέ* that he did in the sentence preceding it, he would have used some other particle, for example, *γάρ*, "for"; and the sentence would have read: "Let the woman learn in silence, with all subjection; *for* I suffer not a woman to teach," etc. But the *δέ* shows that there is something in the second sentence to be distinguished from something in the first. So our translators understood it, and so, grammatically, it must be understood. Now, what is that something in the first sentence from which the teaching of the second is to be distinguished as "something

¹ Robinson's Lexicon.² Thayer's Winer's N. T. Gram. 442, 453.

else"? Was it preaching, speaking, prophesying, as distinguished from teaching? Not one word had been said in the context about any or all of these. Paul had been speaking only of prayer, to be offered by males everywhere; and to prayer he must have referred when he laid silence upon women in the churches, and from which δέ marks a transition to "another particular, different from what precedes."

Conybeare and Howson, indeed, translate the passage as follows: "Likewise, also, that the women *should come* in seemly apparel, adorned," etc.; and add, in a note, that "after *γυναῖκας* we must supply *προσεύχεσθαι* [as Chrysostom does], or something equivalent." It may be objected to *προσεύχεσθαι*, first, that it subverts the accurate use of the particle δέ in the twelfth verse; secondly, that it introduces into the sentence an unnecessary infinitive; thirdly, that it reduces the infinitive, *κοσμεῖν*, to a participle. These far outweigh the reasons for supplying it; for *γυναῖκας* can be made the subject of *κοσμεῖν*, without violation of grammatical rules. Conybeare and Howson supply *προσέρχεσθαι* ("should come"), and Oosterzee suggests *προσευχόμενας* (praying); but neither of these is necessary. The former leaves the particle δέ (v. 12) in full force, while the latter weakens the force of δέ by so much as it implies that the praying may be done in public. It is best to supply nothing.

It appears, then, that the several parts of public worship respecting which silence has been laid upon women are preaching, teaching, prophesying, speaking, and praying. If there be doubt respecting any one of these, that doubt touches only the service of prayer.

IV. The kind of meetings in which silence is enjoined upon women.

What is the meaning, in the passages under consideration, of the word translated "church"? In determining its signification, we are to make use of neither conjecture nor arbitrary rules; for the context and the usage of the word

in the New Testament are our final and conclusive appeal. To this narrow point has the discussion been now reduced.

The word *ἐκκλησία*, "church," is found one hundred and fifteen times in the New Testament. Once, of a popular or other assembly legally called; twice, of a tumultuous assembly of the people, or mob; twice, "in the Jewish sense, of a congregation or assembly of the people on solemn occasions, or for worship"; eighteen times, of the church universal, the spiritual church of God; and ninety-two times, of assemblies of Christians worshipping together, of local or particular churches.

Sometimes the idea conveyed by the word is more radical than at other times, i.e. it refers to the calling together, or to the assembled body of believers, to their meetings, and not so much to an organized body distinguished from some other like body and from the surrounding unbelievers. Sometimes the assemblies of Christians, which are called churches, were small organic bodies, meeting in private houses, and designated by the names of those with whom they met. While once the Christian assembly or congregation is called a synagogue.

The question of silence turns, however, on the precise meaning of *ἐκκλησία*, in 1 Cor. xiv. 33-35. Does it here mean the congregation assembled for worship? Or does it refer to the congregation in its organic business assemblies, or meetings? The context must determine what meetings are here meant, and in what assemblies silence is enjoined.

This passage does not occur in connection with any directions, warnings, or commands touching the business or duties of a church in its organic capacity and relations. The two preceding chapters are given to the discussion of spiritual gifts, and the succeeding to the doctrine of the resurrection of the dead, which had been called in question; while this whole fourteenth chapter is devoted to "directions for the exercise of the gift of prophecy and the gift of tongues," in order to correct certain abuses in their public worship. Paul gives the order in which these gifts may be

exercised: "If there be any who speak in tongues, let not more than two, or at the most three, speak [in the same assembly]; and let them speak in turn; and let the same interpreter explain the words of all." "Of those that have the gift of prophecy, let two or three speak [in each assembly], and let the rest judge." They are exhorted to desire especially the gift of prophecy; for this gift builds up the church; it edifies; while the gift of tongues, unless some one interpret, builds up or edifies the speaker alone. "Therefore, let him who speaks in a tongue pray that he may be able to interpret what he utters." "But if there be no interpreter, let him who speaks in tongues keep silence in the congregation, and speak in private to himself and God alone." "For God is not the author of confusion, but of peace."¹

Now, these directions refer, not to the order of business, but to the order of worship in the assembly — to an order of worship in nature dissimilar to our preaching service, but very similar to our prayer and conference meetings; at which not one, and he a minister set apart to the work by the laying on of hands, but many, can properly take part. Certainly a meeting in which two or three having the gift of prophecy, and two or three having the gift of tongues, are permitted to speak, besides the interpretation of the tongues, the singing, and the praying, is — apart from its supernatural gifts — a modern prayer and conference meeting. Our social meetings are, indeed, the true successors of the devotional meetings of the primitive churches. It is in such meetings that silence is enjoined upon women; not conditionally, as upon the gift of tongues; but unconditionally, upon all the women of the Corinthian church, "as in all the churches of the saints."

The primitive Christians met together at first every day for worship, for the breaking of bread, and for prayers. Their meetings were not as formal as they afterwards became. Some churches, however, abused their liberty, calling

¹ Conybeare and Howson's translation.

out from the apostle the directions already cited, which furnish us the clearest proof that Paul referred to other than business meetings, when he said: "As in all churches of the saints, let your women keep silence in the churches." He does not mean those meetings held on the Lord's day in the Temple, or in a large upper room, or in a private house; but those which assembled, sometimes in one place and sometimes in another, on week days, as well as on the Lord's day, not for business only, but also for Christian worship. It is impossible to make this passage cover only the business meetings of the churches. No such limitation can be put upon ἐκκλησία; while the context extends the word to every meeting of believers for worship where both sexes are present.

As the other passage (1 Tim. ii. 11, 12) enjoins silence upon women in the service of prayer, and in that of teaching, it naturally refers to the ordinary worshipping assemblies of the saints. But this is put beyond dispute by Paul's own words; for he afterwards says to Timothy: "These things write I unto thee, that thou mayest know how thou oughtest to behave thyself in the house of God."¹

We conclude, therefore, that the kind of meetings in which women are commanded to keep silence is every sort of religious meetings where both sexes are present.

V. No conclusive objection can be raised against this command and practice of silence for woman in the churches.

As we have already shown, the prediction that in the last days daughters and maid-servants should prophesy, refers to miraculous gifts, and had its fulfilment on the day of Pentecost, in the virgin daughters of Philip, and in other female prophets. We have no evidence that the prediction referred either to an ordinary gift of speech or to a permanent institution in the church of Christ. On the contrary, we have the strongest proof that it referred to a miraculous gift, which gift was itself laid by the apostle under the injunction

¹ 1 Tim. iii. 14, 15.

of silence in the churches. Certainly there is nothing here that makes against the view which has been presented.

Much unnecessary difficulty has been experienced by some respecting the "woman praying or prophesying with her head uncovered."¹ Paul, for the time, seems to allow the practice while he condemns the manner of its performance; but afterwards he forbids the practice itself. This does not indicate either a vacillating or contradictory course in Paul; for, in the one and earlier passage, he may have allowed an existing custom to pass unrebuked, while he called attention to the indecency of its performance; and, having rebuked the indecency, he may, later and in another part of the same letter, have forbidden the custom itself. This course would be rhetorical, and in accordance with Paul's rule for the winning of men. "For," as Calvin says, "the apostle by condemning the one does not commend the other." Surely no man can seriously venture to place the mere and brief statement of a practice in equal authority with an explicit and repeated command, which command, by its letter and its spirit, forever destroys the rightful existence of that practice, both respecting prophesying and praying in the churches.

It is said, "Let it be noted that these directions were given to Greek churches." "How far were the Corinthian and Ephesian women entitled to represent the women of the present day?"² In reply, let it be noted that the most approved punctuation of the passage in 1st Corinthians shows that these directions, if given, were not limited, to Greek churches; for it reads: "as in all churches of the saints, let your woman keep silence in the churches." Even Dr. Clarke says: "This was a Jewish ordinance." The directions were as widely extended as the churches of the saints. Now the question, how far the women, not of Corinth and of Ephesus alone, but of all the primitive churches, were entitled to represent the women of the present day, depends wholly on the answer given to a previous question, namely: Of what are they called to be representatives? Of customs? Paul

¹ 1 Cor. xi. 13. ² Rev. C.W. Torrey, Congregational Quarterly, Vol. ix. 164.
VOL. XXVII. No. 106.

has not thus used them. Of the relation of women to men as such? Then they may stand as our representatives, and what was laid upon them in obedience to this relation, falls with equal force upon women of the present day. The question is not, How far? but, In what respect? and Paul is careful to answer this conclusively. Mr. Torrey again says: "The reasons for the injunction have ceased, and of consequence it is not now binding. *Ratione cessante, cessat lex*" (p. 167). All very true of the reasons which he so modestly assumes to put into the mouth of Paul; but not in one particular true of the reasons which Paul himself gives for the command; to which reasons Mr. Torrey does not even condescend to allude throughout his whole article. On the same improved principles of interpretation, there is neither doctrine, precept, prohibition, nor rite of any sort, that could be saved to the church. If his only canon of interpretation, namely, "The letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life," has the latitude here given it — putting reasons into the mouth of an inspired apostle for the sake of plucking them out again; while utterly ignoring the reasons which the same apostle in the same passages expressly gives — then the whole letter of God's word disappears forever before the new spirit which is seeking to give life.

But, "the voice of women adds interest to the social meetings of the church." It may be so; but, are those churches which allow women to speak and pray in their meetings distinguished above those which do not allow the practice, for stability, strength, and the growth of every Christian grace? Besides, shall a clear prohibition be set aside in order to promote interest in our meetings? Where would such a principle lead? "Women do good and save immortal souls by their speaking and praying in public." We do not deny it; for their silence is not an essential part of the gospel plan. Hence God blesses those whose lives and hearts are otherwise right. But we do not hesitate to say that they could do as much, yea more good, and save more souls, too, if they would bring their labors for Christ

within the limits which he himself has imposed upon them.

“There are cases,” it is said, “in which the continuance of a church or of a social meeting depends upon the violation of this injunction of silence; shall the church or meeting die, or the injunction be violated?” Calvin long ago answered: “This (rule) we must understand as referring to ordinary service, or where there is a church in a regularly constituted state; for a necessity may occur of such a nature as to require that a woman should speak in public; but Paul has merely in view what is becoming in a duly regulated assembly.” These practical difficulties do not annul the prohibition as the law ordained for the churches, any more than the difficulties which sometimes attend the public confession of Christ make void the believer’s obligation publicly to profess him.

“The world has outgrown such narrow views, and is emancipating the churches from their thralldom.” Is not man still born male and female? Was not Eve deceived and first in the transgression? ‘But, what of that?’ it may be said. Solemnly do we urge you to reflect before you despise God’s revealed law respecting the relation of the sexes. The honor belongs to the Bible of elevating woman to the noble companionship of man which she now enjoys, notwithstanding the restrictions which it lays upon her. It enjoins, moreover, every right attempt to redress the remaining wrongs done her. But that redress must agree with the law of her relationship, otherwise those wrongs will be increased many-fold by the attempt. ‘But, it is a question of rights, not of relationship.’ True, but human rights arise from human relations, and rest on those relations as their only and sure foundation. And, has not Paul, in the passages enforcing silence upon women, given the relation of man to woman in the law of their creation? As a matter of fact, are women equal to men in strength and fitness for all positions and pursuits in life? Have not some who defied the law of their womanhood, at last yielded to it, and obeyed Paul, when he

said : " I will, therefore, that the younger women marry, bear children, guide the house, give none occasion to the adversary to speak reproachfully ?" ¹ Under the influence of the blessed gospel, the world will outgrow all wrongs, and come into closer harmony with God's law, both natural and revealed.

" Will not this reasoning apply to singing and to teaching in the Sunday-school ?" Singing has, like speaking, peculiar words to express it ; but we look in vain for them in these prohibitions. To make the argument apply, then, to singing, is to go beyond what is written. The same is true of teaching in Sunday-schools. Such teaching is not in the assemblies which Paul had in view, or in assemblies so like them as to fall under the same principle and the same condemnation. The argument cannot thus be bent until it breaks.

" As for women, they have been queens, and generals, and sailors, and soldiers, and doctors, and priests, and class-leaders, and we see not why they may not become preachers in the Methodist Episcopal church." ² Did the editor never read 1 Cor. xiv. 33-38 and 1 Tim. ii. 11-15 ? We would commend these passages to his careful, honest, and prayerful examination ; and if then he can see no reason why woman should not preach in any church subject to the will and law of Christ Jesus, we will leave him to the strange logic of his attempted reasoning. ³

¹ 1 Tim. v. 14.

² Zion's Herald, July 1st, 1869.

³ It is worthy of special note, that the interpretation of these passages formerly held is most emphatically confirmed by the ablest expositors who have written since the apostle's commands have been openly set at nought by some churches. See, for example, Broomfield, Hodge, Barnes, Olshausen, Conybeare and Howson, Stanley, Ellicott, Kling, and Oosterzee in Lange's commentaries. See also the translations of Noyes, Sawyer.

On the other side of the question we find Dr. Adam Clarke ; but he is guilty of changing the fact that women *did* prophesy in public into the permission that " some women *might* prophesy " in the assembly ; also of making prophesying equivalent to teaching ; also of turning speaking (1 Cor. xiv. 34, 35) into " asking questions, and what we call dictating, in the assemblies " ; and of saying : " All that the apostle opposes here is their questioning, finding fault, etc., in the Christian church.

Surely, in our interpretation of the New Testament, we are utterly at sea,

None of these objections has much weight ; and surely no one or all of them, or any others that can be found, can assume to stand for one moment against a positive, explicit, repeated, and universal command of God. Who, sitting with the Almighty, shall abrogate this law for the churches of Christ? Just here the argument impinges with such force that those who advocate the speaking of women in the churches, seek to avoid its force by weakening or by destroying the inspiration of the commands of silence. On this attempt consider:

VI. It is no trifling matter to ignore or set at nought the teachings of scripture respecting the silence of women in the churches.

Paul did not so regard it; for he adds to his injunction this solemn caution: "Was it from you that the word of God was first sent forth? Or are you the only church that it has reached? Nay, if any think that he has the gift of prophecy, or that he is a spiritual man, let him acknowledge the words which I write for commands of the Lord Jesus. But if any man refuse this acknowledgment, let him refuse it at his own peril."¹ These, be it remembered, are the words of warning with which the inspired apostle closes his directions for the order of worship which enjoin silence upon women. Hence they have primary and special reference to these directions. Paul does not rank the matter among the things indifferent, of which he says: "Let every man be fully persuaded in his own mind." But, instead: "If any man refuse to acknowledge these injunctions of silence for commands of the Lord Jesus, let him refuse it at his own peril." If ἀγνοεῖται be the true reading (Stanley), the meaning is startling: "He is ignored by God; God is ignorant of him." If ἀγνοεῖτω, the received reading, be the true one (and Tischendorf countenances no other), then it means: with neither chart nor compass to guide us, if its writers made such a loose use of words as Dr. Clarke here implies. Nothing they taught could be made certain.

¹ 1 Cor. xiv. 36-38. Conybeare and Howson's translation.

“Let him be ignorant” — “a contemptuous expression of indifference as to the opinion of such an one, however great his pretensions.” Do not all who, for popularity or policy, or any other reason, seek to parry Paul’s prohibition by calling him a bachelor, and by saying, that were he alive now he would write differently on this subject, incur the apostle’s censure? Such attempts strike at the root of inspiration. They undermine the whole Bible; and sad indeed will be the harvest gathered from this evil sowing. Where learn they that Paul was a bachelor? In what single instance does he rest a command, or prohibition, or anything else, on so strange a foundation? Where does he enjoin silence upon women in the churches by reason of present custom or present distress? It is perilous to speak and write as many do on this subject. If Paul was inspired, as he claimed to be in one of these passages, and as we must hold him to have been in them all, then the reasons he renders for the silence of women in the churches are as true as they are permanent, and are worthy of all acceptance as commands of the Lord Jesus. If he was not inspired when he uttered them, let some one show it, and end the controversy and unloose the tongues of women in the public assembly at the same stroke. But pause, first, and tell us why every doctrine Paul taught, every precept he gave, every command he uttered, every word he said, cannot also be set aside, as null and void, on precisely the same grounds? Why, on this theory, may not the atonement of the Son of God have been a mere mode of thought suited only to the times in which it was announced? regeneration, a requirement for the times? the church and its rites, an institution for the times? heaven and hell, mere figments of the imagination, engendered by the times, and for the times? the scriptures of the Old and New Testaments, a revelation from God for the times? And why, as the times have changed, may not the reasons for all these have ceased, and they themselves, of consequence, be no longer binding? Away with such arguments! It is neither befitting a scholar, nor

a pious man, nor an interpreter of scripture, nor a teacher or preacher of the oracles of God, thus to trifle with the reasons given by an inspired apostle as the ground of an inspired prohibition. Only three honorable ways are open to a man: Either let him show that the reasons given by Paul for the command of silence do no longer exist,—in other words, that the history of man's creation and fall is a myth; or, failing in this, let him, like a true man and Christian, conform to the prohibition as now in full force; or, what God forbid that any one should do, let him deny the inspiration of Paul, spurn the prohibition and the reasons for it alike, and be guided solely by reason and experience. But even then he would run against that great law which, in the whole animal creation, subordinates, in strength, and generally in beauty, the female to the male. He would reject the word of God, only to be held and bound by the law of God in creation. He cannot give to woman man's voice, so that it shall be easy and pleasant for her to speak in public. Neither can he render it proper, or even possible, for women to appear in public, at all times and in all conditions. Silence in the assemblies is imposed upon woman during much of her life by the law of her being, if she discharge her appointed functions as a wife and mother. Paul only makes universal a law which nature makes partial. But this third alternative no true Christian will ever take. He, from his relation to God and to his word, is shut up either to the first or to the second alternative. If he cannot prove Paul's reasons for the command of silence to have been temporary in their nature, and to have already passed away, he is bound by his fealty to God to conform to the letter and spirit of the prohibition, "as the commands of the Lord Jesus," as the law of all his churches. To refuse to acknowledge them as such, is to incur the solemn censure of the Master.

ARTICLE VI.

PROPHECY AS RELATED TO THE "EASTERN QUESTION."

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THE Turkish capital is one of the great centres of the world's political and religious strife. And although now, for more than a decade of centuries, the interest of the historic drama—national, philosophical, and religious—has been moving westward from the old world centres; yet one looking out from this point of observation cannot fail to see that the near future is sure to startle the apathetic Oriental in all these lands with most important events in both church and state. To a Christian mind the interest in all these passing and prospective movements concerns their relation and significance with reference to the coming of the kingdom of Christ, the establishment of the *civitas Dei* on the earth.

It is generally acknowledged that this generation is witnessing the fulfilment of some of the more remarkable and interesting prophecies of the book of Revelation. The states of Southern and Southeastern Europe are undergoing marvellous changes. The day of papal supremacy in national affairs is long since past; its influence even is well-nigh gone. What a contrast is Pius IX. in 1869, in respect of European influence, to Hildebrand in the latter part of the eleventh century, or to Innocent III. in the beginning of the thirteenth!

Believing the positions and arguments and historical interpretations of Mr. Barnes, in his "Notes on the Book of Revelation," as related to the Papacy, to be well established in general, and in most of the important particulars also, some suggestions are here ventured in explanation of the purport of prophecies less elucidated and less discussed, which relate to nations of the East and the spread and

triumph of the gospel among them, "That the way of the kings of the East may be prepared."¹

It is proper that the reasons for dissent from the common opinion, held also by Mr. Barnes — that Mohammed himself and the religion he founded are referred to in the term "false prophet" in the Revelation — should be given here. While there is no question that the Mohammedan power is, under different forms, Saracenic and Turkish, separately and distinctly referred to, there are strong, and to us decisive, reasons for believing that the faith of Islam as a religion, or its founder, is nowhere mentioned or distinctly referred to in our scriptures.

1. The *presumption* is against the popular view. What we may term the *usage* of scripture is opposed to the interpretation which applies the term "false prophet" in the Revelation to Mohammed.

The religious systems of Zoroaster, of the ancient Egyptians, of Confucius, of Brahma, and of Buddha, have had immense influence in the world; but they are nowhere specifically mentioned in scripture, except generally as idolatry. But the Persian and Egyptian secular power, as well as the Moslem secular power, are distinctly and often referred to. And, as there are but three very brief passages where a reference to the faith of Islam can possibly be understood, and those passages are in the last half of the last book of the Bible, and as they can easily and naturally be understood without referring them to Mohammed, certainly the antecedent presumption is against the popular understanding of those passages. The Book of Revelation is taken up with a prophetic narrative of those spiritual events and spiritual conflicts which, commencing from near the time of the Apostle John, should take place within the Christian church in its then future history, till its final victory. Events and revolutionary changes in the kingdoms and powers of the world are subjects of prophecy, in so far as, and because, such changes were to have an intimate relation, either of

¹ Rev. xvi. 12.

friendliness or hostility, to the growth and purity of the church of Christ. Thus many of the principal events in the history of the old Roman empire and of the fragments into which that empire was broken up, and also of the earlier and later Moslem empires, form subject-matter for prophecy; for all these had to do with the "growth and limitation" of the church. But there is no especial reference to the empires of Eastern Asia, or to the tribes of South Africa or America.

It is true that Christianity had an influence upon the religion of Islam in the formation of that system of faith; but the influence of Mohammedanism upon Christianity has not been at all in the line of faith or doctrine; it has been the influence of a hostile and conquering secular power.

2. The term "false prophet" (or prophets) occurs eleven times in the New Testament, and in all the instances except the three in the Revelation, it is universally conceded that the term "prophet" is used for "teacher," and that the reference is to false and dangerous teachers and doctrines which should arise within or find entrance into the Christian church. These passages are: "Beware of false prophets. . . . By their fruits ye shall know them."¹ "Woe unto you when all men speak well of you; for so did their fathers unto the false prophets."² The prophecy of Christ concerning the coming of deceiving religious teachers in connection with his general prophecy relative to the destruction of Jerusalem and the winding up of the Jewish economy.³ The mention of the "false prophet" Bar-jesus, a Jewish sorcerer.⁴ "There were false prophets among the people, even as there shall be false teachers among you."⁵ "Many false prophets are gone out into the world."⁶ Let us now examine the three texts from the Book of Revelation. Two of the texts are sufficiently clear for our purpose standing alone. In the other instance, it seems desirable to quote the preceding and following verses: "And the sixth angel

¹ Matt. vii. 15.² Luke vi. 26.³ Matt. xxiv. 11, 24; Mark xiii. 22.⁴ Acts xiii. 5.⁵ 2 Pet. ii. 1.⁶ 1 John iv. 1.

poured out his vial upon the great river Euphrates: and the water thereof was dried up, that the way of the kings of the East might be prepared. And I saw three unclean spirits, like frogs, come out of the mouth of the dragon, and out of the mouth of the beast, and out of the mouth of the false prophet. For they are the spirits of devils, working miracles, which go forth unto the kings of the earth, and of the whole world, to gather them to the battle of that great day of God Almighty."¹ "And the beast was taken, and with him the false prophet *that wrought miracles before him, with which he deceived them that had received the mark of the beast*, and them that worshipped his image."² "And the devil that deceived them was cast into the lake of fire and brimstone, where the beast and the false prophet are, and shall be tormented day and night forever and ever."³ There certainly appears here to be some close relation, not only in evil spirit and tendency, but a mutually acknowledged connection between "the beast" and the "false prophet." In the second of the three passages just quoted, it is exceedingly difficult to refer "false prophet" to Mohammed or Islam; for there never has been aught but sharp hostility between Islam and every form of Christianity since the religion of Mohammed gained worldly power. Auberlen identifies—unwarrantably, it seems to us—the "false prophet" with the "second beast" of xiii. 11, and following.⁴ But, with this exception, his remarks upon this point are suggestive and worthy of attention.⁵

¹ Rev. xvi. 12-14.² Rev. xix. 20.³ Rev. xx. 10.⁴ See Auberlen on Daniel and Revelation (Andover ed.), p. 305 seq.⁵ In reference to the principal points in explanation of the thirteenth chapter of Revelation, the following seems to us more clear and consistent than the views of Barnes, Auberlen, and others.

1. The whole chapter refers to papal Rome. The prophecies concerning the pagan Roman empire have already been given, in detail, in the preceding chapters, and it is a violation of the chronology to include here the old empire. Moreover, the specific expressions used are not applicable to the old Roman secular power. The "worship," the prophetic time, "forty and two months," i.e., 1260 years, etc., all and each are applicable only to papal Rome.

2. The "first beast" is the Romish hierarchy, not the temporal power.

We understand, then, the term "false prophet" as referring to those deceiving religious teachers and false doctrines which, after the full establishment of the Papacy in its spiritual hierarchy and its temporal supremacy, should enter into and gain authority in the church. It is worldly philosophy, "science falsely so called;" science assuming to speak authoritatively on all questions, material and spiritual, proudly asserting that the human mind needs no special divine revelation; human science domineering over faith, and then despising it, and developing first in certain forms of scholasticism, and afterwards into materialism, rationalism, and pantheism. Under the specious pretext that the forms and specific doctrines of Christianity and even the words of revelation are unessential and unimportant, an unbelieving "science," an "intellectual" apprehension of truth, has eliminated from Christianity whatever is from above and opposed to this world; has denied the supernatural facts

Chronologically this is correct. The view of Mr. Barnes is involved in difficulties. Every word to the tenth verse is easily and naturally applicable to the spiritual power, beginning from the commencement of the seventh century. See the whole long analysis of the chapter by Mr. Barnes, in his Commentary, and read *that* on the hypothesis that the "first beast" is the hierarchy, and the "second beast" the temporal supremacy, and excepting one point, which we will presently explain, it all reads intelligibly and consistently; more so, we submit, on our hypothesis, than on that of Mr. Barnes. We understand the "deadly wound" to refer to the confessed fact, that previous to Hildebrand, the hierarchy was losing power, was sinking by the very weight of its own corruption, and would have perished had it not been vitalized and strengthened by the accession of that immense temporal authority gained for it by such men as Gregory VII. (Hildebrand), and Innocent III. This terrible power of a worldly and world-governing church-state compelled the "worship" of the spiritual power and authority. And while it was the Romish church that wrought the pretended miracles, it was the universal *authority* claimed and maintained by the secular arm which gave to these miracles their character, as such, in the sight of the people. It was the power to say, "You *must* believe," which erected a "lying wonder" into a miracle in the popular credence. Verse 11 of chapter xvii. — "And the beast that was and is not, even he is the eighth, and is of the seven, and goeth into perdition," — seems to confirm this view. The Romish hierarchy was the eighth in order of the forms of government ruling at Rome, preceded by kings, consuls, dictators, decemvirs, military tribunes, emperors and exarch of Ravenna. Though an eighth, i.e., a hierarchy and not a civil government strictly, it was "of the seven," had a similar status and authority.

of redemption, in a word, has rejected the living and true Christ.

Do not such men as Strauss, Renan, Parker, Spencer, *et id omne genus*, in our own day, suggest a fulfilment of the prophecy in question in a way remarkably in accordance with the words and the spirit of the prophecy? Superstition and a worldly philosophy have at once opposed and fostered each other, in conditions of human society not moulded by evangelical influence, ever since the days of the waning of the old Greek and Roman cultus.

But if Mohammed and the faith he founded are not the subject of scripture prophecy, the empires founded by his followers have stood in such relation to the church, have so occupied, and do still occupy, ground over which Christ is yet — and we believe soon — to rule, that it is most natural and to be expected that those prophecies which foretell events to transpire previous to the millennium should concern existing Mohammedan empires, and should, moreover, be hastening on to their fulfilment. As Mr. Barnes clearly shows in his voluminous notes on Rev. ix. 14-19, the Turkish Moslems — dating from the accession of Togrul, after the conquest of Bagdad, to the dignity of temporal vicegerent of Mohammed by a solemn investiture in A.D. 1055 — began those conquests and encroachments upon the Greek empire which terminated in the conquest of Constantinople, after a period representing the prophetic "hour and a day and a month and a year."¹ Their countless hordes of cavalry, their variegated and highly-colored dress, their early use of firearms, their merciless cruelty, their terrible ravages — all point for the fulfilment of the prediction of the slaying of the "third part of men," to that period of devastating war, of massacre of Christian prisoners by the hundred thousand, — that period of terror, blood, and fire, which began by the overthrow of the effeminate Arabic and Mussulman dynasty at Bagdad by later and more vigorous converts to the faith of Islam;

¹ Rev. ix. 14.

which witnessed the rise and conquest in Central and Western Asia of some of the most powerful and barbarous and bloody empires our earth has ever known, viz. those of Zenghis-Khan, Timour the Lame, and the Ottoman; a period which ended in that last great victory of the Turkish Moslem over the Christian in the middle of the fifteenth century, since which time has not the prestige of the surviving Mohammedan empires been steadily dying out, the light of the "crescent" waning and paling, and the Mohammedan races generally losing their ancient prowess and enterprise, and sinking with unmanly supineness under the gathering and threatening difficulties of their "situation"? The text already quoted (Rev. xvi. 12), which presents a vision of the waters of the Euphrates being dried up, "that the way of the kings of the East may be prepared," compared with Rev. ix. 14, where we have reason to believe the "loosening of the angels" refers to the providential permission to those powers whose seat was on or near the Euphrates to go forth conquering and ravaging in the earth, naturally refers to the overthrow, or radical reconstruction in the interest of Christianity, of the Mohammedan kingdoms of Western Asia.

Here, then, is the main question to which we have undertaken to contribute something in the direction of an answer: viz. Have we seen in recent years, do we now see, or, from present indications, are we about to see, such events as would naturally be a fulfilment of a prophecy that Mohammedan powers, which have hitherto proved a barrier to the gospel, are to give way, and that the princes and people and tribes of Central Asia are to be brought under the power and influence of the gospel; "the way of the kings of the East" being prepared for the coming and reign of Christ?

And here it should be remarked that all our interest in this subject, our examination of it, and our reflections upon it will be shaped and colored by our view of what is meant by the "*millennium*." A man's wakefulness and vigilance

in the "morning watch" will be very much affected by the nature of his expectation of the dawn, as a sudden and unheralded appearing of the sun in full-orbed splendor upon the astonished darkness of night; or as a very gradual and mellow diffusion of light from below the eastern horizon, steadily and almost imperceptibly increasing, spreading, rising, reddening, till the day "is born." If we regard the millennium as a new dispensation, differing *in kind* from the present, to commence by an abrupt retiring of the moral and spiritual forces now underlying and shaping human life and the movements of human society, and by the appearing of Christ himself in visible presence, and with a relation to human will of which we now know nothing; if we interpret literally the twentieth chapter of the Revelation, when the rest of the book is filled with the boldest figurative language,—then passing events have no great significance or interest. We cannot base any calculations upon, or form any anticipations from, them; the law of cause and effect does not apply; the history of mankind, whether in church or state, even when read in the light of God's word and providence, has no relevance.

But if we accept the interpretation which Mr. Barnes has so well presented in his Notes on the chapter referred to, then all the events of recent years, the indications of the present, all efforts of the church of Christ in spreading the gospel and discipling the nations, are crowded and glowing with significance and with interest to the Christian mind and heart, as under the conduct of God's providence, and working out his plan; as ushering in the day when Christ shall manifestly "take the kingdom." What is necessary to say further on the question how the "millennium" is to be understood can be condensed into the following extracts from Mr. Barnes's Notes on the twentieth chapter of the Book of Revelation.

"The millennium — the long period, perhaps three hundred and fifty thousand years, a day standing prophetically for a year — when the principles of true religion will have

the ascendancy on the earth, *as if* the martyrs and confessors, the most devoted and eminent Christians of other times, should appear again upon the earth, and as if their spirit should become the reigning and pervading spirit of all who professed the Christian name." "It will be a condition of the world *as if* Satan were bound, that is, where his influence will be suspended, and the principles of virtue and religion prevail. According to the interpretation of the previous chapters, it will be a state in which all that has existed, and all that now exists, in the Papacy to corrupt mankind, to maintain error, and to prevent the prevalence of free and liberal principles will cease; in which all that there now is in the Mohammedan system to fetter and enslave mankind, now controlling more than one hundred and twenty millions of the race, shall have come to an end; and in which, in a great measure, all that occurs under the direct influence of Satan in causing or perpetuating slavery, war, intemperance, lust, avarice, disorder, scepticism, atheism, will be checked and stayed.

"It is proper to say, however, that this passage does not require us to suppose that there will be a total cessation of satanic influence in the earth during that period. Satan will indeed be bound and restrained as to his former influence and power. But there will be no change in the character of man as he comes into the world. There will still be corrupt passions in the human heart. Though greatly restrained, and though there will be a general prevalence of righteousness on the earth, yet we are to remember that the race is fallen, and that even then, if restraint should be taken away, man would act out his fallen nature. This fact, if remembered, will make it appear less strange that, after this period of prevalent righteousness, Satan should be represented as loosed again, and as able once more, for a time, to deceive the nations."¹

We propose to review briefly,

¹ Barnes's Notes on the Book of Revelation, pp. 457-461.

I. *The Commercial, Civil, and Political Condition of Mohammedan Turkey.*

It is claimed by friends of Turkey that her commercial interests have been largely advanced and her political situation greatly improved within the quarter of a century past. And it is, of course, conceded that, if the simple increase of trade in her seaport towns is evidence of her progress, she has improved. If coming into direct relations with Europe and European civilization by steam and by telegraph, or if the establishment of very intimate and complex political relations with European states is a certain sign of real improvement, then Turkey is manifestly on the high road of progress. The Turkish capital and her chief seaport cities resemble European cities more and more every year. Her laws and her system of general education are daily manifesting more clearly the influence of western neighbors. Her ships of war are iron-clad, her cannon rifled, her small arms breech-loaders of the modern style. She is Europeanized in her diplomacy. Her newspapers are numerous and rapidly increasing. And not only so, but the editors of these newspapers — some of them, at least — are straining every nerve to arouse their comrades and co-religionists to earnest efforts in the general march of progress. In one of them, called "The Progress," are very frequent, and, as we should suppose, most *telling* and stimulative exhortations to the Osmanlies to prove themselves worthy of their history, and equal to their opportunity and their destiny.

But there are other considerations in this same direction, parallel and closely related to facts we have just mentioned, to which, whether as a friend to Turkey or as a thoughtful interpreter of prophecy, a Christian man should not, and indeed cannot, shut his eyes.

The telegraph lines of Turkey have been, to a great extent, constructed and worked by the capital and the skill of foreign Christian nations. The steamers plying in Turkish waters carry, for the most part, the flag of one or another

of the Christian nations of Europe. The Turkish navy was mainly built in English navy-yards. Her war material is largely from abroad. Her internal trade is nearly all in Christian hands. Diplomacy, too, although in the control of Osmanlies, has well nigh passed out of the hands of Mohammedans of the old school, that is, of "the faithful," properly speaking, and is managed by Turks of European education and Frank habits — men who, the most of them, though professing the state religion, are just as really infidels as the majority of the literary and diplomatic circles of Paris. The Turkish government has recently opened a Lycee for a thousand pupils, with a full corps of French teachers, and a French infidel *animus* as the inspiration of the whole.

The prejudices of the faithful old Moslem are rudely set aside by the exigencies of the modern state, and by the Europeanized and "progressive" ideas of "Young Turkey." Many venerable and sacred associations, even the very precepts of his faith, are trampled on in the march of modern improvements. The new system of Turkish law known as the "Tanzimat," inaugurated through European influence in 1260 of the Mohammedan era, was a mortal blow at his system of faith.

Moreover, the change, within the memory of men still living, in the actual relations of the Christian Rayah to the ruling Turk, is an immense change. Coupled with the stirring appeals of the Turkish newspaper, "The Progress," already referred to, are found mournful confessions of the real backwardness and stolid indifference of the Osmanly, as compared with his Christian neighbors, abroad and at home. Would such confessions have been tolerated a few years ago? We ourselves lived for several months last year in a house in a city of Asia Minor which, when built, at the beginning of this century, witnessed many a foul murder of helpless, subject Christians by the lordly owner, — of men who were guilty of no crime against any law. They had simply offended the Bey, and were put to death by his will, with no pretence of trial, with no appeal and no redress. Where

is the man, high or low, who would dare commit such an act now? It is scarcely a fourth of a century since the eyes of this generation witnessed, in broad day, in the most public place of this capital, a public execution for apostasy from Mohammedanism. Would such a thing be possible now? And if not, is it that Mohammedanism itself has changed? Not at all. The death of the apostate is still demanded by the only law recognized by the "faithful" Turk. But there are other influences dominant stronger than that law. In fact, the old Koranic law is violated every day by the very government of the caliph ("successor" of Mohammed) in the execution of new laws and treaties. And the government does this neither blindly nor willingly. This suicidal course is pursued by professed Mohammedans with their eyes open, and in the face of the angry protest of great masses of faithful Moslems, simply because the relation of Turkey to European states makes it impossible to do otherwise. Intelligent Turks know perfectly well, and they are naturally more keenly alive to this than others, that the Mohammedan civilization is effete and decaying, that the prestige of Islam is worn out, is a thing of the buried past.

And not only is the *influence* of the Christian population in Turkey, as compared with that of the Osmanly, in the administration of government, in commerce and material improvements, greatly on the increase; it is also true that, while the *condition* of the Christian subjects of the Porte has been growing better under the fostering influence of Christian powers, aided by their own zeal and enterprise and their immunity from military service, the actual condition of the Mohammedan portion of the population has been and is a condition of deterioration and retrogression. A great deal has been said about the inequality of the Christian to the Mohammedan subjects of the Porte, in regard to the injustice and oppression practised upon the Christians. It is true that, to any great extent, Christians cannot hold high offices under government, and that the Christian sub-

jects of the empire are denied the "privilege" of serving in the army, and that they are required to pay an exemption tax in consequence, and it is acknowledged that this tax often presses hard upon the very poor. But, on the other hand, it is also true that one man of principle and integrity, of conscientious fidelity in the discharge of official duty, is not found "among a thousand" officers of government. Such a man, if there be one, will certainly be poor. He will, with equal certainty, have many and bitter enemies. If he is high enough and powerful enough to expose powerful knaves, he will, not unlikely, be secretly poisoned. Is office greatly to be desired by a good man in such a state? And how any Christian subject of the Porte can feel otherwise than profoundly grateful for the immunity from military service which he enjoys, although obtained by the payment of an extra tax,—and it is not a large tax,—it is difficult to see. For, even in the time of peace, the army is eating up the best blood of the Osmanly population with frightful rapidity. Diseases resulting from *Oriental immorality* are fearfully prevalent in the army. Villages and regions in the interior are becoming depopulated by the conscription for the army and by the rush of the young men, as in the decay of the old Roman empire, to the corrupt and corrupting capital. The hatred, on the part of the Osmanly population, against what they regard as a semi-infidel government, the bitterness of feeling in the generation now passing off the stage, as they see their youth consumed by the army and their inherited domain passing, by purchase, out of their own weakening and impoverished hands into those of their more prosperous Christian neighbors,—things which have come under our own eyes in the interior of the country,—are indeed pitiable to see.

It is the incapacity and corruption of this Mohammedan government which leave the richness of the mineral and agricultural resources of the country undeveloped and waste. These characteristics of the administration are illustrated in a way scarcely credible to those who have not actually

seen the facts, in the abortive efforts of the government to build roads in the interior. Money has been appropriated and expended sufficient to complete a road, of which perhaps not a hundredth part, and that the easiest, has been actually built; and that because of the unscrupulous rapacity of officials, high and low.

The enormous expenditures of the Sultan, capricious and utterly useless to the people, with the three thousand inhabitants of his imperial palaces, — a new one, great or small, being built almost every year, — is something hardly conceivable by an American. Meantime, the peasantry of the country — the Mohammedan more than the Christian portion of it, — groan and curse under the intolerable and increasing oppression.

In view of these and similar facts, we do not hesitate to affirm that all the seeming power of Mohammedan Turkey is a grand delusion. Amid, and by means of, passing events, the end is hastening on. *Disintegration, internal revolution, or violent overthrow* is the certain and near future of the Moslem state. Turkey may fall to pieces. She may fall by foreign conquest — an issue which, possibly, is only postponed by the interests of European states, whose "balance of power" is a thing not particularly easy to preserve. Or Turkey may, by internal revolution and reconstruction, become a nominally Christian state. As has been said, Christian influence is growing, and the faith of Islam has but a very feeble hold upon a large fraction of the Mohammedan population. In case of such a revolution as has been indicated, interest would undoubtedly lead thousands to decide upon a profession of Christianity.

Now, confining ourselves to the point of view which we have thus far taken — that is, in view of the civil, commercial, and political situation and changes of the Mohammedan Turkish empire; it is plain that, whatever worldly men may or may not purpose in multiplying and facilitating the means of communication, of travel, and of traffic between Europe and America, on the one hand, and Southern,

Eastern, and even Central Asia, on the other; and particularly between the Protestant nations of Great Britain and the United States, on the one hand, and India and China, on the other; the downfall, whether by gradual disintegration, internal revolution, or foreign conquest, of the Mohammedan empire of Turkey — an event which, in the course of the reflow eastward of western civilization, cannot be distant, — will be a fulfilment of prophecy.

That empire, founded in merciless cruelty, and continued, while the power remained, in injustice and oppression on the great highway of the nations, — in lands where early and for a long period the standard of the cross was raised, — while it exists *as a Mohammedan empire*, will be an obstacle to the spread eastward of the light and saving influence of the gospel of Christ and of a Christian civilization. When this empire falls, it will largely contribute to *the preparing of the way of the kings (or peoples) of the East for the gospel*.

The strong support given by England to this existing Mohammedan administration is, on any high principles of moral action or of far-sighted Christian statesmanship, an anomaly and an absurdity. Present interest, and that narrow, selfish, and material, governs the policy of Protestant England to Mohammedan Turkey to-day.

What has been said of Turkey above will, nearly all of it, apply to the smaller and less important empire of Persia also. Persia bears the same relation as Turkey to the fulfilment of the prophecy that we are considering. It is a Mohammedan power, more bigoted, more corrupt, more cruel than Turkey, but weaker and less formidable as well. The Persian empire, between Russia on the north, British India on the southeast, and revolutionized Turkey on the west, certainly will not, in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, prove any serious barrier to the progress and triumph of a Christian civilization in Asia.

Now, it may be said, and it is true, that, as far as we have yet advanced, that is, in the review of the commercial, civil,

and political situation, we have discovered nothing which is more at best than indirectly and mediately promising with reference to the progress of the gospel and the ushering in of the millennium. Thus far the influences at work are, as we have seen, rather destructive than restoring. There is nothing in the influence of commerce and in the political influence of the incoming civilization of nominally Christian, but really semi-infidel Europe, which can truly vitalize what remains in the wake of the outgoing Moslem civilization. Material reform, even if successful, cannot stay spiritual decay. The preparation of "the way of the kings of the East" for the gospel is therefore, thus far, but negative. It is a removing of obstacles, not a constructing of highways.

Having now glanced at the internal civil condition of Turkey, having considered the influence of commerce and intimate political relations with the Christian states of the West upon the Moslem state and the faith of Islam, and having found that these influences are in their natural and final result disintegrating and destructive, we come now to consider

II. *The Influence of Western or Protestant Christian Doctrine and Life in Turkey.*

As preliminary, and for the proper understanding of what is to be offered below, we must give a moment's attention to the relation which the religion of Islam bears to Oriental Christianity, and the influence exerted upon the Mussulman by his Christian fellow-countrymen. The religion of Mohammed was founded, and has made its way in the world, in the face of and over Oriental Christianity. This has been so because that Christianity had, when Islam arose, become so choked and overloaded with vain forms and injurious doctrines, so denuded of its true glory, so false to its mission in the world, that it could not satisfy the cravings of an awakened religious mind.¹

¹ See Article on Christianity and Islamism in the *Bibliotheca Sacra*, No. 91 (July, 1866).

From the first, Islam has been hostile to that Christianity with which it has come in contact, and has been the superior power, both religiously and politically, in those lands where the two religions have existed. It may be true that the result of the famous controversies, extending through nearly two centuries, which preceded the rise of Islam, was to fix accurately and scientifically in the terminology and in the faith of the church catholic the true doctrine concerning the Trinity and the Person of Christ; but a practical evil and injury resulting from so much intellectual discussion and disputing over so recondite and mysterious a subject was a certain baldness and frigidness in the form of expression and explanation used by the church Fathers, and great grossness of conception and freedom of utterance among heretical sects, so numerous all through the East, and especially in North Africa and Arabia. All this was, and is, a great offence and stumbling-block to the Moslem. "Mother of God" became the title for Mary in the Eastern church before Islam arose. This false term has for twelve hundred years borne a terrible harvest of false impression in the Mohammedan mind. The gross notions which the Mohammedan generally has about the Christian conception of the Trinity and the person of Christ are directly traceable to the bald and rigid form of the Christian dogmas on this subject, and the coarse and careless manner in which those dogmas have been explained. Mysteries above human reason have been so boldly and fearlessly and irreverently handled as to appear absurdities and blasphemies to those who, in the midst of great doctrinal and practical errors, have ever steadfastly held to the truth of *one God*.

Then, also, on the subject of the inspiration and permanent authority of the scriptures of the Old and New Testament, — had not the Bible remained in the ancient tongues, and had not the respect shown among Christians to the decisions of councils and the dicta of patriarchs, as compared with that shown to the word of God itself, become sadly out of proportion, even before Islam arose, the Moslem

would never have had the reason which has actually been afforded him for treating slightly, as no longer necessary, and as interpolated and mutilated, those Christian scriptures which even he acknowledges, in their original form, to be the word of God.

Now, as a matter of fact, the doctrines of the Christian system requiring to be cleared up with patient and reverent care to the apprehension of the Moslem — the doctrines on which, even when most clearly and considerately explained, he is naturally most ready to stumble — are, and have always been, just these of the Trinity of the Godhead, the Person of Christ as very God and very man, the atoning work of the God-man, and the inspiration and permanent and paramount authority of the scriptures of the Old and New Testaments.

But practically a far worse corrupting effect has been produced upon generation after generation of Mohammedans, in common with other Oriental minds, by the defective anthropology and moral teaching of the Eastern church.

The teachings of all the Eastern or Greek church, almost from the beginning, that our connection with our parents, and so with Adam, the parent of the race, relates only to the mortal body, and not also to the immortal soul; that we are born only with a fleshly corruption or depravity, which is our misfortune, and furnishes an excuse for our actual sins, and not with a will, guilt-stained from the first; these and such like teachings had their legitimate influence in debauching the conscience and moral sense, so that, to this day, the clear sense of personal moral responsibility, the crystalline conscience which shows a man his own sin as his guilt, and not merely as a fault, or as something evil, is hardly found in any sect of Christians in all the East. These teachings, so accordant with a fallen human nature, so opposite to the teachings of God's word and Spirit, have been almost universally received, and have proved so powerful an opiate to the Oriental conscience that the searching revelations of personal sin and guilt made to the unperverted

and quickened conscience by the word of God are taken as Oriental hyperbole, and so but soothe the senses like pleasant and distant music. Almost without exception an Oriental is guided in moral action by interest or by feeling, and not by moral principle. The influence of this sort of "Christian" morality has been very marked upon, and been reflected in the faith of Islam and in the life of Mohammedans. In fact, it accords precisely with their notions and teachings on the same subjects. It is manifest, therefore, that there is nothing in Oriental Christianity — its idolatrous respect paid to pictures and images has ever been an unendurable offence to the Moslem, — which can meet the real wants of enlightened Mohammedans for a truer and purer faith than their own falling and decaying hereditary religion. No intelligent Mussulman, with his spiritual wants consciously awakened, and in honest search for the truth, will ever turn to Oriental Christianity; and it is as obvious that all we have said above applies equally to Romish Christianity.

Therefore the influences we meet with here also, as well as those in the line of civil and political changes, are only destructive, not restoring.

We have now seen that the decay of the effete Moslem civilization, accompanied by the crumbling of the Mohammedan faith, is hastened, and to be hastened, by commercial, civil, and political "progress" of the people; that there is no form of Oriental Christianity which affords any promise to the enlightened and inquiring Turk; and that many educated Osmanlies are taking refuge in infidelity.

At the same time, as we read prophecy, we should expect the incoming of a living and vitalizing Christianity, which shall either revolutionize or remove the powers that hinder the spread and triumph of the kingdom of Christ in Asia. We should expect, not only the removal of obstacles, but the actual preparing of a highway for the gospel to enter Central Asia.

It is scarcely more than a generation since evangelical Christian doctrine, with the Bible itself as the source and

substance of it, began to exert an influence, to develop evangelical Christian life and example in this empire. A few foreigners, from a land far away, were God's instrumentality for hiding a little leaven in this great mass of the population of Turkey. Through their learning, zeal, and piety, seconded, as their labors have borne the expected fruit, by the practical knowledge, zeal, and piety of native evangelical Christians, the word of God has been carefully translated into all the principal languages of this empire — languages spoken by Christian and by Moslem, — and has been circulated and read, to the extent of hundreds of thousands of copies, east and west, north and south, in city, town, and village, all through the land; the word of life has been preached "publicly, and from house to house," by the wayside, in market-places, almost everywhere that the Bible itself has gone. Congregations have been gathered, communities organized, schools established, and that in the face of bitter and long-continued persecution. From regenerate souls in the congregations are formed churches, small and feeble at first, but, with very few exceptions, they are proving living, growing, laboring, shining churches, and there are more than sixty of them scattered all over the land. They are like cities set on a hill, and, what is most significant, almost all of them are in the midst of great centres of the Turkish — the Moslem — population. And, although these churches are composed mainly, as yet, of those who have been converted from a nominal and dead Christianity to a true and living faith in Christ, yet some from the ranks of the Mohammedan population have embraced the gospel, and these young and earnest churches, with their growing native ministry, are girding themselves, not only to the work of caring for their own religious institutions, and going forth as missionaries to their own nation, but they are beginning to feel their responsibility, to hear their call, and learn their mission to the Mohammedans — work which will not be "foreign," but "home missionary," work to them. The few thousand members of evangelical Christian churches in Turkey may seem, on any principle of

worldly calculation, a small force for the moral and religious revolutionizing of such a mass of population — a “little leaven,” indeed, for so “great a lump”; but, regarded in the light of Church history and especially of the history of the rise and progress of evangelical influence in this land, regarded in the light of prophecy, regarded with the eye of faith, though it may *seem* “small and despised,” yet, supported by the sympathies and prayers of the church of Christ in western lands, under the conduct of God’s providence, with the power of his word and the fire of his Spirit, the evangelical churches of Turkey will not fail in the work, to which they alone can prove equal, of restoring, rebuilding, vitalizing, where all other influences can only pull down and destroy. Christian truth will prove an antidote to old superstition and falsehood, and to new forms of infidelity. Christian life and example will prove a salt and a leaven in the midst of a decaying and vanishing civilization. Evangelical Protestant Christianity developing in a way native to her soil, is the hope of Turkey.

Evangelical Christian doctrine and evangelical Christian life and example are undeniably the most revolutionary, and to whatever opposes the gospel and the kingdom of Christ, the most destructive, forces possible; but they are so incidentally, and because whatever opposes them is opposed to God and to Christ and to his truth and kingdom in the world. They are, in their own nature, positively vital and restoring forces when brought into contact with human life and human wants; for the gospel alone is adapted to satisfy the deepest spiritual wants of men universally — those of the Moslem, as well as those of the pagan.

The evangelical Christian doctrine of the Trinity and of the person of Christ, set forth and applied to the conscious want of an awakened soul, not merely argued to the intellect; the God-man held up to the sinner, as only the pure teaching of the gospel does it, in a lucid explanation of his work of atonement for human sin, is the true antidote against the poison of a false construction and presentation

of Christian doctrine, and against the cold scepticism and unbelief of the system of Islam. The blankness of the Mohammedan system on the subject of atonement is felt and acknowledged often by intelligent Turks.

Such Christian lyrics as "Just as I am," "My faith looks up to thee," "How sweet the name of Jesus sounds," "All hail the power of Jesus' name" — all translated into Turkish, and sung in the hearing of Mohammedans by loving Christian hearts — will do more to convince them of the truth of the evangelical doctrine of the God-man than the Nicene Creed, and all that has ever been written on it, could possibly do.

In like manner, the Moslem's prejudice against the Bible, as we receive and circulate it, will give way under the light of that word itself in his sacred and also in his common language; especially as the fundamental Protestant doctrine of the right and duty of every man to read the word of God is becoming more and more generally recognized and respected all through this land, and that far beyond the number of those who are called Protestants. Thus God is preparing for himself in these lands, what has not truly existed here since the days of Primitive Christianity, a *witnessing Church*.

How mighty will be the change in the whole current of business and of social life in these Oriental communities, when evangelical views of human character, — of the human *will*, with its responsibility and its guilt, coupled with right views of the holiness and justice of God, have leavened the mass of society in which they are already powerfully working. The teachings of an evangelical morality — right doctrines concerning man — wrought into the consciousness of society would alone upheave and revolutionize it, especially when this power is applied, as it is and will be, by the fire of the Spirit. Reproduce the best forms of Christian life and character in this empire; and such moral forces can no more be shut up and kept inactive in general society than could Luther and his associates be silenced in Germany, or

the Puritans be intimidated and their influence circumscribed in intolerant England two and a half centuries ago.

On the very banks of the Euphrates to-day the "way of the kings of the East" is preparing; and the labor put forth there, and the prayers and offerings made in Christian lands, should all be with the firm conviction, the feeling, the confident expectation, that these efforts of ours to-day are, in fulfilment of prophecy, in accordance with the purpose of Christ, and in obedience to his explicit command, directly preparing for the ushering in of the millennium.

What a stimulus is here to Christian endeavor in the line of missionary labor! Let Christian men look, in the line of New Testament prophecy and of God's providence, so conspicuous in human history, at the present state and prospects of the Mohammedan empires of Western Asia, and feel a profounder interest in the work now doing,—on a small scale as it appears, perhaps, to human vision, compared with the great work to be done, but a work which is day by day making rapid advances. These advances are not, indeed, toward the establishment of any earthly kingdom or other form of civil government, but toward the setting up of the spiritual kingdom of Christ in this land—a kingdom which is at once a monarchy, an aristocracy, and a republic.

Looking forward in the line of vision of the apocalyptic seer, and contemplating events now near at hand, the Christian can regard without anxiety, nay, rather with exultation, those processes and changes which are rapidly dissolving and removing an empire; for he knows the existing administration is but *in the way* of the setting up of the spiritual kingdom of Immanuel. We should rejoice in, and desire and pray for, the removal of disorganizing matter—a decaying state—that the living humanity remaining may, without hinderance, be reconstructed under Christian rule, when evangelical influence shall be an *acknowledged power* in society.

It is not for the servant of the King of kings to be disturbed by whatsoever overturnings there may be of human society

and governments. With him it is not doubtful that every movement of society, all commercial and civil changes, all the plans and diplomacy of princes, are but parts, often blindly played by the human agents, of a grander plan which Divine Providence is unfolding for the reign of Christ all through the Orient. God has appointed his word, now doing its work in all the principal languages of the world's inhabitants, and his servants, who "have gone everywhere preaching the word," adding to these the power of the Spirit, and superintending all by his omniscient and omnipresent providence, as the means and agents for the accomplishment of his "grand designs."

"His purposes will ripen fast,
Unfolding every hour."

And, whether the path we are individually treading, or that particular corner of the great vineyard in which the Master has bidden us individually to labor for him, be in light or in shadow, be cheering or for the moment saddening, we may look up and see the day-dawn of the millennium. But let no one think that we can *long* stand thus "gazing up into heaven." "Up, and be doing," is the motto and watchword of the hour. It is so in all the world of business, in commerce, in politics, in all the material interests of human society. And we may rejoice that, beyond all comparison, it is so in the church of Christ to a greater extent than in any former period of her history. But if we look at the work yet to be done, at the "land yet to be possessed," at the strength and malice and cunning of the "Anakims" yet to be overcome, we might well be appalled. But this is not our duty either. Sluggish inactivity, timid shrinking, and premature shouts of victory are alike unbecoming the Christian soldier. Labor, patience, courage, fidelity, in trustful reliance on our Captain and King is what is still appointed for us. But it *may* be, *ought* to be, in the confident assurance that all is working directly toward the glad day of our Redeemer's triumph; all in the line of the fulfilment of prophecy, "that the way of the kings of the East may be prepared."

ARTICLE VII.

NOTICES OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

A. GERMAN WORKS.

JOSEPHUS ON THE RULE OF REASON.¹ — The treatise entitled *περὶ αὐτοκράτορος λογισμοῦ*, attributed to Flavius Josephus (the 4th Book of the Maccabees), is the subject of the work whose full title is given below. Dr. Freudenthal is of opinion that the said treatise is in reality a sermon, actually delivered by Josephus to an audience of Hellenistic Jews, and that it is therefore one of the earliest specimens of this kind of literary production, excepting, of course, the prophecies of the Old Testament. As a sermon, too, it was actually regarded till late in the Middle Ages. It is found, for example, among the discourses of Gregory Nazianzen and Chrysostom in the Paris Codex of these authors, though there ascribed, of course, to Christian preachers. Modern writers have questioned this its character; Germans in particular think it too philosophical for any audience likely to meet in a synagogue; but they judge too much by the standard of the emotional exhortations which are now the fashion in their Lutheran churches. The writer seems to make out a very good case, so far as we are able to judge. The exordium and conclusion, in particular, as quoted by him, certainly smack strongly of a discourse. Dr. Freudenthal, besides the numerous learned references adduced in illustration of his theme and in support of his position, gives a considerable number of notices bearing on the general subject of homiletics, which will interest theologians, whether Jewish or Christian.

THE STUDY OF THE HEBREW LANGUAGE.² — This brief account of the Study of the Hebrew language in Germany from the end of the fifteenth to the middle of the sixteenth century comprises the following chapters: 1. Relation of the study of Hebrew to the intellectual and religious movements of the age; 2. The predecessors of Reuchlin; 3. Johannes Reuchlin; 4. Johannes Böschenstein and Matthäus Adrianus; 5. The pupils of Elias Levita — Sebastian Münster and Paul Fagius; 6. The Universities; 7. The Schools; 8. Conclusion. The history is interestingly written, and gives an idea, not only of the subject discussed, but of the life, relations, positions, difficulties, and the like, of scholars in the age of the

¹ Die Flavius Josephus beigelegte Schrift Ueber die Herrschaft der Vernunft, etc. Von Dr. J. Freudenthal. Breslau: Skutsch. 1869.

² Das Studium der Hebr. Sprache in Deutschland vom Ende des xv. bis zur mitte des xvi. Jahrhunderts. Von L. Geiger. Breslau: Skutsch. 1870.

Reformation. One thing comes out very clearly, that they were as apt to fall out with each other then as men are now-a-days. We recommend Herr Geiger's work to the notice of our readers.

INTRODUCTION TO THE JERUSALEM TALMUD.¹ — We are obliged to confess that of the work now under notice we have been able to understand little more than the double title — Latin and German. It is written in Hebrew without points. All we can do therefore is to say a word or two about its subject and its author. There are two Talmuds, the Jerusalem and the Babylonian. The former was edited at Tiberias, whither the Rabbinical school of Jerusalem was finally transferred, after the destruction of this city, about three hundred years after the Temple was destroyed; the latter at Sora, about 500 A.D. The Talmud Jerushalim is comprised in one folio volume: the Talmud Babli, in about twelve folio volumes. Any one desiring a popular, though very rose-colored, account of the Talmud, should read Deutsch's Essay, published in the Quarterly Review (England). Dr. Z. Frankel, the author, is chief Rabbi at Breslau, Director of the Seminary for training Jewish Rabbis, the Editor of a Monthly Journal, and we believe one of the heads of the orthodox party in Germany. To any one who is able to read the Hebrew, in which this work is written, we have little doubt that it will be both valuable and interesting. It has a full index, and is attractive in form.

EUSEBII PAMPHILI VITA CONSTANTINI, ETC.² — The first volume of this edition of the works of Eusebius was noticed in a former number of the Bibliotheca Sacra; the two volumes now before us complete it. They contain the Vita et Panegyricus Constantini and the Oratio Constantini ad Sanctorum coetum; four indexes — of the passages of scripture quoted; of the writings referred to; index geographical and historical; an index of words and phrases; and lastly, an extensive critical and explanatory commentary. We can only here repeat what we said before, that this edition, cheap, accurate, and attractive in form, is just the one to be recommended to students generally.

DOGMATIC THEOLOGY.³ — When complete this work will comprise the Lectures delivered by the late eminent Heidelberg Professor, Dr. Richard Rothe, on the subject of Systematic Theology. The Discussions *Zur Dog-*

¹ Introductio in Talmud Hierosolymitanum auctore Z. Frankel. Vratislaviae: H. Skutsch.

² Eusebii Pamphili Vita Constantini et Panegyricus atque Constantini ad Sanctorum coetum oratio. Recensuit, etc. F. A. Heinichen. Lipsiae: H. Mendelssohn. 1869.

³ Dogmatik von Dr. R. Rothe. Herausgegeben von Dr. D. Schenkel. Heidelberg: I. C. B. Mohr. 1870.

matik, published some years ago, first in the *Studien und Kritiken*, and then separately, may be described as the Prolegomena to the present publication. We first give a brief outline of the contents. Part A treats of the Consciousness of Sin. Division I. Theology: Section 1. The Existence of God; 2. The Nature of God, or the Trinity; 3. The Attributes of God; 4. The Works of God: (1) Creation; (2) Providence; (3) Angels. Div. II. Anthropology. Div. III. Hamartiology. Part B. Consciousness of Grace. Div. I. Soteriology: Sect. 1. The divine decree to redeem sinful humanity; 2. The historical preparation for the accomplishment of the divine decree; 3. The actual accomplishment of redemption by Jesus of Nazareth: (1) The person of the Redeemer; (2) The work of the Redeemer: a. His prophetic office; b. His high-priestly office; c. His kingly office: (a) The foundation of the kingdom of God or the means of salvation: (a) The word of God; (β) The sacraments — baptism, Lord's supper. The third and concluding part is to appear in the course of the current year.

In order to give an idea of Rothe's position we refer to two points — the doctrine of the person of Christ, and that of the atonement. As to the first; Jesus of Nazareth, as the second Adam, entered into existence in a supernatural way, being, though born of a woman, created in her womb by God. Hence from the very first he was free from the sinful bias natural to man, and growing up in what was "morally the purest circle of the human race," was preserved from falling either into sin or error. His development was normal; accordingly as his development advanced, God took up ever more fully his abode in him, until, his development being complete, that is, until having attained absolute moral perfection, or absolutely holy spiritualization, God entered into full union with him. In other words, the incarnation of God in Christ was coincident with and conditioned by his realization of absolute moral perfection. From that moment there was no separation between him and God; he was true God, for he who was in him was God himself. When Christ reached this the goal of his development he died; he could not but die, for he had attained perfect a-materialization.

Of the Atonement Rothe seems to hold the following view: It is such a modification in the position of the sinner toward God, that God, without infringing his righteousness and holiness, can forgive the sin which actually still cleaves to him, and, notwithstanding the same, enter into fellowship with him. Now God can only forgive the sinner his sin, before that sin is actually done away with, if he have a sure pledge that sin will in the future actually be destroyed in the sinner. This actual destruction of sin is guaranteed by Christ; and he is qualified to guarantee it, because of his absolute unity, on the one hand, with God, on the other, with the human race. He atoned for our sin by himself, developing in an absolutely normal manner to actually good and holy spirit, and thus to absolute unity with God, on the one hand, and with the totality of our race, on the

other. The atonement of sin was essentially accomplished by a moral work. The view of the atonement thus set forth seems to differ very little from that of Barclay the Quaker, as expounded in his *Theologiae vere Christianae Apologia*. Rothe controverts vigorously any view of the work of Christ that can be termed Anselmic. The general method pursued by Rothe is that of Schleiermacher; he constantly appeals, for example, to the "Christianly pious consciousness" (christlich fromme Bewusstseyn). To us it seems a mistake to give the first part the general title: "Consciousness of Sin," seeing that sin is only discussed in the last section. But we have no space to enter on criticism. Though we are somewhat disappointed with the work as a whole, perhaps owing to its not having been prepared for the press by the author himself, Rothe's eminence as a Christian theologian and philosopher makes it incumbent on every one interested in these subjects to examine whatever he may have written on them.

REASON AND REVELATION.¹—It may not seem wise to take up valuable space by a notice of the work whose title is given below; but it is well that our readers should know what even enemies are doing. It is one continuous attack on the Bible and Christianity, marked mainly by infatuation. As a sample of the book, we may adduce the replies to the following questions: By what is the progress of culture conditioned? By the progress of knowledge. What is the impelling principle of human lettings and doings? The sensations awakened in man by the outward world. What is the true doctrine of morals? Strive after pleasant sensations, without injuring human society. The book is useful, as a popular summary of the so-called liberal ideas which at present possess the greater part of educated Germany and France. As such, it may interest some of our readers, though it is dismally shallow.

CONSCIENCE.²—Any one who knows how very indefinite and self-contradictory the definitions of conscience are, will be eager to take up any production that is devoted to the subject; especially if it be by one otherwise deemed competent. Dr. Gass, the author of this treatise on conscience, long since won his spurs as a theologian. His chief work—"The History of Dogmatic Theology in Germany since the Reformation"—occupies a very high position in the esteem of his colleagues, both theological and philosophical. He discusses his subject in ten chapters, headed respectively: Preliminary Remarks; Pre-Christian Background; Biblical Material; Historical Survey; the Nature of Conscience; Moral and Religious Conscience; Error and Truth of Conscience;

¹ Vernunft und Offenbarung. Die Widersprüche zwischen Glauben und Wissen. Von K. W. Kunis. Leipzig: Moritz Schäfer. 1870.

² Die Lehre vom Gewissen. Ein Beitrag zur Ethik. Von Dr. W. Gass. Berlin: G. Reimer. 1869.

Conscience, in a Secondary Sense ; the Forms of its Activity ; Conclusion. Dr. Gass gives his view of conscience in the following words: "It is the expression of the moral rule incorporated with man's being, partly in the form of testimony, partly in the form of assertion of obligation." His exposition is not very clear ; though it contains some good hints which point in the right direction. It is a pity that our German teachers — for, in many respects, the theologians and philosophers of Germany are the teachers of the entire world — do not take more care to set forth separately and distinctly exactly what their own views in each case are, instead of giving them in fragments, and interwoven with refutations of everybody that differs. But, after all, as the German proverb says, "Ländlich sittlich" ; and we must be content to take people as they are. "Jedermann rede wie ihm der Schnabel gewachsen ist," and then science will best progress.

THE OLD TESTAMENT.¹ — A series of somewhat popular Essays on the Books of the Old Testament, mainly republished from the *Grenzboten*. The point of view is "liberal and critical." The author believes the Old Testament literature to have had a purely human origin. Considered apart from this (in our opinion) primary error, the work deserves attention for the earnestness and truthfulness of its tone and spirit. The nature of the results arrived at may be judged by the following specimens: The "Book of Psalms" comprises lyrical poems from David down to the Maccabees, and contains no reference to a Messiah ; The "Song of Solomon" is a drama, written to glorify true love in opposition to mere lust ; "Ecclesiastes" is the work of a sceptic who failed to arrive at clear conclusions, and was written about 200 B.C. ; "Daniel" was written about 166 B.C.

SCIENTIFIC CRITIQUE OF THE EVANGELICAL HISTORY.² — A new and enlarged edition of this well-known work. It now contains no fewer than twelve hundred and thirty-seven pages. The recent attacks on the Gospel history by Schenkel, Renan, Strauss, Scholten, and others are discussed. From the first, Ebrard's work has been a complete armory of defences of the orthodox position. It is not less so in the present revised and enlarged shape. We cannot say that we always admire Ebrard's style of polemic. He loves to say hard things ; but often his blows are as heavy and well-directed as his words are keen, and so one forgives him. It is needless to say more than that almost every question, historical, critical, philosophical, doctrinal, that can arise out of the Gospel narratives, is here more or less touched. No one will repent buying the work.

¹ Die Alttestamentliche Literatur in einer Reihe von Aufsätzen dargestellt. Von Dr. Theod. Nöldeke. Leipzig : Quandt und Händel. 1869. Price, 1½ thalers.

² Wissenschaftliche Kritik der evangelischen Geschichte. Von Dr. J. H. A. Ebrard. 3 Auflage. Frankfurt-am-Main : Heyder and Co. 1869. Price, 5 thalers.

THE LAMENTATIONS OF JEREMIAH.¹ — Dr. Gerlach believes Jeremiah to have been the author of the Lamentations, in opposition to such as Noldeke, and defends his view in a very thorough manner. The Commentary on the Lamentations is learned; but the translation, though accurate, lacks poetic fire and vigor.

Hengstenberg: Die Weissagungen des Proph. Ezechiel. Part second of the late lamented theologian's practical exposition of Ezekiel. No one could write better on the prophets of the Old Testament than Hengstenberg. He was at home in them; and he enjoyed being a prophet himself; using the word in its full and proper sense. Nor was he a dilettante prophet, like Dr. Cumming.

Keil: Biblischer Commentar über den Propheten Ezechiel. One of the volumes of the series of commentaries now publishing on the Old Testament, by Drs. Delitzsch and Keil. It is orthodox and learned, etc. Ezechiel is a difficult, but mighty prophet. Too little attention is paid by Christian preachers to the prophetic portions of the Old Testament; and their understanding is hindered for the laity by our defective translation.

Hofmann: Der Brief Pauli an die Römer. The third part of Dr. Hofmann's "New Testament connectedly Investigated." We have noticed other parts in previous numbers. Dr. Hofmann is a difficult writer to understand; but his thought is deep and subtle. He bears studying. Sometimes, indeed, if not often, his thought is so subtle that one has a difficulty in fixing and grasping it; perhaps, too, there is sometimes no solid thought to grasp.

Palaeorama: Oceanic-American Investigations. Professedly by a deceased American antiquarian. The fundamental idea of the work is that Genesis is a primeval book of ancient America, and that the events there narrated took place in America. It is a curious production, but seems to us more German than American.

Delitzsch: Handwerkerleben zur Zeit Jesu. We have here five lectures delivered by Professor Delitzsch before the Young Men's Christian Association, in Leipsic; lectures designed to illustrate the occupations, circumstances, education, etc., of handicraftsmen at the time of Jesus. It is needless to say that they contain much interesting matter that throws light on the biblical narratives.

Polenz: Geschichte des Calvinismus. This fifth volume carries the learned author's History of French Calvinism down to the year 1629. It is, we fear, the last volume. We wish that Dr. von Polenz, however, may gather strength and courage to issue further results of his studies. The work is written, from first to last, in a thoroughly religious and free spirit; though the style is unfortunately heavy.

¹ Die Klagelieder Jeremiä. Von Dr. E. Gerlach. Berlin. W. Hertz. 1870. Price, 24 sgr.

B. ENGLISH AND AMERICAN WORKS.

TWO LETTERS ON CAUSATION AND ON FREEDOM OF MIND IN WILLING, addressed to John Stuart Mill. With an Appendix, on the Existence of Matter and our Notions of Infinite Space. By Rowland G. Hazard, author of "Language," "Freedom of Mind in Willing," etc. Boston: Lee and Shepard. 1869.

The importance of this work to students of metaphysics is in the fact that it explains and supplements portions of Mr. Hazard's former work on the will. The latter was published in 1864. Its full title, "Freedom of Mind in Willing; or, Every Being that Wills a Creative First Cause," indicates its principal proposition. By the phrase "Creative First Cause," as Mr. Hazard explains in the present work (note, p. 10), he intends to signify "one that of itself begins and effects change, and not one that is prior to all others, as some of the reviewers have supposed."

The most important definitions employed in the new work are of cause, freedom, and will. Cause is defined as "that which produces change." Mr. Mill's definition of cause, namely, "the whole of the antecedents, or the assemblage of phenomena which invariably precedes the effect," is sharply criticised by Mr. Hazard. The definitions of freedom and will appear in the following language of the author, to which he understands Mr. Mill to assent: "Everything in moving or in acting, in motion or in action, must be directed or controlled in its motion or its action by itself or by something other than itself; and that of these two conditions of everything moving or acting, or in motion or action, the term 'freedom' applies to the former; hence, self-control is but another expression for the freedom of that which acts, or of the active agent." "The faculty of will is simply a faculty or ability to make effort." "An act of will or volition is the same as an effort" (pp. 81, 82; also *Freedom of Mind in Willing*, chap. iv.).

The principal propositions of the work it is fairest to give in Mr. Hazard's own words. "The ideas of cause and uniformity are essentially distinct and different." "Succession is the effect, and to make it the cause is to make it the cause of itself." "All theories of causation must bring us something already active or that has the ability to become so." "In my view spirit-cause cannot be dispensed with; must always have existed." "The being that wills is a power, and not merely an instrument through which power is transmitted." "In willing we have a prophetic anticipation of the effect, and the knowledge of the mode of moving the muscles must be innate." "Effort of a conative intelligence requires no prior application of power." "Power to begin action the peculiar attribute of conative intelligence." "The doctrine of freedom does not assert that the mind makes the conditions (external or internal), but only that in view of them it determines its own effort." "The invariable conformity of volition to

want and knowledge does not favor necessity nor militate against freedom." "Our volitions may be additions to God's knowledge, and reasons for varying his action." "All these variations may be embraced in a more extended uniformity." "Volition is always a new power thrown in, breaking the order which would otherwise obtain, and also it may be a beginning of action, having no past. This indicates that there is no necessary connection with past antecedents, or means of predicting from them." "Prediction only indicates uniformity, not necessity." "Necessitarians test their views by statistical results, which, having a certain degree of uniformity, admit of like degree of certainty of prediction." "Perhaps nothing but finite volitions of finite free agents can produce the variety which is the basis of the average uniformity of aggregates."

The form of this work, which is that of two letters to John Stuart Mill, is unfavorable to severity of method in the arrangement of the matter. Those least able to adopt Mr. Hazard's views in detail, are highly interested to have his suggestive treatment of the problem of the will fully worked out.

THE SERMONS OF HENRY WARD BEECHER IN PLYMOUTH CHURCH, Brooklyn. From Verbatim Reports by T. J. Ellinwood. "Plymouth Pulpit," First and Second Series. 8vo. pp. 438, 466. New York: J. B. Ford and Company. 1869.

These volumes contain fifty-three sermons preached in the Plymouth Church, between September 1868, and June 1869. For everything that appears, although they were not written out by Mr. Beecher, he is to be held responsible for them in reference to their style, to the selection of topics, and to the methods of illustration and enforcement; and we suppose we are at liberty to regard them as a fair illustration of Mr. Beecher's usual style of preaching.

We certainly find in these sermons a great deal which we can conscientiously commend, and that amply justifies the exalted position which their author holds among American preachers. They are worthy of great praise for the freshness, vigor, and earnestness of their style; for the beauty and oftentimes surprising aptness of their illustrations; for the large amount of consolatory and stimulating thought embodied in them, and for the force and skill with which religious considerations are made to bear upon the most common transactions of life. The sermon, in the first volume, on the Love of Money, is one of the most powerful sermons in the English language.

Yet we think these sermons open to very grave criticism for their want of the specifically evangelical element. There is altogether too little in them which a disbeliever in the essential truths of the gospel might not have written. Mr. Beecher says in his preface, that chapters of theology, if preached now-a-days, would not be listened to. *We* say, that if Mr.

Beecher could attract the attention of such a congregation as his to some of the discussions contained in these sermons he could very easily attract their attention to such topics as total depravity, the nature and necessity of regeneration, and the nature and necessity of evangelical faith; and we do not know that we can point him to a better argument in favor of what we have said than the preaching of his own father.

There are one or two questions we should like to ask. If the object of the preacher is to convey ideas to the minds of the hearers by words whose meaning can be readily apprehended, what end is gained by using such words and phrases as "inwardnesses," "avertness," "hereditated," "basilar," "vacuous," "acerb," "effulge," "resurrected," "sapid," "salacious," "to traverse the canons of morality," "products that have in them no ministration of faculty"? We cannot help asking, also, whether Mr. Beecher, in his public prayers, is never troubled by the intervention between God and himself of the image of the reporter, diligently engaged in his task; nor can we suppress our intense admiration of the marvellous power possessed by Mr. Ellinwood, of uniting the abstraction of mind and fervor of spirit required in the devout worshipper of God, with the mental and manual labor which he has to put forth as a reporter of prayers.

MAN IN GENESIS AND GEOLOGY; or, the Biblical Account of Man's Creation tested by Scientific Theories of his Origin and Antiquity. By Joseph P. Thompson, D.D., LL.D. 12mo. pp. 149. New York: Samuel R. Wells. 1870.

It was a happy thought in Dr. Thompson to prepare and publish these Lectures. The questions discussed in them are such as candid and honest Christians are often perplexed about, and infidels are apt to use in the attempt to undermine the confidence of men in the Bible. They relate to the comparative antiquity of the world and of its human inhabitants, to the origin of man, the law of the Sabbath, and the relation of the sexes to each other. Dr. Thompson brings to the discussion of these questions unusual qualifications. He is a devout believer in the supernatural origin and inspiration of the Bible. Without being a professed scientist, his scientific attainments are yet sufficiently thorough and extensive to give much weight to his judgment with respect to any scientific question; and, what we regard as matter of no less importance, to put him into sympathy with scientists with respect to the difficulties which they find in the scriptures. These difficulties he does not evade, nor does he find a solution of them in a sneer. His views in reference to the questions of which he treats, we regard as eminently conservative and just. He does not attempt to fix the length of time spent in the creation; and yet he suggests no doubt as to the trustworthiness of the account of the creation in the first chapter of Genesis. He argues manfully and successfully

against the idea of the development of man from a lower order of animals; but yet finds what he conceives to be satisfactory reasons for supposing the date of the creation of man to be anterior to that commonly assigned to it. As to the length of this anterior period, it is not possible in the present state of science to form a decisive judgment. The opinions advanced in these Lectures, as to the law of the Sabbath and the mutual relation of the sexes, are such as should gain the assent of all right-minded investigators.

Dr. Thompson, as we have said, is not a professed votary of science, but a divine of varied culture and enlarged views. While we are not to look, therefore, in this book, for an exhaustive discussion of the points at issue, we can commend it to all readers as an eminently satisfactory and timely production.

THE LIFE OF JOSEPH ADDISON ALEXANDER, D.D., Professor in the Theological Seminary at Princeton, New Jersey. By Henry Carrington Alexander. 2 vols. 8vo. pp. 921. New York: Charles Scribner and Company. 1870.

The subject of this memoir was a very remarkable boy, and a no less remarkable man. The early promise was fully realized in mature life. At the age of six he began Latin, and might be seen among his companions with a little card containing a list of Latin words with their English equivalents, which he was to commit to memory. At ten he began the study of Hebrew, and not long after the Arabic and Persian. A facsimile of an Arabic translation of the title-page of "Waverley," made by him when thirteen years old, is preserved. When fourteen years of age he read in one week five books of Homer. He expressed great joy at finding a Persian manuscript in the library. He entered the junior class in Princeton College at the age of fifteen, and graduated with the highest honors at seventeen.

Such was the boy, who in manhood became an eminent philologist, knew twenty-five languages, contributed some fifty Articles to the Princeton Review, published a Commentary on Isaiah, Psalms, Matthew, Mark, and Acts, and other less important writings. He filled successively the chairs of three Professorships in Princeton Seminary. He was unquestionably a genius, had great versatility, a wonderful memory, a brilliant imagination, rare powers of acquisition, and indefatigable application. He visited Europe twice—in 1833 and 1853, and died in 1860, at the age of fifty-one.

The life of such a man has points of great attraction, both for the general reader and for those personally acquainted with him; and these volumes, prepared by his nephew, will be read with interest and profit. But had the record here given been condensed, as it might have been, into a single volume, it would have been more generally read, and cer-

tainly with no less interest and profit. In these days, when so many subjects demand attention, a biography in two volumes is somewhat of a venture.

While the public are under great obligations to the author of these interesting volumes, the taste of many will regard the somewhat frequent use of the first person pronoun as a blemish. The biographer may safely keep himself in the background. The views or statements expressed are understood to be his, and ordinarily need not be qualified by such expressions as "I think," and the like. In most of the instances where this pronoun occurs a slight change in the sentence would render it unnecessary: "I shall now present the reminiscences of" = the following are the reminiscences of (p. 94); "I have it on the best authority" = it is stated on the best authority (p. 94); "This (which I get from Mr. Cameron)" = this (from Mr. Cameron) p. 838; "I have already said enough" = enough has already been said (p. 847); "It is but right that I should add to this Dr. Green's own testimony" = it is but right to add to this, etc. (p. 877).

Yet, independent of this and some other defects, no one can read these memoirs without being stimulated by the example of this eminent scholar.

THE POPE AND THE COUNCIL. By Janus. Authorized Translation from the German. 12mo. pp. 346. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1870.

We consider this one of the relatively small class of books, written in the defence of religious liberty and pure Christianity against Romanism, which are adapted to carry forward, rather than impede, the cause which they profess to advocate. Its authors are Catholics of the liberal school. They are evidently in earnest, and as evidently in the right. They write in a calm but vigorous manner. They have obviously had access to original sources of information as to the points of which they treat, and have used them with conscientious fidelity. By means of numerous references, they give readers an opportunity of verifying the statements made, if they are inclined to do so.

This book was written in view of the Ecumenical Council now sitting in Rome; and we need scarcely say that its appearance is very timely. Altogether the largest and most important part of it is occupied in giving a history of the hypothesis of Papal infallibility, from its first beginning to the end of the sixteenth century; and in doing this, it furnishes, as we think, irrefragable arguments against that hypothesis; and by one who remembers how closely connected together are the perpetuity of Romanism and the doctrine of Papal infallibility, its importance, at this moment, cannot be overestimated.

It is very much to be wished that this book should be carefully studied by Protestant clergymen. What they may have to say to their congregations on the subject of the papacy will be thereby rendered much more effective.

A NEW CHURCH REGISTER. Prepared by Rev. Daniel P. Noyes, Secretary of Home Evangelization in Massachusetts. Boston: Nichols and Noyes.

Mr. Noyes has done a valuable service in the preparation of this much-needed register. Though the publication of blank sheets is not favorable to authorship, the work is by far more satisfactory than much of the matter, which it is becoming altogether too common to publish. Although the author publishes but few thoughts, he arranges his blanks so as to induce others to think.

The work before us is a well-arranged register for a church. Its usefulness is apparent from a moment's attention. No business can thrive without keeping accounts. The merchant who keeps no account of his purchases and sales is fully as wise as the minister who works on from year to year preserving no record to inform him where he stands. We have never seen a record-book which seemed better arranged. A blank page is ruled for the names of the successive pastors of the church. We hope that this list will not increase rapidly. Four pages are then given for the lists of deacons, and as many more for church committees and Sabbath-school superintendents. Several pages are then furnished in which to register the names of those who do the miscellaneous work, such as superintendents of branch Sabbath schools, etc. A large number of blank leaves is then ready for the names of all communicants, and opposite to the name blank spaces for date of entering and leaving the church. The names of all who receive baptism are registered in proper places. Very accurate blanks are provided in which to record marriages, and the marriage laws of each state are inserted in the book. Blanks follow for deaths; then spaces to record the councils and conferences in which the church takes part. Mr. Noyes's design is also to have attendance on public worship recorded. It is proposed that the sexton or some friend count the number in attendance on each Sabbath, and report to his pastor at the close of the day. The wisdom of recording this fact is obvious. Any one can see that a book of this kind carefully kept will tell vividly the present condition of the church in every department, as well as its past history. The influence cannot fail to be good when a church keeps such a barometer, revealing its state at a glance.

A COLLECTION OF THE PROVERBS OF ALL NATIONS. Compared, explained, and illustrated by Walter K. Kelly. 12mo. pp. 232. Andover: Warren F. Draper. 1869.

The history of proverbs is the history of language. To present all the proverbs of all languages would be an endless labor. To present all the proverbs of any one language is by no means a simple matter. The older a language, the more extended its dialects and interest, the broader will be the range of its "sayings," which originating perhaps in some repartee or jest, by frequent repetition lose all their original meaning and

become mere household words or aphorisms. We daily use expressions which in their literal rendering bear no possible relation to the subject under discussion, and by way of explanation can only say, "Custom has authorized us." The study of proverbs presents to the student many a subject replete with thought and investigation. To the philologist it opens the way to many a hidden word and phrase; to the ethnologist it gives many a clue to the various customs and thoughts of different nations.

"Proverbs of all nations" is readily understood from its title. It is a collection of common English proverbs with frequent explanations and historical allusions and synonymous aphorisms from all languages. They are grouped in various sections under such topics as Experience, Boasting, Woman, Will, Desire, and the like. The explanations are pertinent and in many cases connect the various proverbs together in such a manner as to render the book not only instructive, but exceedingly entertaining. We cite a few extracts taken almost at random (pp. 54 and 55): English—"The darkest hour is before the dawn"; French—"By dint of going wrong all will come right"; Italian—"Ill is the eve of well"; Persian—"It is at the narrowest part of the defile that the valley begins to widen"; Hebrew—"When the tale of bricks is doubled, Moses comes." Again (p. 144), while the English has, "A burnt child dreads the fire," the French and Italian and Spanish say: "A scalded dog dreads cold water," and the Italian again, "Whom a serpent has bitten a lizard alarms"; the Latin, "He that has been wrecked shudders even at still water." And (p. 158), "Ill-will never spoke well"; The Spaniards say: "He that is an enemy to the bride does not speak well of the wedding"; and the Italians, "A runaway monk never spoke in praise of his monastery." But no good idea of the book can be given by such small clippings, though even with these one can see the value which a student would place on such a key to national characteristics, laid upon his table. A copious index also adds to the value of the volume as a manual. The author has done good service in compiling, and the publisher in presenting in so handsome and convenient a form, a book which every student, as well as the general reader, will find a valuable aid in understanding the "sayings" of different nations.

THE WRITINGS OF MADAME SWETCHINE. Edited by Count De Falloux, of the French Academy. Translated by H. W. Preston. 12mo. pp. 255. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1869.

In these days of increasing intercourse between our country and Russia, any fragments of Russian literature possess a new value. The writings of this Russian lady, Madame Swetchine, have, however, a value independent of any nation or any sect, for she had one of those minds which belong to the universal world and the universal church. The present volume forms a beautiful sequel to the "Life and Letters of Madame Swetchine," which have already been so favorably received by the American public. "Life and Letters" present vividly the early doubts and struggles of this

gifted woman, describing especially her change from the Greek to the Catholic church. The present volume gives the "admonitions of her ripened wisdom, and the serene results of her early experience." Madame Swetchine was one who lived "in this world, but not of it"; her intellect interested all around her, while her wonderful spirituality drew them towards a better life. While she lived, she was a natural physician of the mind. Sick and erring hearts were drawn to reveal themselves to her, and on every page of the book she reveals that knowledge of the human heart which almost approached divination, and that beautiful womanly power which could really lead on another mind, while it seemed to follow. Many of the thoughts expressed in the book are hardly below the profoundness of the "Pensées" of Pascal, while they excel Pascal in a certain penetrating power and exquisite delicacy of expression.

All minds can find some nutriment in such a book as this; in it the suffering find thoughts and germs of thoughts adapted to give increasing consolation, while the theologian comes with delight to profound conclusions lying beyond all reasoning, discovered only by spiritual intuition, and set in a modest, delicate, frost-crystal expression — refreshing indeed to one who is wearied with the jargon of schools. It is interesting to notice how the thinking philosopher and the feeling woman both reach the same point. The book has a purity and interest from its thoroughly feminine character; the ideas are of a kind which a man would express clumsily if he knew them, and would not be apt to discover at all. The translator's work is done with accuracy, and often with beauty, and the volume is neatly printed. The pearl has a good setting.

EVERY-DAY SUBJECTS IN SUNDAY SERMONS. By Robert Laird Collier. 12mo. pp. 232. Boston: American Unitarian Association; Chicago: Western News Company. 1870.

Are we to regard this book as a fair specimen of the works now published by the American Unitarian Association? If so, we judge that since the days of Buckminster and Channing, there has happened a sad decline among Unitarians as it respects the standard of excellence in literature, and especially religious literature. We have found in all the thirteen sermons in this volume scarcely one attempt to describe any of the sentiments or state any of the truths which belong to spiritual religion; unless we are to consider as such a detestation of orthodoxy and a certain low form of philanthropy; nor are any of the lessons of duty which are laid down enforced by religious sanctions. Mr. Collier apparently has no conception, approaching to a correct one, of the nature of the religion of Christ. His conceptions of the nature of logic are as defective as those of religion. It is the duty of men — this is the way in which he reasons — to save sinners; yet, he affirms, in the most unqualified manner, that even the highest power conceivable cannot save sinners from the only things from which it is desirable that they should be saved; namely, the con-

sciousness and the consequences of sinning. But, he proceeds to argue, the consciousness and the consequences of sinning have an atonement in forgiveness; that is to say, the sinner can be saved by means of forgiveness, from all that from which it had just been affirmed to be impossible for even God to save him; or in other words, as forgiveness is nothing but the removal from the sinner of the bad consequences of sinning, the sinner can be saved by being saved.

These sermons are an altogether unique production; though brilliant and attractive, they have marked faults.

ESSAYS ON THE SUPERNATURAL ORIGIN OF CHRISTIANITY; with special reference to the Theories of Renan, Strauss, and the Tübingen School. By George P. Fisher, D.D., Professor of Church History in Yale College. New and enlarged Edition. 8vo. pp. 620. New York: Charles Scribner and Co. 1870.

Professor Fisher's book was favorably noticed in the *Bibliotheca Sacra* for April 1866. The present edition differs from the first in the addition of a somewhat extended Introduction and several Supplementary Notes, in which are discussed anew some of the most important topics considered in the body of the work, and the recent literature bearing on the subject incidentally reviewed. It is certainly an auspicious sign of the times, that a third edition of a work of such a character as this should be called for so soon.

THE TEMPERANCE BIBLE-COMMENTARY: giving at one View, Version, Criticism, and Exposition, in regard to all Passages of Holy Writ bearing on "Wine" and "Strong Drink," or illustrating the Principles of the Temperance Reformation. By Frederic Richard Lees and Dawson Burns. Second Ed. 8vo. pp. 456. London: S. W. Partridge. 1869.

The main proposition attempted to be established in this Commentary is, that there is nothing in the nature and usage of the words for "wine," etc. which at all teaches that the use of intoxicating drink is in harmony with the divine will. There are thirteen different words used in the Bible, which are translated "wine." Some of these words signify fermented juice of the grape; others, unfermented. In all passages which indicate approval of the use of wine, the unfermented juice of the grape is meant, and therefore the scriptures do not justify the use of any intoxicating beverages. We do not anticipate any harm to the cause of virtue and religion as the result of the universal acceptance of this theory.

LOYALTY TO CHRIST: its Nature considered. By a Professed Loyalist. 18mo. pp. 105. Boston: Crocker and Brewster. 1869.

A vigorous and well-meant protest is uttered in this little book against certain doctrinal errors alleged to be set forth in the "Independent," "Gates Ajar," and other publications; and also against certain forms of

amusement, now alarmingly prevalent. Whether this book is happily adapted to accomplish its excellent purpose, is somewhat questionable. It is pervaded by a tone of austerity which we think will interfere with its usefulness.

SORROW. By Rev. John Reid, author of "Voices of the Soul answered in God." 12mo. pp. 373. New York: Robert Carter and Brothers. 1870.

The present work contains some very excellent ideas, while the many quotations show that its author is well read. But the ideas are not marked by any striking originality; they are gathered from the common stock, and somewhat loosely put together. An author should marshal his thoughts like the ranks of an army; but the ideas of the present work are not controlled and arranged as though the author had a definite aim. The real meat of the book could have been given in much less space.

THE SHEPHERD OF ISRAEL: or, Illustrations from the Inner Life. By Rev. Duncan Macgregor, M.A., Minister of St. Peter's, Dundee, Scotland. 8vo. pp. 339. New York: Robert Carter and Brothers. 1870.

We cannot regard these as sermons of the highest order, though they have very decided merit; they are convincing, pungent, and sometimes quite picturesque. The author has a strong and vivid imagination, neither is he wanting in logical power. To our minds, the best feature of the discourses is their strikingly evangelical character. The writer presents his theme with a heartfelt and really refreshing earnestness. We notice some slight errors in the language, and the sermons are better adapted for delivery in the pulpit than for the critical reader. They are discourses which might be delivered with great power and immediate effect.

A DICTIONARY AND CONCORDANCE of the Names of Persons and Places, and of some of the more remarkable Terms which occur in the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments. Compiled by William Henderson, M.D. Royal 8vo. pp. 689. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark; New York: Scribner, Welford, and Co.

On the topics of which this volume treats, it is very much fuller than any of the Concordances usually accessible. For example, under the name "Aaron," Cruden gives sixty-three passages; this volume, three hundred and fifty-six. Under "David," Cruden has three hundred and seventy-eight passages; this, eleven hundred and twenty-seven. The passages in which the word "Lord" occurs in the Old Testament occupy forty-one pages, arranged under four different heads, according to the original word translated "Lord." In thirty-nine of these forty-one pages, the word rendered "Lord" is Yehovah in the original. The passages in which the word "God" (Elohim in the original) occurs, cover eight pages; "Israel," seventeen; "Jerusalem," four; "Egypt," four; "Judah," six;

"God" (Θεός) in New Testament, eight; "Lord," five; "Christ," four; "Jesus," seven. This is a sufficient illustration of the fulness of the work.

The place, person, etc. is briefly described at the head of each Article. Part I. embraces the names occurring in the Old Testament; Part II., those in the New. The Appendix gives the value of scripture weights, measures, and coins.

Though the author thinks that many will consider the work "an example of misdirected labor," it certainly will be found a very convenient and valuable addition to the apparatus for the study of the Bible; and the thanks of the Biblical student are due to the compiler and publishers for furnishing him this new help.

Messrs T. and T. Clark of Edinburgh have just published two volumes on Biblical Introduction: one on the Old Testament by Professor Keil, and one on the New by the late Professor Friedrich Bleek. Both are from the second German edition. The second volume of each, completing the work, is soon to appear. The authors are both known as eminent biblical critics, with unshaken faith in the scriptures.

The same House have just issued the first instalment of the fourth year of the Ante-Nicene Library, in two volumes; one comprising the second volume of Cyprian, the other the works of Methodius and various other writers of the same period.

This series forms a collection of all the works of the Fathers of the Christian church prior to the council of Nice. Fourteen volumes are already published, and seven more are promised. So far the series is edited with great ability, which the publishers have presented in a very attractive form. These volumes are full of instruction for the student of church history and theology. All these works of the Messrs Clark are published in this country through Messrs Scribner, Welford, and Co.

The Second Edition, in one volume, of the Life of Rufus Choate, by President Brown, of Hamilton College, is a valuable and welcome addition to our biographical literature. An extended and favorable notice of the First Edition was given in the April No. of 1863. Published by Little, Brown, and Company, Boston.

There is evidently a demand for small Hebrew Grammars, as well as Latin and Greek. W. F. Draper has just published Elements of the Hebrew Language, by Rev. A. D. Jones, A. M., containing reading lessons and Clavis. pp. 163. Asher and Co., of London, publish Ewald's Introductory Hebrew Grammar, pp. 266.

The Bible in our Public Schools, being the case of the Cincinnati Board of Education, with the arguments of counsel, and the opinions and decision of the Court, is a very timely publication. Published by Robert Clark and Company, Cincinnati. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company.

Guericke's Manual of Church History, translated by Prof. W. G. T. Shedd, D.D., has just appeared from the press of W. F. Draper. This embraces Mediaeval Church History, from A.D. 590 to 1073. pp. 160.

THE
BIBLIOTHECA SACRA.

ARTICLE I.

THE CRUCIFIXION ON THURSDAY—NOT FRIDAY.

BY REV. J. K. ALDRICH, EAST BRIDGEWATER, MASS.

It is generally believed that our Saviour was crucified on Friday, the fifteenth day of the Jewish month Nisan. A careful examination of the subject has confirmed us in the opinion that the established theory is incorrect. We believe he was crucified on Thursday, for these reasons: 1. If he was crucified on Friday, his body could not have lain *three days* and *three nights* in the grave, and, in all probability, he must have risen on the *second*, and not the *third* day, according to the scriptures. 2. If he was crucified on Friday, there is a plain discrepancy between John and the other Evangelists. 3. His crucifixion on Thursday, removes both these difficulties.

1. On the assumption that Christ was crucified on Friday, he lay in the grave but *two nights* and a part of three days, whereas it is said that he should be three days and *three nights* in the heart of the earth (Matt. xii. 40). The language here is specific, and it was uttered by the Saviour, who by reason of his divinity was omniscient. He foreknew the controversy that would arise in regard to the interval between his death and resurrection; that the term "three days and three nights" would be understood literally, and that if the period between his death and resurrection did not correspond

it would produce scepticism and caviling among the enemies of the truth. Moreover, he was the living embodiment of the truth, and we believe that with reference to so important an event, he would not have used language which was evidently liable to mislead. When he said three days and three nights, the Jews, no doubt, understood him to mean precisely that which the language is naturally intended to convey. The efforts made by commentators to explain it differently are to get over a difficulty—square it to a particular theory. Their explanations are unnatural and forced.

Assuming that he was crucified on Friday, the common statement is, that “he was in the grave but two nights, and a part of three days,” since the first day of the week was the day of his resurrection. In advocating this theory, they say: “This computation is, however, strictly in accordance with the Jewish mode of reckoning. If it had not been the Jews would have understood it, and would have charged our Saviour with being a false prophet, for it was well known to them that he had spoken this prophecy. Such a charge, however, was never made; and it is plain therefore, that what was meant by the prediction was accomplished.” No attempt is here made to prove that Christ was crucified on Friday. That which should have been proved, being taken for granted, is made the basis of the argument. The inference is, that there must be some way of reconciling the assertion with the assumed fact; that it must have been understood, according to the Jewish reckoning, to mean, not as it says, “three days and three nights,” but two nights and a part of three days, or else “the Jews would have charged our Saviour with being a false prophet.” A theory is set up, and the argument founded upon it. But the premise is wrong, and it leads to a false conclusion.

Again, it is said, that “It was a maxim among the Jews in computing time, that a part of a day was to be received as the whole”; and in proof of this we are referred to 2 Chron. x. 5, 12; Gen. xlii. 17, 18; Est. iv. 16, compared

with Est. v. 1. In 2 Chron. x. 5, Rehoboam said to the people of Israel: "Come again to me after three days," and in the twelfth verse, we read that "Jeroboam and all the people came to Rehoboam on the third day, as the king bade, saying, 'Come to me on the third day.'" In Gen. xlii. 17 Joseph is represented as putting his brethren in prison, when they had come down into Egypt to buy corn. "And he put them altogether into ward three days." And in the eighteenth verse, "Joseph said to them, the third day, this do and live," and this, taken with the context, is proof that he then released them. In Est. iv. 16 Queen Esther desires that the Jews in Shushan, should "neither eat nor drink three days, night or day," and declares that she and her maidens would fast likewise, and so would she go in unto the king. And in the fifth chapter and first verse we learn that she did this on the third day. These are all the passages; and what do they prove? Only that the expressions "after three days," and "on the third day," are equivalent. So that when our Saviour taught his disciples, that "after three days he should rise again" (Mark viii. 31), and again, that "the third day" he should rise again (Mark x. 34), the passages are found to be in harmony, and by his resurrection on the third day his declaration was fulfilled. But it in no sense proves that the expression three nights, as used by our Saviour, is to be interpreted to mean but two.

It is said again, that "the term 'three days and three nights' is a round number according to the popular mode of Hebrew reckoning, although Christ lay only one day and two nights in the grave." It is claimed that if it be necessary to make good the three days and nights, it must be done by having recourse to the Jewish method of computing time, and that in the Jerusalem Talmud (cited by Lightfoot) it is said that a day and night together make a *νυχθήμερον*, and that any part of such period is counted as the whole. But unfortunately for this argument, the expression is not *νυχθήμερον*, as in 2 Cor. xi. 25, where Paul says, "a night and a day have I been in the deep," but *τρεις ἡμέρας* and *τρεις*

νύκτας, three days and three nights. Instead of resorting to these expedients, why not take the passage literally as it reads, when the Bible, as we purpose to show, admits clearly of this interpretation.

But were we to admit all that is claimed, that "three days and three nights," according to the Hebrew mode of reckoning, does signify but two nights and a part of three days, we should still labor under a difficulty. If Christ was crucified on Friday, we have no evidence even that he lay in the grave a part of three days. His death did not take place until after the ninth hour, or three o'clock in the afternoon (Matt. xxvii. 46-50). After that the Jews besought Pilate that the legs of the crucified might be broken, and that they might be taken away. The permission of Pilate was obtained, and word was brought to the soldiers. "Then came the soldiers, and brake the legs of the first, and of the other which was crucified with him. But when they came to Jesus, and saw that he was dead already, they brake not his legs: but one of the soldiers with a spear pierced his side, and forthwith came there out blood and water" (John xix. 33-35).

All this, which occurred subsequently to Christ's death, the going of the Jews to Pilate, the obtaining of his permission, and the carrying of the information to the soldiers, must have occupied some time, so that Christ could not, to say the least, have been taken down from the cross until very nearly the close of the day. But before he was taken down, Joseph went to Pilate and begged the body of Jesus. "When the even was come there came a rich man of Arimathea named Joseph, who also himself was Jesus' disciple. He went to Pilate and begged the body of Jesus" (Matt. xxvii. 57, 58). "And now when the even was come" etc. (Mark xv. 42). The original word in both these instances, translated "even," is *ὀψίας*. This, in its proper or literal sense, Robinson says signifies "late evening."¹ The Jews reckoned two evenings, one commencing at three o'clock,

¹ New Testament Greek Lexicon.

and the other, it is believed, at five. The word sometimes, we admit, is used to denote the former evening, but it cannot in this instance, since Christ did not die until after the first evening had commenced. Luke also specifies the time of Joseph's coming to Pilate: "And that day was the preparation day, and the Sabbath drew on, and behold there was a man named Joseph" etc. (Luke xxiii. 50, 51). In Lange's Commentary¹ it is said: "In all probability we have to understand the late Friday afternoon, between five and six o'clock. *Ἐπέφωσκε* (the word translated 'drew on') signifies here the dawning, not of the natural, but of the legal Saturday." Joseph then could not have gone to Pilate until five o'clock, or after. In going to Pilate in all probability they went to the praetorium, or governor's house, and whether this was the palace of Herod, or more probably the fortress Antonia, and whether the place of Christ's crucifixion was that assigned by Christian tradition or not, since it was without the walls of the city, it must have been some distance between the two places. And as Pilate before giving permission called to him (sent for) the centurion, to ascertain if Christ was already dead, this distance must have been travelled over four times, twice by Joseph, in going and returning, once by the messenger sent by Pilate, and once by the centurion. The time thus occupied, and in taking down the body of Jesus, wrapping it in linen with the spices, and laying it in the sepulchre, could not reasonably be supposed to have been less than an hour, and this would bring it to six o'clock, which would have been the beginning of Saturday. The Jews reckoned their day from evening to evening, and the legal day in the time of our Saviour commenced evidently at six o'clock in the afternoon. The night at that time among the Jews was divided into four watches; a fourth watch having been introduced by the Romans. These watches are all distinctly mentioned in Mark xiii. 35: "At even, or at midnight, or at the cock-crowing, or in the

¹ Lange's Commentary on Luke, p. 383 of the American edition.

morning.” Says Horne:¹ “The first watch was at even, and continued from six till nine; the second commenced at nine and ended at twelve, or midnight; the third watch lasted from twelve till three; and the morning watch closed at six.” Now as the first watch began at six, that was the beginning of their night, and, as the Jews reckoned their day from evening to evening, of course of their legal day.

The same is seen, also, from the Jews dividing their day into hours. Thus seven o’clock was the first hour, eight the second, nine the third, and so on; and six was always the twelfth hour, showing that six o’clock ended the legal day, and, of course, began the next.² The natural day of the Jews varied in length according to the season, but not the civil. The earliest mention of hours in the sacred writings is in Daniel; hence it is believed that the Jews derived this method of dividing the time from the Babylonians during the captivity; and as the Babylonians reckoned the natural day from sunrise to sunset, so, probably, did the Jews. But while the Jews, like the Babylonians, reckoned their natural day from sunrise to sunset, their civil or legal day, as we have seen, which we must follow in our reckoning, was from six o’clock in the afternoon of one day to six o’clock in the afternoon of the next, and was either longer or shorter than the natural day, according to the season.

We have shown that the body of our Saviour cannot reasonably be supposed to have been laid in the sepulchre before six o’clock, and this, on the assumption that he was crucified on Friday, would have been the beginning of Saturday. So that, as he rose on the morning of the first day, his body could have lain in the grave only on Saturday and a part of Sunday, and hence he must have risen on the second, and not on the third, according to the scripture. We do not get even the parts of three days which have been claimed. And, even admitting the unreasonable idea that

¹ Introduction to the Critical Study and Knowledge of the Holy Scriptures, Vol. ii. chap. iv. p. 73.

² See Horne’s Introduction, Vol. ii. p. 72.

he was laid in the sepulchre before six o'clock, we know it could have been but a few minutes before six, as Joseph did not go to Pilate to solicit his body until after five; and how unreasonable to suppose that the fraction of an hour would be regarded in Jewish reckoning as a day! Evidently, he was not put into the sepulchre until six o'clock, or after, which, according to Jewish reckoning, was the day after he was crucified.

But it may be objected that, according to the Jewish law, the person hanged was to be taken down the same day: "His body shall not remain all night upon the tree, but thou shalt in any wise bury him that day" (Deut. xxi. 23). And again, it is said: "The Jews, therefore, because it was the preparation, that the bodies should not remain upon the cross on the Sabbath-day (for that Sabbath-day was an high day), besought Pilate that their legs might be broken, and that they might be taken away" (Luke xix. 31). We answer that Josephus, who is good authority for the customs of the Jews in his day, which was but a few years after Christ, has taught us, by inference from the Jewish practice, that this had reference, not to the civil, but to the natural, day; that the bodies of such were to be buried before sunset. Thus he says: "So great care did the Jews take respecting sepulture, that even the bodies of those condemned to be crucified they took down and buried before sunset."¹ Now, as our Saviour was crucified on the fourteenth of the month Nisan, answering to about the first of our April, the sun did not set in Palestine until about a quarter past six; hence, though not buried until six o'clock, or after, he would still have been buried before sunset; after the beginning of the legal day, and yet before the close of the natural.

2. If Christ was crucified on Friday, then there is a discrepancy between John and the other evangelists. The synoptists say: "Now the first day of the feast of unleavened bread the disciples came to Jesus, saying, Where wilt thou that we prepare for thee to eat the passover?" (Matt. xxvi. 17.)

¹ Wars of the Jews, Book iv. chap. 5. sec. 2.

“And the first day of unleavened bread, when they killed the passover, His disciples said unto him, Where wilt thou that we go and prepare that thou mayest eat the passover?” (Mark xiv. 12.) “Then came the day of unleavened bread, when the passover must be killed. And he sent Peter and John, saying, Go and prepare us the passover, that we may eat. And they said unto him, Where wilt thou that we prepare?” (Luke xxii. 7, 8, 9.)

It will be noticed here that the day in which Christ sent his disciples to prepare for him the passover was the first day of unleavened bread, and the day in which the passover or paschal lamb was killed, that is, the first day of the passover (which was called also the feast of unleavened bread), and the fourteenth of the month Nisan, for that was the day in which the passover was killed (Ex. xii. 6): “And ye shall keep it up (the lamb) until the fourteenth day of the same month, and the whole assembly of the congregation of Israel shall kill it in the evening” (between the evenings, as is the marginal reading from the Hebrew), that is, between three and five o’clock in the afternoon, or near the close of the fourteenth. In regard to this, there is no question. “In the fourteenth day of the first month at even is the Lord’s passover” (Lev. xxiii. 5). “In the fourteenth day of this month at even [marginal reading from the Hebrew, in our version, between the two evenings], ye shall keep it in his appointed season. And they kept the passover on the fourteenth day of the first month at even, in the wilderness of Sinai” (Num. ix. 3, 5). And in Deut. xvi. 6, it is said: “Thou shalt sacrifice the passover at even, at the going down of the sun.” It must, therefore, have been killed near the close of the fourteenth day. With this commentators agree. Says Dr. Robinson: “The true time of killing the passover in our Lord’s day was between the ninth and eleventh hour,” i.e. between three and five o’clock, or “towards sunset.”¹ Says Horne: “The Jews reckoned two evenings; the former began at the ninth

¹ English Harmony, p. 193.

hour of the natural day, or three o'clock in the afternoon, and the latter at the eleventh hour. Thus the paschal lamb was required to be sacrificed between the evenings, which Josephus tells us "the Jews in his time did from the ninth hour until the eleventh."¹

But, while the passover was to be killed between the two evenings on the fourteenth day, it was to be eaten on the night of the fifteenth. Thus Ex. xii. 8: "And they shall eat the flesh in that night [the night after it had been killed], roast with fire, and unleavened bread." As they killed it between the evenings of the fourteenth, it could not have been prepared and roasted before six o'clock, which, as we have shown, was the commencement of their legal day; and hence it could not have been eaten until the fifteenth. The Jews reckoned their day from evening to evening (Lev. xxiii. 32). But the proof is positive. The Jews left Egypt the same night (Ex. xii. 29-37), after midnight, evidently toward morning. But in Num. xxxiii. 3 it is said that "They departed from Rameses on the fifteenth day of the first month"; and as they ate the passover on the day that they departed, they must have eaten it on the fifteenth. Accordingly, we are told: "In the fourteenth day of the first month at even is the Lord's passover. And on the fifteenth day of the same month is the feast of unleavened bread" (Lev. xxiii. 5, 6). Also: "And in the fourteenth day of the first month is the passover of the Lord, and in the fifteenth day of this month is the feast" (Num. xxviii. 16, 17). Dr. Robinson says: "The paschal lamb was killed on the fourteenth of Nisan, towards sunset, and was eaten the same evening, after the fifteenth day of Nisan had begun."² This, as we have seen, accords with the scripture narrative, and on this point, also, commentators are agreed.

Christ, then, according to the synoptists, must have sent his disciples to prepare for him the passover on the fourteenth day of the month Nisan; for that was the day in

¹ Introduction, Vol. ii. Part ii. chap. 4. See War of Jews, iv. chap. 9. § 3.

² Greek Harmony, p. 207.

which the passover must be killed, and this, if he was crucified on Friday, must have been Thursday. He ate the passover with them the evening after, which, according to the Jewish law, as we have seen, must have been the beginning of the fifteenth, with us Thursday evening, but with them the evening of Friday. This is according to the synoptists.

But John (xiii. 1, 2, 4) speaks of Christ's supper with his disciples as being before the passover: "Now before the feast of the passover, when Jesus knew that his hour was come, that he should depart out of this world to the Father, having loved his own, he loved them unto the end; and supper being ended, he riseth from supper" etc. In xviii. 28 he says: "Then led they Jesus from Caiaphas into the hall of judgment, and it was early; and they themselves went not into the judgment hall, lest they should be defiled, but that they might eat the passover;" implying that the Jews were expecting to partake of the paschal supper the ensuing evening, and of course had not already eaten it. But the ensuing evening would have been the sixteenth, and hence, on this supposition, the Jews in the Saviour's time must have broken the Mosaic law. That they did not break it is evident, for Josephus says,¹ that in his time (and he was born but about seven years after), the Jews sacrificed the passover on the fourteenth, and observed the day of unleavened bread on the fifteenth. Again, John (xix. 14) speaks of the day in which Christ was crucified as being the day of the preparation of the passover: "And it was the preparation of the passover, about the sixth hour." The preparation of the passover evidently was the day on which the passover was to be killed, or on which it was prepared to be eaten, and this was on the fourteenth; but Friday was the fifteenth, and if Christ was crucified on that day, then this, and not the fourteenth, must have been the day of preparation. On the assumption, therefore, that Christ was crucified on Friday, there is a plain discrepancy between John and the other evangelists.

¹ Josephus, *Antiq.* Book iii. chap. 10. sec. 5.

Robinson, in common with other commentators, claims that Christ ate the passover, with his disciples, on Thursday evening, according to our reckoning, but on the beginning of Friday, the fifteenth, according to the Jewish, whereas, if this theory be correct, the plain inference according to John is, that the Jews did not eat the passover until the sixteenth. Dr. Scott believed this, for he says: "Christ was crucified on this day of holy convocation," that is, on the day in which they eat the passover, the day of unleavened bread, the fifteenth, for that was the day of holy convocation. "In the first day ye shall have a holy convocation; ye shall do no servile work therein" (Lev. xxiii. 7). Not the day called elsewhere the first day of unleavened bread, for that was the day of preparation, the fourteenth, but the first of the seven that succeeded it, as will be seen by taking the passage in its connection. "Seven days must ye eat unleavened bread," commencing with the *fifteenth*, "In the first day ye shall have a holy convocation." "Christ was crucified on this day of holy convocation," says Dr. Scott; "yet, whether the Jews calculated the days in another manner or not, it seems not to have been thus observed, but the next, being the Sabbath, was a high day, and probably was kept as the day of holy convocation." Dr. Scott would not have reasoned thus if he had not been attempting to reconcile John's statement with that of the other evangelists; and to do this on the assumption that Christ was crucified on Friday, he saw apparently no other way. And hence he inferred that for some reason that year the Jews did not obey the commandment.

Says Tholuck: "This difference [between John and the other evangelists] is one of the most litigated questions in the criticism of the Gospels." "John designates the day on which the passover should have been eaten as the day on which Christ was crucified. The contrary date fixed by the synoptists, which would make the crucifixion fall on the fifteenth of Nisan, that is, on the first day of the feast, is encumbered with great difficulties. The larger portion of

the modern critics have been led by this subject to the ultimate result that there must be a mistake on one or other side, either on the part of John, or on that of the first three evangelists." These assertions, with others that might be cited, especially when taken in connection with the facts, are sufficient to show that with the present understanding that Christ was crucified on Friday, and that Friday was the fifteenth of the Jewish month Nisan, there is not only an apparent, but a real discrepancy, between John and the other evangelists.

Four ways have been devised in the attempt to reconcile it: The first is, that Christ did not eat the passover with his disciples on the evening before his crucifixion. The second, that he *did* eat it, and that the Jews ate it also, at the same time. The third, that he did eat *a* passover, but one of his own institution, different from that eaten by the Jews. The fourth, that he did eat the passover, but anticipated the time by eating it the day before.

The first argument is, that Christ did not eat the passover, but merely a supper with his disciples. In proof of this it is said that John does not call the supper which Christ ate with his disciples, a passover supper, but on the contrary says it was before the feast of the passover; that he makes the next day to be the day of the passover when he says, in speaking of the morning of the next day, "The Jews would not go into the judgment hall lest they should be defiled, but that they might eat the passover" (John xviii. 28), implying that they had not then eaten it. And in xix. 14, speaking of Friday noon, he says: "It was the preparation of the passover." And again, it is said that, among all the expressions used, there is no mention of any lamb. These arguments we think are evasive.

That our Saviour did eat the passover with his disciples is evident. 1. He sent his disciples to make ready the passover — not a supper, but the passover. 2. It was the proper time — the first day of unleavened bread — when the passover must be killed. 3. "He said unto them, With

desire I have desired to eat this passover with you before I suffer" (Luke xxii. 15). 4. He ate it at that hour in the evening in which it was to be eaten. "And when the *hour* was come, he sat down, and the twelve apostles with him" (Luke xxii. 14).

In regard to there being no mention of a lamb, it was unnecessary; the term "passover" defined it. The day on which the passover must be killed was the day on which the paschal lamb was to be killed. That was the passover, by synecdoche. When Peter and John had received their Lord's command to go and prepare the passover, it is said: "They went and found as he had said unto them, and they made ready the passover" (Luke xxii. 13), that is, got a lamb, and prepared it for the purpose, according to the law. That Christ ate the passover with his disciples is as plain as language can make it. The second opinion is, that he did eat the passover at the same time with the Jews. And to prove this, the attempt is made to explain away the passages in John. Thus, it is said that the expression "before the feast of the passover" (John xiii. 1) has reference, not to the paschal supper, but to the entire festival of unleavened bread, which continued seven days. To this there is one fatal objection. Not only does the expression "before the passover" seem to imply the paschal or passover supper, which gave the name to the entire festival, but that supper was the beginning of the festival; and therefore, as Christ and his disciples were then eating it, if the Jews also were eating it at the same time, it could not be said to be "before the feast [or festival] of unleavened bread." That cannot be before a thing which occurs after it has commenced.

The expression "And they themselves went not into the judgment hall, lest they should be defiled, but that they might eat the passover" (John xviii. 28), is interpreted, by the supporters of this theory, to mean, again, not that they might eat the paschal or passover supper, but that they might keep or celebrate the passover festival, or eat the passover sacrifices throughout the remaining days. It is

plain that this explanation would not have been thought of, if it had not have been to relieve them of a difficulty. But that this theory is inadmissible, will be seen from the remarks of Benson, which Townsend quotes and endorses.¹ He says: “No critical distortion appears to me capable of giving to xviii. 28—*καὶ αὐτοῦ οὐχ εἰσῆλθον εἰς τὸ πραιτώριον ἵνα μὴ μιανθῶσιν, ἀλλ’ ἵνα φάγωσι τὸ Πάσχα*—any other meaning or translation than this. ‘And they themselves went not into the judgment hall, lest they should be defiled, but that they might eat the paschal offering,’ the sacrifice of the passover. The word *Πάσχα*, when alone, is not always used exclusively for the paschal lamb, but often in a more enlarged and extended sense, for the whole feast of unleavened bread; but the phrase *φαγεῖν τὸ Πάσχα*, though used by each of the first three evangelists, and more than once, is never applied except to the eating of the paschal offering itself, at the time appointed, in remembrance of the Lord’s passover in Egypt.” The inference, therefore, from the words of John above quoted is, that Christ and his disciples did not eat the passover at the same time with the rest of the Jews.

Still another passage: “And it was the preparation of the passover, about the sixth hour” (John xix. 14), referring to the day of his crucifixion, which would lead any unbiassed reader to suppose, on the face of it, that it was the preparation for the passover festival, by the putting away of the leaven out of their houses, the killing of the paschal lamb, etc., which occurred the day before the passover was eaten, it is attempted to explain away, by saying that it was not the preparation, literally, of the passover, but of the paschal Sabbath, that is, the Jewish Sabbath, or Saturday, that occurred in the passover week. But the fatal objection to this is that that Sabbath was not the paschal Sabbath, but, as we shall prove hereafter, the paschal Sabbath was the day of holy convocation, the first of the seven days of the feast, succeeding the day of preparation, in which un-

¹ Notes on the Gospels, p. 156.

leavened bread was eaten ; and hence, admitting that the preparation of the passover really meant the day before the paschal Sabbath, it would be in exact accordance with the literal interpretation.

The third opinion is that Christ ate a passover with his disciples, but not the prescribed passover.

We answer first, that there is no intimation that this was not the regular passover. Second, it is not consistent with the character of Christ, to suppose that he would observe a passover different from that which had been commanded by Jehovah. Third, and here we quote the argument of Dr. Newcombe, Archbishop of Armagh, on Luke xxii. 15: "And he said unto them with desire have I desired to eat this passover with you before I suffer." He says: "It is to be noted that they had now sat down to eat that passover, which had been before prepared, and that every word which is spoken is peculiarly proper to the occasion. 'With desire,' says our Lord, 'have I desired (τοῦτο τὸ Πάσχα φαγεῖν), to eat this very passover;' not ἐσθίειν τὸ Πάσχα, 'to eat the passover' or something commemorative of it, but τοῦτο τὸ Πάσχα, 'this very passover,' and it is no mean proof that they were then in the act of eating the flesh of the paschal lamb, from the use of the word φαγεῖν, which is most proper to the eating of flesh; as ἐσθίειν signifies eating in general," or eating bread, pulse, etc. The same word in reference to the same act of eating the passover, not to the bread and wine of the holy supper, is used in verse 16: "For I say unto you, that I will not any more eat thereof (οὐ μὴ φάγω ἐξ αὐτοῦ, 'I will not eat of *him* or *it*'; viz. the paschal lamb) 'until it be fulfilled in the kingdom of God;' i.e. this shall be the last passover I shall celebrate on earth." We claim, therefore, that Christ did eat, not a different passover, but the veritable passover, appointed under the Mosaic legislation.

The fourth opinion set forth in the effort to reconcile the statement of John with that of the other evangelists, is that our Lord did eat the passover this year, but not at the same

time with the Jews. To this opinion also we are unable to assent.

Christ ate the passover with his disciples the evening before his crucifixion, which on the assumption that he was crucified on Friday, must have been Thursday evening ; and this is the general belief. In that case the disciples, Peter and John, were sent by Jesus to prepare for him the passover, some time in the day of Thursday. This, by general consent, is believed to have been the fourteenth of the month Nisan.¹ Now if the Jews did not kill the passover until Friday and ate it on Friday evening, then they violated the Jewish law, which was that they should kill it on the fourteenth. Instead of eating it on the beginning of the fifteenth, the day of unleavened bread, they must, on this hypothesis, have eaten it on the beginning of the sixteenth. Now we know that in the time of Josephus, who lived but a few years after, they killed the passover on the fourteenth, as they were commanded. How then are we to account for such violation at the time of Christ's crucifixion? Moreover, such a violation is not in keeping with the Jewish character. They were strict in observing the very letter of the law. That Christ observed the passover at the proper time is evident, for the time that he sent Peter and John to make preparation is said to have been "The first day of unleavened bread, when the passover must be killed." These various opinions therefore do not fully clear up the difficulty.

We are presented with the incontrovertible fact, that Christ ate the passover with his disciples before the time of its being eaten by the Jews ; that they did not eat it until after his crucifixion. Now if we can find any way of showing that Christ and the Jews, though keeping the passover at different times, both observed it on what might be regarded as the proper day ; that the same day might properly be called the preparation of the passover, and the preparation for the Sabbath, in accordance with this idea, and that every

¹ See Dr. Robinson and others.

passage in John bearing upon this subject may thus be made to correspond with the assertions of the other evangelists, it will satisfy all the conditions of the problem, and, by reconciling this apparent discrepancy, will furnish a yet stronger proof that the scriptures have been written by divine inspiration.

If Christ was crucified as we believe on Thursday, such an explanation can readily be given.

If he was crucified on Thursday, then he ate the passover with his disciples on Wednesday evening, and must have sent Peter and John some time in the day of Wednesday to prepare it. But it is distinctly said that this was "the first day of unleavened bread," that is, the first day of the feast of unleavened bread, "when the passover must be killed," reckoned as one of the days of the festival, because it was the day of preparation (Matt. xxvi. 17; Mark xiv. 12; Luke xxii. 7). And as the passover was to be killed between the two evenings, on the fourteenth day of the month Nisan (Ex. xii. 6; Lev. xxiii. 5; Num. ix. 3), it (Wednesday), must have been the fourteenth. Now it is believed that Christ was crucified in the thirty-fourth year of his age; and the Christian era, according to Archbishop Usher, and the modern chronologers generally, commences four years after the birth of Christ.¹ This then would make the date of his crucifixion to have been A.D. 30, according to the generally received opinion. And it is a remarkable fact that Roger Bacon, Mann and Scaliger, Dodwell and Ferguson, who have calculated the passover full moons, which determine the fourteenth of Nisan, from A.D. 26 to A.D. 36, a period of ten years; all agree that in A.D. 30 it fell on Wednesday, while in every year, with that exception, they differ, some claiming that it fell on one day of the week and some on another. To say the least, this is strong presumptive evidence, that the fourteenth of Nisan, in the year that our Saviour was crucified, was Wednesday. And hence, being the first day of unleavened bread when the passover must be killed, it

¹ See Religious Encyclopaedia, p. 44.

was the day when Christ sent Peter and John to prepare for him the passover. And as he ate the passover with his disciples that evening (Wednesday evening), he would eat it, according to the commandment, on the beginning of the fifteenth, the day of unleavened bread (Lev. xxiii. 6; Num. xxviii. 17), since the Jews reckoned their days from evening to evening (Lev. xxiii. 32).

That Christ ate the passover the evening before the Jews, coincides not only with the testimony of John, as we have seen, but was the general opinion of the ancients. Tertullian, Clement, Origen, Chrysostom, Apollinarius, Euthymius, and others; of various members also of the church of Rome, as Lamy, Calmet; and of the Protestant theologians Cappellus, Lampe, Deyling, Gude, and indeed of almost all theologians until the last century,¹ though they believed that Christ anticipated the passover by eating it before the time. The explanation which we have given, however, agrees with the statement of the evangelists—makes him to have eaten it on the fifteenth of the month Nisan, the day of unleavened bread.

But now the question arises: Why did not the Jews observe the passover at the same time? In answer to this we refer to Townsend's Notes on the Gospels, where he says: "The learned Cudworth in his admirable treatise on the Jewish passover, has proved from the Talmud, Mishna, and some of the most reputable of the Jewish rabbins, that the Jews, in ancient times, reckoned the new moons, not according to astronomical exactness but according to the *φάσις*, or moon's appearance; and as this appearance might happen a day later than the real time, consequently there might have been a whole day of difference in the time of celebrating one of these feasts which depended on a particular day of the month, the days of the month being counted from the appearance of the new moon."² Townsend further says: "As he describes the manner of doing this, both from the Babylonish Talmud and from Maimonides, I shall give an

¹ See Tholuck on John, p. 306.

² Townsend's Notes on the Gospels, p. 158.

extract from this part of his work, that my readers may have the whole argument before them.”¹ And then follows this extract. “In the great or outer court there was a house called *Beth Yazek*, where the Senate sat all the thirtieth day of every month to receive the witnesses of the moon’s appearance, and to examine them. If there came approved witnesses on the thirtieth day, who could state they had seen the new moon, the chief man of the Senate stood up, and cried *mekuddash*, ‘it is sanctified,’ and the people standing by caught the word from him, and cried ‘*mekuddash, mekuddash.*’ But if when the consistory had sat all the day, there came no approved witnesses of the *φάσις* or appearance of the new moon, then they made an intercalation of one day in the former month, and decreed the following one-and-thirtieth day to be the calends. But if after the fourth or fifth day, or even before the end of the month, respectable witnesses came from far, and testified they had seen the new moon, in its due time, the Senate were bound to alter the beginning of the month, and reckon it a day sooner; viz. from the thirtieth day.” “As the Senate were very unwilling to be at the trouble of a second consecration, when they had even fixed on a wrong day, and received very reluctantly the testimony of such witnesses, as these last mentioned, they afterward made a statute to this effect, “That whatever time the Senate should conclude on for the calends of the month, though it were certain that they were in the wrong, yet all were bound to order their feasts according to it.”² “This,” says Townsend, “Dr. Cudworth supposes actually took place in the time of our Lord; and that, as it is not likely our Lord would submit to this perversion of the original custom, following the true *φάσις* or appearance of the new moon, confirmed by sufficient witnesses, he and his disciples ate the passover on that day; but the Jews following the pertinacious decree of the Sanhedrim, did not eat it till the day following.” He adds: “Dr. Cudworth further shows from Epiphanius, that there was contention (*θόρυβος*),

¹ Townsend’s Notes on the Gospels, p. 158.² Ibid. p. 158.

a tumult among the Jews, about the passover that very year.” Hence it is probable that the real paschal day observed by our Lord and his disciples, who adopted the true *φάσις*, was only the preparation or antecedent evening to that observed by the Jews, who acted on the decree of the Sanhedrim.

Adopting this view, which comes to us on high authority, we can readily perceive that the account of John harmonizes with that of the other evangelists. Matthew, Mark, and Luke, following the true appearance of the moon, as did the Saviour and his disciples, speak of the day before the Saviour’s crucifixion, or the time of sending Peter and John to prepare the passover, as being the first day of the feast, and the day when the passover should be killed. While John, speaking in accordance with the reckoning of the Sanhedrim, which had been adopted by the Jewish nation, calls the day on which Christ was crucified, “the day of the preparation of the passover,” that is, the day on which they put the leaven out of their houses, and on which the passover was killed — that, as we have seen, being the day that year which the Jews actually thus observed.

This accounts, also, for John’s speaking of the time when Christ was eating the passover with his disciples as being before the feast of the passover (John xiii. 1). It was before the time appointed by the Sanhedrim, that year, when the Jews observed it. It serves, also, to explain his assertion that, on the day in which Christ was crucified, the Jews would not go into the judgment hall, lest they should be defiled, but that they might eat the passover (John xviii. 28).

Further, this view — that Christ observed the passover with his disciples on Wednesday evening, the beginning of the fifteenth of Nisan, according to the true appearance of the moon — not only allows of his strict compliance with the law, but also fulfils the requirement in regard to the passover sacrifice. The paschal lamb was a type of Christ. It pointed to him as our Passover. That lamb, as has been shown, was to be sacrificed between the evenings, that is, between three and five o’clock on the fourteenth day of the

month Nisan (Ex. xii. 6; Lev. xxiii. 5; Num. ix. 3, 5). As the paschal lamb, the type of Christ, was sacrificed on the fourteenth of the month Nisan, between three and five o'clock, what more reasonable than that Christ the great Antitype should give up his life at that time, which would have been between three and five o'clock on Thursday afternoon, and which, according to the explanation given, was the day observed that year by the Jews as the fourteenth of Nisan, and hence regarded by them as the proper time for killing the paschal lamb. And as confirmatory of this, we learn from Matthew that Christ's death did not take place until after the ninth hour, or three o'clock in the afternoon (Matt. xxvii. 46-50). As the hour coincides with the requirement, why not also the day?

It is no objection that it was not the day for killing the passover according to the true appearance of the moon; for, if our explanation be correct, it was the day observed that year by the Jews as the fourteenth of the month Nisan, by the appointment of the Sanhedrim; and it was necessary that he should be crucified on that day, the day recognized by the Jews, in order to convince them that, as the great Antitype of the passover, the law with respect to him had been fulfilled. Again, it was necessary that he should eat the passover with his disciples before his death, that he might institute in place of it the Lord's supper; and yet, as a Jew made under the law, it does not seem proper for him to have violated the divine command by observing it before the time appointed. One necessity appears to have been antagonistic to the other; and yet, upon the explanation that Christ observed the passover on the fifteenth of the month Nisan, according to the true appearance of the moon, and that the Jews observed it on the next day, according to the appointment of the Sanhedrim, as shown by Dr. Cudworth, they are both accomplished, and it would seem as if Jehovah that year had instituted that particular arrangement to obviate this difficulty.

We see, also, why there should be an apparent discrepancy

between John and the other evangelists, or why they should speak of the time of Christ's eating the passover with his disciples according to the true appearance of the moon, while John speaks of it according to the then popular acceptance. The reason is furnished in John's design in writing his Gospel. Matthew's design was to write a genuine and authentic history of the Saviour's life. Mark's design was the same; but, from internal evidence, he appears to have written principally for the Gentiles. Luke also wrote his Gospel, apparently, for the Gentiles, and as supplementary to the other two, to supply facts and circumstances omitted in the others, as he has himself expressed it: "To set forth in order from the beginning a declaration of those things believed among them" (Luke i. 1-14), that is, to deliver a true and genuine account of the life, doctrines, miracles, death, and resurrection of our Saviour. This being the design of the first three evangelists, it would be natural for them to use language inferring that the time of Christ's eating the passover with his disciples was the time appointed, for it was the time according to the true appearance of the moon, and so Christ and his disciples regarded it. But John was writing to Jews, and his design was not merely to give an authentic account of the life of Christ. That had been done already; but, as he tells us, "that they might believe that Jesus was the Christ, and that believing they might have life through his name" (John xx. 31).

Bishop Bloomfield, in speaking of this difference between John and the other evangelists, says: "The real difference between them is, that they wrote a history of our Saviour's life, but St. John of his person and office." John's design, then, was to prove to the Jews that Jesus was the Christ; and to do this, it was necessary that they should be made to see that Jesus was himself their Passover; and hence he represents the crucifixion of Christ as taking place on the day observed by them that year as the day of preparation; that being the time when the passover should be killed. This would be to the Jewish mind a remarkable circum-

stance in proof that he was the Messiah — the fact that, as the great Antitype of the passover, he was slain at the appointed time. This would seem, also, to account for John's expression, with reference to a previous occasion: "No man laid hands on him, for his hour was not yet come" (John viii. 20).

We now pass to notice other objections. Both John and the other evangelists speak of the day on which Christ was crucified as being the preparation for the Sabbath: "And now, when the even was come, because it was the preparation, that is, the day before the Sabbath" (Mark xv. 42). "And that day was the preparation, and the Sabbath drew on" (Luke xxiii. 54). "The Jews, therefore, because it was the preparation, that the bodies should not remain on the cross on the Sabbath-day (for that Sabbath-day was a high day), besought Pilate that their legs might be broken, and that they might be taken away" (John xix. 31). Now, it may perhaps be said, that Thursday could not have been the day of Christ's crucifixion, because the Jewish Sabbath was not until Saturday, and hence Thursday could not have been "the day before" it, nor the day of "preparation" for it.

We answer, while John speaks of it as being the preparation for the Sabbath, he also speaks of it as the "preparation of the passover" (John xix. 14), and the term "passover" here must apply to the passover supper, and not to the Jewish Sabbath that occurred during the passover festival. When John speaks of the same day as being the preparation of the passover, and the preparation for the Sabbath, we are not to understand that he contradicts himself. The whole difficulty appears to lie in a misunderstanding of the term "Sabbath." It has been thought to signify the Jewish Sabbath, or Saturday; and hence Friday has naturally been regarded as the day of preparation. But the Sabbath referred to was not the Jewish Sabbath, but the day of unleavened bread. The first day was to be a day of holy convocation. They were to do no servile work therein (Lev. xxiii. 7). That this was the fifteenth of Nisan, the

day of unleavened bread, is evident, by taking it in connection with the preceding verse: "On the fifteenth day of the same month is the feast of unleavened bread unto the Lord: Seven days ye must eat unleavened bread. In the first day ye shall have a holy convocation." Not the first day of the passover, for that was the fourteenth, but the first day of the seven days, the fifteenth, the day of unleavened bread. That this day was regarded as a Sabbath is evident, from the thirty-ninth verse of the same chapter, where, in speaking of the feast of tabernacles, it is said: "In the first day shall be a Sabbath, and on the eighth [the last day] shall be a Sabbath," that is, days of holy convocation, like the day of unleavened bread.

That the Sabbaths here mentioned were not the Jewish Sabbath, is clear, since the Jews reckoned their time by lunar months, which were determined by the moon's appearance; and therefore the first and eighth days did not always occur on the same day of the week, and hence these days could not always come on the Jewish Sabbath, or Saturday. Moreover, John explains it, when he says (xix. 31): "For that Sabbath was a high day" (*μεγάλη*, a great day). He uses the same term, *μεγάλη*, in speaking of the last day of the feast of tabernacles, to which we have already referred, though in itself it was not more sacred than the first day, and in Lev. xxiii. 39 is called, with the first day, a Sabbath. Thus he says: "In the last day, that great day of the feast" (John vii. 37). So the calling of assemblies (Isa. i. 13) is translated "a great day," by the Seventy, implying that, in their estimation, any day of solemn convocation was a great day.¹

We see, therefore, that Thursday, the day on which Christ was crucified, was the day of preparation, not only of the passover, but also of the Sabbath, the day of holy convocation. So that both John's assertions completely harmonize, and the fact is seen to be in accordance, also, with the assertions of the other evangelists.

¹ See Robinson's English Harmony of the Gospels, pp. 203, 204.

Another seeming objection is found in the following passages: "After the women had beheld his sepulchre, and how his body was laid, they returned, and prepared spices and ointments, and rested the Sabbath-day, according to the commandment" (Luke xxiii. 56). "And when the Sabbath was past, Mary Magdalene, and Mary the mother of James, and Salome, had brought sweet spices, that they might come and anoint him" (Mark xvi. 1). Now, we know that they came for this purpose "very early in the morning, on the first day of the week" (Mark xvi. 2). If Christ was crucified on Thursday, then they must have rested Friday and Saturday, two days. How shall we consistently explain it?

We answer: Friday, the fifteenth, as we have shown already, was a Sabbath, or day of holy convocation, and Saturday, the seventh day of the week, was the regular Jewish Sabbath; and hence, both being Sabbaths, the time throughout was as one continued Sabbath; and in the expressions referred to, they seem to have been regarded as one. But Matthew has removed the difficulty: "In the end of the Sabbath [or, more correctly, after the Sabbath], as it began to dawn toward the first day of the week, came Mary Magdalene and the other Mary, to see the sepulchre" (Matt. xxviii. 1). "In the end of the Sabbath." Here the translation is in the singular number; but the original is in the plural: *Ὁψὲ δὲ σαββάτων*, "the end of the Sabbaths," which certainly is consistent with the idea that between Christ's crucifixion and the first day of the week there were two Sabbaths. We do not deny, however, that the plural *σαββάτα* may mean a Sabbath, or Sabbaths, or a week.

We have shown, we think, conclusively, that Christ was crucified on Thursday; since this harmonizes the account of John with that of the other evangelists; gives Thursday night, Friday night, and Saturday night for the body of Jesus to lie in the grave; thus making the words of the Saviour literally true, that the Son of Man should be three nights in the heart of the earth, and allows of his resurrection on the third day. But this calculation is based, as we have seen,

on the idea that he was crucified 30 A.D., according to the general opinion.

That he was crucified that year is evident: 1. It is the general opinion. A thing established by common consent is presumed to be correct, until it is proved to the contrary. 2. It incidentally confirms the argument in regard to Thursday as being the day of Christ's crucifixion, so essential in reconciling the scripture narrative. 3. There is strong circumstantial evidence in its favor. 4. The most critical commentators confirm it.

The proof claimed under the first and second is self-evident; and the following facts, we think, establish the third:

1. Christ was crucified when Pontius Pilate was governor; and it is known that he was governor ten years, from 25 A.D. to 35 A.D. Luke informs us (iii. 1-3) that when John the Baptist began his ministry Pontius Pilate was governor. Now, as we must allow at least four years for the preaching of John and the ministry of Jesus, he could not have been crucified before 29 A.D.; since John could not have commenced preaching before 25 A.D. His crucifixion, therefore, must have taken place between 29 A.D. and 35 A.D.; for after that Pilate was no longer governor. But 30 A.D. is the only year, as we have seen, between these dates, in which Roger Bacon, Mann and Scaliger, Dodwell, and Ferguson, who have given their attention to a critical investigation of this subject, agree that the passover full moon, which determined the fourteenth of the month Nisan, fell on the same day of the week; and that day they decide to have been Wednesday, which answers fully, as we have shown, all the conditions of the scripture narrative, providing that our Saviour was crucified on Thursday.

We are aware that Sir Isaac Newton and some others have thought that Christ was crucified 33 A.D. But against this there lies the fatal objection, that he would have been at that time, in all probability, thirty-seven years old, and it would have given seven years and a half for his public

ministry. We are told that he came to John to be baptized when he was about thirty years of age, which was the beginning of his public ministry. As the great High Priest he then entered upon his priestly office. And this accords with the Mosaic legislation, that the priests should minister in their office from thirty years old and upward (Num. iv. 3). Though David afterward changed it to twenty years, we have no evidence that he did it with authority. It is well known that Christ attended but three passovers, at least we have no mention of more than three, and we have no reason to infer from the scripture narrative that there were others; and hence there could have been but three years and a half of his public ministry. It is known, also, that the Christian era, fixed by Dionysius Exiguus, in the sixth century, does not, in reality, date from the birth of Christ, but some years later. The general opinion is, that it is about four years, though some think it two years, and others five. Taking the least date, two years, if our Lord had been crucified in 33 A.D., he would have been at least thirty-five years old, and his public ministry must have continued at least five years; and according to the correct date, thirty-seven, giving seven years as the time of his public ministry.

We see, therefore, that he could not have been crucified in 33 A.D.

Again, according to Daniel (ix. 24, 25): "Seventy weeks were determined. From the going forth of the commandment to restore and to build Jerusalem unto Messiah the Prince should be seven weeks and threescore and two weeks." And Dan. ix. 27: "In the midst of the week the sacrifice and oblation should cease." The sacrifice ceased, under the law, when Christ the great Sacrifice was offered. Seven weeks and threescore and two weeks are sixty-nine weeks, or four hundred and eighty-three days, which (a day in prophecy denoting a year) is four hundred and eighty-three years. Now, according to the Hebrew chronology, the commission of Artaxerxes Longimanus to Ezra was given four hundred and fifty-seven years before the com-

mencement of the Christian era. Four hundred and fifty-seven from four hundred and eighty-three gives 26 A.D., the time when our Lord began his ministry; and, as it is generally admitted that he was born about four years before the commencement of our era (twenty-six and four being thirty), it would agree in time with the scripture narrative, that "he began to be about thirty years of age" (Luke iii. 23). The *Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge* says: "Dr. Prideaux, who discourses very copiously and with great learning on this prophecy, maintains that the decree mentioned in it for the restoring and rebuilding of Jerusalem cannot be understood of that granted to Nehemiah in the twentieth year of Artaxerxes, but of that granted to Ezra by the same Artaxerxes in the seventh year of his reign." We know that ancient chronology is not reliable; but in this instance we think we have strong circumstantial evidence. Artaxerxes Longimanus was the son of Xerxes, and succeeded him in the kingdom. Xerxes was assassinated 465 B.C. Adding to this the seven years of the reign of Artaxerxes before giving the commission, and we have 458 B.C., a difference of only one year from the time, according to the Hebrew chronology, of issuing the decree; and this may be accounted for from the fact that the Jews began their civil year in the autumn, and not in the spring. Hence, if Artaxerxes began his reign after the autumnal equinox, it would be really 465 B.C., according to the common reckoning, but 464 B.C., after the manner of the Hebrews. And this, with the seven years of the reign of Artaxerxes before issuing the decree, corresponds exactly with the statement, according to the Hebrew chronology, that it was in the year 457.

The sacrifice was to cease in the midst of the week, that is, in the midst of the seventieth week, as seventy weeks were determined. Seven weeks and sixty-two weeks, making sixty-nine weeks, had passed before the beginning of Christ's public ministry. A week in prophecy representing seven years, the midst of it would be three years and a half, which was the time of Christ's public ministry. Now, as he

was crucified in the spring, he must have come to John to be baptized in the autumn of 26 A.D., and three years and a half added would bring his crucifixion in the spring of 30 A.D. The most critical commentators, also, as we have said, confirm this opinion. Wieseler (p. 386 sq.) claims that he was crucified in the year 30 A.D., or 783 from the foundation of Rome.

The birth of Christ was in the autumn of 749 A.U.¹ He began to be about thirty years of age when he came to John to be baptized, which would bring it to the autumn of 779 A.U. And three years and a half, the duration of his public ministry, would bring his crucifixion at the time of the pass-over, in the spring of the year 783 A.U. And reckoning the Christian era, as we have shown, to begin four years after the birth of Christ, or 753 A.U., 783 A.U. would be 30 A.D. That he was crucified 30 A.D. is also the opinion of Friedlieb, Tischendorf, Greswell, Andrews, Ellicott, Lange, and many others. We conclude, for these reasons, that our Saviour was crucified 30 A.D., on Thursday, the day observed that year by the Jews as the fourteenth day of the month Nisan.

¹ See discussions upon this subject by Robinson, and others.

ARTICLE II.

THE DOCTRINE OF THE APOSTLES.

BY S. R. ASBURY, RESIDENT LICENTIATE AT ANDOVER.

[Continued.]

THE DOCTRINE OF THE EPISTLE TO THE HEBREWS.

Introduction.

The Author. This Epistle does not bear the name of Paul at its head—a circumstance which admits of no satisfactory explanation. On the contrary, the author intimates, in ii. 3, a decided dependence on the immediate eye-witnesses of the life of Christ. In such a letter, we should have expected Paul to defend himself from the attacks of his Judaistic opponents, and to discuss in detail the relation of the law to the new covenant, and of the Jewish to the heathen Christians. The unmistakable relationship of this to the Pauline Epistles is satisfactorily explained on the hypothesis that the author stood in intimate connection with the Apostle Paul. The external testimony is indecisive. Who the author was—Apollós or Barnabas—is not to be determined; but he is certainly not to be regarded as the Apostle Paul.

The condition of the readers appears to have been one of vacillation between the Old and New Testament worship, and the object of the letter is to show them the greatness of the danger thus arising. It is clear that the continuance of the Old Testament ritual is thus presupposed. Passages which intimate this (e.g. viii. 4) are not to be explained as a vivid reproduction of the past. Had the object been, as Schmid states, to show the fulfilment of the law, now abolished, in Christianity, some definite statement to this effect must have been made. The readers were evidently Jewish Christians, in daily observance of the Mosaic ritual.

The Arrangement. The superiority of the divine revelation in Christ to that of the Old Testament is the main thought of the Epistle. The fact that this is exhibited in the perfection of the New Testament worship, in comparison with that of the Old, indicates a peculiar doctrinal system. This is based, first, on the superiority of the Priest of the new covenant; then, on that of the Sacrifice. In the prominence of the Christological element, this Epistle approaches the doctrine of John. Its anthropological ideas are in essential agreement with those of Paul; but are simply presupposed, not developed.

The Priest and Sacrifice of the New Covenant.

Christ is regarded as entering on his priestly work only after his death, and by the offering of his blood in the sanctuary of heaven. He is, however, in a specific sense, the Son of God, which presupposes his possession of divine glory before his incarnation. He is designated as superior to the angels, because, according to the view shared by the author with his readers, the law and its worship were traced to the mediation of angels. He is not termed the Logos; no suitable reference being found in iv. 12-14 to the pre-existent Christ. But, as in v. 13 the author personifies the Word, and attributes to him omniscience, we may discern here a transition to John's doctrine of the Logos. Apart from Christ's being designated as God in i. 8-10, his being the medium of all created existence implies that he is not himself a creature (i. 2); and in the expression "splendor of God's glory and impress of his essence," we perceive that the author passes from the oeconomic Trinity to the immanent. It is, however, also implied that he stands in a mediate relation to God, which is necessary, in order that he may be the Mediator of sinful humanity.

In order to this, it was necessary for him to leave his condition of equality to God, and enter one of entire dependence, to learn by experience the needs of suffering, because sinful, men. Hence the author lays special weight on the purely

human development of Christ, according to which he attained moral perfection only by continued subjection of his will to the divine (v. 8). His participation in human nature and its ἀσθένεια exposed him to continual temptations to sin (iv. 15) through his whole life, and culminating in his death. Only by being able to sin, but never realizing this possibility, could he earn the power of being the Priest of sinful humanity. In ascribing the high-priesthood to Christ only after his ascension to the Father, and in founding it on a realistic, historical basis, the author's idea, as Neander remarks, is essentially distinguished from Philo's high-priesthood of the Logos.

The author takes for granted the necessity of expiation for sin by a pure sacrifice (ii. 14). Man cannot himself offer this; all his acts in a state of sin being *dead works* (vi. 1), which expression includes not merely the works of the law. He does not, in this connection, set forth the resurrection of Christ, only mentioning it once (xiii. 20). There was, indeed, no occasion for this, the general thought being a comparison with the sacrificial work of the priest. As the readers of the Epistle took offence at the death of Christ, it was necessary to illustrate this fact on all hands. His first distinctive view is his conception of it as the *blood of the covenant* (ix. 19-28). The superiority of the new covenant requires it to be sealed, not by the sacrifice of beasts, but by the blood of the Son of God. Another view of the death of Christ regards its necessity, in order that men may enter on the inheritance of the good things promised and typified in the old covenant. It is surprising that, in the passage expressing this view (ix. 16, 17), the author departs from his usual meaning of διαθήκη, and uses it for "testament."

It is not the physical sufferings attending the death of Christ which give it its atoning efficacy, but rather the dread of the divine punishment, and the feeling of being forsaken of God, in connection with his holy life, his willing subjection to the divine will, and his love for suffering humanity, which

his participation in human weakness rendered possible (v. 7).

As the priestly vocation presupposes a sanctuary in which it is exercised, Christ enters on his priestly functions only in heaven, the divine abode. Though sin has been expiated by his death, the atonement has to be constantly appropriated anew by men. This appropriation takes place through the intercession of the ascended Saviour, and leads to the complete destruction of sin. When this has been effected, his intercession as High Priest will be no longer needed; and the expression "forever" must therefore not be taken absolutely. With the exception of the second coming to consummate the kingdom of God (ix. 28), no other point, besides the fundamental idea already considered, in the work of Christ is set forth. Paul would assuredly have found occasion to speak of the resurrection and the mission of the Spirit as part of this work.

The Old Testament Worship, and the Advantages of the New.

According to the fundamental idea of the whole Epistle, the Old Testament worship is related to that of the New as copy or shadow, designed to awaken a longing for the reality. In the former, heavenly and purely spiritual relations are represented in an earthly, sensible form. The author thus adopts the distinction of the Alexandrian philosophy between the ideal world, in which all is perfect, and the phenomenal world, in which all is defective — the *κόσμος νοητός* and the *κόσμος αἰσθητός*. It is implied that the Old Testament worship cannot alter the relation of man to God, but simply remind him of the chasm existing between them. The Jewish Christians might continue to observe the ritual for this latter purpose, without attributing to it any saving efficacy. Only when this was done was the observance inconsistent with Christian faith. The readers of the Epistle were believers (x. 32–39), but showed a weakness of faith in still clinging to the shadow, the time for which had

passed away (ix. 9), and which gave them not the least pre-eminence over the Gentile believers.

The priest of the old covenant, being himself sinful, needed to offer sacrifices for himself, and was subject to death. Hence his functions could not be performed without interruption. Wanting in the essential qualities of a true priest, he was such by appointment merely (vii. 16). His priesthood, also, was not the first, but was preceded by that of Melchisedek. The latter is the type of Christ in the uniqueness of his position. Unless we refer the description in vii. 3 to the silence of scripture on these points, we must suppose that the author is transferring to Melchisedek predicates which properly belong only to Christ, though ἀμύτωρ is not, indeed, strictly applicable to him.

With the imperfection of the Levitical priesthood is connected that of the sacrifices; the offering of beasts being entirely inadequate to restore communion with God (x. 4) and break the power of sin. All it can do is to keep alive the consciousness of guilt (x. 3), and restore the relation to the theocratic church by the removal of outward defilement (ix. 13).

The advantages of the new covenant are spoken of as good things to come, although forgiveness of sins is chief among them, because they will be fully realized only at the second advent. It is implied in the prominence of the death and priesthood of Christ that forgiveness of sins must precede the impartation of new life, and that it is conditioned by a man's own appropriation of the atonement. The new life is developed, according to the author, from hope (vii. 19), which was not produced by the Old Testament sacrifices.

Faith, according to this author, is a firm confidence in the future and invisible (xi. 1) and the general truths of religion (vs. 3, 6). Paul's idea of justification by faith does not definitely appear in the Epistle. There are two passages in which it seems to be presupposed (x. 38; xi. 7), but not necessarily so, since, from the connection of the first, ἐκ

πίστεως must not be connected, as by Paul, with *δίκαιος*, but with *ζήσεται*; and in the second, *δικαιοσύνη κατὰ πίστιν* designates the subjective condition of which justification by faith is a prerequisite. According to this passage, the Old Testament faith differed from the New, not in object, but only in degree. The Old Testament heroes directed their gaze to the consummation of the kingdom of God. It is evident that faith is not here spoken of in the Pauline sense, as effecting the justification of man before God. The author does not definitely distinguish two sides of faith; one, as apprehending the divine grace, which on the ground of Christ's death declares man free from sin and guilt; and the other as in connection with hope, the only condition for the attainment of the glory of the perfected kingdom of God. He expressly sets forth only the latter. Nor does he express the Pauline idea of the fellowship in Christ's death and resurrection involved in faith. Still, the idea of justification by faith is implied in the whole train of thought in the Epistle, as in the milder term *ἀγνοήματα* for the sins of the regenerate (ix. 7), and the impossibility of restoration in case of apostasy (vi. 4-6; x. 26-31; xii. 16, 17). As Paul's doctrine does not appear to exclude such a possibility, we must regard the author as having here in view a condition in which all receptivity of salvation is completely destroyed, and a persistent opposition to known truth.

The Old Testament worship being abolished by Christ, its human priesthood is also. The priesthood of all believers is granted in that of Christ. All can enter the holiest place, without distinction (x. 19). All the acts of believers are regarded as priestly (xiii. 15), though there are also distinctions among them (v. 17). All Christians belonging to the heavenly Jerusalem (xii. 22), and having received the powers of the world to come (vi. 5), they no longer stand in need of any human mediation.

The author, writing to Jewish Christians, speaks only of the relation of the redemptive work to the Jewish people, and does not touch on its relation to the heathen. It is,

however, implied in the abrogation of the old covenant that salvation in Christ is designed for the heathen, as well as the Jews, and is granted to them on the single condition of faith.

The Consummation.

Faith especially removes the chasm between the present and the future. Regarding the *Parousia* as near, the author does not give any special attention to the state of believers between their death and Christ's second coming. In ix. 27, the judgment is represented as following immediately on death, and in xii. 23, glorification is intimated as simultaneous. With the *Parousia*, the worship of the old covenant will reach its end. Already decaying (viii. 13), and having lost their significance, its forms will then cease. From the expression *χωρὶς ἁμαρτίας* (ix. 28), we might infer that at the time of the second advent there will be no evil remaining among men. It accords with this, that Christ is nowhere expressly designated as Judge in this Epistle. Such a view, however, so divergent from that of Paul, is not to be deduced from a single ambiguous phrase.

THE DOCTRINE OF JOHN.

Introduction.

As sources, we use only the Gospel and First Epistle of John, retaining the Apocalypse for special consideration. Of the Gospel, those portions only are available in which the apostle expresses his own views. Of these, we especially distinguish the passages i. 16-18; iii. 16-21, 31-36. In these it is evident that the apostle neither reports the words of Christ nor of John the Baptist, though, according to his characteristic style, he does not expressly discriminate them from the rest. We may also learn some points distinctive of John's doctrine from his selection of Christ's discourses, and their bearing on the great whole of his representation.

The historical Position of John in the Apostolic Church. According to Gal. ii. 9, he regarded his mission as especially to the Jews. But later in life his teaching evidently exer-

cised greater influence over the heathen. The remarkable absence of any account of his labors in the Book of Acts may be due in part to their quiet, unobtrusive character, and in part to the fact that they were chiefly supplementary to those of Paul. His teaching was especially adapted to unite the Jewish and Gentile churches, being based rather on ardent love than on dialectic acuteness. He regards the doctrines of grace more from the Christological, than from the anthropological point of view, and with reference to the Old Testament prophecy, rather than the law. He emphasizes what is specifically new in the gospel, but not polemically. His intimate relation to the Saviour rendered the person of Christ prominent in his view, and hence, in accordance with the speculative tendency of his mind, all his other doctrinal conceptions are developed from that of the eternal Logos.

The Logos before his Incarnation.

The manner in which John speaks of the Logos indicates that this term was already familiar to his readers. The Alexandrian Jewish philosophy was diffused in the circles of his activity, and, if not the *source*, was undoubtedly the occasion of the *form*, of his doctrine.

By the Logos John does not mean reason or wisdom, but the essence of all the divine powers; for it was "in the beginning," that is, eternal ("before the world was," xvii. 5). Except in the prologue to the Gospel, we find a certain designation of Christ as Logos only in 1 John i. 1 (λόγος τῆς ζωῆς). This fact, and the antithesis to idols in v. 21, is against the reference of ὁ ἀληθινὸς θεός, in 1 John v. 20, to Christ. The mass of evidence, also, is adverse to the genuineness of 1 John v. 7. The Logos is not an emanation; for he is himself θεός. In representing him as the organ of creation, John removes the Philonic opposition of the ὕλη, though he may not have had this definitely in view. The Logos stands in a special relation, also, to humanity. He is the Life and the Light of men (John i. 4). As this is

meant before the incarnation, it must be intended to trace man's natural receptivity to good to the illuminating influence of the Logos, as well as all positive revelations, though sin was not really vanquished until after his incarnation. It is implied that this preparatory work was especially directed to the Jews, to whom, therefore, we may refer *Ἰδαί*, in v. 11.

Sin. The Prince of this World.

Sin, according to John, consists in alienation from the truth, light, and life of the Logos, and hence in a condition of falsehood, darkness, and death. The divine is that only which has true reality; the ungodly has only apparent existence.

All men (not merely the Jews) are by nature closely connected with the Logos (John i. 4, 9), and yet in their present condition are all estranged from the light. Ungodliness has become a power in all, which the Logos, before his incarnation, could not overcome (John i. 5). Hence, by the "world" John designates the entirety of all finite relations, in so far as they are not permeated by the relation to God.

Mankind are divided by John into two classes — the children of the world and the children of light. It is evident, however, that he uses the latter designation in two senses (John viii. 47; xi. 52; xviii. 37). In the narrower sense, it applies to those in whom the divine life has a real dominion; in the wider, to those who make an honest endeavor to fulfil the divine will. In this wider sense, the deeds of such may be spoken of as "wrought in God" (iii. 21). In order to be born again of God, man must already have been in communion with him (vii. 17). When man becomes a partaker of salvation, there is an enhanced divine operation within him which releases the existing, but slumbering, germs of the divine. He only whom the Father draws (vi. 44), or gives (xvii. 6), to the Son can enter into full communion with the Father. This, again, presupposes a susceptibility

to the divine operation (John vi. 45). The redemptive work is designed for all, without distinction (1 John ii. 2). When all are not brought to the Son, the reason is, that the enhanced divine operation is excluded by the insusceptibility of a part. The Jews are representatives of this class (John xii. 39), having persistently rejected the divine light of the Logos.

According to John iii. 6, sin is the reigning principle in all men, by reason of their descent from the first man. This state of darkness, however, owes its origin to an evil spirit. John everywhere refers only to him who stands at the head of the kingdom of evil spirits. As he developed his own sin from within, this is more intimately connected with his innermost nature than is the case in man. Hence he is called a murderer from the beginning (viii. 44), i.e. the author of sin and death, not, as in 1 John iii. 12, with reference to the murder of Abel. According to John, every sin has close connection with the devil.

The antagonism between the kingdom of light, whose head Christ is, and the kingdom of darkness, whose head is the devil, is not eternal; being already abolished by the incarnation of the Logos. Nor is it from eternity; for, though John does not definitely speak of the fall of the devil, this is involved in his doctrine of the Logos. All creaturely existence has the ground of its existence in the Logos; this evil spirit, therefore, must have been originally in possession of the divine light. The term ἀπ' ἀρχῆς, then, must be referred, not to the beginning of his existence, but to that of his sin.

As all men are by nature evil, John designates them all as children of the devil; using the term, however, in two senses — of those who are insusceptible of divine influences, and of the unrenewed in general.

The Incarnate Logos. His Person and Work.

Only by the reception of the incarnate Logos, the intimate union implied in eating the flesh and drinking the blood of

the Son of Man, can man become a partaker of the divine life (vi. 53-58) and overcome sin. Though the Logos was the animating principle of all life, even under the old covenant, a new and specific element appears in Christ—his assumption of the *σάρξ*. He is also represented as possessing not only a human *ψυχή* (xii. 27), but also a human *πνεῦμα* (xi. 33).

John portrays the whole human life of Christ as the revelation of the glory of the incarnate Logos (John i. 14). Christ's prayer for his former glory (xvii. 7), however, implies that he did not possess it in the metaphysical sense of the fulness of the divine glory, but only in the ethical sense of the fulness of the divine love and grace. This is the *δόξα* which he shared with his disciples (xvii. 22), and which was revealed by his miracles (John ii. 11), since these are regarded as wrought by the Father in answer to the prayer of the Son (xi. 41).

The incarnate Logos, according to the divine side of his being, is designated as the Son of God. By the added term *μονογενής*, John further designates the perfect unity of Christ with the Father. He has also life in himself (v. 26), that is, not as a communication, but as inherent in his nature. Still, in the designation "Son of God," it is involved that in comparison with the Father the Son possesses life derivatively. The holy life of Christ, the archetype of human life, is only a copy of the holy life of God.

As Christ not only *has* life, but *is* life, his whole work is a self-communication to the world, a revelation of his love to it. The First Epistle, together with his mission of the Spirit, and his second coming, sets forth only the death of Christ, while the Gospel indicates other sides of this work. As John regards Christ's holy life, his miracles, and his testimony as also the revelation of his glory, his death is, according to the Gospel, only a single element in his work. By the greater works referred to in John v. 20, 21, he understands not miracles, but those works which effect the revivification of humanity. Miracles, appealing to the senses,

invite attention, and may be the means of faith; but they may also cause still further alienation from the divine. More important than miracles is Christ's testimony, which, being distinguished from all others as a testimony of himself, exerts a transforming power over human life (viii. 31, 32); he who receives his word entering into a living communion with him.

The Death of Christ.

From the commencement of his ministry, Christ is conscious of the necessity of his death for the redemption of the world. The close of his life is always present to his miraculous vision (John iii. 14, 15; vi. 51; x. 18; xii. 24; xv. 13; xvii. 19). From the first passage it is also evident that he foreknew the manner of his death. Only John xvii. 19 indicates the close connection between the death of Christ and the forgiveness of sins. The importance ascribed to Christ's testimony is not inconsistent with his regarding Christ's death as the highest revelation of his glory; since this consists in holy love for sinful men (John i. 14), which is perfected in his giving up his life for them. The predominant idea in John is not, as in Paul, the atonement, but the communication of a new divine life. But before this can take place in any man, his sin must be expiated, as is clear from the designation of Christ as *ἱλασμός* (1 John ii. 2), and also from *ἀγιάζω* (John xvii. 19), which must refer to his approaching death. It is evident that John ascribes the same significance to the death of Christ as Paul does, though he presents the doctrine of the atonement in a less developed form.

The resurrection of Christ also occupies a less conspicuous position in John's doctrine than in that of Paul. It is regarded as the greatest of miracles and the divine confirmation of Christ's mission (John ii. 21; cf. also x. 18), but chiefly as the transition to his state of exaltation. His abiding in the flesh involves limitations; his elevation to the Father must therefore take place before he can fully impart his life to men. According to John xiv. 23, indeed, one must already be in the communion of love to Christ before he can receive

the Spirit. This, however, is to be distinguished from that life-communion with the glorified Christ which is effected by the Spirit in believers. John sets forth the second coming of Christ as perfecting this new life, which is still troubled by sin, and the judgment, which has already been passed on the ungodly by the Spirit (John xvi. 8-11).

In speaking of the Spirit, John regards him as the medium of communion with the Father and the Son. In using the masculine pronoun, however, in reference to him, and attributing to him such works as teaching, correcting, witnessing, he evidently teaches that he is a person. We have, therefore, no reason for believing, with Lutz, that John apprehended the Spirit as "only a power of God producing enlightenment and sanctification in the human spirit, to which belongs divinity, but not personality."

The Incarnate Logos and the Revelation of God in the Old Covenant.

The old covenant is abrogated, according to John, not by the *Parousia*, but by the appearance and ministry of Christ in the flesh (John iv. 23). The law is for the Jews (viii. 17; xv. 25). The revelation of God in Christ is more closely connected with the prophecy of the Old Testament (xii. 41), but the fulfilment contains far more than the prediction. The knowledge of God as Love and Light (1 John iv. 16; i. 5), and also as Spirit (John iv. 24), is regarded by this apostle as living and effective only in Christ, in whom religion is freed from dependence on sensible, earthly things, as from time and space (iv. 23; v. 17).

The Separation of Mankind into two Classes.

A moral judgment (which, however, does not exclude the final judgment, cf. 1 John iv. 17) having already taken place, mankind are already divided into children of darkness and children of light. The latter are already partakers of eternal life, i.e. life in itself powerful and indestructible, which, however, may be lost in consequence of certain sins

(1 John v. 16). *Faith* is the sole condition of such participation; the law being presupposed, not expressly proved, to be altogether superseded. John sometimes calls the susceptibility for salvation *faith* (viii. 31); but it is specially characteristic of his idea of faith that it introduces to a life-communion with the Saviour. It is hence indubitable that it involves more than a mere walking according to the pattern of Christ, more than the recognition of his teaching as the pure expression of the divine will, more than any relation to the historical facts of Christ's life. In John's view the object of faith is not so prominently as in Paul's the death of Christ, but rather his whole life as the revelation of his glory. While he regards faith as a principle of new life, it is plain, from 1 John ii. 1, 2, that he does not ascribe man's justification before God to this new life, but to the objective work of redemption. Still, it is the lowest grade of faith which has for its object any single manifestation of Christ's power. Essentially synonymous with the conception of faith is that of knowledge, the same things being predicated of both; but when faith is mentioned as preceding knowledge, it is intended in the wider sense, explained above.

A principle of new life is contained in faith itself (the victory which overcometh the world) and the beginning of this new life is designated by John as "being born of God," which is the immediate result of faith (1 John v. 1).

Love is the soul of the new life of believers. Love is the key-note of John's First Epistle. In its wider sense love may precede the devotion of the heart to Christ (John xvi. 27); but true Christian love is in response to the love of God (1 John iv. 19). God is its first object; it must manifest itself also in love to the brethren, but is not to be confined to them. We thus see that while in its depth and comprehensiveness John's doctrine may be regarded as mystical, it is yet also thoroughly practical in its tendency.

In some passages of his Epistle John seems to regard sin as actually destroyed by the new birth, though in others he speaks of sin in the regenerate (1 John ii. 1). We under-

stand by the former the ideal condition of believers, which is, however, only progressively realized in fact (John xv. 2). John also makes a sharp distinction between sin unto death and sin not unto death. It is evident that intercession is not to be made for the former, because it would be useless, all susceptibility for salvation being destroyed by it.

The *Communion of Believers* is involved in John's designation of their life as one of love (he only mentions the *ἐκκλησία* in a single passage, 3 John 6, and here with reference to a single church); and in Christ's parable of the vine, and his words in John xvii. 21. John also records declarations of Christ concerning a great communion of Jews and heathen (John x. 16; xi. 52), though he regards the Jews as in the great mass wholly inaccessible to the gospel. He further emphasizes the unity, rather than, as Paul, the differences, in the members of Christ's body.

We find no express reference by John to baptism and the supper as means of grace and communion with Christ. They are not referred to in John iii. 5 and vi., for they were not then instituted, nor in 1 John v. 6. In the second passage, also, were such a reference intended, *σῶμα* would be spoken of, instead of *σάρξ*. This silence is in accordance with John's peculiar type of doctrine, which emphasizes by preference the inner divine life.

The members of the church are those who have received the new divine life; but, as others are found in outward connection with the church who have not this life (1 John ii. 19; John xv. 2) we are led to a distinction between the more and the less extended domain of the church. In 1 John v. 16 John seems to teach that even a member may so fall back into sin as to be incapable of restoration.

The Consummation.

As already remarked, John's spiritualization of the idea of Christ's coming and judgment as already taking place does not exclude its future realization. This will be necessary to the perfection of Christian life. John evidently

regards the second advent as close at hand (1 John ii. 18), and we find no disclosures by him concerning the state between death and this event. In designating the life of believers as eternal, it is, however, implied that it will not be interrupted by death. This is also taught in John xiv. 3; the coming of Christ here being a spiritual coming, and referring to the death of believers.

John designates in a manner similar to Paul the tokens of the impending *Parousia*. It will be preceded by a final struggle between the kingdom of evil and the kingdom of God; but this will be, not an outward persecution of the church, but a spiritual power, seeking to destroy it by spiritual weapons (1 John ii. 18 sq.).

THE DOCTRINE OF THE APOCALYPSE.

Introduction.

As the Apocalypse does not itself decide the question of its authorship with certainty, as the external testimony is rather for than against its composition by the Apostle John, but is not conclusive, and as the internal evidence is more against than for this view, we regard it as the more probable hypothesis that this work was not written by the apostle.

It predicts the destruction of Jerusalem and the first persecution of the church under Nero. As the Temple was still standing at the time of its composition (xi. 1), this must have been prior to its destruction.

Its Eschatology.

This is its most important feature; all its other points of doctrine are subordinate. This prominence is due to the circumstances of outward oppression of the church in which the Apocalypse was written, and strikingly distinguishes this book from the Gospel and Epistle of John, since there was no occasion in these for excluding this element. The central point is the second coming of Christ. This will be sudden, but is now preparing. The seer therefore describes first the events which must precede the *Parousia* — the

great struggle of the world against the kingdom of God, and the judgments revealing the divine holiness and justice, anticipatory of the last judgment.

As we might expect from the prophecies of Christ in the synoptics, unbelieving Judaism is regarded as one of the antichristian powers; but as the city whose destruction is described in Rev. xvii., xviii., as immediately preceding the second advent must be Rome, the Jewish people is not the first and principal object of divine judgment, but antichristian heathendom.

It is opposed to the view that a judgment on the worldly church is described in xi. 1 sq., and not on Jerusalem, that such a judgment has been already treated of in the seven Epistles; and to the other view, that the judgment is on Jerusalem as rebuilt and inhabited by the Jews, that no former destruction of Jerusalem and the Temple is anywhere mentioned. The only difficulty is that in vs. 2 and 13 a partial destruction only is mentioned, which seems to contradict our Lord's prediction, and has led to the Judaistic notion being attributed to the author that Jerusalem thus purified would remain the centre of God's kingdom. We find no contradiction here, but an intimation that only the outward and accidental element of the theocracy will be removed, while the true and imperishable will remain, and that thus the still susceptible portion of the Jewish people will be won to Christ.

By the emblem of the beast with the seven heads (xiii. 1), we understand Rome, as the Apocalypse itself interprets the seven heads of seven mountains (xvii. 9). The only difficulty seems to be in the designation of the beast as himself the destroyer. One of the seven heads of the beast appears to stand for the beast himself. And as these heads are seven kings, and the one is described as both one of the seven and the eighth (xvii. 10, 11), the reference must be to a king who reigns twice, which agrees with the legend current in the East concerning Nero. The destruction of Antichrist is the fall of the Roman empire, as the represen-

tative of heathenism and all ungodliness. The author does not distinguish between this single victory and the progressive overthrow of all ungodly antichristian forces. He does, however, distinguish between the coming of Christ for the destruction of Antichrist, and his coming for the general judgment, between which a long period will intervene, wherein some believers who have shared in the great conflict will be already glorified.

The Millennium. This period is designated as a thousand years; but this is no more to be taken literally than the other numbers of the Apocalypse. As the writer passes rapidly over this to his description of the kingdom of God in its perfection, there is much obscurity about it. All we can conclude with certainty is that the condition of the church during this period is essentially different from that which begins with the judgment. There is nothing to indicate that it will be one of sensuous, outward prosperity, but only one of spiritual predominance of the church over heathendom. As living believers are not yet glorified, as a second persecution is to take place at the close of the period, and as the coming of Christ is elsewhere connected with the final judgment, the view is beset with great difficulties that Christ will himself be present on earth during the millennium. For the same reasons, it appears that the opposition between the world and the church will not yet be entirely removed. Antichrist is wholly destroyed, and the kingdom of God perfected only after the final judgment, in which all previous judgments culminate. The description of this perfect state (xxi.—xxiii.) is so purely ideal as to exclude all sensuous conceptions. The central point of its happiness is the communion of believers with God no longer disturbed by sin.

The Doctrine of Christ.

In the Apocalypse Christ is spoken of as he is exalted to the Father, in possession of absolute power and glory, and the object of divine adoration and worship on the part of all creatures. Throughout the book there is a polemic reference

to the deification of creatures in heathendom; it is hence implied that the object of divine worship cannot be himself a creature. This is also involved in his designation, together with God, as *πρῶτος* and *ἔσχατος* (xxii. 13), and by which the other designation as *ἀρχὴ τῆς κτίσεως* is to be interpreted (iii. 14) as expressing the idea of absolute pre-existence. The designation of Christ as *λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ* (xix. 13) seems to indicate that the readers were already acquainted with it in the writings of the Apostle John.

There is a reference to the *death* of Christ in the prevalent designation of him as a Lamb—not as the paschal lamb, but rather as the sacrificial lamb of Isaiah.

While the Gospel and Epistle of John emphasize the ethical attributes of God in relation to the atonement, the Apocalypse refers more to his metaphysical attributes in relation to the world. So, also, the Spirit is regarded chiefly in his operation on the world, as comprehending all the forces by which God effects his purposes. A further difference is the prominence given to the higher world of spirits in the Apocalypse. The angels are represented as the agents in the execution of judgment, and Christ as standing at their head. While the Apostle John refers only to an evil spirit as the head of the spirit-world, in this book many members of it are represented as active in promoting sin and heathendom—the kingdom of the devil—and as suffering in the conflict with the kingdom of God.

Those who find a Jewish bias in the Apocalypse find, also, in some passages, a preference of the Jewish over the Gentile Christians, especially in the number one hundred and forty-four thousand, in xiv. 1, supposing it to refer to the converts from Judaism. But it more probably refers to the martyrs under the first persecution, who were mostly Gentile converts.

PART II.—COMPARISON OF THE APOSTOLIC DOCTRINE.

The presentation of the various forms of apostolic doctrine according to their differences does not exclude the idea of scripture as a single divine revelation. In this part,

however, we are not to form a single doctrinal system, this being the work of dogmatic theology, to which our labors are only preparatory. Nor are we to compare merely the express doctrinal statements of the apostles, since their writings were not intended as exhaustive expressions of their views: but must first consider the fundamental conceptions, and then the particular doctrines, as confirming and supplementing each other — the less developed forms presenting no real contradiction to the more developed.

Thus the fundamental conception of James, of the new covenant as a transfigured and spiritualized law, is not altogether foreign to Paul; though the latter emphasizes the differences, rather than the unity, of the two covenants. The same is true of Peter's conception of the gospel as the fulfilment of Old Testament prophecy, since it is involved in this that the fulfilment is more than the prediction. The Epistle to the Hebrews agrees with Paul in regarding salvation as unattainable by adherence to the old covenant, but as prepared for by it; the law being a *παιδαγωγὸς εἰς Χριστόν* (Col. ii. 17). So, also, where the Apostle John regards the old covenant as already passed away, this does not exclude his acceptance of its preliminary character. The views of the Apocalypse, as we have seen, show no trace of a Judaistic character; they therefore present no real opposition to the doctrines of Paul and John.

With respect to the *doctrine of sin*, there is an apparent contradiction between Paul and James, in that the latter applies the term *ἁμαρτία* to actual sin; while Paul refers it also to the sinful *habitus*. This can, however, exist only if James denies this *habitus* as the source of the lust from which he represents sin as springing, of which there is no trace. With respect to the consequences of sin, the difference may be explained, if we suppose James to refer merely to physical death as the result of actual sins. Though James does not develop the doctrine of the atonement, his fundamental view by no means excludes it. All the apostolic views of sin are, indeed, closely connected, because all

are rooted in the doctrine of the Old Testament. The great antitheses of the world and the kingdom of God, of nature and grace, moreover, are common to all; and, according to all, a new birth, or entire transformation of the inner life, is necessary. The same, also, may be said of the hidden connection between the sin of mankind and a kingdom of evil spirits. The new element in the doctrine of the apostles is that the kingdom of evil is conquered by Christ, and its power broken forever.

The Doctrine concerning Christ. According to all the apostles, Christ is in possession of full divine power and glory after his exaltation to the Father; but according to Paul and John, Hebrews and the Apocalypse, he only again received the glory which he had before his incarnation; while in James, Jude, and Peter we find no trace of this view. Nor by these apostles are the expressions "Son" and "Logos" used, as by the others. Still, their distinction of Christ from all other bearers of divine revelation implies that he possessed a unique dignity; the difference being not merely quantitative, but qualitative. All agree in representing that he only who was Mediator of the original creation can be the Mediator of the new moral creation.

The most developed doctrine of Christ is found in John and the Epistle to the Hebrews. In the Apostle Paul we find a progress from his earlier to his later Epistles, but nowhere such explicit statements as John's concerning the Logos, or a certain designation of Christ as *θεός*, as in the Hebrews. Any contradiction as to the renunciation by Christ, on his incarnation, not merely of the unlimited use of the divine power and glory, but of its actual possession, is found only if we fail to distinguish the twofold conception of the *δόξα* held by John.

With respect to the *work* of Christ, we find no definite trace of his prophetic office. Nor is it distinctly set forth by James, though implied in his fundamental conception. There are references to it in the other apostolic writings. On the other hand, we find no reference to the atonement

in James. Yet, if man by faith in Christ receives power to fulfil the law out of free love, Christ must be regarded as not only the Teacher of truth, but the Communicator of a new divine life.

In all the principal writings of the apostles, we find forgiveness of sins closely connected with the death of Christ; though Peter lays greater emphasis on the resurrection, and John on the life-communion with the Saviour. Paul and the Epistle to the Hebrews agree in representing the death of Christ as an expiatory sacrifice, and Christ himself as a Priest. Some find traces in Paul of the doctrine of Peter concerning Christ's preaching the gospel to the dead; but, while we fail to discover any such reference, we also perceive nothing opposed to it in any of the apostolic teachings.

It is a conception common to all the apostles that Christ's work is continued after his ascension, and will be closed by his second coming. The different sides of this conception are all united in the view of Paul, and are, therefore, not contradictory. Peter, Hebrews, and the Apocalypse regard the work of Christ chiefly as the subject of hope. This, however, is not opposed to the view of John; since he also regards the perfection of Christian life as dependent on the second advent.

The *doctrine of God* appears in essential agreement in all the different forms of doctrine, being founded on the Old Testament. Those forms which are less developed on other points are so also on this. With the exception of James, whose doctrine is least developed, the apostles agree in representing the divine causality of salvation as threefold — the Father, Jesus Christ, and the Spirit. The presence of this doctrine in Jude shows how deeply it is founded in the inner essence of Christian truth.

Another point common to all apostolic forms of doctrine is the *new birth*; though all do not trace it back to election and the eternal divine counsel. Nor do all the apostles distinguish so exactly as Paul between justification and sanctification. James, however, agrees with Paul in setting

forth with the greatest emphasis that God's treatment of men is conditioned by their behavior towards him. The doctrine of election, then, is by no means opposed by the teaching of James. The idea of hardening the heart implies, also, a persistent opposition to the influences of divine grace, which would lead men to salvation, which includes both the ideas of election and the freedom of the will. The absence of any definite statement of the doctrine of justification in Peter, John, and the Epistle to the Hebrews does not exclude it. All the essential elements of Paul's doctrine are found in John and in the Hebrews. John's use of *ἀγιάζεσθαι* in the sense of objective consecration to God is also essentially identical with justification. The representation, by Paul and John, of the new life as founded in a real communion with the glorified Saviour is also due to the greater development of their forms of doctrine.

Faith, according to all the apostles, springs from a change of mind. James, in referring to historical belief as *πίστις*, was merely accommodating his language, as we have shown before, to the usage of his opponents. In Peter, the Epistle to the Hebrews, and the Apocalypse, the object of faith appears especially as the future perfection of salvation, and the conception of faith is closely allied to hope; while the idea of faith as introducing into life-communion with Christ falls into the background. There is, however, no opposition in this, as some merely set forth more prominently the manifestation of Christian life, and others its innermost principles — faith and love. In accordance with this, James represents faith manifested by works as a necessary condition of justification; while Paul ascribes efficacy to faith which has not yet produced any works. There is, however, essential agreement in their views; since Paul would attribute no value to faith which could not produce works, nor James deny it to faith which is inoperative simply from lack of opportunity.

Of the three elements of the Christian life, Peter, the Hebrews, and the Apocalypse set forth hope most promi-

nently ; Paul, faith ; John, love ; but none of these exclude the others. According to the common doctrine of the apostles, faith is the root of love and of hope.

The *kingdom of God*, according to the common doctrine, includes the higher kingdom of heavenly spirits ; while the church comprises only redeemed humanity in its present earthly development. It is a purely internal, invisible kingdom, since connection with it depends on a purely moral condition. The doctrine of the new covenant, as embracing all nations, is most fully developed by Paul ; but it lies at the basis of all the apostles' teaching.

The *church* is regarded by all as the external community of believers. This is implied in Paul's designation of it as the body of Christ, in Peter's as a holy nation, in the parable of the vine in John, and the idea of the universal priesthood. Some, indeed, appear to be members of the church who have either never received the new life, or, from lack of watchfulness, have fallen back into a life of sin. We are not, therefore, to regard the church as, according to the apostles, consisting of all the baptized, as seems to be indicated by Paul ; for this would be altogether at variance with his designation of it as the body of Christ. All that is necessary is to distinguish between a narrower and wider domain in the church.

The outward means of salvation, baptism and the Lord's supper, are not mentioned by all the apostolic writers. Indeed, the latter is mentioned and defined only by Paul. The greater prominence of baptism accords with the general apostolic tendency to regard chiefly that which relates to the antitheses — world and kingdom of God, sin and grace.

The centre of the eschatological doctrine of all the apostles is the second coming of Christ. This is represented by all as near at hand ; since they do not direct their view more particularly to the condition which lies between the death of individual believers and the *Parousia*, regarding it only as one of higher and more intimate communion with Christ. In the less developed forms of doctrine there seems to be no distinction between the *Parousia* and the final consum-

mation ; while, according to Paul and the Apocalypse, there will be a period of indefinite duration between the *Parousia* and the last judgment, in which all forces hostile to the kingdom of God will be destroyed. The distinction of a first and second resurrection, which we find in the Apocalypse, seems also to be intimated by Paul, as he connects the glorification of believers with the coming of Christ, but the resurrection of unbelievers with the final judgment.

ARTICLE III.

THE CREATIVE PERIOD IN HISTORY.

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THE ORDER OF EVENTS.

THE student of the creative period in history meets, at the starting-point of inquiry, the question of an authentic record. Where is such a record to be found? In geology, and the first two chapters of Genesis—the rocky and the written revelations. This is the best, perhaps the only, general answer which the case allows.

A thoughtful reader of the first verse from the inspired penman is startled by its simplicity, comprehensiveness, and grandeur. “In the beginning, God created the heaven and the earth.” It proclaims the one absolute, originating, and creative will. Thus the written record places itself, in its first announcement, in bold conflict with atheism, polytheism, and pantheism. There is a God, it says, and there is but one. That God is the Creator of the heavens and the earth, not the mere distributor, reformer, or manipulator of his own being into a finite universe. He is the originator of a new substance, by a fiat and force clearly personal and infinite.

How comprehensive, yet concise, is this opening of the book of “creation and providence! How appropriate this

title-page of history! How grand as the frontispiece of the universe!

Some doubt whether this is the record of the first creative act, or only the reconstruction of an old ruin, preceded by successive creations, catastrophes, and re-formations, recorded in the rocks, but of which the inspired writer makes no mention.

The later and the most careful examiners, however, concur in accepting this as a statement of the creative origin of the material universe. "And the earth was without form and void." The conjunctive particle *vav* conversive, denoting the continuity of results, favors this as the idea of the writer. The object, order, and unity of the record favor it, as do the leading facts of geology. For, if this be the record of only a mere re-fashioning of old material, and not the creation of a new substance, the history of the world commences, singularly enough, in the middle, and not at the beginning, of the creative work. It should also be borne in mind that, if this is not an account of the origin of the material universe, there is none on record; and that God's first and most noteworthy act of wisdom and power fails of all mention, and that in a document claiming expressly to record the beginning of things.

Further, there is in the Hebrew term *בְּרֵאשִׁית*, *beginning*, an admirable expressiveness of the object and exigencies of the case. It was at the first, at the head of all things, the beginning of the finite and of history, that this first fiat came forth. And no event, no thought, even, of creative act, can antedate the simple force of this phrase, "In the beginning."

This fact of a beginning is also a corner-stone of theistic history. It stands out in fundamental contrast with the atheistic and pantheistic philosophies, which, because they deny creation, and hold, instead, a necessary and eternal emanation, give only a beginningless movement, without progress or end.

After this introduction of what may be called the raw

material of the universe, organization, by the same creative agency, comes next in chronologic and logical order. The Spirit of God brooded over the chaotic deeps, and, by the molecular activity imparted, out of the dark, dead mass sprang light, and with it heat. This discrimination of light and heat from frigid darkness introduces the chief mediate element of the rocky formation, and of growth in the forthcoming vegetable and animal kingdoms.

By a second discriminative act the upper waters are divided from the lower, and an atmosphere created — a vast aerial reservoir for vapors drawn up by the sun, and condensed by cold, sent back in rain, dews, and snow, to cool and refresh the heated earth.

A third creative gravitating force gradually consolidates the mineral kingdom; the waters, falling away from the rising continents and islands, settle into oceans and seas; and thus is provided for the coming race, on the one hand, a fruitful soil, and on the other, a broad, ever-flowing highway for its commerce.

In these three discrete movements of the creative will, four preliminary and indispensable elements of science and of history are brought into being — light, air, earth, and seas. This completes the azoic or ante-life period.

The next introduces in the vegetable kingdom, the lowest grades in the order of vital organisms — the grass, the herb yielding seed, the fruit-tree yielding fruit, “each after its kind.” Thus was enacted that great law of organic unity and reproduction which defines and limits species in nature, which all the sciences now hold as fundamental, and on which rest so many of their most important classifications and generalizations.

For the more perfect development of the vegetable kingdom, and in anticipation of the animal, the hitherto diffused, cosmical light is collected into the sun, as a great light-distributer — to rule the day, and as a divider of times and seasons. How much is implied in this ruling of the sun, it was left for modern science to discover. “The accumulated

power of its delicate rays," says Professor Cooke, "produces every motion and every change which takes place on the surface of this planet, from the falling of an avalanche to the crawling of a worm."

Next, comes forth from the waters "the moving creature that hath life," — the first forms of the animal kingdom, and "the fowl that may fly above the earth."

On the last of the creative days, two works come together — the production of land animals and of man — in the completion of the life-period, as two did at the close of the ante-life period. The whole was finished appropriately when God created man in his own image: "In the image of God created he him; male and female created he them."

"And God said unto them: Be fruitful and multiply and replenish the earth"; a potent mandate, including the mysterious law of sexual appetencies and soul-affinities, for the continuity and ethical unity of the race, with all the cementing and culturing influence of progenitors and descendants.

From the explication of the first chapter in Genesis given in the second, Adam, it appears, was for a time the sole human inhabitant of the new-made earth. But God saw that solitude was not good for man, and Adam felt the same.

In a profound sleep, and dreaming, perhaps, of some coming bliss, a rib taken from the sleeper's side was divinely made a woman; whom God brought, in the bloom of innocence and beauty, to be a help-meet for him. In this created duplication of man come into history those primal and most influential of all the institutions — marriage and the family; a very pivot of society and of destiny.

From the peculiar and significant manner of the woman's creation, in taking her at the wedding from the hand of her God-Father, the man says: "This is now bone of my bones and flesh of my flesh. She shall be called (אִשָּׁה) woman," — the feminine form of the Hebrew אִישׁ, *man*, — "because she was taken out of man." As to her physical nature, she is, therefore, by creation, a derivative and betterment of man.

Hence a man shall leave his father and his mother, and shall cleave unto his wife; and they shall be one flesh. Here is the law of a dual unity, the peculiar and affectional agglutination of a most rigid monogamy. It is a unity for which the sexes were formed by creative wisdom, and to which they are drawn by the purest elective affinities. To this divine oneness all forms of polygamy and concubinage are a most grievous offence.

In every attempt to abrogate this primal law, — whether ancient or modern, by the Buddhist ascetics or Christian priestly celibates seeking a higher sanctity than they conceive it to allow, it has avenged itself on the experimenters, in the dry or dreamy degeneracy, in the shallow half-humanity which it induces in them, or else by the out-breaking assertion of its normal force in the debasements of scortatory violations. The purest and richest sanctities of life are attained only within the harmonies of these primal institutions; not by breaking them down, on the one hand, or assuming them, on the other, to be clogs to the holy aspirations of men and hinderances to their highest destiny, either in church or state.

The six epochs of this creative period, called in the record “days” — those long working-days of Providence — are followed by a seventh, as a period of rest: “And God blessed the seventh day, and sanctified it.” Creation, in the proper sense, was concluded on the sixth. So far as science can ascertain, no new kingdoms or genera or species in nature have since been produced.

Thus is explained that sevenfold division of time which is more or less manifest in almost all ages and nations. Six days are for labor; one for rest and a reverent, simple worship. This proportion of labor to rest has been demonstrated, by actual experiment, to be just what the physical nature of man and of beast requires, for healthful and most productive service. And the prescribed season for worship, with equal wisdom, meets an equal need of man’s moral nature. To increase essentially the number of successive working-days,

as was attempted in the French Revolution, by substituting a tenth for a seventh day of rest, is to waste the physical forces, and was a blunder of atheism in political economy. Any attempt, on the other hand, materially to lessen this number by multiplying obligatory holidays, as is done by the Romish church, is an equal infraction of the providential order by superstition, though not, perhaps, equally disastrous. All deflections, as matters of religious or irreligious enactment, prove by their results that this Sabbath arrangement is one of those nice harmonies and hinges of Providence of which history is so full, and which show God to be wiser than men.

Thus, with these two institutions, marriage and the Sabbath, closes the creative period in history. Both have their origin in a peculiarity of the creative work; one, in the formation of woman out of the man; the other, in the six-fold division of time for labor and a seventh day of hallowed rest. One looks towards human society, by the natural unity of the race in the family; the other to a divine society, by its moral unity with God in the church.

As creation is the door through which God makes his entrance into history, so these two institutions, marriage and the Sabbath, are the chariot-wheels of Providence, upon which he moves forth in the unfolding of his purposes and plans of government. Or they may be called the corner and key-stone in the arch of human history and human destiny.

OBJECTIONS TO THE FACT OF CREATION.

To this view of the creative period two objections are alleged — one, to the fact of creation; the other, to the inspired record as a veritable statement of history. In the former, the atheist and pantheist join their forces, and on nearly the same ground. The atheist, from his central assumption of no God, alleges that there is no creation, but, instead, an eternally mutating mental and muddy universe, without beginning, purpose, progress or end.

The pantheist, from an equally controlling dogma, claims that everything is God—the one substance self-diffused, self-modulated, in a complete *homoousian* universe of nature and God.

Both agree in the form of the objection—the impossibility of the origin of the world and history by creation. *Ex nihilo nil fit*, has been held as an invincible argument, from the old Greek atheists down to the modern German pantheists.

Benedict Spinoza demonstrated, as he supposed, the impossibility that one substance could create, or be created by, another. But the demonstration was purely ideal. It consisted solely in a definition: "Substance is that which exists *in itself*, and is necessarily *infinite*." What is infinite cannot be created. And if a substance should be created, there would be two substances, where there is, and can be, but one. What is not substance, is phantom—is nothing. This is not argument, but assumption. It proves nothing, and casts not a ray of light on the problem of creation. M. Comte affirmed the same impossibility, and even the incomprehensibility of the idea. Émanuel Swedenborg enlarged on the difficulty, and ran it into a clear contradiction. "Every one," he says, "who thinks from clear reason, sees that it is impossible for anything to be made out of nothing; for nothing is nothing, and to make anything out of nothing is a contradiction."

"Is it supposed," asks Herbert Spenser, "that a new organism, when created, is created out of nothing? But this supposes the creation of matter, and the creation of matter is inconceivable. It implies a relation between something and nothing—an idea that cannot be formed into coherent thought." Those who entertain it, he thinks, do so "because they refrain from translating their words into thoughts. They do not really believe, but rather believe that they believe." Thus he dismisses the theory of creation as "worthless and absurd." This is very explicit, and equally dogmatic.

But is this summary decision final? Were Kepler and Copernicus the receivers of incomprehensible, contradictory, and absurd propositions? Were Bacon and Newton and Cuvier mere word-men on this profound subject? And are our Humboldt and Wagner and Murchison and Silliman and Guyot and Agassiz and Dana mere believers that they believe? Has all the thinking upon this subject been done by those who deny the possibility of creation?

Besides, such bold averments of absurdity and impossibility indicate shallowness, rather than thorough examination and profound thinking. When the project of navigating the ocean by steam was first conceived, Dr. Lardner demonstrated, to his own entire satisfaction, that it was practically impossible. And when Walter Scott heard that it was proposed to light the streets of London with gas, he said: "It can't be done; it's only the dream of a fanatic." And even Sir Humphrey Davy said, in respect to the plan: "It's all nonsense; you might as well talk of lighting London with a slice of the moon." But these prophets of impossibility were mistaken. Our cities are illuminated with something more brilliant even than moonshine, and which serves us when we have no moon. And the ocean is ploughed by innumerable vessels—merchantmen and men-of-war—all propelled by steam.

That there are difficulties in connection with this creative starting-point of history no thoughtful student will deny. How can it be otherwise, when the Infinite enters on a plan which includes the production of a finite universe, and the revelation of himself to the intelligent of that universe? The astute Hamilton perceived these difficulties, and staggered under them well-nigh into the postulate of pantheism or atheism, in his doctrine of the inconceivability, either of creation or the infinite. Yet he held each as one of two inconditionates, neither of which can be conceived as possible, but which must both be true.

But what, exactly, is the theistic and historic doctrine of creation? The common phrase, "God created all things

out of nothing," and Webster's definition of *create*—"to bring into being from nothing"—contain the truth. But they are likely to confuse those who do not think carefully, if not to convey a positive error. They give occasion for the dilemma in which we ourselves were once placed by a learned emanationist: "Did God create the world out of something?" he asked. We answered: "No." "What did he create it out of?" "He did not create it out of anything," we replied. "Such is not a formula for the thought—out of something, or out of nothing."

The production of something out of something else is emanation, formation, or development, not creation. The other horn of the dilemma—creation out of nothing—supposes nothing to be an antecedent something; an absurdity into which only those fall who adopt the Hegelian starting-point in philosophy: "Sein und Nichts ist dasselbe,"—being and non-being, something and nothing, are identical. That nothing is something is indeed a contradiction; and that, by its own force, it can become something, is, of course, impossible and absurd. That a finite agent can create a new substance—a sculptor produce, as well as chisel, his marble—indeed, that any effect can be produced without an adequate cause, admits of no question. Within the province of the finite, "Ex nihilo, nil fit" has a universal application; but beyond that it is irrelevant, and of no value. Nature, with all her voices, disclaims creative power. But her disclaimer is worthless and impertinent, except in her own sphere. No human skill can produce even a new form without material to work upon, and tools to work with. But the Infinite, in his work, requires neither materials nor tools.

From all these difficulties, impossibilities, and absurdities, the theistic doctrine of creation stands entirely clear. With them it has nothing to do, except to enter its protest against them.

The doctrine of creation, simply stated, is, that the Absolute and infinitely Perfect, by his omnipotent will, brought

into being the material of the finite universe, which before had no being, either in himself or anywhere else.

Is there anything inconceivable or unintelligible in this? anything impossible or absurd? Does it not contain the elements of our most rational thoughts? our most solid, most universal logic? the law of cause and effect, and the operation of a power perfectly adequate to the effect—a personal intelligence, an infinite causative will for the created universe?

What, then, is the source of these objections? Atheism, pantheism, naturalism, and nothing else,—the assumption that there is no God, or that everything is God. But what advantage does either of these assumptions bring to science? Is it easier to suppose that this matchless harmony, beauty, and utility of the material world, this grand astronomical, geologic, biologic, and moral machinery, has no beginning or end, no cause or designer, but has been eternally gyrating—a vast hap-hazard universe? What do we know of an originating and guiding intelligence, of design or will anywhere, if all these signs are deceptive?

Or, is it more rational to assume, with the pantheist, an unconscious and reasonless expansion of a vast impersonal substance into the numberless particles and personalities that fill the world, the dividing of the indivisible, and finiting of the infinite, the mutation of pure spirit into gross matter, and its transmutation back into spirit? Does science, in any of her crucibles or laboratories, disclose any such changes? Has matter ever been detected in passing into mind, or mind into matter? the divine in pressing itself out of the Deity, and then recalling itself back again?

If spirit and a stone are only terms applied to opposite ends of the same, ever-mutating, one substance; if this stone was once spirit, and may be attenuated to it again, and the spirit be cooled and consolidated into stone; if the one is God immanent, and the other God emanent, then all the discriminations of science are at fault, and science itself worthless. For, if anything is clear, it is the essential

difference between mind and matter. If science has a first principle, it is that a bridgeless gulf separates them. One may be the product of the other, matter of the infinite mind; but parts of the same thing, flowing and reflowing, and thus originating and modulating the world and man and history, without intelligence, will, or plan at the starting-point—this it pronounces impossible. And if these ground-discriminations of reason and science cannot be trusted, reason itself is delusive, and science a lie; everything is confused and chaotic; nature and the supernatural, the tinker and his tools, the worshipped and the worshipper,—all are swallowed up in this all-devouring generalization.

OBJECTIONS TO THE MOSAIC RECORD.

The objection to the written record of the creative period follows naturally from the denial of creation. For that record is discriminatingly and positively theistic. In its doctrine of creation it sets forth, as we have seen, the existence of God against atheism, and an infinite creative personality against pantheism; cutting off the infinite series of the former, and the eternal emanations of the latter. Hence the confederation of all the schools of these anti-creative philosophies in sternest opposition to it. Some impugn its genuineness, its authenticity, its cosmology, and its harmony with itself and with natural science. Some pronounce it fragmentary, mythical, and allegorical.

Lord Bolingbroke says the account of the creation, in a historical sense, is false, unphilosophical, and absurd. Strauss thinks the course of events cannot have taken place in the manner there represented; for the supernatural is unhistoric and impossible. "Such things may be known from common sense," writes the Swedish seer, "not to have been, and are not acknowledged by any one who thinks interiorly, as possible."

A few of the many attesting harmonies of the rocky with the written revelation respecting this period will place the objection in its true light.

1. The Mosaic account refers the creation of man directly to the Almighty fiat; and the rocky record, according to the testimony of its best interpreters, does the same. Chemistry, physiology, and paleontology, so far as they speak at all on the subject, vouch for the correctness of this testimony, and make it evident that man had his beginning, not from any self-developing force in nature, but by a personal will and power wholly above nature.

2. The record ascribes the commencement of animal and of vegetable life to the power of God; and all the efforts to establish a counter-origin, by spontaneous generation, natural selection, electricity, or chemical combinations, have signally failed. The careful experiments of Schultz and M. Dalle must be regarded as settling the question of artificial vitalization.

3. The record refers the production of light to the creative fiat, and places it in the first day. The objectors vauntingly alleged the absurdity of this, when the sun was not created till the fourth day. But they did not distinguish between chemico-cosmical and solar light, nor perceive, what chemical science now makes perfectly plain, that light is a result reached by creative energy through molecular activity and gravitation, and, as a first step in the organizing process, made its appearance necessarily on the first day. "Science," says Professor Guyot, "teaches that the first creation was accompanied by the manifestation of light; and that which has been a stumbling-block to the sceptics is thus, in reality, the corner-stone of creation."

4. The status of the newly-created substance was unorganized, matter in its simplest and most homogeneous condition. To this result the best modern chemists have all arrived, and with them the astronomers, geologists, and physicists, so far as they say anything, entirely agree.

5. The divisions and subdivisions of the creative work, as given by the Mosaic record, are marked and minute. The whole is mapped out in a sixfold division of time. Then occurs, on a larger generalization, first, what is called the

azoic or ante-life period, filling up three of the six days, the material of the universe being produced in the beginning; then light, as an organizing force; next the evolution of the atmosphere; and last, the mineral kingdom, as a foundation for what was to come; the waters, falling off into seas, closing the period with the prophetic dawn of vegetable life.

In the discriminations of the second, or the life-period, the record is even more full of intelligence and minuteness of plan. The vegetable kingdom, introduced at the close of the former period, makes three steps in the progressive work; the seedless grasses, esculents, and fruit-trees, the last, and the perfection, of vegetable life.

In the animal kingdom comes a fourfold division — fish for the sea, fowl for the air, quadrupeds to roam over the land, and man, the crown and sub-ruler of all the rest.

Each great division constitutes an epoch in the creative work. No one kingdom slides into another, as if by development. No one species passes over to another, or crowds it aside, by any principle of natural selection. Nothing develops anything which was not enveloped by the creative fiat.

Now, here is a series of divisions and subdivisions, drawn out minutely in the order of logical progress by a clearly defined plan. The record is didactic and perfectly unambiguous. It touches on the profoundest problems of ontology, physiology, philosophy, and history — the relations of the finite and the infinite, the production of the finite by the infinite. It steps with a masterly freedom into almost every department of science, with no fear of being ruled out, or of counter-testimony.

This appeal to the sciences for harmonic confirmation is made in the quiet confidence of perfect certainty. It is made, too, where the averments were sure to come to trial, though not till thousands of years after, and where error, if it existed, would not fail of detection. Such an appeal, there and then, was a venture of no ordinary boldness. It is one of the highest historic sublimities, based on one of the completest of historic harmonies.

And what is the result? Some of the sciences in their infancy have been dragged into apparent conflict with the Bible; but in coming to maturity, they have all placed themselves with its friends and allies. "The first thought that strikes a scientific reader of the first chapter of Genesis," says Professor Guyot, "is the evidence of divinity, not merely in the first verse, but in the whole order of creation. There is so much that the recent readings of science have for the first time explained, that the idea of man as the author of the account becomes utterly incomprehensible. By proving the record true, science proves it divine; for who could correctly have narrated the secrets of eternity, but God himself?"

Thus, before all its accusers, and in the illuminated centre of the sciences of the nineteenth century, the providential Book stands unharmed and undismayed. More and more, as intelligence increases, is it found to be the inspirer of the best poetry, the patron of the best philosophies, and the light of the best sciences. All these come to it for the seeds of their profoundest thoughts and their most beneficent discoveries. Earlier than Thucydides by a thousand years, it is more lucid and exact, even in what is purely historical. Before Homer by seven hundred years, it is more poetic and more dramatic. It is the only record of the course of events for the first three thousand years which has any repute at the bar of science or philosophy.

As a providential record, it connects the great facts of history with the profoundest principles of social, political, and religious life. It is not idealistic, or nominalistic, but a most practical realism, bearing on the great problems of history, in the enlightenment, and for the regeneration, of humanity. It punctures the balloon-like inflations of a self-confident naturalism, and yet tasks the reasoning faculties on the plane of a most rational science, and in the solution of the weightiest moral problems. It treats of man and his Maker—the finite and the Infinite—and their relations; of man's duties and destinies. It tells him

whence he came, what he is, and whither he is going — just what he most needs to know.

It is not necessary to inquire how this earliest record came to be in such remarkable harmony with the latest sciences, and to embrace in its statements so many of the the first principles of social and political life ; though we can see but one satisfactory explanation. It is sufficient that it can be held as veritable history, against those who resolve it into a myth or an allegory, or allege against it the contradictions of science and common sense. These harmonies scatter forever the fogs and fancies of the fabulists and allegorizers. Can the writing be a fable, and the things written solid and scientific facts ?

Thus this written record stands in no danger from the sciences or the sound philosophies. No essential error has been discovered in it. No fact, in any department of knowledge, has been shown to be at variance with it. Not a feather or a fin strikes against it. Not a star or a stone impeaches it.

But how is this ? Because it is a book of creative history. Because God's revelation of himself in nature and in the Bible can never be discrepant. And the students of these two great books cannot, by any fair interpretation of either, be placed in antagonistic or rival relations. Neither side has occasion for jealousy, or to fear the effect of advancements on the other. The chief danger comes from ignorance, self-conceit, and dogmatism ; and this danger lies more or less on both sides.

ARTICLE IV.

RECENT QUESTIONS OF UNBELIEF.

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NEVER, since the crucifixion, has the religion of Christ, in its purest forms, had a stronger hold on the popular heart than at this day. But at no time has it been assailed with such variety and persistency of argument for its overthrow as during the hundred years just passed, nor in our own country as during the present century. Within the last fifteen or twenty years, especially, every department of knowledge has been solicited, both here and abroad, to bear witness against it. Even intelligent men, from whom we might have expected more wisdom, if not piety, led away by what the apostle has designated "science, falsely so called," and by "philosophy and vain deceit," have, in some instances, surrendered Christian hopes, and embraced a scepticism as terrible as it is unreasonable. The spirit of doubt has been extensively infused into the popular literature of the day; and a romantic semblance of Deity has been substituted in it, to an alarming degree, for the great personal God our Father. These seductive influences have shaken the faith of many who know little of the sources from which their misgivings were derived.

While the unlettered disciple of Jesus, besides that great witness which he has within himself, needs have no fear lest the argument for infidelity should be too powerful—even on the plane of the natural understanding—for the argument which defends the cross, intelligent men, under such circumstances, have a mission, not only to stand with firmness in their own constancy, but to protect and strengthen the weak; beating down antichristian opposition with the weapons of just reasoning and the wisdom of Christ.

We propose a few remarks on the Recent Questions of

Unbelief. We must premise, however, that they so overlap, intermingle, and complicate themselves with each other, that any perfect classification of them, chronologically considered, would be impossible. At the same time, we may hope to set them forth with sufficient exactness for the purpose now in view, by arranging them according to their degrees; beginning with the less formidable, and proceeding to those which leave us nothing but the blackness of darkness, instead of our old religious lights.

The first form of unbelief may be called a question of *interpretation*. It admits that Christianity is a supernatural religion; that Christ himself, in a high, mysterious, supernatural sense, is the Son of God; that the Bible, at least the New Testament, is a supernatural revelation. But it endeavors to eliminate from the record, by means of criticism and interpretation, all those principles which are distinctly evangelical. While it admits miracles, especially the resurrection of our Lord from the dead, it reduces the supernatural to the lowest possible degree, as expressed in them, and endeavors so to explain the text that the doctrines of the divinity of Christ, his incarnation as God in man, his expiation for sin, the personal divinity of the Holy Spirit, supernatural regeneration, justification only by faith, and all the kindred doctrines usually denominated "evangelical," shall not be found in it. This early opposition to the old orthodoxy of the fathers was sometimes, in the heat of conflict, denominated infidelity. But it was not infidelity, according to any received usage of the term. Though far enough from being the Christianity of the New Testament, it was still further from that absolute infidelity which rejects miracles and everything supernatural in the religion of Christ. It had pressed its explanatory and apologetic criticism far on towards the slippery and perilous edge of that abyss which separates it from infidelity, and from which many in its front ranks were soon seen plunging down to be engulfed; but still it was not infidelity. It had accepted miracles; it held strongly, at least with one hand, upon the New Testa-

ment as an authoritative revelation, and containing the pledges of a future life. But, at the same time, it rejected nearly the whole of that great system of Christian doctrine which the church, in the grand current and sweep of its faith, has always received. Of this form of unbelief it may be said: first, that its adherents have always been comparatively few. Common Christians could not find its negations in their Bible. Of the educated, only a small number ever ventured, by continuous commentary or explanation of whole books, to interpret the New Testament according to it. It sustained itself chiefly by objections and sceptical generalities. The notion of various readings, spurious interpolations, preconceived improbabilities, and consequently possible explanations through emendations, conjectures, and severe straining of the text, satisfactory almost to no one, formed the staple of its protest. In the second place, the foremost minds in this form of unbelief, those who dared to follow such principles to their logical conclusions, soon came to reject this method of interpretation altogether, as unsatisfactory and not radical enough to meet the facts of the case or the ends in view. Progressive minds in Germany, England, and America have generally long since given it up. It is now, for the most part, conceded that, whatever may be said of Christianity as a supernatural religion, it must be acknowledged that the New Testament as it stands teaches both it and the system of connected doctrines which the church has generally believed. We shall probably be opposed by comparatively few intelligent persons, when we assert that the system of interpretation here described is obsolete, and that the semi-rationalism which prevailed in New England forty or more years ago, and in Germany near the close of the last century, is essentially dead. Indeed, the idea of retaining the Bible as of supernatural authority, and of excluding the main features of the evangelical system from it, is hopeless and absurd. It would be like an attempt to explain Homer with the Trojan war left out, or construct a planetary system of astronomy with no place in it for the sun.

The second question of unbelief, nearly allied to the former, and complicated with it, is a question of *inspiration*. It combats this thesis: "Holy men of old composed the sacred scriptures, as they were moved thereto by the Holy Spirit." It most generally admits the fact of a supernatural revelation once given, but totally denies that our biblical writings came to us under the sanction of divine authority. The Old and New Testaments are merely human and very imperfect records of *some things* divinely communicated, which the authors of our books were able to remember and put down, but with their own imperfect apprehensions of these things, and their still more imperfect comments upon them. We are, therefore, in forming our judgments as to what is truth, to consider the credibility of the biblical statements, their probability and reasonableness, and accept what accords with our notions, and reject the rest. Hence, while we may receive many things contained in the Bible, since they are confirmed by our intuitions or by our reasonings and what may seem to us likely, we cannot select a single passage of scripture, and say of it: This was certainly from God, and was rightly recorded. The consequences of such a position were as might have been expected. Many of the sketches, narratives, statements, particularly of the Old Testament; many views of God, actions directed or sanctioned by him under the first dispensation; and several doctrines of the gospel, particularly the Trinity, the atonement, and the eternal punishment of the wicked, judged by the standard of what is called human reason, it pronounced false.

To all this it was answered, first, that, on mere rationalistic grounds, many of the objections to specific passages and accounts, when these passages and accounts come to be carefully examined, disappear. This statement holds good all the way from Paulus to Colenso, and those who follow. Rightly considered, the objections are not there. Secondly, the number and weight of objections not thus disposed of are much further reduced by correcting the idea of inspiration which scepticism attributes to believers in the scriptures,

and which some believers to a certain extent have, in former times, justified. When it is remembered that "the Bible was written by men and for men," that it was written in human language by persons who expressed their thoughts each in his own manner, that it was written, not for purposes of scientific accuracy or information, but simply for the communication to man of a divine standard of faith and practice, most of these remaining objections also disappear.

As to the doctrines of the New Testament, it was answered, that the human mind is not competent to decide in such cases, beforehand, what principles and facts God would reveal. Indeed, the very necessity for a revelation arises chiefly from the incompetency of man to discover its truths unhelped. Moreover, the doctrines in question have been examined and accepted by minds at least as strong as those who have examined and rejected them, and no such contradiction to the reason of the former has been discovered in them. They ought not, therefore, to be put down as certainly contrary to reason. But the principle of unbelief in question does not usually extend to a total rejection of the supernatural in religion. It more commonly accepts the Christian miracles, or, at least, some of them. Most of all, it accepts the fact of the resurrection of Christ from the dead, and by logical necessity, therefore, accepts enough of revelation to make the Bible, at least the New Testament, our highest rule of faith and practice. Indeed, few Biblical scholars at this day would venture to reject most of the received doctrines of the church on the mere ground of imperfect inspiration. Christianity will stand in all its leading features, as set forth in our sacred books and heretofore believed in the church, unless some more radical question than this should destroy it. We must totally reject the fact of a truly divine revelation, the Christian miracles, the supernatural in religion; or the necessities of probable reasoning will bring us back to a reception again of that very evangelical system of faith which the doctrine of imperfect inspiration was expected to overthrow. In short, give us

the resurrection of Christ from the dead, and we are sure of our Christianity as from God. This second question, which we have called a question of inspiration, is quite an advance on the downward plane of scepticism upon the first — the question of interpretation. Both views, however, were for a long period held together within the limits of the same traditional supernaturalism and veneration. But even the denial of inspiration and the reliability of our scriptures was not total infidelity; though it approached fearfully near to it. There is an immense difference between the acceptance of the supernatural in our Christianity and the denial of it. Besides this, unbelief has gained almost nothing in its favor, so long as one allows that our Bible contains a true revelation, however intermixed and corrupted in its transmission. One might dispense with all the texts about which there is, or is imagined to be, the least possible question, and proceed to the sacrifice of entire chapters, and even books; and the great temple of truth, in its perfect proportions, would still remain without a single column broken.

Before passing from these two questions of unbelief, it will be proper to notice a peculiar form under which both of them sometimes appeared. It might be called Indifferentism. It neither exactly accepted, nor exactly denied, the old methods of interpretation, the old doctrine of inspiration, or the accepted doctrines of the church; but passed them all by as unimportant. Dr. Porter, of Roxbury, in a sermon preached before the convention of Massachusetts ministers, in 1810, expressed the spirit of deteriorated Lutheranism in Germany, and a miscalled Arminianism in New England, as it had existed and been increasing at least since the Revolutionary War. His subject was "Christian Simplicity." After mentioning several doctrines, such as "original sin, a Trinity in unity, the mere humanity, super-angelic nature, or absolute Deity of Christ, and the absolute eternity of punishment," he says: "My individual belief in respect to the truth or error of these points can be of but little importance, and my subject no way requires that it should be

given. It rather becomes me to follow the example which has been sometimes set by learned judges on the bench, when difficult questions suggested themselves, but whose decision the main subject before them did not require, and prudently say: 'Neque teneo, neque repello.' But it is pertinent to the object of this discourse, and consonant to my serious and deliberate conviction, to observe, that I cannot place my finger on any one article in the list of doctrines just mentioned, the belief or rejection of which I consider as essential to the Christian faith or character."

The third question of unbelief is a question of *revelation*. Thus far the conflict has gone on within the limits of a professed loyalty to Christ. Many of the older Unitarians regarded the returning Deism of the preceding century with unfeigned disapproval. And it is no more than justice to say of their historical, though not perhaps logical, successors, that they are earnest believers in the superhuman Jesus, and regard with feelings approaching horror the idea of a Christianity with Christ left out; and, moreover, that the difference between them and those who are called evangelical believers dwindles down to an infinitesimal, compared with the awful gulf which lies between them and the other wing of their own denomination. In our third question we cross the gulf. Is there a revelation? This form of unbelief answers: No. It starts with the underlying assumption that a miracle is an impossibility, or, at least, that the fact of miracle has never been proved. The historical evidence, therefore, usually adduced in favor of Christianity, is rejected. But how? The testimony in support of the Christian miracles is acknowledged to be strong. For the establishment of any common fact in history it would be abundant and superabundant. The direct testimony of eye-witnesses, so situated that they could not be deceived, — of men who give every possible indication of competent intelligence, candor, and honesty, who attest the truth of their conviction by immense labors and the sacrifice of their lives, — demonstrate, if any such evidence can demonstrate, the

reality of the facts which they declare. The wonderful importance of the revelations which these miracles were wrought to confirm ; their adaptation, carried out into sublime effect, to regenerate spiritually individuals and masses of mankind ; the character of the Author of the religion, which, if he wrought no miracles, is itself a miracle ; the church, or kingdom of God on earth, built upon him, or by his influence — these and numberless collateral evidences concentrate upon the Christian miracles a more powerful proof than can be brought to sustain any other equally ancient events. No person would think of disputing the reality of them in consequence of any defect of testimony, except from the foregone conclusion that miracles are impossible, or, at least, that no ordinary evidences, however strong, could certify us of their truth. Hence the problem of this form of unbelief — *to explain away the supernatural of Christianity*. It is not enough to array objections, to allege corruptions of the original text, to show, if show it could, that some of the records are unreliable. Here is the religion, the wonderful effects it has produced, the miraculous story it affirms, the seemingly supernatural character of its author, its inherent, irresistible, constantly disseminating power and progress. Here is the mighty lever which, beyond everything else, lifts up mankind. The religion comes to us, also, bringing its own explanations. It accounts historically for its existence, and for all the phenomena which attend it, on the principle of the supernatural. Unbelief, therefore, must yield, and accept Christianity as a supernatural religion, or explain it away. This, then, is its problem — to explain the existence of the New Testament, the existence of the church founded upon it, the existence and character of the author of it, the experiences and lives of his followers, on principles of ordinary history, without anything of the supernatural connected with it.

In attempting to solve this problem, the existence of Christ, and his crucifixion in the time of Tiberius Caesar, his remarkable, elevated, noble character, his belief in, or

pretension to, something supernaturally divine in himself, and his effort to found a religion, is necessarily admitted. So is also the fact that the New Testament records were made up and finished, essentially in their present form, in the early part of the second century, if not before the close of the first, and that the Christian church was built upon this religion, and the world has been revolutionized by it. All this must be allowed; but all miracle, all that is supernatural, the whole idea of Christ being more than man, must be explained away. Many have worked on this problem with great diligence and perseverance. A special attempt was made to solve it on the theory of myths. The writers exaggerate facts, or romance them out of their imaginations, or record what was thus exaggerated or romanced by others; not exactly intending to deceive, nor hardly conscious that they were expressing feelings and fancies in forms of truth. In this manner Strauss attempted to explain nearly the whole of the New Testament religion. Narrative, doctrine, miracle, and all the true greatness of Christ's person went down before him.

But, notwithstanding these ruthless criticisms, the character of Christ so stands out in glory, with all the world wondering about it; the religion is so full in every presentation of it, and so completely implied in all the various records and exhibitions of it; the witnesses are so numerous and unimpeachable in bearing testimony to it; and such a great kingdom of light and love has been built upon it, that very little impression has been made upon the uneducated or on the learned minds of its friends against it. While they have taken some trouble to answer the assailants, without a single doubt the faith of believers has only been strengthened by the attacks. Of Theodore Parker, however respected for his philanthropic efforts by many, it is not extravagant to say that, with considerable beauty of language and many noble sentiments and all the argument which he could command, his writings have made no impression upon evangelical scholars in the way of creating

alarm or misgiving. Renan's "Life of Jesus" hardly now deserves notice, except as a brilliant, but extinguished, vanity. For a time it made some impression, but is now regarded, even by the unbelievers, as hardly more than romance. Throwing out all miracle and everything supernatural in the Gospels, and reducing the Saviour of the world to a mere, though remarkable, man, this author's problem is to account for the wonderful story or stories recorded by the evangelists, and their still more wonderful exhibition of the character of Christ and the Christianity which he started, and which has overspread and overmastered the civilized world. Assuming the falsity of large portions of the fourth Gospel; more than insinuating the charge of dishonesty against the Apostle John; rejecting everything in the other evangelists which cannot easily be woven into his theory; resorting, in the case of the resurrection of Lazarus from the dead, to the absurd supposition that Jesus was himself deceived, or connived at a great imposition, and that Lazarus, feigning himself dead, wrapped himself in grave-clothes and came forth at the Master's call,—and all this because it was necessary to make the impression of supernatural power at that time, in order to overcome the growing opposition of the Jews at Jerusalem,—he seems to imagine that he has accounted sufficiently for Christ and his religion. His work, which is nothing less than a romance founded on certain facts in the life of Christ, has charms for some, and some may be bewildered in its delusions; but every wise man of Christian experience will only be confirmed in his faith by the utter shallowness, the total insufficiency, of this attempt to destroy it. The idea of lighted candles will not explain the stars, nor the supposition of a brass ball two feet in diameter explain the sun; but they are better explanations than Strauss and Renan and those who think with them have given of the religion of Christ.

The fourth question of unbelief is a question of *science*. Astronomy, geology, ethnology, and the science of organized beings generally, are set forth as giving testimonies incon-

sistent with the principles of natural and revealed religion. Science is thought to be infallible. Religion, therefore, must succumb to it.

More than two hundred years ago the whole Catholic church was thrown into convulsions by the astronomical discoveries of Galileo. They were considered as threatening the overthrow of the entire Bible. In this case the conclusions of science were fully sustained. But an improved intelligence as to the principles of interpretation brought about a natural and durable harmony between astronomy and revelation; and confidence in the Bible, instead of being destroyed, became stronger than ever. In our day, geology and the Book of Genesis have come into imagined contradiction. Paleontology, especially, is thought to be conclusively opposed to the Mosaic account of the creation. This, of course, believers in revelation deny; and they furnish plausible harmonies in answer to alleged disagreements, which, if not above question, are almost infinitely more probable than the idea of uninspired fable. But, without insisting on this position, if conclusions out of the opened volumes of the earth should finally be established in opposition to any which are usually drawn from the sacred scriptures, it now seems morally certain that, as in astronomy, so in geology and paleontology, a clearer insight into the real meaning and genius of the Bible would bring out harmony between the works and word of God. Ethnology, also, has boldly denied the Bible doctrine of the unity of the human race. But later theories of the creation, and the origin of species and organized being generally, confidently maintain that all the orders of living beings sprang from a very few original types, and perhaps from a single type. Hence the great argument for the diverse origin of the human races is so far from being conclusive that more thorough systems of scientific unbelief which have lately found favor, can secure converts only by renouncing it. We may say, then, with regard to the scriptures, that even on scientific grounds alone there is no reason for supposing

that the sciences in question can ever weaken their authority. The progress of science may require a better understanding of the principles, and some further modifications in the methods, of biblical interpretation. But we see not how it is possible for them to disturb the position that the sacred scriptures, properly understood, furnish a perfect, and the only perfect, rule of faith and practice.

The scriptures, it must be remembered, however, were not written to teach the sciences, but only to reveal religion. When the sciences, so called, shall prove themselves able to contradict successfully any of the great moral and religious principles of the Bible; and when it shall appear certain, after careful review, that those principles thus contradicted are in the Bible—then, but not till then, need we tremble for the ark of God.

But modern scepticism seeks to array the sciences against revelation in another way. It maintains that all processes in the universe are carried on by natural laws, and that miracles and the supernatural, being contradictory to them, are impossible. What is this but a new version of the oft-refuted sophism of Mr. Hume? It certainly begs the question. Its supporters say that natural laws are never suspended, and that nothing ever occurs except in accordance with them. But how do they know it? They answer: We have seen the constancy of nature's laws; but we have never seen them interrupted. Very well; you have never seen them interrupted; but does it follow that nothing has ever occurred in the universe except what you have seen? But again, if you have never seen the constancy of nature interrupted, you have seen many phenomena in nature which you cannot explain on any existing laws.

But suppose, for the sake of argument, it be granted that the Creator started the germs and processes of all things in the beginning, and rested forever? How is it known that, in his complicated arrangements, and with his infinite foresight and power, he did not make provision for all that we call supernatural—for miracle, for special providence, as

we designate acts, for answers to prayer? The truth is, men forget, in their mere natural studies, that there is a supernatural power — a living, infinite Being who created; that there is an infinitely intelligent, active Mind; and that there are minds, as well as matter, which he has called into being. In the study of mere natural laws they have no room for God to be, or to work, among them. But what! Did he create, and then enter into nothing? Has he, like Budh, after once existing, gone into nicban? But they say, all *science* is built on the constancy of nature's laws; and we could have no certainty in our inductions without such laws. But are none of nature's laws above our comprehension, and almost as much above it as the Christian miracles? And yet the study of science goes on. Indeed, miracles are so peculiar — so much above the common order of events, so exceptional — that, rightly regarded, they never can disturb the usual processes of nature or the conclusions of a rational science.

There have been attempts, powerful attempts, to prove by induction and inference that the universe as it now exists, with its myriads of starry globes, — the earth, with all its vegetable, animal, and rational forms of life, — is the result of development, through millions of ages, from some original, created or uncreated, unity. In other words, if there be, or was, a God, he has been totally inactive, so far as our earth is concerned, for countless millions of years. Without arguing the question at length, it may be sufficient, for the present, to say, first, that this theory, while in its scientific forms it does not deny the being of a God, has its logical, not to say well-understood, basis in pantheism. For once admit the being of a living, personal God, the original Creator of all things, and the groundwork of all this disbelief is destroyed.

Scientific scepticism, in these lines of non-belief, has totally failed in its attempt to destroy the grounds of natural and revealed religion. A sceptical writer, in full sympathy with Mr. Darwin's work on the Origin of Species, and

hailing it as a great discovery, no longer ago than 1860 — in an Article contained in the “Westminster Review” for that year — makes this remarkable concession: “Two years ago, in fact, the position of the supporters of the special creation hypothesis seemed more impregnable than ever, if not by its own inherent strength, at any rate by the obvious failure of all the attempts which had been made to carry it.” Up to that time, then, by the concession of high authority among the sceptical critics on the scientific side, science had totally failed in all its attempts to overthrow religion. Since that time, we have the treatises on the “Origin of Species.” But the journal just alluded to, while applauding the first of those works in the highest terms, and hoping that something decisive might be made out of it, was constrained to acknowledge, as every one must be, that the main propositions of the author had not been proved. While the doubters thus doubt, what reason have we for being disturbed as to the foundation of our faith, either in natural religion or revealed? On the contrary, the argument from science is not against a supernatural creation and government of the world, and of miracles.

But there is another form of scientific unbelief. We might almost call it a separate question of practical economy. Sustaining itself by the regular sequences of cause and effect, it consists in a simple abandonment of faith and all further inquiry respecting it. It says: Let us make the most of this world; we know nothing of another. And when conscience enters its loud protest against the recklessness and wickedness of this decision, a compromise is attempted with the higher nature thus outraged and outcriing, by implied pledges to live for the good of the race, whose only immortality is to be found in the endless succession of its generations on earth. It is a form of unbelief which, under able leaders, has taken powerful hold on the working classes of England. We refer, of course, to secularism, which means living for this world only. It is simply the old practical atheism of the human heart, and was sufficiently

answered by the Psalmist, three thousand years ago, when he said: "The fool hath said in his heart, There is no God."

Positivism, in all its forms, is necessarily inconclusive on the theistic question. In its observation of phenomena and generalizations deduced therefrom, it discovers no God; though on men generally phenomena have impressed the fact of his being. But, if it were true that the entire phenomena of the universe failed to evidence divine personality, nothing could thereby be established against the reality of the divine existence; for God might be, and might be proved to be, if phenomena did not witness, as they do, to the fact.

We must not pass this form of unbelief without notice of a recent phase of it, in Professor Huxley and his notions of protoplasm. By protoplasm, he of course means the primordial forms of life, and maintains that they are the actual, though material, basis of all life; the same in the animal and the vegetable, producing in us nervous forces and activities and thoughts. But does not this hypothesis assume, what it makes no progress in attempting to prove, that there is no higher element in man than protoplasmic cells? On his own ground, if all egg formations are originally alike, and develop differently, why may not similar protoplasma develop forces which are radically unlike? But on any ground, has the Professor, after all, proceeded a whit beyond what was revealed to the Hebrews three thousand years ago, viz. that "the life is in the blood"; and therefore, on the principle of life for life, blood makes atonement? We cannot see that the new form of protoplasm proves anything against immateriality of thought and the doctrine of religion.

The last question of unbelief is a *question of philosophy*. It rejects the doctrine of a personal God our Father, and substitutes a world-god in its stead. This deity — the god of the pantheists — though variously defined, is substantially the aggregate and unity of all the forces in nature, physical and mental, with the phenomena resulting therefrom, working blindly, by regular processes of development, towards the never-to-be-reached perfectibility of itself. It is an infi-

nately complicated system of things — without a Creator, without a guiding intelligence, without a meaning, without an end; the immense whole denominated God, but never reaching consciousness or wisdom, except as they exist in man. Of course, accountability and the hope of personal immortality, and the religion of Christ as we understand it, perish together.

The basis of this radical form of unbelief is found in the supposed inability of the human mind to demonstrate by its reasonings the being of a personal God. We need not advance, in this connection, to any philosophical discussions of subject and object, being and becoming, mind and matter, and relations between them. It may be sufficient to say that no pantheistic philosopher, from Spinoza to Hegel (if Hegel, indeed, was a pantheist), nor any who followed after, have been able to prove — nor is it possible to prove — the negative of the question: Is there a personal God? The most that can be said, is: “Behold, we have gone forward, and he is not there; and backward, and we cannot perceive him.” They have sought him where a supernatural, spiritual, holy God would be least likely to reveal himself, in the processes of the natural understanding, or they have looked for him among the uncertainties of supposed intuitions, and they have not found him. Or rather, the problem which pantheism assigns itself is, how to conceive, or reason out, or explain the creation without a Creator. If it could have succeeded at all in this line of argument, it would not have proved the non-existence of our God, but only that the metaphysical evidence of his being is insufficient to establish it. Though we will not concede so much as this, it is all that the metaphysical pantheist could possibly demonstrate. Then, it should be remembered that not only have all theistic and Christian philosophers rejected the assumptions on which these reasonings are based, but no leading philosopher of this school has ever been satisfied with the postulates and conclusions of his predecessor. Nor has a single principle demonstrably opposed to natural or revealed religion been

established. Moreover, not only do all the evidences of the divine existence drawn from our intuitions, from observation of design and final causes, and from the natural sentiment of mankind remain untouched, but this last evidence, the universal sentiment of the race, convicts the doctrine of metaphysical non-belief of a positive absurdity. Its all-god, which is no God, develops a universal falsehood in human nature; it makes that nature testify firmly and universally to a belief which has no foundation.

Once more, the enormous credulity which could suppose that this vast and complicated system of things was developed out of nature without God — which must be the fact, if pantheism is true — would enable us to believe that *Christianity itself was developed in the same way*; that, in the process of development, that beautiful being, the Christ of the New Testament, came forth, the single and glorious outflowing of the human race; that it had pleased blind nature, which had developed such an infinite variety of wonders, to develop, at last, its masterpiece, an incarnate God working miracles, a being out of nature to be nature's head, embodying its forces in himself, and exercising them according to his will; and thus, coming round the circle in the track of pantheistic argument, we would get back everything, and have a real God and Saviour, after all.

It is also significant, on this subject, that while positivism and transcendentalism stand forth in strenuous antagonism to each other, Christianity alone, as a system, is able to mediate between them, and include them. She supplements positivism by the intuitions of the reason and the convictions of consciousness; especially when the inward evidence ascends to the region of communion with God and a perfect faith; and at the same time gives sobriety and direction to the inward beholdings of transcendental belief.

In view of this exhibition of scepticism at the present day, it becomes obvious, that we have no cause for being "shaken in mind" by the unbelief of some distinguished scholars. Considering circumstances, their infidelity need

not surprise us. While we appreciate their researches, and beseech them to go on in all ways of honest inquiry, we would not charge them with conscious dishonesty in weighing the Christian evidences, or with an overmastering wish to break them down. Many of them have been led to their conclusions by objections and difficulties which they have really experienced in their reasonings. But in estimating the worth of their opinions, some special considerations ought to be noticed. In the first place, according to their own showing, they have never experienced that great spiritual renewal in themselves which the gospel designates, and all evangelical Christians accept, as a resurrection from the dead, a new creation, and a new birth; and which it declares to be necessary in order that a man should have the true witness in himself, or any clear perception of the grounds of Christian truth. In the next place, unbelievers are necessarily prejudiced, and most powerfully prejudiced, against some of the essential principles of the New Testament scriptures; for instance, the Christian atonement, the change of heart, and the deep personal depravity which makes that change indispensable. While they accept a religion of natural culture, the idea of supernatural redemption is repulsive to them. The educated mind, and the more highly educated the more proud it becomes, must either receive these doctrines, and submit to what they involve, or reject and denounce them as false. Hence, unconsciously to themselves, perhaps, many are predisposed to construct or adopt systems which set the brand of falsehood on a religion so obnoxious to them. Hence, in part, the denials of the supernatural, and the attempts to explain religion on mere natural principles. We would on no account speak uncandidly of those men who reject the revelation in which our hopes are all centred. But we must say that, while in our solemn conviction the unbelievers have totally failed in all their principal efforts to explain religion, the New Testament has beforehand explained them, or, at least, some of them. Among many passages, take the following: "Light has come

into the world, and men loved darkness, rather than light"; "I will pray the Father, and he will give you another Comforter, even the Spirit of truth, whom the world cannot receive, because it seeth him not, neither knoweth him"; "When they knew God," or might have known him, "they glorified him not as God, but became vain in their imaginations, and their foolish heart was darkened"; "Professing themselves wise, they became fools"; "The preaching of the cross is to them that perish foolishness"; "The world by wisdom knew not God"; "The natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God; for they are foolishness unto him; neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned." Moreover, the very studies of these men lead them away from God. They confine themselves chiefly to the laws of nature, to mere natural causes and effects, or to the logic of the natural understanding or doubtful intuitions; neglecting the conscience and the deep wants and longings of the soul. No great philosopher in the domain of unbelief has ever taken universal sin and guilt, as the New Testament represents it, into his reasonings; but has left out a fact, which, if it be a fact, must vitiate his conclusions.

How should we conduct ourselves, in view of the unbelief which presses so hardly upon us? To the mass of less educated Christians we say, confidently: You have no call to follow the sceptic through the tortuosities and subtleties of learned irreligion. The faith, as you have received it, is a light on the earth, and a light within you. It makes your days blessed, and lifts you into the heavens, while you cry out, exultingly: "I know that my Redeemer liveth." The worst that could happen is that our Christianity should finally fail us, and thus we all go down together. And for our part, we had rather go down with John and Paul, and the blessed mother of our Lord, and the martyred church champions, and the great church teachers, and the precious saints we have known who lived and loved and slept in Jesus, than with Celsus and Porphyry and Julian, Voltaire and Thomas Paine, and the more respectable, but no less

determined, unbelievers, Strauss and Parker and Renan. Yes, let us go down, if go down we must, with that Divine Man, though man, of Calvary, who flooded all the ages which came after him with life and light and joy and love, than with Judas who betrayed him, Pilate and Herod who gave him up, and the "scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites," of whatever generation, who have cried: "Away with him! Crucify him; crucify him!"

But we shall not go down. The religion of Christ is that "munition of rocks" against which the infidel cannon has been thundering for centuries, and has never made in it a destructive breach. Is it possible that for thousands of years the world has been crying, "O my God, my God," when there is no God? Has nature, or the universal whole of things, so true in the instincts of beasts and birds and reptiles which it has developed, failed only, and failed fatally, in the instincts of man? Was Christ an imposter? Let us open our New Testament, and read: "When he was come down from the mountain, great multitudes followed him. And behold, there came a leper and worshipped him, saying, Lord, if thou wilt, thou canst make me clean. And Jesus put forth his hand, and touched him, saying, I will; be thou clean. And immediately his leprosy was cleansed." Could the Christ of the Sermon on the Mount have uttered the ineffably pure and heart-searching sentences of that soul-ravishing discourse, and wind up with the miserable juggleries of false miracle and imposition upon the people? Could he pass days and hours in deceitful contrivances and duplicities, that by hypocritical shows he might astonish and gain the multitudes, and, with no deterioration of character, come out the blessed Christ whom we worship? "It is difficult," says an unbeliever,¹ "without exhausting superlatives, even to unexpressive and wearisome entirety, to do justice to our intense love, reverence, and admiration for the character and teaching of Jesus. We regard him, not as the perfection of the intellectual or philosophic mind, but

¹ Creed of Christendom, p. 227.

as the perfection of the spiritual character, as surpassing all men of all times in the closeness and depth of his communion with the Father. In reading his sayings, we feel that we are holding conversation with the wisest, purest, noblest being who ever clothed thought in the poor language of humanity. In studying his life, we feel that we are following the footsteps of the highest ideal yet presented to us on earth." All this! and yet a whole life of falsehoods and impositions—the alone super-eminent man, yet making assumptions which, if he were not divine, were blasphemy. No, no; there is no other alternative; the glory of Christ must go into dread eclipse, or we must say, with the centurion: "Truly this was the Son of God."

To the *mass* of *educated* men one might say almost the same thing: You have no call to perplex yourselves often with the objections of unbelief. Live in your religion, enjoy it, and grow in it; remembering the words of the Lord Jesus: "Blessed are they who have not seen me, and yet have believed." But, as there must be officers in armies, so in the defence of Christianity there must be leaders and champions for the foremost foes. We must have scholars who can sound the depths of Fichte and Feurbach, test the inductions of Darwin and the "Vestiges," and meet Paulus and Baur and Powell and Jowett on their own grounds. Nor need they be afraid to study the universe, whether mental, material, or natural. Only let them study reverently, living, meanwhile, "in the light," and the Spirit which guides them into all truth will preserve them.

In dealing with the scepticism of the present day, there is a peculiarity which must not be passed without notice. The profane levity and bitter scorning of the preceding century has nearly ceased. The unbelievers have grown serious. They no longer rail at the Nazarene. They stand by the dead form of the blessed Christ with head uncovered; they touch the bier reverently; they bear him forth tenderly; they bury him with religious rites, "dust to dust, ashes to ashes," but with no resurrection. He is a dead Christ, and

neither here nor hereafter shall we see him any more. But not yet has human thought become free. The infinite Father must also go down. In all the universe there must be no God. The unbelievers understand themselves; they perform their work resolutely, but sorrowfully; and there is a strange mixture of wretchedness and exultation, as they contemplate the result. The world with them is at length free; for that awful power no longer overshadows it. But there are yearnings in the desolated heart which will not be appeased. The loneliness, the vacancy, the sense of bereavement which some of them express in their melancholy gladness appalls us. Could Sarah Hennell and her distinguished brother, whose death she so sorely lamented, have had the spirit of him who cried out, "Lord, I believe; help thou mine unbelief," or of one who exclaimed, in anguish, fearing that the foundations of his faith were passing away, "Ask the Saviour you believe in, if he be true, to convince me," she might have seen the heavens opened, and the Son of Man standing on the right hand of God; and, instead of those poor attempts to exult in the discoveries of foremost thought, amidst the appalling darkness of her spirit, she might have joined the chorus: "Unto us is born a Saviour." At the hazard of being thought unscholarly in our discussion, we accord to such persons our compassion. They seem to us like mourners, who have come up from the funeral of the Great God. While we contend in argument, believers as we are in prayer, we ought to pray for misguided scholars, with whom we have so many sympathies, to him who said, "I live forever," that he who cried, "Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do," might guide them unto truth.

A closing caution still remains. All Christians should regard it; for it springs from the nature of their religion. While we do not believe in the utility of too much of what may be called preaching, when such subjects are under discussion; nevertheless, as certain as the religion is true, there is a moral influence which must affect our conclusions. "Take heed," said the apostle, "lest there be in any of you

an evil heart of unbelief in departing from the living God.” If the religion is true, we cannot understand our scriptures without a spirit which is in harmony with them. In the neglect of true Christian culture, in the disuse of spiritual communion and a loving, obedient endeavor, the mind will grow dark. It is an appalling retribution, that they who exclude the light gradually lose the power to see. As fishes in dark caves have rudimentary eyes, but no vision, so, if the real truth is disliked, or regarded with prejudice, the mind will be darkened to its perception. We meet a blind man, with downcast face and hesitating step, groping his way along the street, and are sad for our blind brother. But how much more an object of compassion is he of the sightless soul.

ARTICLE V.

DEMOSTHENES AND THE RHETORICAL PRINCIPLES ESTABLISHED BY HIS EXAMPLE.

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SEMINARY.

It is a remarkable fact that eloquence is to be found in its highest and best state at so early a period of its history. It is another remarkable fact, that there has been an almost universal concurrence in the sentiment that places Demosthenes at the head of all the eloquent. Men have differed in most other matters. But all eyes, from all countries and all ages, have agreed to look upon Demosthenes as the prince of orators. The verdict of all time being as it is, and being right, probably, I have selected him as being thus the highest authority in all matters of eloquence, and, for the purpose I have in view, shall first give a mere outline of his training — a summary of the qualities of his manner and style — and then proceed to derive from him certain oratorical lessons; using him as a teacher and corrector, and

bringing to this acknowledged standard some of the doctrines and practices of these later times.

The Grecian orator was born about 385 B.C. His father, who was respectable and affluent, died when he was seven years of age. This event placed him under the care of guardians, who plundered his property, while they neglected his education. As to native endowments, it is said, there was no early evidence of anything very remarkable. As to physical constitution, we are told, he was of a slender, sickly habit. But while his body was originally weak, his passions were strong — that for distinction showing itself decisively. The vindictive passions, also, were very prominent and active.

The fire of eloquence was early enkindled within him. Hearing Callistratus deliver an oration, Demosthenes felt the charm of his oratory, beheld the distinction it conferred, and then and there resolved to become an orator of the very first order. He resorted for instruction to Isaeus, on account of the nerve of his style, rather than to Isocrates, who was the more celebrated rhetorician. Cicero intimates that he had help from Plato. But Demosthenes, to a great extent, brought himself on by self-culture, severe personal drill. In this part of his course there was the utmost diligence and decision. However, previous to this protracted and rigid self-discipline, he made some public attempts. The first was a prosecution of his guardians, who had defrauded him of his patrimony. Here he succeeded so well that he adventured further. He stepped on a higher arena, and failed. He was laughed down and hissed away. But he carried with him an indomitable spirit, that said, in the depths of his disgrace: I will return, and stand in this same place, the first orator of Athens. He went out of sight. He went underground. His failure was prominently in the matter of delivery. He entered his subterranean abode, chiefly to practice and perfect himself in this. There he studied and practised, sallying forth into the light only to get the material used in his solitude — having shaved one half of his head,

that there might be no possibility of another premature attempt.

Of the fitness and efficacy of some of his resorts it is now difficult to judge favorably. How speaking when out of breath should strengthen the lungs, or how articulating with pebbles in the mouth should cure stammering, we can hardly understand. They are certainly remedies which are not resorted to now. But his attention during his withdrawal from the world was not wholly given to the proprieties and graces of action. He tasked most severely his powers of thought, and composed many of those passages, and even orations, which have since been the admiration of the world.

It was eight years before Demosthenes appeared again before a popular assembly; and soon after the field opened admirably for his nervous and heated eloquence. Philip, by craft and bravery, was fast striding to the sovereignty of all Greece, as he went on trampling state after state into subjection. The Athenians, who alone could have brought him to a stand, or turned him back, looked on with indifference. On these two points—the arrogant, deceiving, all-grasping Philip, and the uncaring, supine Athenians—did the mind of the orator fasten and glow and blaze. He was favored with an audience that could feel all that was forcible in the sentiment and spirit, and appreciate all that was melodious and fine turned in the style of his eloquence. The common people were masters of the language; critics, often, in its scholarly niceties; practiced judges upon every species of oratory. It became a speaker to be careful how he came before such auditors. And Demosthenes was careful. He appeared willingly only when he had prepared himself thoroughly. The preparation extended, not merely to the gathering of material, the framing of the argument, the arranging of the thoughts and illustrations, but to the nice choice and position of the words; occasionally to the musical balance of the sentences; in short, to the utmost closeness, richness, strength of the language. This did Demosthenes and Pericles, and the greatest orators of that age.

Demosthenes was remarkable for growth in the line of effectiveness, up to the last effort he made. His last effort, the oration *Περὶ Στεφάνου*, was his greatest; this being made at the age of fifty-five, in the year 330 B.C., eight years before his death. What I have to say in this connection will have exclusive reference to this, which is called his masterpiece.

The occasion of it was as follows: Soon after the defeat at Cheronea, which determined the subjugation of Greece and the complete ascendancy of Philip, Demosthenes, who had prepared for, and even advised to, this battle, was assailed by the voice of faction, because his measures had been unsuccessful. At this juncture, Ctesiphon, on the part of the friends of Demosthenes, that the clamor of unreasonable men might be silenced, moved a decree in the senate, to be ratified in the popular assembly, that Demosthenes be crowned with a golden crown, in consideration of the liberality of his private expenditure upon a public work with which he was intrusted. The senate agreed to the measure. But ere the question came before the popular assembly, Aeschines, the rival and enemy of Demosthenes, commenced a prosecution against Ctesiphon as the mover of a decree which was contrary to law: First, Demosthenes, being a public accountant, had not passed his accounts and had them approved; and the law was, that no such person should receive a crown till his accounts had been examined and approved. Secondly, the crowning was proclaimed in the theatre, which was contrary to law. Thirdly, the motion was full of falsehoods, stating that the conduct of Demosthenes had been honorable and highly serviceable to the country, when the fact was far otherwise. It was eight years before this memorable contest between these two greatest orators of the age came on.

At length the tribunal, composed of five hundred of the wisest and best citizens of Athens, was seated, and around them crowded myriads of eager auditors, curious to hear the advocacy of a cause which would range over a space of

twenty years, and bring in for argument and illustration all the great national affairs and events for that long and pregnant period. Aeschines opened with great ability, and in his speech expressed the wish that Demosthenes might be compelled to use the same method of arrangement in his defense, which he himself had used in the accusation. But no such power was exercised against Demosthenes. He was allowed his own order, which was far better for him than the one Aeschines prescribed. What Aeschines would have him put first, and make the chief point, Demosthenes reduced down to the smallest possible size, and laid away very quietly in the middle of his speech.

Our orator begins by conciliating his audience; meeting at the threshold the obnoxious attribute of egotism, which would be forced into his speech by the nature of the argument,—it being very prominently a defence of his own course and the measures of his administration. He cast the blame of this feature upon his adversary, who had instituted an impeachment of such a nature. He implores a kind and candid hearing, on the ground that everything was at stake with him. He affects not to come at once to the main question, because his adversary had not kept to it. He had brought in matters foreign, false, and injurious to himself, which he must meet and correct at the outset, or the judges would not be in a state to view his case impartially. He goes on, then, to raise a sentiment in his own favor, even to excite a spirit of admiration toward himself. To this end, he passes over, in a rapid and suggestive sketch, past events in which he and Aeschines had been prominent—brings to view the craft and hostility of Philip, his fearful encroachments, his own inflexible opposition to all his schemes, and the favor and service Aeschines had done Philip to the detriment of Athens. He avails himself here of the strong national sentiments and feelings of his countrymen, touching upon topics which feed that feeling, that he might be carried on its tide toward his great object. Having thus prepared the way, the orator ventures upon the ground of the laws

respecting the crown, which was his adversary's strong and main point, and his weak one. He affects to meet it fully and fairly; he makes it all so clear and obvious, by a few strokes, that he all but apologizes for turning aside from his main drift to notice it at all. He then turns back again most willingly to the topics he was on before; gives them more expansion; shows that the failure of his measures was to be attributed to fortune. The measures he advised to were the only likely and practicable ones. No one *did*, no one *could*, show any better. He defies his antagonist, even now, if he can, to point out any better; and, in an unparalleled strain, ascribes to the actors in those adverse events the high glory of following in the footsteps of their ancestors. He compares his own resources in the conflict with those of Philip; shows that he had been embarrassed and defeated in his patriotic designs by the influence of Aeschines and his party, who all along played into the hands of Philip. He comes, next, to more private matters — to the personal character and conduct of Aeschines and himself; and here are epithets of reproach, and passages of scorching obloquy, which cannot well be matched. He then draws a picture of a good citizen, to show, by the contrast, the vileness of his adversary; and concludes with the sentiment, which, indeed, runs through the speech, that Aeschines was with Philip, and against the country; Demosthenes, the opposite.

Wherein, now, lies the power of this speech of Demosthenes, or of the speeches of Demosthenes generally? We may answer this negatively, and say: It is not in a few detached and remarkable passages, which you can take out, and they shall seem as admirable and forcible as they are in the piece. There are not in this speech the unevennesses and the contrasts which sometimes appear in our eloquent men. It is earnestness, passion, progress throughout. Again, it is not the power of pregnant, condensed thought and sentiment. It is a rare thing, comparatively, to find in Demosthenes a great and independent sentiment or maxim, such as Burke, for example, abounds in. We read on a

long way in the great speech before we find a substantial one like the following: "It becomes individuals in their private concerns, and the state in public affairs, to shape their subsequent conduct in consistency with the brightest passages of their former lives." Admirable this; but few in our orator like it.

Nor was his power at all in pathetic appeal, nor in the kindred attribute of humor; for in both these he was almost wholly wanting. If he possessed, he did not use, either power. His eloquence was of the bare, unrelieved, severe sort. He had, in more senses than one, great severity. Singularly severe in the bad, the abusive sense, he had in an almost frightful degree the power of withering sarcasm and cumulative reproach. He calls his adversary "a reviler," "a wretch," "a miscreant." "Why, then, wretch, do you bring your false accusations? Why do you fabricate your lying words? Why do you not purge out your filth with hellebore?" He calls him "a pompous declaimer," "a slanderer," "a sneer-monger," "an unhallowed villain," "the offscouring, the hack of the courts," "word-spawner," "execrable pedagogue," "a most abandoned citizen, the common pest of all that have perished — men, districts, cities." Though Demosthenes had the eloquence of Paul, he had nothing of his spirit. His was the spirit of utter selfishness, of intense, unappeasable revenge.

Let us turn, now, to the rhetorical severity. "In nothing," says Lord Brougham, "is the vast superiority of the chaste, vigorous style of the Greek orators and writers more conspicuous than in the abstinent use of their prodigious faculties of expression. A single phrase, sometimes a word, and the work is done, — the desired impression made, as it were, with one stroke; there being nothing superfluous interposed to weaken the blow or break its fall." This rigid abstinence extends to matters of figure and ornament. The extended, gorgeous, high-wrought figure is not found in our orator. Often is it the extreme of the brief and the simple, — as in that celebrated one, the *ὡσπερ νέφος*. The heavens had

become black with overhanging perils, when, with one magic touch, the orator causes them all to pass away before the potency of his decree, ὥσπερ νέφος, “as a cloud.”

Before proceeding further in giving specimens of our orator's figures, we remark that there is really a dearth of figures, that is, such figures as one can take out, and hold up as specimens, with good effect. Still, though this characteristic has led some critics to deny the fact, we are compelled to admit, as we read Demosthenes, that he has a highly figurative style. The figures are closely inwrought into the whole texture of discourse—into the words, facts, arguments. The facts and arguments are figures; the figures are all arguments.

We will begin our illustrations with *metaphor*. The great oration is full of this figure; but it lies very much in the words, and therefore is not separable for purposes of illustration. The following is of this kind: “In the Greek state there shot up a crop (φορά) of traitors, mercenary and abandoned, such as no one remembered at any former period.” Here is an instance of very pregnant metaphor, where the words are so full of a figurative sense that critics and commentators have been greatly plagued to get out into English the whole strong, picturesque meaning. He says: “Aeschines has disgorged upon me the foul contents of his own villainy and injustice.” The original word places before us this picture, viz. of one dashing into the face of another the remains, results—spewings, if you please—of a previous night's debauch. Our orator's terms of reproach, often so cleaving, and so ludicrously, terribly picturesque, are metaphorical; and their singular force results from this fact. In this way he gets a great deal of hot, heavy obloquy into a word, and then drives it into his adversary without any flinching. Thus, at the close of a passage where he succeeds in winding up Aeschines, he breaks out upon him: ἐμβρόντητε. If we say “thunderstruck,” we get out but a portion of the meaning; for Demosthenes intends to insinuate that Aeschines was turned into a fool, as by a

clap of thunder. Again, in the phrase "Raising his voice, and exulting and vociferating," the last word is so chosen as to present a ludicrous image of the fellow straining and cracking his wind-pipe. A term which our orator repeatedly applies to his antagonist, and which we can only render, "despicable wretch," carries the scorned idea of spit upon — *κατάπτυστον*, "this spit-upon." This must suffice in illustration of the character and power of the metaphors of Demosthenes, in his way of employing which he gained to his orations great condensation and liveliness.

Antithesis is another figure of which our orator seems to have been very fond. And this figure he loved, doubtless, as affording condensation; especially, as so combining closeness with clearness as to produce vivacity. The single instance which we will adduce is a fine one, for the quick turn of the parts and the rapidity of the movement: "Draw the parallel between your life and mine, Aeschines, and demand of this audience which of the two each of them had rather be for his past. You were an usher, I was a scholar; you were an initiator, I was initiated; you danced at the games, I presided over them; you were clerk of the assembly, I, a member; you, a third-rate actor; I, a spectator; you were constantly breaking down, I always hissing you; your measures were always in the enemy's favor; mine, ever in the country's." We cannot stop to quote antitheses from Demosthenes. Almost everything is by contrast. The whole oration on the Crown is one great antithesis — the patriotic and incorruptible Demosthenes set off against the traitorous and corrupt Aeschines.

The *dilemma*, related not distantly to antithesis, we find in our orator, well executed, though not always perfect. But then a complete dilemma — that is, one that admits of no retort — we are told, by one of the greatest of living debaters, is an exceedingly rare occurrence in oratory. "And here I should like to ask Aeschines a question. When all this was going on, and the city was filled with enthusiasm and gratitude and eulogy, did he join in the gratulation, or

remain at home, sorrowful, and bemoaning and begrudging the public prosperity? For, if indeed he made his appearance and took part with the rest, is not his conduct dreadful, — nay, rather, is it not impious, in now calling you to condemn those proceedings as evil which he called the gods to witness were good? But if he did *not* appear, does he not deserve a thousand deaths for groaning over a spectacle that filled all others with joy?” In the following we have two terrible horns: “And now, one of two things follows [from the silence of Aeschines], — either, that, finding nothing to blame in my measures, he had no others to propose; or, that, seeking to *benefit the enemy*, he did not propound measures better than mine. But said he nothing, propounded he nothing, when there was room for working you some mischief? Why, then there was no chance for anybody else to be heard.”

Again, the *climax* is a figure admirably managed and sustained in our orator. The interest rises and swells, as he proceeds; and, even though he brings forward the same facts again and again, they are so connected and invested that they have augmented force on every repetition. We bring forward a particular instance of the climax, which has been much admired. “Having said thus much, I sat down; no one uttering a word to the contrary. Not only did I offer this speech, but I made a motion; not only did I make a motion, I went ambassador; not only did I go as ambassador, but I persuaded the Thebans; and, throughout the whole transaction, I persevered, and gave myself up, without any reserve, to confront the perils which surrounded the country.” There is a remarkable climacteric passage, which ends with the famous oath, and has been pronounced “one of the greatest pieces of declamation on record in any tongue”; but it is too long for citation. It rises and pours along in augmenting majesty and vehemence, till he comes to the extreme elevation: “But it is not true, men of Athens, that you have done wrong in fighting the battle of all Greece, for her freedom and salvation. No! By your

forefathers, who for that cause rushed upon destruction at Marathon; and by those who stood in battle array at Plataea; and by those who fought on the sea at Salamis; and by the warriors of Artemisium; and by all the others, who now repose in the sepulchres of the nation — gallant men, to all of whom the state decreed a public funeral, deeming that they, too, had earned such honors, not merely those who had combatted fortunately, and had come off victorious, — and justly; for the duty of the brave has been done by all.” The saddest, most untoward event in all the administration of Demosthenes was the utter defeat at Chaeronea; and when he comes to this dark spot, he wakes up all his powers, and strives to hide, if not illumine it, by a sudden, overpowering blaze of rhetoric. We have here argument, precedent, apostrophe, the most spirit-stirring recollections. The effect upon the Athenians must have been prodigious, giving to defeat all the prestige of victory.

In coming to the reasoning of the Grecian orator it is very obvious to say, what every one sees on reading a few passages of him, that he is not a reasoner, in the formal, technical sense. There are no propositions laid down, and then proved by close, rigid processes of argumentation. In his orations we do not find one portion set apart for proof, another for narration, another for appeal. And while it is true that there are no portions rigidly given to the set forms of reasoning, there is diffused all through that kind of reasoning most effective for the occasion and purpose. It is rapid, linked with fact, made lucid by figure, impregnated with passion. There is argument in his comparisons and metaphors, in his antitheses and dilemmas, in his climaxes, his interrogations, and apostrophes. These are put into such a shape, brought into such connections, and so charged with fact and sentiment as often to do very quickly and powerfully the whole work of argument. Demosthenes takes an early opportunity to change the argument from the ground of law to that of facts, and so secure to himself the high advantage of fighting from his own ground, and making the course and

policy of his own administration a shield of defence. Demosthenes's arguments, then, are Demosthenes's facts; and those topics and facts that are especially to his purpose he makes the most of. He brings them up again and again, in new connections and with fresh illustrations. In this we have a distinguishing feature of the great master's reasoning. He seizes upon the strong points and facts, and makes these do about the whole work of conviction. The hand of the master is seen in investing the old topic with a new interest and power, every time it is fetched in. There is one point, or fact, which, as we have already seen, our orator makes great use of, and which he employs with astonishing effect. The point is simply this: Why did not Aeschines bring his *accusations* at the time of the events? Why did he not propose his *measures*, if he had better, at the proper time, and not now croak about mine? These points, topics, Demosthenes swings around, like a great sledge-hammer, upon the head of his antagonist, and, though the first blow from it smites him to the earth, he swings it and swings it, till by it he grinds him to powder. "But if he saw me acting injuriously toward the state, especially if I were doing the things he has been ranting about, it was his duty to enforce the penal laws against me while the facts were recent." Again: "But you—by what name shall I describe you aright?—when did you ever come forward at the moment to testify your indignation at seeing me, before your eyes, wrest from the country so grand an opportunity for an alliance as that you are now tragically declaiming about? When did you ever stand forth to denounce or to scrutinize all that you are impeaching me for?" Once more: "Then, when by law you could have brought me to justice for the public good, had I offended, you never proceeded against me on any head of charge whatever. But, when I stand clear on all hands,—by the laws, by lapse of time, by prescription, by judgments repeatedly pronounced, by my never having been convicted before the people of any offence,—and when much glory has been gained to the country by my public conduct, then it is you take your stand."

We pass now to his other oft-repeated topic. He says: "Here is what I did. You know it all; you know the circumstances. Now, what ought I to have done? What better could I have done?" "The statesman," he says, "gives his counsels before the event, and makes himself responsible. The partizan, holding his peace when he ought to speak out, finds fault, for the first time, the instant anything goes wrong." Observe, now, the skilful use, the climacteric arrangement of this topic. He says, in the next recurrence of it: "I will go to such a pitch of candor as at once to confess I was in the wrong, if, even now, any person will point out a better course, or show that any other could then have been taken than the one I did take." A page further on it comes around again. Addressing his adversary: "If you spoke not then, speak out now. Say, what plan ought I to have fallen upon? What alliance, what measure, was there that I ought to have preferred, and pressed upon the people?" A little further on, he asks again: "If I did not adopt all possible expedients, according to all human calculation; if I did not strenuously persevere in them, and with exertions above my strength; or, if I did not insist upon those measures which were glorious for the country, and worthy of her renown, and necessary for her safety, show me that, and impeach me when you please." Further on, again: "But, since he dwells so much on the actual events, I will hazard a somewhat bold assertion: If the events of futurity had been manifest to all, and you, Aeschines, had foretold them, and had bellowed out your protestations ever so vociferously, instead of never uttering a word, — not even then ought the country to have acted otherwise than she did, if she had any regard for her glory, or her ancestry, or her posterity." Further on it comes up once more, and he finishes off the topic with a little spice of drollery: "For why will you now be insisting on what ought then to be done, when you never brought forward any such proposition *at the time*, though you were in the city, and were present at the debates? What does your eloquence profit

the country, while you now descant upon what is past and gone? As if a physician, when called to patients in a sinking state, should give no advice, nor prescribe any course by which the disease might be cured, but, after one of them had died, and the funeral rites were performing, should follow him to the grave, and expound how the poor man would never have died had such and such things only been done? Moon-stricken! is it now, at length, that you too speak out?"

Our orator affords some fine specimens of the clinching force in the argument from the less to the greater: "But mark this. If such was our fate when we fought with the Thebans *on our side*, what had we not to expect if, instead of having them for allies, they had joined Philip, which Aeschines spent all his voice to make them do? And if, when the battle was fought three days' march from Attica, so great peril and such alarm beset the city, what would have been our prospects if the disaster had happened close upon our territory?"

We have alluded to interrogation as aiding in the reasoning of Demosthenes. The peculiar argumentative power of the orator's questions lies in this — that they admit of but one answer. If answered at all, they must be answered in the orator's favor. They also help in the speed and sprightliness of the movement. We have a quick succession of short, pithy questions, with a few rapid strokes following them, and "in the quick process he contrives," in the phrase of another, "to forge the whole massive chain of his argument." The following is an example: "What should you, at that crisis, call upon the Greek states to do? To attain peace? They had that already. To make war? But you yourselves were deliberating about peace."

Having now shown, by references and citations, what the practice of Demosthenes was, we pass on to state some rhetorical principles and lessons, established, we think, by the authority of the great performer before us.

1. The first is, That the true style for effect in one age,

or upon one class of minds, will be effective in every age, and upon every class of minds. In other words, there is a universal style, always powerful, always pleasing. Demosthenes has it perfectly, and it is the secret of the fact that he has kept the crown of eloquence so long and so indisputably. Whereas, if he had had an artificial style, of a kind that abounds in our day, he would have passed into oblivion ages ago. It is owing to this attribute of his style that the remark which Hume makes of it is perfectly just — that, “could it be copied, its success would be infallible over a modern assembly.”

This universal style, of which Demosthenes is both a master and a model, is characterized, at bottom, by great simplicity. The words chosen are the familiar and the known. The Grecian orator understood that the words which are oftenest in the people’s mouths go the quickest and deepest into the people’s ears. There is also great precision in the choice of the words; so that a great weight of meaning is conveyed on the wing of very little language. Yet there is also a very considerable range to the style. While the general feature is close, condensed simplicity, occasionally there is a roundness and fulness to the sentences; in one place, great delicacy and an artistic finish; in another, lying almost in juxtaposition, a vulgar and startling coarseness. Thus, he says to his adversary, in close connection with a grand and impassioned movement: “You cannot deny it, though you lie till you split open.” The great orator’s style inclines more to the side of the palpable and strong than to that of the refined and the beautiful. Still, there is a touching on both sides. This appears in our ample citations. But, what is better, go to the book for yourselves, and see what it is. It would be well to read this, or some kindred style, till we learn to love it, and shall try to do like it; read it till it shall harmonize in our ears, and fully satisfy them. It seems to me that a person has made a very encouraging advance, when he can relish and be satisfied with the Demosthenic style. Cicero informs us

that he was not satisfied with it. He gives Demosthenes all praise; then says: "Nevertheless, he does not fill *my* ears; they are so greedy and capacious, always desiring something immense and infinite." We plainly see in this fact that, if we would utter simple and pungent things, we must come to relish them. If we would pour from our mouth the Demosthenic eloquence, we must get our ears down to the Demosthenic dimensions. Most certainly, if we keep the great ears of Cicero, we shall have with them his *ore rotundo*, his swelling mouth.

The man we now have before us, let us say, is precisely the man we want for the correction of many faults found among us in the use of language and figure. We refer to the strong tendency there is to excess in these respects—the running into the extra-fine, the lofty, and the grandiloquent. There is a great deal brought in for mere show, as a flourishing appendage; reminding one, as Moore says, in his life of Sheridan, of a peacock's tail. This is a mistake, no matter what the subject or the object. If there is any design of eloquence, it is a great mistake. For the mind in a truly earnest or eloquent frame never goes after embellishment. It will pick it up, if in its way, but never step aside for it. The orator uses his imagination, it has been well said by some one, as the ostrich uses his wings, not to fly with, but to aid him in running—to give him an onward, rushing vehemence. In oratory we want what has force, and we find not this quality in the merely beautiful. It lies rather in the opposite. There was not a little meaning in Mirabeau's declaration, as he shook his seamed and shaggy head: "You do not understand all the power of my ugliness." There is certainly a power in plainness, sometimes in a homeliness and coarseness, far more than in the opposite. We say, *let there be good taste*; let there be also a pervading simplicity, verging, if you please, toward the Grecian severity and rigor. It will not hurt us to be studying and striving in that direction; and the old master will help us amazingly, if we will only listen, and let him teach us.

2. My second remark is, that condensation, as an element of power, comes to us as another lesson from the model before us. We here learn that a great effect may be produced in a reasonably short time. Demosthenes generally produced his prodigious results in a brief space. There is but a single oration — that on the Crown — which is of any considerable length. This is a choice sentiment, or fact, worthy to be laid up by the speaker in a place where it will always be at hand and ready for use. Not a few of our speakers seem to have got possession of the notion (or the notion of them) that a great effort must be a long effort. And the effort and the man who made it appear to be reckoned great in proportion to the huge holding on. A monstrous perversion this of every common-sense principle. The truth is, this exhausting system, this wearying diffusion, this desperate unwillingness to let go of a thought when once we get hold; this beating and spreading out, this embarrassing and burying up with piles of wordy paragraphs the simple point that needs to be seen or felt, is utterly at war with all the precedents and precepts, and utterly preventive of all the great results of eloquence. Fluency is a good thing; but sometimes it is a nuisance. It is flow, flow, flow: never at a loss for something to say; never having anything worth saying: never in want of a word; never seizing one of any significance and power. Eloquence comes not out from such places. Eloquence has ever put forth its greatest things closely, rapidly. All the memorably great effects of the great orators of the past have been the results of masterly strokes, intensely conceived and quickly delivered. “Sudden bursts,” to present an admirable description of two of the most effective speakers that have appeared — “sudden bursts, which seemed the effect of inspiration; short sentences, which came like lightning, dazzling, burning, striking down everything before them; sentences which, spoken at critical periods, decided the fate of great questions; sentences which everybody still knows by heart — in these, chiefly, lay the power of these extraor-

dinary men." Whoever he may be, or wherever, that finds himself called to the vocation of speaking, let him learn to gather all the force and all the fire of his thoughts, as the diffused fluid is gathered on the electric wheel, and he will be pretty likely to produce an effect. He will have a power at his disposal, and the people will know when it touches them.

3. In the next place, we remark that we may learn something from the great Grecian master upon the mode of effecting this desirable reduction and condensation of discourse. The substance of the rule is found in the brief and blunt advice given by Dr. Witherspoon to his students: "When you have anything to say, say it; and stop when you get through." Demosthenes manifestly effected the reduction and condensation for which he was so remarkable by observing these two things: First, immediately coming to the point; secondly, inflexibly adhering to it. This is the grand beauty of his exordiums, a grand felicity in his eloquence. While the exordium was very much elaborated, it was perfectly simple — every word in it had to do with the subject in hand. How infinitely preferable to those heavy, vague introductions we are sometimes doomed to sit and hear! The speaker commences far off in the distance, with some frigid generalities; then edges up, and carefully approximates; and ventures a little nearer, and then a little nearer, to the subject of discourse, till, at length, he is seen to strike upon it. And no mortal can tell why he did not start at the point which he has thus reached, after twenty-five minutes' wearisome travel.

Not only from the exordium of our orator, but from the body of the piece, all extraneous matter was expelled, pushed aside, pushed out. The splendid coruscation off from the straight line of remark was never seen in the great Grecian model, and never should be in any speaker. Episodes in oratory, however fine, commonly do more hurt than good. They distract the hearer's mind, decoy attention from the main point and business in hand, and help to make out,

often, an insufferable length of discourse. They denote the speaker's mind at play; while the straightforward style, which takes in only what is to the purpose, denotes a mind full, and at the same time significant and earnest in the discharge of its contents. The figures and metaphors of the former have been well likened to fire-works shown up for display; and those of the latter to sparks emitted from a working-engine.

4. The next oratorical doctrine, or maxim, which we derive from the great model of ages is, that the most effective eloquence is not, as a thing of course, nor commonly, the address which is the most replete and weighty with thought, argument, matter. In other words, the orator is not to strike for a learned discourse—a discourse abounding in original views and profound researches and novel theories—a discourse heavy and crowded with recondite material. He has to do rather with the common things, the common sentiments, the common minds and hearts of the world. He feels strongly, as he should feel, on the great, the obvious, the generally admitted facts and truths. His chief object is to transfer, and his work is done when he has transferred, his own glowing sentiments to the breasts of others. So far from laboring to put a crowd of foreign thoughts within those who attend upon him, he touches, wakes up, gives life and productiveness to what were there before. Demosthenes, we know, did produce the greatest effects by his efforts. In this none have ever surpassed him. Yet he is never close, concatenated in his argument; or rich, profound, or philosophical in his matter. What is true of this orator is true of the whole kind. We do not undertake to say that the utmost solidity and depth of thought and sentiment may in no case go with the utmost oratorical force and effectiveness. We only state the fact, as it has notoriously occurred. All along down from the Grecian master, we find that the most effective orations have not been those most replete with profound thought and severe argument, but the reverse. For example, few forensic arguments in modern times have

equalled in weight and wealth of sentiment and splendor of illustration the celebrated defence of Peltier by Sir James Mackintosh. Yet, for the purpose of shielding the poor Frenchman, it was good for nothing. Though read ever since with delight, it was at the time a splendid and miserable failure. The three most effective speakers that were ever in the British House of Commons were probably Lord Chatham, Charles James Fox, and Richard Brinsley Sheridan; and they, especially Chatham and Sheridan, never produced their effects by solidity and strength of matter. When Sheridan was asked how it was that he succeeded so well in the house, he replied, "that he had not been there very long before he found that three fourths of the members were fools; and he resolved, therefore, not to shock them by too much severity of argument." Nor did Chatham, in the character of him drawn by Grattan, "conduct the understanding through the painful subtilties of argumentation, but rather lightened upon his subject, and reached the point by the flashings of his mind, which, like those of his eye, were felt, but could not be followed." In precise accordance with the above was the advice given by that shrewd observer, Dr. Johnson, to Boswell, who had occasion to speak at the bar of the House of Commons: "You must not argue as if you were arguing in the schools. Close reasoning will not fix their attention." But it will be said, according to these authorities eloquence is mere declamation. And so it is, often. In its greatest passages, all along its course down, it has been declamation — solid, arguing, nervous declamation. The famous oath of Demosthenes (which has been quoted from his speech upon the Crown), deemed the greatest passage in all eloquence, is declamation. It is made of clear, plain, fresh things, vividly conceived and earnestly uttered — torrents of palpable truth, of inflamed common sense. But it will be asked, perhaps, if we mean to discourage the power of profound thought in the orator. By no means. Let him be a very master in this line. But what use the power to him, if it is not to be brought out in his appropriate

work, his professional structures? What the use of sense, and what use in laboring to acquire it, if it be true, after all, that the world suffer themselves to be swayed and ruled by nonsense? We confess that we have sometimes been completely staggered by this question, as it has been forced upon us, in witnessing frequent instances of the magic and triumph of nonsense. Yet we must believe, after all, that sense is a good thing, and that nothing but manliness and variety of thought will sustain the orator, and give him reputation and success, in the long run. The people will be satisfied, will think better of him, will more deeply feel him, when they know he has the power, even though he does not always use it. Let him not be too lavish of the mere product of the brain,—not aim to crowd the address as closely as possible with this material,—but have regard to some of the other things which we know to have made up the effectiveness of all the great eloquence of the world.

5. Kindred with the preceding remark is this—that practical power in oratory consists, often, very much in skilful repetition. This is another of the lessons we derive from the Grecian master. We have seen that Demosthenes brought up and presented the same things again and again. The same is true of Fox. And in his case this was not the result of accident; it was not because he had not enough else to say, but because he deemed this the way to carry his points, and imbed them in the minds of the people. If we aim at a crowded fulness of thought in a popular address,—make it an object to see what an amount and variety of matter we can press into it,—there cannot, of course, be these rhetorical repetitions; they are necessarily crowded out. So that we see how, in one respect, the utmost amount of thought in a popular appeal is not consistent with the highest oratorical effectiveness.

The position that the repeated bringing up, or the continued holding up, of the same point is indispensable in order that the thought or argument may do its full execution, we might sustain by authorities additional to that of De-

mosthenes. Said Dr. Johnson, in his instructions to Boswell, already quoted from: "You must say the same thing over and over again, in different words. If you say it but once, they miss it in a moment of inattention." An eminent advocate of this country remarked to a preacher, whose pulpit performances he criticised, as losing in effectiveness for the want of this species of repetition, that he found it necessary, in addressing a jury, to repeat what he wished to impress upon their minds, at least twice, and often three and four times, or even more; otherwise, he did not carry their minds along with him, and so failed in the end. We have the same doctrine, and rather a humorous instance of its success, in the excuse rendered by a distinguished English advocate for being rather prolix in a plea he had made. He acknowledged the fact, but said in justification: "Did you not observe the foreman—a heavy looking fellow in a yellow waistcoat? No more than one idea could ever stay in his thick head at a time; and I resolved that mine should be that one. So I hammered on, till I saw by his eyes that he had got it." It was the hammering on that got in the idea, and the getting in of this gained the case.

The secret of the efficacy of skilful repetition is: (1) That it insures attention to the important point; (2) A full understanding and apprehension of it; (3) It enhances the hearer's estimate of its importance; (4) It holds it before the mind, till its just importance and force are felt.

But, after all, we must be allowed to say that this repetition, the bringing up or presenting the same topics or points, is rather hazardous business. While it is deeply convictive and implanting, if well done, it is dull, burdensome, disgusting, if badly done. It is one of the difficulties in the way of reaching the highest style of popular eloquence. Repetition, with variety and an augmenting interest and power—this the difficulty. Demosthenes mastered it, and his name has become the synonym for cogent and successful appeal.

6. We get from the Grecian orator confirmation of the

doctrine that clearness of meaning is found in connection with the highest oratorical power, and is indispensable to it. Demosthenes, though often concise, was always clear, entirely so, to those he addressed. Not only the Grecian, but all eloquence, ever has had, and ever must have, this quality of lucidness. In order to an effect, the meaning must stand out; must be obtrusive, not to be searched for, not dug out of darkness, but flashing and forcing itself upon the people. "Nothing in nature," says Robert South, "can be imagined more absurd, irrational, and contrary to the very design and end of speaking than an obscure discourse." Yet this very consummate absurdity has really been embraced and practised by many as the true doctrine. According to the old-fashioned doctrine, a discourse to be impressive must be intelligible. According to the new-fangled doctrine, the way to be peculiarly searching is to be utterly unsearchable; the way to sink the truth deep into terrestrial breasts, is to aim the shaft at the zenith. And this will be pronounced very fine and very forcible, and will raise a very great admiration on the part of some in the community, who are always most rapturously taken with what they cannot comprehend. They behold a lofty figure and flourish before them—manifestly a great gathering and rolling up of the elements, and they are quite sure there is something remarkable going forth from the speaker; and, though they cannot see any meaning in particular, yet they have no doubt that there is a most magnificent meaning behind the cloud. All this may be very admirable; but that obtuse, probative class, who insist upon knowing what they admire, will not be very much carried away with it. They certainly will not feel the force of it as eloquence. For eloquence is not only a clear thing; it is a sublunary thing. The orator, in his telling strokes, like the lightning, strikes downward. Just so far as he mystifies and subtilizes his matter, he spoils it for oratorical effect. Man was not made to be moved by such means. Civilized or savage, there is nothing in his nature which responds to such exhibitions. If our eloquence is to be car-

ried forward, or higher, in power, it must be kept from these morbidly refining and obscuring tendencies and influences.

7. The next oratorical doctrine or principle that we get confirmation of, is, that the style which has great power is often the result of great labor. Demosthenes certainly settled the point that utmost finish and utmost force of style are perfectly consistent, if not necessary, one to the other. Our orator, we have said, greatly elaborated his style. He not only labored to attain power in composition, he also expended a vast amount of strength and solicitude upon the several pieces he produced. He had his favorite passages, which he wrought to the very highest possible finish, and introduced into different orations. And it is curious to see the delicate changes which he introduced on the repetition of a favorite passage — how careful as to the collocation of a word, or the position of a particle; and yet these are the passages of the greatest effectiveness, those on which he particularly relied.

Not only Demosthenes, but all the best writers that have lived, and whose writings have lived, have been hard elaborators. The men who stir us by things put down a century ago, put down those things with a great deal of painstaking. We might show this, were there time, by individual allusions and proofs, and make it appear that every cogent quality of style may be gained by rightly working on it. A person may work his style into the utmost closeness and condensation, by habitually working out from it all the inept and useless words, and getting and keeping in only the precise and significant. He can work off roughnesses, when a smooth surface would be the most effective, and put on a polish that shall flash and attract. He can take the wind out of the too swollen and bombastic, and bring it down to a decent and comely simplicity. The rigid and hard-moving joints he can change to an easy and quick flexibility. His bluntest and squarest sentences he can forge to a point, if a point they should have, as infallibly as the blacksmith can hammer his iron to that form. And if more heat is wanted in the mass,

he can blow it in. Certainly, by working it over, he need not draw out what is already in, as many seem to suppose. Not only may the skilful elaborator gain all these and more good qualities in his productions; but, while he continues thus to elaborate, he will be advancing in the power to bring out every effective attribute of style. In order to this, he must know how to elaborate; must do it heartily, with resolute vigor, and with the eye upon the right things. Some of the most stirring paragraphs that ever went from human lips into the human ear and heart were written to the turning of every tittle. The doctrine we here find is that the foundation of power must be laid in the tasked and striving pen. So, we are told, Brougham did; so he taught. In his Inaugural Discourse he lays it down, as a rule admitting of no exception, that a man will speak well, in proportion as he has written much; and that, with equal talents, he will be the finest extemporaneous speaker, when no time for preparation is allowed, who has prepared himself most sedulously when he had an opportunity of delivering a premeditated speech. This may seem extravagant doctrine; but such actually is the mode in which no small part of the most effective eloquence of the world has been prepared for and produced. Great power in this line has been, for the most part, the result of the extremest labor and painstaking — not to make the discourse dense and deep with thought, but to crowd it full of that indefinable, but electric thing called eloquence. Such a course, where there is a strong and earnest soul, will help to the attainment of eloquence. But the rage and clamor for mere off-hand, and the consequent practice of opening the mouth and slovenly pouring forth whatever happens to be uppermost, tends to reduce our speech to a compound of utter feebleness and offensiveness.

8. Let me say, finally, when we have attained to good matter, it should be remembered that it will not do to trust in that alone. The Grecian master, in the first instance, made this mistake. He came forth with good matter, only, and the people would not hear it. They hissed him out of

sight. At length he came back, with the orator's other part — *the manner* — perfected, and he swayed and moulded the same mass at pleasure. There is a decided tendency in educated men, men who think richly and strongly, to disregard and despise manner. What they have to say is so important and so good, that it needs the commendation of no mere outside trickery. It is admitted that a few men have done wonders by the simple, unaided power of thought. But these men are the exceptions. It is not safe to undertake to be one of them. It will not do for the preacher at the present day to hold up his sermon in his hand, and read it off, without motion or emotion, because Jonathan Edwards did so with success. If he does, let him not be surprised should some empty-headed vociferator across the way empty his meeting-house for him.

There is one point, in this connection, deserving notice, namely, the attainableness of a good manner, in the face of serious defects. Demosthenes encountered such defects, and came off with triumphant success. He seems greatly to have increased the compass of his voice, to have made it flexible, and gained the mastery of it. Let any other man, who has marked faults of manner, meet them as the Grecian did, and, with a like indomitable purpose, decree their correction and the bringing in of the corresponding excellences, and he will, in a measure, succeed. Let him put his finger resolutely upon the specific defects, and say: "If my voice is harsh, I will try to make it smooth; if it is feeble, I will try to give it strength; if it is slender and squeaking, I will labor for volume and manliness; if the emission is mostly at the nose, I will practise till I can drive it out at the mouth, where it ought to go; if I can make but one inflection, I will work till I can make two; if I can make none, I will labor till I can make the whole, just when and where and how I please. The wretched, lullaby, sing-song monotony, which makes me perform the office of an opiate upon my auditors, I will somehow break up; and in the process of breaking it up, I will leave no resort untried." It was,

doubtless, a spirit and decision like this which sent our orator voluntarily down into that dark hole, there to assail the faults which hung upon him, and which brought him forth again to the world with a manner the most effective, probably, the world has ever seen. What if a man now cannot accomplish so much in this cultivation as the great Grecian did? Let him accomplish what he can. There is no reason, because he may not reach the highest point of excellence, in refusing to attempt any improvement; no reason, because he cannot rise to the power of a Chatham, in drawling and stammering like the boor. The individual who put into a napkin his one talent, because it was not five, failed of the justification on which he stupidly reckoned.

In aiming to do as well as we can in this particular, we learn from the Grecian that we should cultivate the manner of our style, as well as of our delivery. In order to make the nearest approximation to the Demosthenic delivery, it is necessary that we forge the Demosthenic sentences. There are two features in the style of our orator which adapt it to a powerful enunciation. One is, the variety, the range in the structure, admitting and demanding a corresponding range in the voice. In the sentences there are all degrees of smoothness and roughness; all degrees of length, from a single word to a whole page; all sorts of endings, requiring all sorts of tones and inflections. Let this character be brought into all our writing for oral delivery. Let the essay smoothness and evenness be broken in upon, and broken up, till we gain the ability to fit our paragraphs to the purposes to be answered by them — now yielding sweet music to the ear, now going like ruthless daggers to the heart.

The other marked feature of adaptation for delivery in the style of Demosthenes is the frequent, full, emphatic bringing up of his sentences at the period. They often come out, ordnance-like, heavy and strong, shaking down all opposition. This is a capital feature in a style to be spoken. Whereas the tapering style, as it may be called, in which nearly every sentence has a flimsy, dragging tail to it, sets

at defiance all the mouths that were ever fashioned. Neither a Roscius nor a Garrick could pronounce it effectively. Let the speaker see to it, and strive for these high and emphatic qualities of style; and, in connection, let the voice be trained to give execution to what the brain may conceive, or the pen put down. We say, again: Beware how you put your trust in matter alone, even though it be of Demosthenic stringency and power. Intense, prolonged, and painful labor alone can make the orator; but how amazing the power gained as his reward.

ARTICLE VI.

REVELATION AND INSPIRATION.

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IN ANDOVER THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.

NO. VI.

SEQUEL TO THE GOSPEL HISTORY.

By the Sequel to the Gospel History we mean the collection of writings known as the Acts of the Apostles, the apostolic Epistles, and the Apocalypse. We apply to them the epithet "sequel," not as implying that they were all written after the Gospel narratives (for the fourth Gospel, at least, is later than most of them), but as indicating that they followed naturally from the *facts* recorded by the four evangelists. The genuineness, integrity, and credibility of the Gospel narratives have been shown, in preceding Articles, to rest on an immovable foundation of testimony. We are thus prepared beforehand to expect not only a record of the labors of the apostles, and writings emanating from them, but also a record and writings resting on the same *basis of supernatural facts* as that which underlies the evangelic narratives. If the truth of the Gospel narratives can be denied, or the supernatural element eliminated from them, then the truth of the supernatural events recorded in the Acts of the Apostles, and

implied in the Pauline and catholic Epistles, becomes of itself improbable. But if the reality of the facts recorded in the four Gospels is admitted, there is an antecedent probability that the bright train of miraculous events inaugurated in connection with our Lord's ministry will flow on, in greater or less measure, into the history of the primitive church, and also that we shall find written discussions and instructions, relating to the doctrines and duties of Christianity, such as those contained in the apostolic Epistles. It is very important to remember that the Saviour established his church only in its fundamental principles. He left to his apostles the work of publishing his gospel, and organizing churches among Jews and Gentiles. Some truths, moreover, of the highest importance, he gave only in outline, because the time for their full development had not yet come. Such were especially the doctrine of his atoning sacrifice on Calvary, with the connected doctrine of justification by faith; and the divine purpose to abolish the Mosaic economy, and with it the distinction between Jews and Gentiles. It must be obvious to all, that, for the accomplishment of the work thus committed to them, the apostles needed the *supernatural illumination* of the Holy Spirit, and also a *supernatural seal* of their authority. The Acts of the Apostles show us how both these wants were supplied.

First, in respect to the supernatural illumination of the Spirit, the Saviour had taught them, in plain terms, that the Holy Ghost could not come (that is, in his special and full influences as the administrator of the new dispensation) till after his glorification: "It is expedient for you," he said, "that I go away: for if I go not away, the Comforter will not come unto you; but if I depart, I will send him unto you."¹ And again: "When the Comforter is come, whom I will send unto you from the Father, even the Spirit of truth which proceedeth from the Father, he shall testify of me. And ye also shall bear witness, because ye have been with me from the beginning."² Compare, also, the same

¹ John xvi. 7.² John xv. 26, 27.

apostle's comment on the Saviour's words: "He that believeth on me, as the scripture hath said, out of his belly shall flow rivers of living water. But this spake he," adds the evangelist, "of the Spirit which they that believe on him should receive; for the Holy Ghost was not yet given, because that Jesus was not yet glorified."¹ In accordance with the tenor of these words, the Saviour's promise and direction to the apostles was: "Behold, I send the promise of the Father upon you; but tarry ye in the city of Jerusalem, until ye be endued with power from on high."² Now we have, in the opening chapters of the Acts of the Apostles, a record of the fulfilment of the Saviour's promise that he would send the Holy Ghost. This is a sequel to the Gospel record so natural and necessary that it could not be wanting from a book professing to give even the briefest summary of the labors of the apostles.

Secondly, as to the supernatural seal of their divine commission, the same book shows us how it was given, in connection with the descent of the Holy Spirit. He communicated to them not only the inward illumination which they needed for their high office, but also the gift of speaking with tongues, and working stupendous miracles. This was to the world the outward and visible proof of their apostolic authority. They derived it from Christ, as they were everywhere careful to state, and it was Christ's seal to their commission. To affirm that they needed no such divine attestation, would be to say that they had no new truths to communicate by revelation of the Holy Spirit. The reader need not be told that this would be in direct contradiction of the Saviour's declaration, that he had many things to say to his apostles, which they could not then bear, but which should be afterwards imparted to them by the Spirit of truth.³ The divine seal of their commission which the apostles received on the day of Pentecost, was, then, in full harmony with the Saviour's plan as previously developed — a consistent sequel to the facts recorded in the Gospels.

¹ John vii. 38, 39.

² Luke xxiv. 49.

³ John xvi. 12-15.

The narrative itself of the apostolic labors, contained in the Acts of the Apostles, is simple and natural. It bears throughout the stamp of reality, not of fiction. Its very incompleteness is a testimony to its authenticity; for it is an incompleteness easily explained from the author's position. He does not profess to cover the whole field of primitive church history, but follows down the main line of apostolic labor to the time when Paul commenced his missionary tours. To a history of these the last half of his work is exclusively devoted. How naturally this grew out of the fact of his personal connection with the great apostle of the Gentiles, every one understands.

Of the apostolic Epistles we remark, in general, that, along with the unfolding, as circumstances required, of the peculiar doctrines of grace, and the solution of various difficult and delicate questions growing out of the introduction of Christianity as a new power in society, they give the practical application of the gospel to the manifold relations of human life, in a way so natural, and taking its shape so directly from the particular historic circumstances of the churches addressed, that they carry on their front the proof of their genuineness and truthfulness. We cannot conceive of any more natural sequel to the Redeemer's work as recorded by the four evangelists. What we have further to say will be given under the three heads of the *Acts of the Apostles*, the *Acknowledged Epistles*, and the *Disputed Books*.

I. *The Acts of the Apostles.*

According to Chrysostom, this book was not so abundantly read by the early Christians as were the Gospels — was, in fact, unknown to many, as respects both its contents and its author.¹ The explanation of this comparative neglect, in

¹ The words of Chrysostom are as follows: "Many are ignorant of the existence of this book — of the book itself, and of its author and composer. For this reason, especially, I have decided to undertake this work [a series of homilies on the book], in order that I may thus instruct those who are ignorant, and not suffer so great a treasure to lie concealed and hid from view. For it is able to be not less profitable to us than the Gospels themselves," etc. — Intro-

an age when the art of printing was unknown, and manuscripts were expensive, is found in the fact that it is occupied, not with the words and deeds of our Lord himself, but with those of his apostles. The peculiar interest which attaches to the book in these latter days, as containing not only a vivid portraiture of apostolic times, but also the great principles on which the Christian church is organized, did not exist for the masses in Chrysostom's day. While many, from simple neglect, were ignorant of it, others, as the same writer tells us, regarded it as too plain and simple to deserve their attention.¹ Passing by some uncertain allusions to the book in the writings of the apostolic Fathers, we have, preserved to us by Eusebius,² an epistle from the churches of Lyons and Vienne, in Gaul, to the churches of Asia and Phrygia, describing a severe persecution through which they had passed in the reign of Antoninus Verus, about 177 A.D. In this they say of the martyrs: "Moreover, they prayed, after the example of Stephen, the perfect martyr, for those who inflicted upon them the cruel torments, 'Lord, lay not this sin to their charge,'" where we have an indubitable reference to the narrative of Stephen's martyrdom.³ Irenæus, in the last part of the second century;⁴ Tertullian, in the last part of the second century and the beginning of the third;⁵ Clement of Alexandria, about the end of the second

duction to the First Homily on the Acts. The reader will notice that it is simply of the neglect of this book on the part of many Christians, and their consequent ignorance of it and its author, of which Chrysostom speaks; not of any doubt or conflicting testimony in respect to its authorship. Compare what the same author says elsewhere. Homil. I., In principium Actorum, near the beginning.

¹ πολλοῖς γοῦν τὸ βιβλίον τοῦτο οὐδὲ γνώριμόν ἐστι, πολλοῖς δὲ δοκοῦν σαφὲς εἶναι, πάλιν παρορᾶται. καὶ γίνεται τοῖς μὲν ἡ γνώσις, τοῖς δὲ ἡ ἄγνοια βαθυμίας ὑπόθεσις. "To many this book is not even known; by many others it is neglected because it appears to be so plain. Thus to one class knowledge, to the other class ignorance, becomes the ground of indifference." — Homil. I. in Principium Actorum.

² Hist. Eccl. v. 1.

³ Acts vii. 60.

⁴ Adv. haeres. l. 3. c. 14 and 15.

⁵ De Jejunio. c. 10; De praescript. haeret. c. 22; Adv. Marcion. l. 5. c. 2 and 3, etc.

century, and onwards¹ — all these bear explicit testimony to the Book of Acts, ascribing it to Luke as its author; and from their day onward the notices of it are abundant. We may add the concurrent testimony of the Muratorian canon, the Syriac Peshito, and the old Latin version. In a word, the book is placed by Eusebius among those that were universally acknowledged by the churches.² The rejection of the book by certain heretical sects, as the Ebionites, Marcionites, Manichaeans, etc., rested, not on historical, but on doctrinal grounds, and is, therefore, of no weight. Though Photius mentions various opinions respecting the author of the Book of Acts, he himself ascribes it to Luke. In fact, the third Gospel, which proceeded from the same hand as this work, was never ascribed to any other person than Luke.

The internal evidence of Luke's authorship is in harmony with the external. Not to mention the fact that the writer himself, in dedicating it to the same Theophilus, expressly identifies himself with the author of the third Gospel, there is a remarkable agreement in style and diction between the Gospel of Luke and the Acts of the Apostles, as any one may learn who peruses them both together in the original Greek.³ Luke, moreover, as the travelling companion of Paul, had all needed facilities for composing such a work. With regard to the latter part of the book, this is denied by none. His use of the first person plural — "we endeavored," "the Lord had called us," "we came," etc. — which first appears xvi. 10, and continues, with certain interruptions, through the remainder of the book, is so naturally explained by the assumption that the writer was actually in the apostle's company, that it is worse than superfluous to go out of the way to find another and an unreasonable explanation. As it respects the first part of the book, we notice that he visited

¹ Stromat. i. 5 (p. 588 of Sylburgius).

² Hist. Eccl. iii. 25.

³ See Davidson's Introduction to New Test., Vol. ii. p. 4, where he has collected forty-seven examples of "terms that occur in both" books, "but nowhere else in the New Testament."

Caesarea with Paul's company, and "tarried there many days."¹ Afterwards he went up with the same apostle to Jerusalem.² And we find him again with Paul at Caesarea when he sets out for Rome.³ Now, at such centres of Christian activity and intercourse as Jerusalem and Caesarea, he must have had abundant opportunity to learn all the facts recorded in the present book which could not be gathered from Paul's own lips.

As to the *credibility* of the book, it bears all the marks of historic verity which apply to the Gospel narratives, especially to the Gospel of Luke. To admit the credibility of this Gospel and to deny that of the book of Acts would be illogical. They who assume that no record of miraculous events can be credible must deny both. But they who admit the reality of supernatural interposition, as we have it in the four Gospels, are prepared beforehand to find the same element in the history of apostolic labor.

To some modern writers, the narrative of the gift of tongues on the day of Pentecost has seemed to present an insuperable difficulty; and they have pronounced it "unpsychological," according to the common understanding of the transaction. We have no disposition to deny the stupendous and incomprehensible character of the miracle; for it was a miracle, not in the sphere of material nature, but of the human spirit. That they who received the gift of the Spirit on that memorable occasion uttered *true languages*, and not an unintelligible jargon, is plain from the words of the hearers: "Are not all these who speak Galileans? And how hear we every man in our own tongue wherein we were born? We do hear them speak, in our tongues, the wonderful works of God."⁴ If, now, we assume, according to the view of some, that they were supernaturally endowed with the power of speaking, *in a conscious way*, languages which they had never learned, and that, too, as a permanent gift for their use afterwards in the work of propagating the gospel, it is undoubtedly some-

¹ Chap. xxi. 8-10.

² Chap. xxvii. 1.

³ Chap. xxi. 15.

⁴ Chap. ii. 7, 8, 11.

thing utterly above our comprehension. We cannot, however, but think that those commentators venture beyond their depth, who speak of such an endowment as something not only contrary to the analogy of God's dealings, but self-contradictory, and therefore impossible.¹ Certainly, such of them as are devout believers in the record of our Lord's supernatural works place themselves in an awkward predicament. Had we no record of the fact, we should be under the necessity of believing that there must have been in Palestine in our Lord's day, as in all other countries, persons born deaf and dumb. Can any one suppose, for a moment, that when one of this class presented himself to the Saviour, he had, for the first time, a case beyond his immediate healing power, as it must have been if the instantaneous bestowal of the permanent gift of speech is "self-contradictory, and therefore impossible"? Faith answers, No, and so does the divine record itself, according to Alford's own interpretation of Mark vii. 32-37.

While, however, we maintain that the instantaneous communication of the gift of speech, as well as of hearing, to persons deaf and dumb from early childhood came necessarily within the sphere of our Lord's miraculous works, we wish it to be understood that we do not insist upon this view as applicable to the pentecostal gift of tongues; that is to say, we do not affirm that it gave, as a permanent possession for future use, the ability to speak in languages hitherto unknown to the recipients. It may have been, to use the words of Alford, "a sudden and powerful inspiration of the Holy Spirit, by which the disciples uttered, not of their own minds, but as the mouth-pieces of the Spirit, the praises of God in various languages hitherto, and possibly at the time itself, unknown to them." We understand the closing words of this quotation, "possibly at the time itself unknown to them," as meaning that possibly "the speakers did not themselves understand what they said," in accordance with one interpretation of 1 Cor. xiv. 13, 27, 28. It is not

¹ See Alford on Acts ii. 4.

necessary for our purpose that we decide between these different views of the pentecostal gift of tongues. Our only concern is, to maintain the historic truth of the narrative, that the tongues spoken were real languages, intelligible to those to whom they were vernacular; and not a jargon of mere sounds, like the Irvingite tongues, according to the unworthy interpretation of DeWette, and others.

Much less can any just exception be taken to the narrative of the sudden death of Ananias and Sapphira, who died not through the agency of Peter, but by the immediate act of God. His wisdom judged such an example of severity to be necessary, in the beginning of the gospel dispensation, as a solemn warning against hypocrisy and falsehood under the mask of religion. All who believe the words of Christ and his apostles, believe that the gospel, though it be a system of mercy, takes a severe attitude towards those who reject it. Why not, then, towards those who make a hypocritical profession of it? When the Mosaic economy was inaugurated, Nadab and Abihu were consumed by fire from heaven, because they presumptuously transgressed the divine ordinance in the matter of offering incense; and their destruction was a solemn warning to all, that God would be sanctified in them that came nigh unto him.¹ So in the beginning of the Christian dispensation, God gave, in the persons of Ananias and his wife, a testimony to all future ages of his abhorrence of hypocrisy, and of the doom which awaits hypocrites at the last day.²

Luke has omitted some events in the history of Paul, as, for example, his journey into Arabia, which must have occurred during the three years that intervened between his conversion and his first visit to Jerusalem.³ But this furnishes no argument against the writer's credibility. There are like omissions in the evangelic narratives, when we compare one Gospel with another. Difficulties that arise simply from a writer's brevity must not be allowed to set

¹ Lev. x. 3.

² Compare Matt. vii. 21-23.

³ Acts ix. 22-26, compared with Gal. i. 15-18.

aside satisfactory evidence of his competency and truthfulness.¹

II. *The Acknowledged Epistles*

To say that the apostolic Epistles are a natural sequence to the facts recorded in the Gospels, is to affirm only a part of the truth. Not only does the evangelic narrative, when received as true, solve in the most satisfactory way the question of their peculiar character, but, without the evangelic narrative, the existence of such a body of writings must remain an impenetrable mystery. There are some things above the power of human genius. One of these things is the production of such a body of epistles, so fresh and life-like, so historic in their dress, so practical in their character, so full of references to past and present circumstances, without such a basis of facts as they everywhere assume, and as is contained in the record of the four Gospels. Another of these things is to invent such a basis of facts in the interest of the Epistles, and adjust it to them with such wonderful naturalness and truthfulness. Let the sceptic take what ground he will, it remains true that the Gospel narratives account for and explain the Epistles, and the Epistles presuppose the Gospel narratives, not as myths, but as the record of facts which stirred humanity to the centre of its being. Intermediate between the Gospels and the Epistles, stands the record contained in the Acts of the Apostles, binding both together into one consistent whole; intertwined, moreover, if one may so speak, into the very fibres of the Pauline Epistles by the numerous undesigned coincidences between the two.²

In respect to the *external testimony* of the primitive church, it is well known that the thirteen Epistles which bear the name of Paul, with the First Epistle of Peter, and the first of John, belong to the class of *acknowledged* books (the

¹ The historical difficulties connected with Stephen's address do not concern Luke's credibility as a historian; and the discussion of them belongs to the commentator.

² As Paley has so happily shown in his *Horae Paulinae*.

ὁμολογούμενα of Eusebius); that is, books that were uniformly received from the first as of apostolic origin. To cite testimonies in their favor would be superfluous. It is only necessary to say a few words respecting the doubts raised by some critics in modern times respecting the Epistle to the Ephesians and the pastoral Epistles.

The Pauline authorship of the Epistle to the Ephesians was never called in question by the early church Fathers, nor the fact that it was addressed to the church in Ephesus. But there is reasonable ground for doubting whether the words of the first verse, "in Ephesus," existed in all the early copies. They are found in all the ancient versions, and in all existing manuscripts, except the Vatican and the Sinaitic, which omit them.¹ The cursive manuscript 67 omits them, indeed, but only at second hand, by emendation. If, now, we look to the testimony of the early church Fathers, we find two passages in the writings of Tertullian, one in those of Basil, and one in those of Jerome, which have been often quoted, and we think with reason, to show that in some early manuscripts the words "in Ephesus" (*ἐν Ἐφέσῳ*) were wanting.² How is this omission to be explained? The supposition that the words in question were wanting in the original autograph, on the assumed ground that the Epistle was designed for general circulation among the churches, is inadmissible. This would make the apostle, in violation alike of his own usage and of the Greek idiom, to have written: "To the saints who are, and faithful in Christ Jesus" (*τοῖς ἁγίοις τοῖς οὖσι καὶ πιστοῖς ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ*); and that, too, when it would have been perfectly easy and natural to say: "to the saints and faithful in Christ Jesus" (*τοῖς ἁγίοις καὶ πιστοῖς ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ*); or: "to the

¹ In the work entitled "Companion to the Bible," published by the American Tract Society, on p. 466 (pp. 391, 392 of the London reprint) the Sinai codex is omitted by inadvertence. Instead of "the Vatican manuscript" (line 16), it should read: "the Vatican and Sinai manuscripts," and so in line 24. It is not necessary to notice the emendation at second hand of the cursive manuscript 67.

² See Appendix A.

saints who are in Ephesus, and to the faithful in every place" (τοῖς ἁγίοις τοῖς οὖσι ἐν Ἐφέσῳ καὶ τοῖς πιστοῖς ἐν παντὶ τόπῳ; compare 1 Cor. i. 2).

If it be assumed, again, that several copies were prepared, under the apostle's direction, with a *blank space* after the word οὖσι, which was to be variously filled out (ἐν Ἐφέσῳ, ἐν Λαοδικείᾳ, etc.) with the names of the churches to which they were respectively delivered, this mode of procedure is too artificial and too far removed from apostolic simplicity to be admitted as credible on simple conjecture. Far more natural is the supposition that in one of the early transcriptions, *made for the use of another church*, the words were omitted by the copyist, while the rest of the text was left unchanged; and that from this copy others, again, were executed.

It is, however, entirely reasonable to assume that the apostle, in writing to the Ephesian church, had a *more general end* in view than when he penned his Epistles to the Colossians and Philemon, which latter were written at the same time, and forwarded by the same agency. We may suppose that, having completed his letters to the Colossian church and to Philemon, he improved the opportunity of Tychicus's journey to Asia Minor to write to the Ephesians also, though he had not, as in the case of the Colossians, a particular error to combat. He proceeds, therefore, to unfold the same great theme of Christ's personal glory, and the union through him of both Jews and Gentiles in one holy family, but in a more placid and contemplative frame of mind. This supposition will account for both the general character of the Epistle and its remarkable agreement with that to the Colossians.

De Wette¹ urges the following objections to the genuineness of this Epistle:

First, its alleged dependence on the Epistle to the Colossians, which he thinks unworthy of an author like Paul, who always

¹ Exegetical Handbook to the New Test., Introduction to the Epistle to the Ephesians, No. 2.

writes from the freshness of a richly furnished mind. We cannot admit the validity of this argument. There is not, properly speaking, any dependence of the one Epistle upon the other. More reasonable is it to say that there is only an expansion in both, by the same author, of the same great theme, with only such agreements as might be expected in two Epistles written about the same time, and such differences as were naturally introduced by the different ends proposed in the two writings—agreements and differences not unworthy of the most gifted author.

Secondly, the occurrence of several passages which must, as he thinks, give offence to the reader who is acquainted with the Pauline writings. That some of the passages to which he refers (iv. 8; v. 14, for example) involve exegetical difficulties cannot be denied; but this is no just ground for denying their Pauline authorship. Where in the present Epistle is there a greater difficulty of this kind than in the First Epistle to the Corinthians?¹ Yet who thinks of denying, on this ground, its Pauline authorship? As to the objections which he urges against other passages, they are fairly met by the true exposition of them, as given, for example, in Meyer's commentary.²

Thirdly, the alleged degeneracy of the style, as compared with that of Paul—wearisome spinning out of sentences, playful carrying out of allegories (that of Christ and his church³ and that of the Christian armor⁴), etc. For a sufficient answer to this argument, we refer the reader to a simple perusal of the Epistle.

As to the omission of salutations in the present Epistle, that may, or may not, have been connected with its general character. We do not find, upon examination, that the number of the apostle's personal greetings is measured by either the

¹ Chap. xi. 10.

² De Wette specifies chap. iii. 3; ii. 20; iii. 5; ii. 8-10; the apostle's demonology, chap. ii. 2; vi. 12; the characters which he ascribes to God, chap. i. 17; iii. 9, 15; the use made of the Old Testament promise, chap. vi. 2; and the admonition against stealing, chap. iv. 28.

³ Chap. v. 26 seq.

⁴ Chap. vi. 11 seq.

extent of his personal acquaintance with the several churches to which he writes, or the more or less specific object which he has in view. On the contrary, these salutations abound most of all in the Epistle to the Romans, whom he had never visited, and in writing to whom he had, moreover, a very general end. They are found, also, in the Epistle to the Colossians, to whom Paul was personally a stranger ;¹ but are wanting, except in a general form, in the Epistles to the Corinthians, Galatians, Philippians, and Thessalonians, not to mention that to Titus, and the first to Timothy. In a word, the insertion or omission of these salutations depended on so many considerations unknown to us, that no valid argument can be drawn against either the genuineness of the Epistle or the correctness of the address "in Ephesus."

It remains to say a few words respecting the *Pastoral Epistles*. The external testimony in favor of these Epistles need not be adduced, since, in the words of Wiesinger, "they are second to no one of the other Pauline Epistles in historic authentication, and long before the close of the second century had already obtained, in accordance with these testimonies, the full recognition of the church."² But since the beginning of the present century, they have been subjected to a series of attacks on the alleged ground of *internal evidence* against their Pauline authorship. The assault was begun by Schleiermacher, in 1807, on the First Epistle to Timothy alone, while he acknowledged the remaining two as genuine. But it was soon perceived that the three Epistles must stand or fall together as a whole. The Pauline authorship of all three was accordingly called in question by Eichhorn, as early as 1812, as it has been by various writers since ; while the attacks have called out able defenders on the other side.³ The argument of Baur and

¹ Chap. ii. 1, compared with iv. 10-14.

² Pastoral briefe. Allgemeine Einleitung § 2 (at the end).

³ For an enumeration of the German writers on both sides, see Wiesinger, as above, § 3, near the beginning. To the list of defenders may be added: Huther, in Meyer's Commentary ; Davidson, in the third volume of his Introduction to the New Test. ; Alford, Introduction to the Pastoral Epistles, etc.

De Wette against the genuineness of these Epistles contains all that need be noticed.

The first point made by Baur, according to Wiesinger's summary, is that the *heretics* of the Pastoral Epistles are the *Gnostics of the second century*. The correctness of this position is, with good reason, denied by De Wette, who would place the authorship of the Pastoral Epistles somewhere towards the end of the first century. The Gnostics of the second century, whom Valentinus and Marcion represent, were essentially anti-Judaistic, separating the God of the Jews from the God of Christianity, and placing the two in antagonism to each other. But the false teachers of the Pastoral Epistles were mainly Jews,¹ of a speculative turn of mind, who introduced into Christianity the semi-oriental philosophy of that day, which contained, indeed, the seeds of Gnosticism, but not Gnosticism in its fully developed form. Everything that is said of these men in the Epistles now under consideration agrees with the supposition that they had the elements (at least, some of the elements) of Gnosticism, only *in a germinal form*, such as must have preceded the full development of the system.

The next position taken by Baur is, that the references in these Epistles to the government and institutions of the church point to a later age. In respect to *church government*, he affirms that they reveal a *hierarchical spirit* foreign to the character of the apostle Paul. A candid perusal of the writings in question is the best refutation of this assertion. The churches had from the first their officers — bishops. or elders,² and deacons. It was natural that the apostle, in writing business letters (as two, at least, of these Epistles may be called) to men expressly appointed by him to “charge some that they should teach no other doctrine,”³ and “to set in order the things that were wanting, and

¹ See 1 Tim. i. 7; Titus i. 10, 14; iii. 9.

² It is admitted on all hands that in the Pastoral Epistles, as in the Acts of the Apostles (Acts xx. 17, compared with xx. 28), the terms *πρεσβύτερος* and *ἐπίσκοπος* are convertible. See Titus i. 5, 7.

³ 1 Tim. i. 3.

ordain elders in every city ”¹—and this, too, in an age when false teachers were beginning to abound—should dwell abundantly on the importance of sound doctrine, on points of church order, and on the qualifications of elders and deacons. This he does in an earnest tone; but no trace of a hierarchical spirit is discernible in his precepts. If one would see the difference in this respect between the Pastoral Epistles and the spirit that had already developed itself in the beginning of the second century, let him read together the Epistles to Timothy and Titus and the seven acknowledged epistles of Ignatius.

As to the *institution of widows*, which is the other item under this head specified by Baur, there is some difficulty in determining the exact position of the *enrolled* widows.² But, whether the enrolment simply placed them on the list of those entitled to receive relief from the funds of the church, or whether (as is more probable) they were also set apart for special service in the church—performing for their own sex duties analogous to those which the presbyters performed for the church generally—there is, upon either supposition, no difficulty in admitting the existence of such an arrangement as early as the latter part of Paul’s life.

Baur’s third argument is drawn from the impossibility of finding a suitable place for the composition of these Epistles in *the known history* of the apostle, that is, his history as recorded in the Acts of the Apostles. This we freely concede.³ But we are not shut up to the assumption that the apostle’s life was terminated at the close of his recorded imprisonment in Rome. We are at liberty to assume, and we do assume, that he was released from this imprisonment, resumed his apostolic labors, and was subjected to a second

¹ Titus i. 5.

² 1 Tim. v. 9–16. *Χήρα καταλεγέσθω*, let a widow be enrolled, are the words of the original.

³ The arguments for the composition of the Pastoral Epistles *after* the apostle’s recorded history may be seen in the Introductions of Wiesinger, Huther, Alford, and other commentators. For a very full presentation of the arguments on the other side, see Davidson’s Introduction to the New Testament, Vol. iii. p. 3 seq.

Roman imprisonment, which was terminated by his martyrdom, 67 or 68 A.D.; further, that he wrote, during the interval of his freedom, the Epistle to Titus and the First Epistle to Timothy, and near the close of his second Roman imprisonment, the second to Timothy.¹

The final argument of Baur, which De Wette also makes especially prominent, is drawn from the *peculiarity and alleged un-Pauline character* of these Epistles, in respect to diction, style, and ideas. The objection from the alleged un-Pauline ideas of the Pastoral Epistles can be readily disposed of. There are no passages which, legitimately interpreted, contain un-Pauline ideas. The universality of the gospel, as a way of salvation provided for the whole human family, is strongly asserted in these, as in Paul's other Epistles. If he does not do it by way of contrast between Jews and Gentiles,² it is because he has no occasion for such a contrast. The great doctrine of salvation by grace is stated in its fulness;³ and he nowhere teaches the merit of good works. If he earnestly insists on the necessity of good works, and sets forth the glorious reward of fidelity to Christ, this is what he does in his other Epistles also.⁴

The peculiarity of *diction* and *style* which prevails in these Epistles, and which marks them, as a whole, in contrast with the other Pauline writings, cannot be denied, and it is worthy of serious consideration. Here the following suggestions are in point:

1. The apostolic age was one of intense activity and rapid

¹ See Appendix B.

² As, for example, in Rom. i. 16; iii. 29, 30; iv. 9-12; Gal. iii. 28; Eph. ii. 11-22, etc.

³ 1 Tim. i. 15, 16; ii. 5, 6; 2 Tim. i. 9, 10; Titus iii. 4-7 — passages in which salvation by grace is set forth, and the merit of our works is denied, in the clearest terms.

⁴ The true Pauline doctrine is, that good works are the *stream* which flows from the *fountain* of faith: *No stream; no fountain*, and consequently no approval at Christ's bar. This is the position alike of the Pastoral Epistles and of the other acknowledged writings of Paul. Rom. ii. 6-11; vi. 21-23; viii. 6-8; 1 Cor. vi. 9-11; ix. 24-27; Gal. vi. 7-9; Eph. vi. 8; Phil. iii. 18, 19; iv. 8, 9; Col. iii. 5-14, 24, 25. Compare 1 Tim. iv. 10, 16; vi. 11, 12, 17-19; 2 Tim. i. 18; ii. 19-22; iv. 7, 8; Titus ii. 11-14; iii. 8.

development within the sphere of Christendom. Under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, the church passed rapidly from a formative, towards a more mature, state of organization. In the course of this progress, new questions were continually arising, and new phases of social Christian life. We may add, also, that towards the latter part of the period especially, errors and vain speculations had also a rank and rapid growth. Of this we have clear indications, when we compare the Epistle to the Colossians, about 62 A.D., with the Epistles to the Galatians and Corinthians, 57 A.D. It is not surprising that, within the space of three or four years more, there should have been, in Asia Minor and the adjacent islands, still further developments of error and profitless fables, and these, too, of a very marked character.

2. The great apostle to the Gentiles had a mind of intense activity and flexibility also. The "many-sidedness" of his character, as it has been called, is wonderful. His style has, indeed, certain grand characteristics, which belong to the essence of his character; and these appear alike in the Pastoral Epistles and his other acknowledged writings. Nevertheless, it is of no cast-iron stamp, but is marked by marvellous variety. He knows how to adapt himself, in the twinkling of an eye, to the circumstances in which he is placed, and the work to be performed. If new forms of argument, or new terms, are needed, to enforce new duties, or refute new errors, we are sure that they will be forthcoming. Compare, for example, his Epistle to the Romans with the two to the Corinthians. All three are alike "Pauline"; but who that had read only the Epistles to the Corinthians would have expected, *a priori*, that an epistle like that to the Romans would almost immediately follow? Or who would have judged, from his two Epistles to the Thessalonians, that, within a few months, he could deliver an address to the philosophers on Mars' Hill, like that recorded in the Acts of the Apostles? All that is "Pauline" does not lie in two or three or half-a-dozen of the apostle's writings. Every new Epistle adds something to the "Pauline"

vocabulary and style; and nothing can be proved to be "un-Pauline" in which he says what the circumstances require him to say in the way in which it ought to be said, even though the particular expression occurs nowhere else.

3. The defenders of the Pastoral Epistles have, with reason, laid stress on the two considerations that they are addressed, not to churches, but to trusty friends and fellow-laborers, and that they are mainly "business-letters," pertaining to their office and the duties connected with it. In such letters we ought to expect a peculiar range of topics and peculiar freedom of communication.

4. The apostle's age may well be taken into account. Some time before, in writing to Philemon, he had described himself as "Paul the aged." Reminiscences of the past are natural to men in advanced life; and they are apt, also, to embody the gathered experience of years in the form of proverbs or commonplace sayings. The Holy Ghost sanctifies old age, as it does youth and manhood, but does not abolish what is purely natural to it.

If, now, we examine the Pastoral Epistles in the light of these principles, we find in them nothing, in respect to diction, that can reasonably give offence. They contain many new terms—"fables," genealogies," "vain talk" and "vain talkers," "profane vain babblings," "strifes about words,"¹ etc.; but this is because such terms are needed to meet the errors of the time. No one can deny that the errors referred to may have actually existed in the apostle's lifetime, or that these terms appropriately describe them. Why, then, take offence at them?

Peculiar to these Epistles is the designation of the gospel as "the mystery of godliness," "the doctrine according to godliness," "the truth which is according to godliness," and the frequent use otherwise of the term "godliness";² also,

¹ *μῦθοι, γενεαλογίαι, ματαιολογία* and *ματαιολόγος, βέβηλοι κενοφωνίαι, λογομαχίαι*, etc.

² The term *εὐσέβεια* occurs once in the Acts of the Apostles (iii. 12), four times in the Second Epistle of Peter, and ten times in the Pastoral Epistles. It manifestly came into current use in the latter part of the apostolic age, when

the forms "sound doctrine," "sound words," "being sound in the faith"; these latter in opposition to those who are "sick about questions and strifes of words, whereof cometh envy, strife, railings, evil surmisings, perverse disputings of men of corrupt minds and destitute of the truth."¹ These forms exhibit the practical side of Christianity as a healthful doctrine, producing a healthful life, in opposition to the "profane vain babblings" and profitless speculations of the false teachers, which the apostle regards as a moral disease. They are, therefore, entirely in place.

As regards the *general style* of the Pastoral Epistles, critics have noticed the peculiarity that the writer frequently digresses into general remarks, from which he returns by way of an exhortation or application to the person addressed.² Such remarks are often introduced by the formula: "Faithful is the saying," by which they receive a sort of proverbial character. They may, in truth, be regarded as maxims treasured up in the apostle's soul, on which he dwells with increasing fondness as he draws towards the close of his ministry; and that he should immediately make an application of them to Timothy or Titus is entirely natural. If there be, further, as is alleged, a summary character in the precepts of these Epistles, and, as naturally connected with this, a certain looseness of structure, the explanation is, that he is writing confidentially to fellow-laborers, trained under his own supervision, who need not so much details as hints of the several points that require their special attention

III. *The Disputed Books.*

The *disputed books* (*ἀντιλεγόμενα*) are those respecting the apostolic origin and authority of which doubts existed, to a greater or less extent, in the primitive church before the fourth century; viz. the Epistle to the Hebrews, the Epistle the necessities of the time required a sharp distinction between the substance of a holy Christian faith and the empty profession of it.

¹ 1 Tim. vi. 4, 5.

² Among other examples may be specified: 1 Tim. i. 15-18; iv. 9-12; Titus ii. 11-15; iii. 5-8.

of James, the Second Epistle of Peter, the Second and Third Epistles of John, the Epistle of Jude, and the Apocalypse — seven books in all. The discussion of the grounds on which each of these books has been received into the canon of the New Testament belongs to the department of Particular Introduction. We shall here restrict ourselves to some general suggestions, which apply to them as a whole.

1. The question about the reception or rejection of these books concerns only the *extent of the canon*, not the *truth of Christianity*. Some persons, when they learn of the existence of doubts in the early churches respecting certain books, are greatly troubled, as if a shade of uncertainty were thereby thrown over the whole New Testament. Not so. They should understand that its several books were written, one after another, as occasion required, and that the churches received each of them *separately*, on the evidence they had of its apostolic origin. At last *collections* of these books, that is, *canons*, began to be formed, each of which represented the prevailing judgment of the churches in the region where it was made. The Eastern churches, for example, omitted from their canon all of the disputed books but the Epistle to the Hebrews and that of James. On the other hand, the Western churches omitted these two books, but received the Epistle of Jude, the Apocalypse, and apparently, also, the second and third of John.¹ Now, this diversity of judgment in regard to particular books does not, in the least, affect the remaining books of the New Testament, which are sustained by the undivided testimony of the ancient churches. The Christian church has received the seven books in question on grounds which she judges adequate. But, if any one feels under the necessity of suspending his judgment in respect to one or more of them, let him follow the teachings of the other books, which are above all doubt; for in them he will find all the essential truths of Christianity.

2. The primitive age of the church was one of *free inquiry*.

¹ The Muratorian Canon, which represents the judgment of the Western churches, is here very obscure and of doubtful interpretation.

General councils were not then known ; nor was there any central power (such as unhappily grew up in later ages) to impose its decisions authoritatively on the churches. In the essential doctrines of the gospel there was everywhere an agreement ; but this did not exclude differences on various minor points in the different provinces of Christendom ; and in respect to these the churches of the several provinces were very tenacious, maintaining obstinate and heated controversies over them. As a specimen of these may be named the controversy which the churches of Asia Minor had with the church of Rome respecting the festival of the passover, which finally proceeded to such an extremity as to break the bond of fellowship between them. We need not be surprised, therefore, to find also in the different provinces of the Roman empire a diversity of judgment in respect to certain books of the New Testament.

3. Although we cannot account for the universal and undisputed reception of a given book, except on the assumption of its genuineness, the reverse is not true ; that is to say, the non-reception of a certain book by some of the early churches is no conclusive argument against its apostolic origin. From the influence of circumstances unknown to us, it may have remained for a considerable period of time in comparative obscurity. We have good ground for believing that some apostolic writings are utterly lost. To deny the possibility of this would be to prejudge the wisdom of God. The question is one of fact, not of theory. The most obvious interpretation of 1 Cor. v. 9 and Col. iv. 16, is, that Paul refers in each case to an epistle which has not come down to us. And, if an inspired epistle might be lost, how can one reasonably deny that the knowledge and use of such an epistle might be for some time restricted to a comparatively narrow circle of churches ? When such an Epistle — the Second of Peter, for example — began to be more extensively known, it would encounter many difficulties in obtaining a general circulation ; because, in this matter, the churches of one region were slow and cautious in receiving what came from other regions.

4. The caution and hesitation of the early churches, with respect to the books in question, is to us a satisfactory pledge that, in settling the canon of the New Testament, they acted deliberately and conscientiously. Did the history of the canon present no such phenomenon as the distinction between acknowledged and disputed books, there would be ground for the allegation that they received, without discrimination, whatever claimed to be of apostolic origin. But now, their mature and final judgment in this matter is entitled to profound respect. The judgment of the early churches, let it be remembered, was not simply *affirmative*, but *negative* also. While it received the seven books now under consideration, it rejected others that were highly valued and publicly read in some of the churches.¹ On this ground, though not of binding authority so as to exclude our free investigation and examination of the facts on which it is based, it is worthy of reverential regard. While we earnestly protest against that blind spirit of reverence for antiquity which would exalt the judgment of the early church Fathers — not theoretically, but *practically* — to a place co-ordinate with scripture, we think it no less necessary to lift up a warning voice against the narrow self-complacency which contemptuously rejects the mature decisions of the primitive Christians on historic points, for the determination of which they had better data than we of this nineteenth century can hope to find.

It was our original intention to finish the subject of REVELATION with the present Article. But we find it necessary to add another before proceeding to the momentous question of INSPIRATION.

¹ The first epistle of Clement of Rome, with a part of the second, is appended to the Alexandrian Codex. The epistle of Barnabas, with part of the Shepherd of Hermas, is attached to the Sinai Codex. The explanation is that these three books were read in at least some of the churches when these codices were executed.

APPENDIX A.

ON THE WORDS "IN EPHESUS."

The passages from Tertullian are the following: "Praetereo hic et de alia epistula, quam nos ad Ephesios praescriptam habemus, haeretici vero ad Laodiceos"¹—"I pass by here another epistle also, which we have inscribed to the Ephesians; but the heretics, to the Laodiceans."

"Ecclesiae quidem veritate epistulam istam ad Ephesios habemus emissam, non ad Laodiceos; sed Marcion ei titulam aliquando interpolare gestiit, quasi et in isto diligentissimus explorator. Nihil autem de titulis interest, cum ad omnes apostolus scripserit, dum ad quosdam," etc.² "According to the truth [that is, according to the true tradition] of the church, we have that Epistle sent to the Ephesians, not to the Laodiceans. But Marcion some time pleased himself with foisting upon it a title,³ as if he had been in this matter also a very diligent investigator. Titles, however, are of no importance; since the apostle wrote to all when he wrote to some," etc.

The *title* (titulus) to which Tertullian refers is, apparently, not the words ἐν Ἐφέσῳ, which belong to the text, but the title πρὸς Ἐφεσίους, prefixed to the Epistle, which, however gathered, was not a part of the text, but was properly represented as belonging to "the verity of the church." This title Marcion, and the heretics who sided with him, changed. But there must have been some ground for the change; and the question is: What ground? If we may judge from the words of Tertullian, it must have been the absence from some of the manuscripts of the words ἐν Ἐφέσῳ; for, first, Tertullian appeals, not to the uniform testimony of the manuscripts, but to church tradition; secondly, he accuses Marcion, not of falsifying the apostle's words, but of affecting to be in this matter a very diligent investigator; thirdly, he puts by the whole question with the remark that "titles are of no importance," which he would hardly have done had the testimony of the manuscripts been uniform.

Basil's words are more decisive: Ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς Ἐφεσίοις ἐπιστέλλον ὡς γνησίως ἠγομένους τῷ ὄντι δι' ἐπιγνώσεως, ὄντας αὐτοὺς ἰδιαζόντως ὠνόμασεν εἰπὼν· τοῖς ἁγίοις τοῖς οὖσι καὶ πιστοῖς ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ, οὕτω γὰρ καὶ οἱ πρὸ ἡμῶν παραδεδώκασιν, καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐν τοῖς παλαιοῖς τῶν ἀντι-

¹ Adv. Marcionem, v. 11.

² Ib. v. 17.

³ Du Cange, in his Glossary, defines *interpolationes* to be "adjectiones vel immutationes, quae in transumptis occurrunt vitio librariorum, . . . sive id de industria fecerint, sive non." Interpolare is, then, very nearly equivalent to corruptere. Marcion foisted upon the Epistle a title unknown to church tradition.

γράφων εὐρήκαμεν.¹ "But writing to the Ephesians also, as to those who have a genuine union through knowledge with him who is, he called them, in a peculiar sense, those who are, saying: To the saints who are and faithful in Christ Jesus. For so those before us have transmitted it, and we have found it in the ancient copies."

Much useless labor has been expended to show that the point made by Basil is the insertion, before the participle οὔσι, of the article τοῖς, not the omission of the words ἐν Ἐφέσῳ. Basil does, indeed, regard the Epistle as written to the Ephesians; but this he rests, like Tertullian, on the tradition of the church. The words which he cites—τοῖς ἁγίοις τοῖς οὔσι καὶ πιστοῖς ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ—agree exactly with the text of the Sinaitic and Vatican manuscripts, and it is plain that he means to give in them what he regards as the true text. His argument for calling the saints those "who are in a peculiar sense," falls to the ground the moment the words ἐν Ἐφέσῳ are admitted, and they become simply "the saints who are in Ephesus." His language ἐν τοῖς παλαιοῖς τῶν ἀντιγράφων, *in the ancient among the copies*, implies that this was the reading in the ancient copies generally. See further in Davidson's Introduction to the New Testament, Vol. ii. p. 328 seq.

Jerome, in commenting on the words "Sanctis omnibus qui sunt Ephesi,"² remarks as follows:

"Quidam, curiosius quam necesse est, putant ex eo quod Moysi dictum sit: *Haec dices filiis Israel: Qui est misit me*, etiam eos qui Ephesi sunt sancti et fideles essentiae vocabulo nuncupatos. Ut quomodo a sancto sancti, a justo justi, a sapientia sapientes; ita ab eo qui est, hi qui sunt appellentur. . . . Alii vero simpliciter, non ad eos qui sunt, sed qui Ephesi sancti et fideles sint, scriptum arbitrantur."³

"Some, with an over-refined subtilty, conclude from the words addressed to Moses—"Thus shalt thou say to the children of Israel: He who is hath sent me"—that also the saints and faithful who are at Ephesus receive an appellation denoting *existence*—that, just as they are called holy from him who is holy, just from him who is just, wise from his wisdom, so from *him who is* they are called *they who are*. . . . But others think that the epistle was addressed simply, not to those who are, but to those who are saints and faithful at Ephesus."

Jerome regards the reading "to the saints who are in Ephesus" as settled; but his condemnatory notice of the interpretation "to the saints who are," taken in connection with the words of Tertullian and Basil, and also the further fact that the words "in Ephesus" are wanting in two very

¹ Against Eunomius, ii. 19 (p. 254 ed. Garnier).

² Eph. i. 1, according to the Vulgate, which agrees here with the reading of the Alexandrian manuscript.

³ Commentary, chap. i. 1.

ancient manuscripts, is best explained by the assumption that the reading without the words "in Ephesus" existed in his day, although he disallowed both it and the subtile interpretation based upon it.

APPENDIX B.

ON THE QUESTION OF A SECOND ROMAN IMPRISONMENT.

The *historic testimony* on this point, which may be seen in the introductions to the Pastoral Epistles, is scanty, but all on the side of a second Roman imprisonment. Eusebius, after a reference to the two years' imprisonment at Rome, recorded by Luke,¹ goes on to say: τότε μὲν οὖν ἀπολογησάμενον, αὐθις ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ κησύγματος διακονίαν λόγος ἔχει στείλασθαι τὸν ἀπόστολον· δεύτερον δ' ἐπιβάντα τῇ αὐτῇ πόλει, τῷ κατ' αὐτὸν τελειωθῆναι μαρτυρίῳ· ἐν ᾧ δεσμοῖς ἐχόμενος τὴν πρὸς Τιμόθεον δεύτεραν ἐπιστολὴν συντάττει, ὁμοῦ σημαίνων τὴν τε πρότεραν αὐτῷ γενομένην ἀπολογίαν καὶ τὴν παραπόδας τελεῖωσιν· δέχου δὴ καὶ τούτων τὰς αὐτοῦ μαρτυρίας. ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ μου, φησὶν ἀπολογία οὐδεὶς μοι συμπαρεγένετο, κ.τ.λ.² "It is reported that the apostle, having at that time made his defence, went forth again to the work of preaching; but that, having come a second time to the same city, he suffered martyrdom under him [Nero]. At which time, while held in chains, he composed his Second Epistle to Timothy, referring in it to both his first defence and his speedy death. Hear, if you please, his declarations concerning these: 'In my first defence,' says he, 'no man stood with me,' etc.³ He then proceeds to give his judgment that this tradition is correct, on the ground that the apostle's "first defence" must be understood of the hearing at the close of his first imprisonment, which had a favorable issue; while a second trial awaits him in this his second imprisonment, which will result in his condemnation. Here we must distinguish carefully between the *tradition itself*, and the *reason which Eusebius gives for his adhesion to it*. The reason is undoubtedly false; for it rests on a wrong interpretation of the apostle's words. But this does not affect the reality of the tradition. It is reasonable to suppose that the interpretation owes its existence to the tradition, not the tradition to the interpretation. We further remark that the expression λόγος ἔχει is naturally understood, not of an uncertain rumor, but of a current tradition.

Clement of Rome represents the Apostle Paul as "having been a herald of the gospel in the East and in the West," as "having taught the whole world righteousness, and having come to the limit of the West, and having testified before the rulers," and "so having departed from the world."⁴

¹ Acts xxviii. 30, 31.

² Hist. Eccl. ii. 22.

³ 2 Tim. iv. 16 seq.

⁴ The passage of Clement, filled out according to the text of Cotelierius, reads as follows: κῆρυξ [γενόμενος] ἐν τε τῇ ἀνατολῇ καὶ ἐν [τῇ] δύσει, δικαιοσύνην διδάξας ὅλον τὸν κόσμον, κ[αὶ ἐπὶ] τὸ τέλος τῆς δύσεως ἐλθὼν, καὶ μαρτυρήσας ἐπὶ τῶν ἡγουμένων, οὕτως ἀπαλλάγη τοῦ κόσμου. Ad Corinthios, 5.

Whatever of hyperbole there may be in the passage, "the limit of the West" can be fairly understood only of Spain; not of Rome, where Clement himself resided. The reference will then be to a tradition that, after his first imprisonment, he accomplished his purpose of visiting Spain, hinted at in his Epistle to the Romans.¹

Coming now to the testimony that can be gathered from the *other writings of the New Testament*, we have, in the first place, the apostle's declaration to the elders of the Ephesian church: "And now, behold, I know that ye all, among whom I have gone preaching the kingdom of God, shall see my face no more."² The weight of this passage against the position which we advocate, we are not disposed to deny; for the fair interpretation of the apostle's words, "As I besought thee to abide still at Ephesus, when I went into Macedonia,"³ implies, upon the supposition that the Pastoral Epistles were written after his first imprisonment, that he did again visit the Ephesian church. But they are fairly balanced by his equally strong declaration to the Philippians that his present imprisonment should have a favorable issue.⁴ Such declarations, when no doctrine or fact of Christianity is concerned, are not to be taken as authoritative revelations of the Spirit.

We are left, then, to the full weight of the *internal evidence of the Pastoral Epistles*, which preponderates greatly on the side of a second Roman imprisonment.

¹ Rom. xv. 24, 28.

² Καὶ νῦν, ἰδοὺ, ἐγὼ οἶδα ὅτι, κ.τ.λ. Acts xx. 25.

³ 1 Tim. i. 3.

⁴ Καὶ τοῦτο πεποιθὼς οἶδα ὅτι μενῶ, κ.τ.λ. Phil. i. 25. See also chap. ii. 24; Philemon 22.

ARTICLE VII.

EXPOSITION OF 2 COR. V. 14.¹

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Do any of the translations of the New Testament correctly render the last clause of this verse, and is its meaning understood? A suggestion which calls in question the critical judgment of the great number of distinguished scholars who have taken part in translating the New Testament, and of the still greater number who have written commentaries thereon, may savor of egotism; still, the admitted grammatical and logical difficulties which surround all translations and explanations of this verse render the question a legitimate and proper one for examination. Notwithstanding a majority of the most distinguished modern commentators omit the conditional conjunction *ei, if*, which introduces the hypothetical period, we have, beyond all reasonable doubt, in the received text of the Greek Testament, the very words used by the Apostle Paul; and the question is: Do these translations convey the same meaning as Paul's words? If they do, then these translations are correct; if they do not, then these translations are erroneous, no matter when made, by whom made, or how generally received. The question is not a doctrinal one, but purely a question of interpretation, to be determined in the same manner as the disputed meaning of a statute, contract, or business letter which is made the subject of judicial investigation; that is, by the meaning of the individual words used by Paul, and by the requirements of the whole context or connection in which these words stand.

It is conceded, at the very outset of this investigation, that all translators have rendered the clause substantially in the

¹ "For the love of Christ constraineth us; because we thus judge, that if one died for all, then were all dead."

same manner, and that all commentators have accepted their translations as substantially correct; and that this weight of authority can be overcome only by the clearest grammatical and logical reasons against the correctness of the received versions. To treat the question fairly, it seems necessary to set forth these translations, and the explanations of the leading commentators thereon in their own language respectively, point out their errors, and then submit a better translation. Success in this matter is to be measured, not simply by pointing out the difficulties of the received translations, but by substituting a better translation in their place.

The verse, in the received text of the Greek Testament, reads as follows:

Ἡ γὰρ ἀγάπη τοῦ Χριστοῦ συνέχει ἡμᾶς, κρίναντας τοῦτο, ὅτι εἰ εἰς ὑπὲρ πάντων ἀπέθανεν, ἄρα οἱ πάντες ἀπέθανον.

In the Vulgate version, translated from the old Italic versions, by Jerome, about the year 390, and which has been exclusively adopted by the Roman Catholic church, since the seventh century, the verse is rendered: "Charitas enim Christi urget nos; estimantes hoc, quoniam si unus pro omnibus mortuus est, ergo omnes mortui sunt."

In the Douay, or English Catholic Bible, adopted, with slight variations, from the Rheims version of the New Testament, translated in 1582, "out of the authentical Latin, according to the best corrected copies of the same," the verse is rendered: "For the charity of Christ presseth us; judging this, that if one died for all, then all were dead."

In the Authorized version, "translated," in 1611, "out of the original Greek, and with the former translations diligently compared and revised," the verse is rendered: "For the love of Christ constraineth us; because we thus judge, that if one died for all, then were all dead."

Without referring more particularly to any other translations of the New Testament, it is sufficient to say, that in all of them this verse is rendered substantially in the same way; and that all translations have, until recently, been generally supposed to teach the idea, as the doctrine of

Paul, that Christ died for all men *because* all men were dead. The interpretation adopted by the Fathers and Schoolmen was that Christ died for all men *because* all men were dead *in sin*; and this interpretation is still maintained by the Roman Catholic church and by a large number of Protestant commentators. But a more careful consideration of the verse has disclosed the fact that, while these translations apparently teach the doctrine that Christ died for all men *because* all men were dead, they logically, and therefore really, teach the doctrine that the *death* of all men was the result of the *death* of Christ *for* all men. And, therefore, the interpretation now adopted by a majority of Protestant commentators is, that all men, for whom Christ died, die *to sin* as the result of the *death* of Christ *for* all men. Now, although Christ died for the benefit of the race, and all the individuals of the race are, until renewed, dead *in sin*, and although all the individuals of the race, when renewed, are required to die *to sin*, still there is no logical connection whatever, as a condition and result, or as cause and effect, between the physical death of Christ and the metaphorical death of the race *in sin*, or the metaphorical death of the renewed *to sin*. Men were dead *in sin*, and men died *to sin*, before Christ died. Therefore the translators of Paul have failed to comprehend his meaning.

Since the time of Augustine, and his famous controversy with Pelagius, but more particularly within the last thirty-five years, the meaning of this verse has been the subject of repeated investigation. Commentators have wrestled with it to extract from it some meaning which should be consistent with the apparent or real idea contained in the received translations, the teachings of the other portions of the sacred scriptures, and the admitted natural and moral state of the race; but no result satisfactory to all has yet been reached. Men of equal learning and critical ability still come to different conclusions as to its true meaning.

Dunigan's Edition of Haydock's Catholic Family Bible, specially approved by the Pope and by all the Archbishops

and Bishops in America, and the commentaries of Archbishop Kendrick are regarded as the very highest authority among Catholics; while the commentaries and annotations of Olshausen, Conybeare and Howson, Dr. Bloomfield, Dean Alford, and Lange and his associates in his voluminous Bible-work, are regarded as the very highest authority among Protestants; and the respective views entertained by these distinguished scholars of the meaning of this verse, though not alike, may be safely accepted as the best considered expositions of the verse which have hitherto been published.

Haydock explains the meaning of the verse as follows: "*For the charity of Christ*, the love of God, the love that Christ has shown to me and all mankind, and a return of love due to him, *presseth* me on — is the motive of all that I do — because I consider that, *if one*, our Redeemer Christ Jesus, *died for all, then all were dead*, and had been lost in their sins, had not Christ come to redeem us. Thus Augustine, in many places, proving original sin against the Pelagians. Divers interpreters add this exposition: *Therefore all are dead*, that is, ought to die, and by a new life look upon themselves as dead to sin, which is connected with what follows in the next verse."

Archbishop Kendrick explains the verse as follows: "The lost state of the whole human family, and the universal character of the atonement of Christ, are here strongly expressed."

Olshausen explains the meaning of the verse as follows: "Therefore the love of Christ (i.e. not love toward Christ, but that which he bears within himself, and imparts to his people) is, as it were, the *destruction* of all those belonging to him; since he died for all, therefore all (who accept him) likewise die for him, i.e. they are annihilated in their independent existence; they live no longer for themselves, but for Christ. The only difficulty existing here is in the fact (apart from the idea of substitution, already considered at Rom. v. 12) that v. 14 says precisely, ἄρα οἱ πάντες ἀπέθανον, *then did all die*, which makes the death of all appear the necessary consequence of the death of the substitute for all;

while in v. 15, the ἀπέθανεν ἵνα, κ.τ.λ. represents the death of all as an act depending on their own pleasure, to wit, how they should believe. The difficulty may be thus explained: Without the death of Christ, absolutely none would be in a condition to die to himself, for that is possible only by entering into and appropriating his life of love; but man may always *hinder*, by his resistance, the power of Christ, 'which kills, and at the same time makes alive,' from perfecting his work in him. From this obstructing resistance the fifteenth verse is intended to withhold the Corinthians. Before Christ's death it was a subject of reproof to no man that he lived to himself, but after Christ's death it was a crime in all those to whom the word of the cross had come. In this manner a strict connection is visible with v. 16. (In ἐξέστημεν, *excess* and *exaggeration*, in this connection, of praise, are represented as the expression of an ἑκστασις or μανία. Chrysostom well elucidates συνέχει, *constrains*, of v. 14, by ἡ ἀγάπη οὐκ ἀφήσιν ἢ συγχάζειν με, *love does not permit me to rest*. See Acts xviii. 5. The εἰ is wanting in B, C, D, E, F, G, and is justly omitted by Lachmann; it is only introduced to join the ἄρα more easily, and also, probably, in order to remove the apparent pleonasm with v. 15. But the hypothetical conception of the substitution is perfectly untenable; the idea applies to no one except Christ, who only, as the second Adam, could be a substitute for the whole human race. The ὑπέρ plainly stands here = ἀντί, for only upon this supposition does the ἄρα κ.τ.λ. acquire significance. See on Matt. xx. 28.)"

Conybeare and Howson, the authors of the admirable "Life and Epistles of Paul," in a note on this verse, say: "Οἱ πάντες ἀπέθανον cannot mean *all were dead* (A. V.), but *all died*." They render the verse as follows: "For the love of Christ constrains me, because I thus judge, that if one died for all, then his death was their death."

Doctor Bloomfield, in the ninth edition of his Greek Testament with English Notes, remarks as follows: "As respects the words ἄρα οἱ πάντες ἀπέθανον, on carefully reconsidering

what has been urged by Professor Scholefield against the common version, 'then were all dead,' I admit the force of his objections; but I would render not, with the Professor, 'then all died,' but, with Dr. Peile, 'then did all these die,' viz. 'whose substitute he was'; in other words, 'were in no better condition than dead men.' See Rom. xii. 19; Eph. ii. 1, 3, 5."

Dean Alford, in the fourth edition of his Greek Testament, explains the meaning of the verse as follows: "*Κρίναντας τοῦτο*, because we formed this judgment (viz. at our conversion:—learned to regard this as a settled truth) that one died on behalf of all (not only, for the benefit of all, as Meyer,—but *instead* of all, suffered death in the root and essence of our humanity, as the second Adam. This death on behalf of *all men* is the absolute objective fact: that *all* enter not into the benefit of that Death is owing to the non-fulfilment of the subjective condition which follows)—therefore all died (i.e. therefore, in the death of Christ, *all, the all* for whom He died, *οἱ πάντες, died too*), i.e. see below, because planted in the likeness of His death, died to sin and to self, that they might live to him. This was true *objectively*, but not *subjectively*, till such death to sin and self is realized in each: See Rom. vi. 8, ff. 7. The other renderings—*ought to die*, as Thomas Aquinas, Grotius, Estius, and others; *were under sentence of death*, as Chrysostom, Theodoret, Beza, and others; *as good as died*, Flatt—are shown to be erroneous by carefully noticing the construction with or without *εἰ*. The *verb* is common to both members of the sentence; the correspondent emphatic words in the two members being (1) *εἰς ὑπὲρ πάντων*; (2) *πάντες*; (One on behalf of all) died, (*all*) died: if *One* died the death of (belonging to, due from) *all*, then *all* died (in and with him). Meyer's rendering of *ὅτι, because*, can hardly be right, as it would leave *κρίναντας τοῦτο* standing awkwardly alone."

Lange, in his commentaries, edited by Dr. Schaff, explains the meaning of the verse as follows: "When the Apostle

adds 'we having formed this judgment,' he introduces the subjective cause of that influence which the love of Christ has over him. That love has led him to form this judgment, i.e. had brought him to this conclusion, to this conviction. Whether this judgment was reached at the time of his conversion (Meyer), or whether the whole meaning of the death of Christ became thus clear to his apprehension at some later period of his life (Osiander), may be left undetermined. Neander remarks that 'the aorist was here used because Paul intended to speak of something which happened once upon a time. He means, that ever since he became conscious of the saving love of Christ, a new principle has entered his heart.' The substance of this conviction, or, rather, of the judgment then formed, was: — that One died for all, and so all died. If we accept the reading of the Receptus, which gives us *εἰ* after *ὅτι*, we must regard *ὅτι ἅπα . . . ἀπέθανον* as belonging together; that (if one died for all) then all died. The hypothetical sentence, however, could have been only formally problematical, since what is there expressed must have been really certain to the Apostle. But if the *εἰ* be left out, *ὅτι* is either equivalent to *because*, and so introduces the antecedent of a proposition (Meyer); or it is in this instance equivalent to *that*, and both clauses depend upon it, i.e. 'we have judged that One died for all, and that all died' (Osiander). *Τοῦτο* appears to favor this latter supposition ('we judged this, that,' etc.). One thing, however, which would go far to determine us in favor of the causal signification is, that it brings out more prominently the *οἱ πάντες ἀπέθανον*, as the proper substance of the judgment to which the Apostle says in the context he had come ('judged this, that One died for all, and so all died'). And yet the whole force of the sentence seems to require that *ὅτι*, in the sense of *that*, should be made to govern both clauses of it. The logical relation, however, would be destroyed, if we thus bring in an independent conclusion by means of *ἅπα*. The inference which the Apostle makes from the proposition that One died for all, argues strongly in favor of its judicially vicarious

signification. One was in the place of all; therefore all must be looked upon as dead; one has made expiation for the offence of all; therefore all are to be looked upon as having suffered punishment."

Before examining in detail the foregoing opinions and arguments of these commentators, we wish to say, generally, that Paul might speak of the death of Christ, and yet not make, or intend to make, any reference whatever to the atoning character of his death, or to the fallen state of mankind; and, also, that he might use the aorist participle to declare that he had already formed an opinion upon the subject which he was then discussing, and yet not make, or intend to make, any reference whatever to the time of his conversion as the date of that opinion. If there be nothing in the words used by Paul, or in the connection in which they stand, to show such reference, it is mere assumption on the part of his commentators to put any such construction upon them. Whoever shall claim such reference must establish it by some affirmative evidence; and until such affirmative evidence shall be produced, a mere denial of such reference is sufficient. All such reference here is denied. And we wish to say, further, that, unless the word *εἰ*, *if*, be retained, the last clause of the verse cannot be intelligibly translated.

It is understood that the learned divines of the Roman Catholic church regard the Vulgate version of the Greek Testament as of equal authority with the original text; and it will be observed that both Haydock and Archbishop Kendrick tacitly admit the verse to be correctly translated, and that neither of them make any reference to the Greek text in order to determine or illustrate its meaning.

Haydock gives two explanations of the meaning of the last clause of the verse: one, the old interpretations of the Fathers and Schoolmen, that Christ died for all men, *because* all were dead *in sin*; the other, the recent interpretation, that men die *to sin* as the *result* of Christ's death. These two explanations are so widely different from each other that only one of them can possibly be correct; and both of

them may be erroneous. It is a sufficient answer to the first explanation to say that neither Paul nor any of his translators use any such language, nor will the language which they do use bear any such interpretation. And it ought to be a sufficient answer to the second explanation, to say that men died to sin before Christ's death, and therefore death to sin cannot be the result of His death.

Archbishop Kendrick gives no critical explanation of the meaning of this clause; but contents himself with saying that it strongly expresses the lost state of the whole human family, and the universal character of the atonement of Christ. But it does not express either. It does not even assert the existence of any fact. The phrase "that if One died for all, then all were dead," is a mere hypothetical statement; and a hypothetical statement proves nothing until it ceases to be an hypothesis by becoming established as a reality.

Olshausen, it will be observed, undertakes to establish the meaning of this clause by a syllogism. He first lays down the proposition that the love of Christ is, as it were, the *destruction* of all who are Christ's; he then lays down the further proposition, that all who accept Christ are annihilated in their independent existence; and from these premises he forthwith draws the conclusion that all who live for Christ are *οἱ πάντες ἀπέθανον*, *dead men*. Substituting these supposed equivalent words of Olshausen for the words of Paul, and omitting *εἰ*, *if*, as Olshausen does, the verse will read: "For the love of Christ, as it were, destroys us; because we judge this, that Christ died for all, therefore all who live for Christ are dead." A syllogistic argument, however specious, which terminates in such a palpable absurdity, must necessarily be founded upon false premises. The idea which Olshausen supposes to have been in Paul's mind, and the idea which was actually in Paul's mind at the time, are the very opposite of each other. Olshausen supposes Paul's meaning to be, that if any man live for Christ, that is, be in Christ, he is a dead man; whereas, Paul himself says, in

the seventeenth verse of the same chapter, that if any man be in Christ, he is, not a *dead man*, but a *new creature*. The words of Paul have no such meaning, and convey no such idea, as the words of Olshausen. To die, is a physical act; it is to pass from an animate to a lifeless state; it is precisely what Christ did; and the verb ἀπέθανεν describes this act of Christ. To die *to sin*, is a moral act; it is to pass from that state of moral infirmity in which our selfish and sinful propensities have dominion over us, to that state of moral likeness to Christ in which they have no longer dominion over us; it is, to all the subjects of it, the commencement of an eternal life; and the verb ἀπέθανον does not describe this act, either in its inception, progress, or consummation.

But there is another still more serious objection to the exposition of Olshausen. As a supplemental argument, in favor of his construction of the words οἱ πάντες ἀπέθανον, he says that “before Christ’s death it was a subject of reproof to no man that he lived to himself.” To live to one’s self is to follow one’s selfish pleasures, passions, and interests as the paramount good, regardless of the claims of God and the rights of men. Cain, when he slew his brother, David, when he was compassing the dishonor and death of Uriah, and Ahab and Jezebel, when causing the murder of Naboth under the forms of a judicial trial, that they might possess themselves of his vineyard, were all living to themselves; and, though Christ had not then died, both reproof and punishment speedily followed their crimes. These cases are mentioned, not because they are exceptional ones, but because they furnish pertinent and indisputable evidence of the fact that both the Old Testament and the New bear the same testimony against all who live to themselves.

Conybeare and Howson hold the clause to mean, and so render it, that if One died for all, then his death was their death. This exposition is more erroneous, if an absolute error will admit of degrees of comparison, than the exposition of Olshausen; for we know that neither in a literal

nor metaphorical sense did the death of *all* follow the death of Christ, as the result of it.

Doctor Bloomfield says that the words ἄρα οἱ πάντες ἀπέθανον read: "then did all those die," which he expands into the phrase, as expressive of the meaning of Paul: "then all those whose substitute he was were in no better condition than dead men." As Doctor Bloomfield retains εἰ, ἵφ, the logical meaning of his statement is, not that Christ died for all *because* all whose substitute he was were in no better condition than dead men before or at the time of his death, but that all whose substitute he was were in no better condition than dead men after his death, and as the result of it. This interpretation of Doctor Bloomfield naturally suggests three questions, the mere statement of which are so many convincing arguments that his interpretation is wrong, and upon which we propose to rest our objections to it: 1. If Paul said precisely, "then did all those die," did he mean that "all those" did *not* die, but only that "all those" were in no better condition than dead men? 2. If those whose substitute Christ was were in no better condition than dead men after his death, and as the result of it, wherein did the condition of those whose substitute he was, and of those whose substitute he was not, differ? 3. If, after the death of Christ, and as the result of it, all those whose substitute he was were still in no better condition than dead men, what benefit accrued to them from his death?

Dean Alford expands the few plain words of Paul into the following sentence: "Because, at the time of our conversion, we learned to regard this as a settled truth, that One suffered death instead of all, in the root and essence of our humanity, as the second Adam, therefore in the death of Christ the all for whom he died, died to sin and self *objectively*, but not *subjectively* till such death to sin and self is realized in each." It is a sufficient answer to this forced and fanciful exposition of Dean Alford, to say that the words of Paul have no such meaning as he strives to impose upon them, and that, if Paul said what he intended

to say, he had no such thought in his mind at the time as Dean Alford attributes to him. In this exposition, Dean Alford is right in one particular, and in one particular only, which is, that, although he omits *εἰ, if*, he makes *οἱ πάντες ἀπέθανον*, whatever may be the meaning of the phrase, a consequence or result of the death of Christ. In all other particulars he is wrong.

Lange rejects *εἰ*, and so translates the verse as to make Paul say that the love of Christ had brought him to the conclusion that One died for all, and so all died; and, by drawing one inference from another, he finally arrives at the following result, as the meaning of Paul, viz. One has made expiation for the offence of all, therefore all are *looked upon* as having suffered punishment. Such a proposition requires no confutation: the mere statement of the proposition carries with it its own refutation. The difference between this exposition of Lange and the foregoing expositions is one of degree merely, and consists chiefly in this, that Lange has misconceived the meaning of the entire verse — its beginning, middle, and end — while these other commentators have only misconceived the meaning of the phrase *ἄρα οἱ πάντες ἀπέθανον*.

These words of Paul can have but one true meaning; and it is evident, from the different results to which all these commentators have come, their illogical and unsatisfactory arguments, and the arbitrary course pursued by them all in construing the words of Paul, that they also have failed to comprehend his meaning. Indeed, we know of no commentator, from the time of Augustine to the present, who has comprehended it. All commentators, so far as we know, have mainly held the meaning of Paul to be, either that Christ died for all men *because* all men were dead in sin *before* his death, or that all men for whom Christ died die to sin *after* his death, and as the result of it. And, although there is no conclusive evidence of the fact, there is some reason to suppose that the former of these meanings was attributed to these words of Paul as early as the second century.

The question naturally arises, How came this interpretation, if erroneous, to be adopted so early, and finally to obtain such universal recognition? The answer is, that the early Fathers, under the influence of the spirit of the age in which they lived, were accustomed to look for some secret or mystical meaning in the words of scripture lurking beneath their natural signification; and in this particular verse they supposed the words of Paul to have reference to original sin and the atonement of Christ, and they interpreted them, not according to their obvious and natural signification, but according to their supposed mystical meaning. In this these early Fathers have been implicitly followed by all subsequent translators and commentators; and so these words of Paul have been blindly subjected, through a period of fifteen hundred years, at least, to gross misconstruction, in order to extract from them a meaning which grammatically they cannot bear, and which they never were intended to convey. The movements of a door, swinging backwards and forwards upon its hinges, without making one particle of advance, is not an inapt illustration of the course and result of the critical investigations upon this verse during all this period of time.

The question now recurs: What was the precise thought in the mind of Paul when he wrote these words, and which he intended thereby to express? The only true and satisfactory way to ascertain this is to refer, first, to the natural signification of the words themselves, and to their grammatical structure and arrangement; and secondly, to the requirements of the argument of which these words form a part.

If the words thus fairly and reasonably interpreted convey a definite meaning, and this meaning corresponds with the requirements of the context, then the meaning apparent on the face of the words, and this meaning alone, must be held to be the true meaning of Paul.

The first clause of the verse has always been translated with substantial correctness. The whole difficulty has arisen from the translation of the last clause, and the interpretation given to this translation.

What is the natural signification of the principal words of the verse, which admit of more than one signification, and which determine its meaning?

Συνέχει is from the verb *συνέχω*, which means, *to hold fast, seize, grasp, urge, possess*, and embraces the idea of irresistible power. The verb is used by Paul in only one other instance (Phil. i. 2, 3), and is rendered: "For I *am in a strait* betwixt two." In the translation of Wiclif, it is rendered by the word "driveth"; in the translations of Tyndale, Cranmer, Geneva, and in our Authorized version, it is rendered by the word "constraineth"; and in the Rheims translation, it is rendered by the word "urgeth." It means, in the connection in which it stands, to urge with irresistible power, which was also the meaning of the word "constraineth" when the Bible was translated into English.

Κρίναντας is the aorist participle, from the verb *κρίνω*, which means *to judge, resolve, decide*, and embraces the idea of deliberation and careful thought.

Ἵπέρ, with a genitive — *ὑπὲρ πάντων* — generally signifies *for*, and in this connection means, *for the benefit of all*, and not, *instead of all*.

Ἀπέθανεν and *ἀπέθανον* are from the verb *ἀποθνήσκω*, which means *to die — to pass from an animate to a lifeless state*. And, as both these words are in the same mode, tense, and person, and differ only in number, they must be translated in like manner. It is not allowable to translate these words in any other way. If *ἀπέθανεν* describes physical death, *ἀπέθανον* must describe physical death also. Moreover, as the death of the One was voluntary, in order that the parallel which was evidently in the mind of Paul should be complete, the death of the *οἱ πάντες* should be voluntary also.

The demonstrative pronoun *οἱ, these*, prefixed to *πάντες*, *all*, which all the translators, except Beza, have failed to render, and the force of which the commentators have failed clearly to see, bears an important part in determining the true meaning of Paul. The word *οἱ, these*, is used in a

restrictive sense. It restricts the *all* from the *all* of the race, as previously used, to the *all* of a particular class. The persons who compose this class must be those who have become renewed through the death of the One. It is wholly unreasonable and illogical to suppose that those who are ignorant of, or who feel no interest in, this death can be induced to make any sacrifices on account thereof.

The sentence *ὅτι εἰ εἰς ὑπὲρ πάντων ἀπέθανεν, ἄρα οἱ πάντες ἀπέθανον* is a definitive appositive sentence, which definitely expresses what the preceding word *τοῦτο* vaguely indicates. It is also a compound sentence, consisting of a *principal* and of a *dependent* clause. *Εἰ εἰς ὑπὲρ πάντων ἀπέθανεν* is the *dependent* clause; *ἄρα οἱ πάντες ἀπέθανον* is the *principal* clause. The former clause assumes something as a *condition*, from which the latter follows as a *conclusion* or *result*. That which is assumed as a condition in this sentence is, that One died for all; that which follows as a conclusion or result is, that these all came under obligation to die, that is, should die. The condition assumed is a simple supposition, without any affirmation of its reality in this sentence, but affirmed to be a reality in the very first sentence of the following verse. If any one shall still be of the opinion that the phrase *ἄρα οἱ πάντες ἀπέθανον* should be translated, with Olshausen, *then did all die*; or, with Conybeare and Howson, *then all died*; or, with Doctor Bloomfield, *then did all those die*; or, with Dean Alford, *therefore all died*; or, with Lange, *and so all died*, because *ἀπέθανον* is in the second aorist tense, which represents the action as done, instead of translating it, *then these all came under obligation to die*, or by its precisely equivalent term, *then these all should die*, a complete and satisfactory answer thereto, is to be found in almost every Greek grammar, which is, that a future action, in view of its *nearness*, its *certainty*, its *rapidity*, or its *connection with another action*, may be conceived of as *now doing*, or even as *already done*, and may be expressed in the Greek by the present, aorist, or perfect tense. Hence, though the obligation of these all to die, as the result of

their renewal through the death of the One, is future thereto, yet, in the opinion of Paul, this obligation is so intimately connected with their renewal through the death of the One, and its consummation ought so certainly and speedily to follow their renewal, that in speaking of these all upon whom the obligation had come, he makes use of a tense which represents them as having already suffered the consummation of this obligation.

But in this instance the argument does not rest upon the natural signification and the grammatical arrangement of the words of the fourteenth verse alone. In the fifteenth verse Paul restates the result which ought to follow from the death of the One for the benefit of all ; and the difference between the statement in the fourteenth verse and the statement in the fifteenth verse is simply the difference between the literal and the rhetorical statement of the same deduction from the same fact. *Οἱ πάντες*, *these all*, in the fourteenth verse, are described as *the living*, in the fifteenth verse, that is, those who have experienced the benefit of the death of the One by becoming renewed thereby ; while *ἀπέθανον*, in the fourteenth verse, is defined to mean, in the fifteenth verse, that these should no longer live unto themselves, but unto him who died and rose from the dead for them. And when it is remembered that to live unto Christ in the days of primitive Christianity always involved sacrifices, sufferings, perils, persecutions, and oftentimes tortures and death, it must be conceded that the meaning of the two phrases is the same, and that the latter explains and defines the former.

The grammatical construction of the sentence, then, is, that if One died for all, then these all should die ; or, in other words, that if One died for all, then all those who have experienced the benefit of his death should die. The sentence is susceptible of no other grammatical translation or meaning. And the whole verse would then read : “ For the love of Christ urges me with irresistible power, having deliberately come to the conclusion, that if One died for all, then all those who have experienced the benefit of his death should die.” The

only things omitted are the course or object to which the love of Christ urged Paul with irresistible power, and the object or purpose for which *these all* should die. But Paul was a rapid thinker, and he oftentimes passed from his premises to his conclusions without stating all of his intermediate steps; and hence we naturally look for verbal omissions in his language. These ellipses do, in fact, so frequently occur from this cause, that they may be said to constitute one of the characteristics of Paul's style.

Having ascertained the grammatical meaning of the verse, it now remains to ascertain the logical meaning of it.

Paul was constitutionally a man of ardent and imaginative zeal; and his natural enthusiasm was intensified to the very highest degree by the miraculous manner of his conversion and call. Thenceforth there was no labor which he was not prepared to undertake, no persecution which he was not ready to suffer, no danger which he was not willing to encounter, that he might communicate the knowledge of eternal life — “*the prize of the high calling of God in Christ Jesus*” — to a perishing world. The conversion of men is emphatically the cause of God, which has engaged his love and sympathy from the foundation of the world, and for which, in the fulness of time, he gave his only-begotten and dearly beloved Son; and for this cause Paul labored with a love second only to that of Christ, more abundantly than all. In his own graphic and heart-stirring description, ‘the life which he lived in the flesh he lived by the faith of the Son of God, who loved him and gave himself for him. Hard pressed, yet not crushed; helpless, yet not hopeless; persecuted, yet not forsaken; cast down, yet not destroyed; looking not to things seen, but to things unseen’; with his love, his hope, his faith, his zeal renewed day by day, he discharged the ministry of reconciliation committed to him, amidst discouraging trials, exhausting labors, and at the frequent peril of his life. To the frivolous, pantheistic Greek, to the formalistic Jew, to the half-developed Christian living amidst the influences of his old religion and only partially emanci-

pated therefrom, the motives to such a life as that of Paul were utterly incomprehensible; and they all alike regarded him as a mad religious enthusiast. This was the obvious and popular and, in the estimation of the world, the most vulnerable point of attack upon Paul's character and influence. It was one of the points which the false teachers and the false brethren of the Corinthian church, who wished to destroy his apostolic character and overthrow his religious teachings, would be likely to make against him; for contempt and ridicule are always regarded by the unthinking and unscrupulous as the most powerful and destructive weapons of offence. It was, in fact, one of the points which they did make against him for that purpose, as this letter to the Corinthians clearly shows. In the general vindication of his character and conduct, to which this letter is in part devoted, Paul felt it to be his duty to meet and refute this particular charge. And he did meet and refute it, in the true Pauline style. Instead of denying, or even palliating, the acts upon which they based their charge, he claimed that these acts sprung from the most disinterested love for the Corinthians themselves; and, in a few fervid words, he demonstrated that the conduct which his enemies denounced as fanatical was a rule of Christian action of universal obligation. There is not a more eloquent passage in the whole compass of Paul's writings than the thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth verses, which constitute the pith of his reply to their charge: *Εἴτε γὰρ ἐξέστημεν, Θεῷ· εἴτε σωφρονούμεν, ὑμῖν. Ἡ γὰρ ἀγάπη τοῦ Χριστοῦ συνέχει ἡμᾶς, κρίναντας τοῦτο, ὅτι εἰ εἰς ὑπὲρ πάντων ἀπέθανεν, ἄρα οἱ πάντες ἀπέθανον· καὶ ὑπὲρ παντὸν ἀπέθανεν, ἵνα οἱ ζῶντες μηκέτι ἑαυτοῖς ζῶσιν, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἀποθανόντι καὶ ἐγεργθέντι.* As Paul is speaking of himself alone, the singular pronoun and verb should be substituted for the plural; and the passage, translated as literally as the idiom of our language will permit, will read: "For if I be mad, it is for God's sake, or if I be of sound mind, it is for yours; for the love of Christ urges me with irresistible power, having deliberately come to the conclusion

that if One died for all, then these all should die; and he died for all, that the living should no longer live unto themselves, but unto him who died and rose from the dead for them."

A paraphrase, which shall fully express the whole idea in Paul's mind, and be both a translation and commentary, will read: "For if I be a mad enthusiast in my efforts for your salvation, it is for God's sake, who takes the deepest interest therein; or if my efforts be only such as the subject demands, they spring from my interest in you; for the love of Christ urges me to this course with irresistible power, having deliberately come to the conclusion that if One died for the benefit of all, then all who have experienced the benefit of his death should die, if need be, to bring to others the knowledge of that death; and he died for the benefit of all, that those who have experienced the benefit of his death should no longer live unto themselves, but unto him who died and rose from the dead for them."

It thus appears that the logical argument perfectly coincides with the grammatical argument; and when such is the case the translation must be correct; for it is a rule of interpretation no less applicable to sacred than to secular writings, that, where the words are clear and precise in their terms, and the grammatical structure and arrangement of the words and the requirements of the context agree, and lead to no absurd conclusion, the meaning which such words naturally present must be held to be the meaning of the author.

The Apostle John gives expression to a sentiment similar to this of Paul (1 John iii. 16),¹ but not so catholic and comprehensive. John teaches that Christians should lay down their lives for the brethren. Paul teaches that Christians should lay down their lives for those who are not brethren, in order that they may make them brethren. When this exalted teaching of Paul, which has been so long

¹ "Hereby perceive we the love of God; because he laid down his life for us; and we ought to lay down *our* lives for the brethren."

hidden from the world, shall become known to Christians, and shall be heartily adopted by them as a rule of Christian action, then will the church of Christ bear palms of victory, through conquering love, over the whole earth; then will there be "great voices in heaven, saying, THE KINGDOMS OF THIS WORLD ARE BECOME THE KINGDOMS OF OUR LORD AND OF HIS CHRIST."

ARTICLE VIII.

THE TOPOGRAPHY OF JERUSALEM.

BY REV. SAMUEL WOLCOTT, D.D., CLEVELAND, OHIO.

IN a former Article (Vol. xxiv. pp. 116-140) we concluded, as we supposed, our examination of this topic, with a refutation of the singular theory which Mr. Fergusson had advanced respecting "the identity of the hills Zion and Moriah." In a preceding number of the present volume (pp. 191-196) we find still another theory, defended by Rev. John Forbes, LL.D., Edinburgh, which is as novel as the former, affirming the identity of the hills Zion and Akra. This originated with Captain Warren, the British engineer who has made such important and interesting subterranean explorations in Jerusalem, and who appears to have enlivened his labors below ground with historical researches above, which are quite independent of his professional work. It is propounded by him, in "Quarterly Statement, No. III," of the "Palestine Exploration Fund," under the title: "The Comparative Holiness of Mounts Zion and Moriah" (pp. 76-88). It is only of late that we have had access to the latter paper, and we now propose to examine the two together in relation to the point under discussion.

Both writers assume, and one expressly concedes (Warren, pp. 80, 81), the baselessness of the Fergusson theory. That has found no recent supporter, and will never, probably, be put forward again. The new theory, we apprehend, will be as transient as the other; and, in venturing to speak freely of the traditional and historical Mount Zion, as "the pseudo-Zion," Mr. Forbes will probably discover that he has been presumptuous.

A decisive test of the new theory, which does not appear to have occurred to either writer, is the ascertained course of the ancient walls. We read: "David and all Israel went to Jerusalem, which is Jebus. . . . David took the stronghold of Zion; the same is the City of David. . . . David dwelt in the fort, and called it the City of David. And David built round about from Millo and inward" (2 Sam. v. 6-9; 1 Chron. xi. 4-9). "And Solomon took Pharaoh's daughter, and brought her into the City of David, until he had made an end of building his own house, and the house of the Lord, and the wall of Jerusalem round about. . . . Solomon built Millo, and repaired the breaches of the City of David his father" (1 Kings iii. 1; xi. 27). If we can ascertain the courses of these ancient walls, we have ascertained the seat of the ancient royal residence, and the site of the true Zion.

In this particular, Josephus has fortunately given us the desired in-

formation. He says: "The city was fortified by three walls wherever it was not encircled by impassable valleys; for in that quarter there was but one wall" (Bell. Jud. v. 4, § 1). He then describes the configuration of the city—its hills and valleys—and in the next section traces the courses of these walls, respecting the first and oldest of which there is no dispute. Beginning at Hippicus, on the north, it ran southward, and then eastward, along the western and southern brow of the southwest hill, and thence across to Ophel and the eastern side of the Temple on Moriah. The latter part of its course is not definitely known; but all are agreed that from Hippicus it followed the brow of the southwest hill, forming, with the deep valleys below, ample protection in this quarter. The "Ordnance Survey of Jerusalem" reports some recent excavations on the southern slope of this hill, and the discovery of an escarpment which "must have formed part of the defences of the old city, the wall running along the crest. The steps which lead down the Valley of Hinnom could be defended by a couple of men against any force, before the invention of fire-arms" (p. 61). The above was the course of the first wall of Josephus, from Hippicus southward.

From Hippicus eastward this wall ran along the northern brow of the southwest hill to the Xystus, an open place on the eastern crest of this hill opposite the Temple, and thence across the valley to the western side of the Temple-area. This is undisputed. And this part of the first and oldest wall, from Hippicus eastward, was the strongest wall in Jerusalem, and the last which was taken in every siege. Josephus describes it as difficult to be taken, and assigns two reasons. The first is its natural position, built on the brow of a hill; and recent excavations have strikingly confirmed his statement, and vindicated Robinson's theory of the course of the Tyropoeon Valley, disclosing, below the present surface, depths at different points of from thirty to nearly eighty feet along the ancient cliff (Smith's Dict., Amer. ed., ii. 1221). His second reason is the extraordinary strength of the wall itself, through the zeal which David and Solomon and the kings who succeeded them took in the work (Bell. Jud. v. 4, § 2). All are agreed that this oldest and strongest of the walls of Jerusalem protected the southwest hill, and was constructed for this special purpose. This part of the city, having the highest area and the most precipitous sides, offered the strongest natural advantages for defence; and King David and his successors took advantage of its natural position, and threw around it a wall which made it well nigh impregnable.

Now, will the advocates of the new theory please favor us with some consistent explanation of the royal zeal, shown through successive reigns, in fortifying this broad and goodly summit? They take pains to explain that Zion was not an isolated fortress, but included a considerable part of the city—the palace of the king and the dwellings of the people; and the upper city was, confessedly, larger than the lower. The most com-

manding spot in the capital, by nature and art combined made the most secure, and of ample extent, withal,—the royal palaces (according to their theory) were not here; the royal treasures were not here; the royal sepulchres were not here; the citadel was not here; the tabernacle and the ark of the covenant, before the building of the Temple, were not here. The wise monarchs of Israel fortified this elevated quarter of their capital, until it could bid defiance to almost any assault, and then (we are asked to believe) built their own residence outside of it, looking up with admiration to its strong bulwarks, congratulating the inhabitants who dwelt within its fastnesses, but depriving themselves, their families, and their possessions, secular and sacred, of the benefit of their own defences. To any reader not theory-smitten—we had almost said, not moon-struck—is this credible?

There succeeded a period of prolonged peace, in which the monarch could have his summer residence in the country, and build a palace for his queen in the unwall'd suburbs. But from the first conquest it was necessary to have a point of as absolute security as possible; and what conceivable point would naturally be guarded with more jealous care than the principal seat of the royal family—the seat of empire? For a considerable period (we know not how long) the wall around the southwest hill was the *only* wall of the city. Josephus repeatedly refers to it as, by way of distinction, “the old wall.” And the interval in which it served as the sole protection of the capital was not a season of peace, but a period of incessant war with the tribes and nations on every side of Israel. And when new walls were afterwards erected, new defences were added to this.

Captain Warren says: “If we place three round-shot close together we have a rough model of Jerusalem in the time of Solomon—the shot to the north being Mount Zion; that to the southeast, Moriah; and that to the southwest, the remainder of Jerusalem” (p. 81). Accepting this “model,” we call the north shot Akra; the southeast, Moriah; and the southwest (which to Warren is nameless), Zion. The north hill was subsequently protected on its exposed side by a strong wall—the second wall of Josephus; and at a still later day, in the reign of King Herod Agrippa, a fourth hill, on the northeast (Bezetha), was protected on its exposed side by the third wall of Josephus. Jerusalem was never attacked from the south. The point of menace and peril, in every siege, was in the highlands on the north. These three walls on the north were successive breastworks against a foreign foe. When the hill represented by Warren’s north shot was protected by one wall, the southwest hill was protected by two walls; when the former was protected by two, the latter was protected by three. And the security enjoyed by the upper city, on the southwest hill, above that of the lower city, consisted, besides its natural defences on the south, in the strength of the old wall on the north, in the construction of which

successive kings had taken an enthusiastic interest. Consequently, as we have said, this part of Jerusalem held out the longest in every siege. "No attack or approach is ever described as made against the *upper* city of Zion until after the besiegers had broken through the second wall, and had thus got possession of the *lower* city" (Robinson's *Bib. Res.*, 1852, p. 214). When the city was invested by Titus, after he had stormed and carried every part but the southwest hill, the course of the siege is thus stated by Mr. Grove: "The upper city, higher than Moriah, inclosed by the original wall of David and Solomon, and on all sides precipitous, except on the north, where it was defended by the wall and towers of Herod, was still to be taken. Titus first tried a parley. . . . It took eighteen days to erect the necessary works for the siege. The four legions were once more stationed on the west or northwest corner, where Herod's palace abutted on the wall, and where the three magnificent and impregnable towers of Hippicus, Phasaelus, and Mariamne rose conspicuous. This was the main attack" (Smith's *Bible Dict.*, Amer. ed., ii. 1307). The wall thus strengthened by Herod for the protection of that part of the city which embraced his own palace, was the old wall, which ran from Hippicus eastward to the Xystus. "The interior and most ancient of the three walls on the north was, no doubt, the same wall which ran along the northern brow of Zion," or the southwest hill. (Robinson's *Bib. Res.* i. 413.) We again ask the champions of the new theory: For whose protection, as more important than their own, was this wall built and strengthened by David and Solomon and their immediate successors?

The preceding test appears to us so decisive that we do not care to apply any other; although the theory might be refuted without it. The reasons offered by these writers for their violent hypothesis are not based on recent discoveries, nor are they new. These speculations have not the remotest connection with Captain Warren's explorations in Jerusalem. The argument rests mainly on two or three passages in Josephus and the first Book of Maccabees, relating to the *Akra* or castle which Antiochus Epiphanes built on the hill sustaining the lower city, and which are familiar to all who have studied the topography of the city. These parallel narratives involve a perplexity which Professor Robinson fully examined, and, we think, satisfactorily explained, almost a quarter of a century ago (*Bib. Sac.* iii. pp. 629-634). His suggestion is, that in process of time "the City of David," at first restricted to the Hill of Zion, came to be used by synecdoche for the whole city, so as to be synonymous with Jerusalem; and he cites evident traces of such usage from Isaiah, the Maccabees, and Josephus. This is a much simpler solution of the difficulty than the bold transfer of site by these writers.

We need not dwell on incidental points. "The stairs which go down from the City of David," on which Dr. Forbes lays stress (p. 196), have, apparently, been discovered where we should naturally look for them—in

connection with the southwest hill (Smith's Bible Dict., Amer. ed., ii. 1331). The conjecture of Captain Warren, which Dr. Forbes passes over in silence, that the boundary between Judah and Benjamin (Josh. xv. 8; xviii. 16) ran through the middle of the city (pp. 79, 81); the conjecture of Dr. Forbes, "that within the lower district of the city rose a towering eminence, somewhat similar to the Castle Rock in Edinburgh" (p. 193); and the further conjecture, less fanciful, but more surprising, that the sepulchre of King David is to be sought in the lower part of the obscure suburb of Ophel (p. 196) — "the place called the Ophla" (Bell. Jud. vi. 6, § 3), and a quarter which does not appear to have been enclosed until the reign of Manasseh (2 Chron. xxxiii. 14), — these conjectures, purely such, we dismiss without further comment.

The immemorial conviction, which has not merely survived centuries of observation, but been confirmed by the investigations of keen-eyed witnesses, — enabling Dr. Robinson to affirm, so late as 1852: "Among many diversities of opinion, it is gratifying to find a few points yet unassailed — especially, 1. That Zion was the southwestern hill of the city" (Bib. Res. p. 2061) — will, we are confident, abide. The southwest hill, fortified beyond the rest, and its dwellings more carefully protected; the most important strategic point in the city, and the last rallying-point in memorable sieges; the hill for which the propounders of the new theory have no name — Dr. Forbes contenting himself with applying the epithet "pseudo" to the current appellation, and Capt. Warren designating it as "the remainder of Jerusalem," — this historic hill has borne, and will continue to bear the sacred and classic name of ZION.

Every Christian reader has felt — what every Christian visitor to the holy city who has stood on its southwest hill has felt more — the force and beauty of such passages as these, in the Psalms of David: "Beautiful for situation, the joy of the whole earth, is Mount Zion, on the sides of the north, the city of the great King" (Ps. xlviii. 2); "They that trust in the Lord shall be as Mount Zion, which cannot be removed, but abideth forever" (Ps. cxxv. 1). From strains like these the transition is abrupt and startling to such sentences as the following: "The site where Zion once was, and is not" (Warren, p. 85); "Mount Zion, once so holy, was at length razed to the ground and obliterated" (Forbes, p. 195). We take comfort in the undoubting conviction that the grand similes of the sacred writer have not been thus emptied of their significance. The Zion of the psalmist and the prophet still stands, with its rocky, precipitous sides, and the deep valleys sweep around its base, as of old. Its "palaces" have disappeared; and in its desolation, literal and moral, it is no longer "the joy" which it once was; a portion of its summit has even been "ploughed," as predicted. But "beautiful for situation" it still is; and, to the eye of the traveller who approaches it from the south, it still lifts itself in strength though not in the ancient grandeur, "on the sides of the north."

ARTICLE IX.

EXPLORATIONS IN PALESTINE.

COMMUNICATED BY PROF. H. B. HACKETT, D.D., THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY,
ROCHESTER, N.Y.

Meeting of the Palestine Exploration Fund.

THE annual meeting of this important Association was held on the afternoon of Monday, May 16, at the Royal Institution, Albermarle street, London. The attendance was large, filling the spacious hall with a highly intelligent and interested audience. The Archbishop of York, Rev. Dr. Thompson, presided on the occasion; and among others present were the Bishop of London, Dr. Stanley, Dèan of Westminster, Sir Henry Rawlinson, the celebrated Assyrian scholar and traveller, Professor Donaldson, Mr. George Grove, and Captains Wilson and Warren, well known for their labors and discoveries in the Holy Land. Reports were read by Rev. F. W. Holland, one of the Secretaries of the Society, and by Captain Warren, and speeches were delivered by the Archbishop, by Sir H. Rawlinson, by Dr. Stanley, and others. At the close of the meeting a collection was taken up in aid of the funds of the Association.

Report of the Doings of the Year.

By the courtesy of Mr. Holland we are enabled to present to the readers of the Bibliotheca an outline of the labors of the agents of the society for the past year.

In addition to the excavations at Jerusalem, which have not been unfruitful in results, some interesting explorations have been made during the past year in the north of Palestine. Captain Warren found it necessary to withdraw his men from Jerusalem during the summer months, in consequence of the prevalence of fever, from which they had already suffered much; and the whole of the exploring party removed to the Lebanon until the cooler weather set in. While there they occupied themselves in investigating the ruined temples of Coele-Syria and Mount Hermon. The temples of Coele-Syria appear to date from Roman times, and the inscriptions found in them are mostly Greek.

The small temples about Hermon appear to be somewhat of more ancient date, their architecture being of the Ionic order.

On the summit of Mount Hermon stand the ruins of a sacellum, which has nothing in its construction in common with the temples on the west below. This probably had to do with a different and more ancient

form of worship. All these temples have been sketched and accurately described.

On his journey northwards Captain Warren visited Saida, the ancient Sidon, and discovered there on the stones of the ancient walls undoubted Phœnician masons' marks, somewhat similar in character to those which he had found in his excavations at Jerusalem. He also procured from excavations which had been made at Sidon some specimens of ancient pottery.

Another portion of Captain Warren's work deserves also to be especially mentioned, viz. his labors in connection with the Moabite stone.

That stone was actually discovered by the Rev. Mr. Klein, a Prussian gentleman connected with the Church Missionary Society in Jerusalem, in August, 1868, and the Prussian Government, to whom the discovery was reported, proceeded to take steps to obtain possession of the stone.

As long as others were in the field, and the safety of the inscription would have been endangered by his interference in the matter, Captain Warren very properly abstained from any action. But when, owing to an unfortunate quarrel between two parties of Arabs, it had been broken into pieces by cold water having been thrown upon it after it had been heated by fire, he very promptly came to the rescue; and it was owing to his exertions that the excellent squeezes of the remaining portions were obtained which have been the means of the interpretation of the inscription.

Another important work which has been undertaken during the past year by the Palestine Exploration Fund has been the exploration of the Tih desert — the wilderness of the forty years' wanderings of the children of Israel. The services of Mr. E. H. Palmer, who was previously connected with the Ordnance Survey of the Peninsula of Sinai, were secured for this purpose; and, in company with Mr. Tyrwhitt Drake, he is now engaged in exploring that vast tract, a large portion of which has never before been visited by travellers.

Mr. Palmer's first work was to examine all passes of the range of mountains which forms the northern boundary of the Peninsula of Sinai, and which must have been crossed by the children of Israel on their march northwards from Mount Sinai. He then visited the mountainous district of the Negeb, or "Son of the Country," of the Bible, and investigated the ancient ruins and wells that abound in that country, which, though now a desert, bears traces of having once sustained a considerable population. Correspondence with that remote region is difficult, and the reports which have reached us from Mr. Palmer were too scanty for us to give any accurate description of the work which he has accomplished. But he appears to have made some interesting discoveries with regard to the fixing of the site of Kadesh, and the maps which he has sent home prove that he is accomplishing with great accuracy the work which he has undertaken.

When we last heard from him he was just starting south again, after a short visit to Jerusalem, to explore the southeast of the Negeb, and after he had accomplished this he proposed to make his way round the east of the Dead Sea to Jerusalem. He will thus pass through the country of Moab, and if any other inscriptions are to be found he will doubtless secure them. His knowledge of Arabic and the Arab character renders him the fittest person to undertake so difficult and dangerous a journey, and the results of his exploration may be looked forward to with great interest.

Report of Captain Warren.

We have space only for a meagre notice of this gentleman's interesting statement, to which reference has been made. He said that two years ago they had brought sufficient light to cause several very curious questions to be raised with regard to the ancient topography of the Holy City, but not sufficient to settle any of the disputed points as to the situation of the Temple; but they had since made such further progress that, although they were not able to state where the Temple actually stood, yet they could say to some extent where the Temple was not, so far as concerned parts about which there had hitherto been utter uncertainty. There were two points of paramount interest in the Holy City, around which all other interests centred—first, the Temple, in which the Jews and first Christians worshipped; and second, the Tombs of the kings of Judah, including the sepulchre of him who was styled “the King of the Jews.” They had been able to lay down a plan of the city as it existed of old, and had made investigations round two thirds of the Haram wall on the outside, part of which was acknowledged to have formed a portion of the outer court of Herod's Temple. He could not, however, lay out the old city to his entire satisfaction, as there was a portion of ground where the rock had not yet been found. A valley appeared running down from the Jaffa Gate to near Wilson's Arch, and his impression was that the Pool of Hezekiah would prove to be the Gihon in the valley where Solomon was anointed king. Captain Warren then described the discoveries he had made in the Haram area of Jerusalem, and said there was no question but that within that area the Temple of Herod once stood, and that some part of the wall was a portion of the old wall of the outer court, and on that account his working party had made that its centre. Although there was no doubt that the Temple once stood within the Haram area, there were many theories as to the particular spot it occupied; but all had some portion to reject of the account of Josephus, of the Talmud, or even of the Bible itself. But his impression was that if read in a proper light, all the topographical accounts would be found to coincide. After entering into a great many details, Captain Warren said the whole question of the topography was rather one of years than of days, but, with regard to the so-called Pool of Bethesda, he believed the present

high walls to be the work of the Saracens. He could not find that they were any nearer the solution of the difficulties about finding the tomb of David and other kings of Judah; and it was premature to speculate upon the matter until they knew the direction of the valley from the Damascus gate. Besides the excavations at Jerusalem, he had been occupied in making reconnoissances outside between Jerusalem and Gaza.

The Moabite Stone.

The credit of discovering this stone belongs, undoubtedly, as already stated, to the Rev. F. Klein, of the Church Missionary Society in Jerusalem, during an excursion on the east of the Dead Sea, in 1868. But we are mainly indebted to Captain Warren and the French vice-consul at Jerusalem, M. Ganneau, for our copies of the writing on the stone, obtained from the rock, or its fragments, after it had been so unfortunately broken to pieces. The dimensions of the entire stone, it may be mentioned here, as taken by Mr. Klein, show it to have been about three feet and nine inches long, two feet and four inches in breadth, and one foot and two inches in thickness. This stone, on his first examination of it, was in almost perfect preservation, lying with the inscription uppermost, and was a basaltic stone, exceedingly heavy. The copies or *squeezes* obtained by Messrs. Warren and Ganneau exhibit (in diagrams drawn from them) the shape of the stone when entire, with the relative positions of the two fragments preserved; the upper fragment with the part of the inscription upon it; the lower fragment, containing many letters which were uncertain, and which are marked with a pencil on the tracing paper by a horizontal line above them. From Mr. Klein's sketch an engraving has been prepared which represents the monument in its unbroken condition.

Value of the Discovery.

It should be stated that some pieces of the stone (if still existing) remain to be recovered; that some of the words and lines of the inscription are too illegible to be deciphered with confidence; and that interpreters are not fully agreed in their rendering of parts of the text where the characters are still comparatively distinct. The results which have been reached in the present stage of the investigation, and are regarded as reasonably certain, are such as the following: (1) The stone is undoubtedly the oldest Semitic monument yet found. (2) It is stated by Mr. Deutsch, of the British Museum, that the characters appear older "than many of the Assyrian bi-lingual cylinders in the British Museum, the date of which is, at the very least, as old as the ninth century, B.C." (3) The stone chronicles the achievements of one Mesha, King of the Moabites. It was near about this period, viz. 900 B.C., that the Mesha lived against whom Jehoram and Jehoshaphat fought (2 Kings iii. 4 sq.). (4) The inscription is full of well-known biblical names, such as Beth-Bamoth, Beth-Baal, Meon, Horonaim,

and Dibon. (5) Mention is frequently made of Israel, a rival power, and of "Chemosh," the national god of Moab. (6) It is invaluable to the student of alphabets. "Nearly the whole of the Greek alphabet," says Mr. Deutsch, "is found here, not merely similar to the Phœnician shape, but as identical with it as can well be."

Commemorative Records.

Sir H. Rawlinson expressed a doubt, in his remarks, whether the Hebrews were in the habit of erecting monumental records on great occasions; though this was a common practice among the Egyptians and the Assyrians. The discovery of the Moabite stone furnishes, at least, one example of this usage among a kindred race in the land of Palestine; and it encourages the hope that by perseverance other monuments may be found, affording other and similar corroboration of intimations (not to use stronger language) of this practice among the early Hebrews, of which we read in 1 Sam. vii. 12 and xv. 12.

ARTICLE X.

NOTICES OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

A. GERMAN WORKS.

COMMENTARIES ON THE BOOK OF JUDGES.¹ — The volume before us is a further portion of the Commentary noticed in a previous Number of the *Bibliotheca Sacra*. It embraces the fourth and fifth chapters of Judges — a very small space to be traversed in a volume of three hundred pages, many of our readers will think. Professor Bachmann's intention, obviously, is to exhaust the subject as far as possible. The two chapters are certainly important ones; they treat of the war between Jabin, King of Canaan, and Israel; of the killing of Sisera, Jabin's general, by Jael, the wife of Heber; and of the song of triumph sung after the defeat and death of Sisera by Deborah and Barak. There is scarcely a greater crux in the Bible for theorists on inspiration than the conduct of Jael and the subsequent praise of her act by Deborah. There is no doubt that we Christians should condemn Jael's act as a treacherous assassination. Looked at, however, in the spirit of the time at which she lived, one might find her, if not it, excusable. But if Deborah were inspired by God to utter her song, how could she praise such an act? We can understand Jael; but we cannot understand Deborah. Jael causes no

¹ Das Buch des Richter. Erklärt von Dr. J. Bachmann. 'Berlin: Wiegandt und Grieben. 1869.

difficulty, for the Bible does not pretend to limit itself to the recording of the lives and deeds of holy men; but Deborah, supposing her to have enjoyed *divine* light and aid, does cause us difficulty. Dr. Bachmann sums up his own view as follows: "Though Jael transgressed in her use of means the right measure, neither the working of the Spirit of God which animated her in the performance of the act, nor her own obedience of faith, can be denied. Looked at from this point of view, we can explain why Deborah overlooked the human weakness of Jael in pronouncing judgment on her act. Relatively to a heavier guilt, she would scarcely have pronounced so full and unhesitating a blessing." Dr. Bachmann's work is so far safe and thorough, and therefore useful.

EVIL AND ITS CONSEQUENCES.¹—This is the last work of the late eminent Göttingen Professor of Philosophy—Heinrich Ritter, author of the History of Ancient and Christian Philosophy. The manuscript was left complete; but the author was unable to see it through the press; he died on the third of February, 1869. The theme of the present treatise had always been a favorite one of the writer's. In his "Encyclopedia of Philosophy" he speaks of the doctrine of evil as the touchstone of the systems. We cannot say, however, that Ritter's meditations seem to have led to any very satisfactory result. We will quote a characteristic passage, or two: "The phenomenon of evil falls into two elements—the will and the judgment. Usually evil is sought in the former alone. The evil will is said to be condemned by the sentence of the infallible conscience or the divine law. We cannot, however, unhesitatingly accept these opinions. Even if one were to grant that conscience can never err, we should have to show that our judgment is a sentence of conscience. We do not intend to call in question the authority of the divine law; but we may doubt the application thereof to the case in question. We may condemn ourselves wrongly." "The good belongs to the essential nature of man; the evil, to its manifestations." "The result of our theory is, in evil we see complications and retrogressions of the moral life, but neither something purely negative, estimated morality, nor something absolutely damnable that must be regarded as incorrigibly opposed to the good." The work is divided into thirty-two sections, and is written in an easy and intelligible style. We need scarcely add that, though unsatisfactory, the author's eminence makes it a duty of inquirers to read the work carefully.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UNCONSCIOUS.²—Not a promising title, most of our readers will think. Nor is the book either very encour-

¹ Ueber das Böse und seine Folgen. Von Heinrich Ritter. Gotha: F. A. Perthes. 1869.

² Philosophie des Unbewussten. Versuch einer Weltanschauung von Dr. E. v. Hartmann. Berlin: K. Duncker. 1869. Price, 3 Thaler.

aging or very quickening. Still, it is ably written, and deserves reading, if not digesting. Dr. Hartmann's essay as a collective view of the world may be said to be an endeavor to combine Schopenhauer and Hegel, or, as one might roughly term them, the Pessimist and the Optimist; for, in a certain sense, Hegel's system was one vast optimism, and Schopenhauer was an incorrigible pessimist. We cannot say that he has succeeded; if he had, he would have solved the problem of the ages—the problem which we Christians profess to believe finds its solution in Christ alone, “in whom are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge.”

By the “unconscious” Dr. Hartmann understands the principles of the instructive teleological activity which pervades both nature and human existence, and which can only be accounted for by referring it to unconscious volition and representation. He therefore repudiates the derivation of this activity both from material causes acting mechanically, and from the direct operation of a mind imposing its will continuously from without. Both animal instinct and man's volitions are traceable ultimately to this unconsciously acting and representing will. This holds good as truly of the cell as of the full-grown man. Consciousness arises when a representation presents itself to the will, as independent of and separate from it, constituting for it a limit, and thus causing it to perceive the distinction between itself and another. The simplest conscious individual, or individual consciousness, is the cell; higher individuals consist of various individuals combined into unity, though unlike and subordinated to each other; and the unity of consciousness found in such a being as man results from the interweaving and interpenetration of the various subordinate individual consciousnesses. This is a sample of the discussion.

To pass to other points: He considers the hope of individual immortality to be based on a false conception of individuality, and redemption to consist in the abolition of existence.

Ernesti: Die Ethik des Apostels Paulus. The chief value of this book would seem to lie in its careful collection of the passages from Paul's writings which can be said to indicate ethical ideas. It only professes to be a sketch. A full discussion would require an extensive work.

Landan: Die Greuzen des menschlichen Erkenntniss. A small book, but by no means destitute of substance and interest. The author's design is to show that the harmony of testimony (from the senses, history, reason, etc.) is sufficient evidence of the reality of human knowledge. Some of his suggestions are good. For example, he points out that even in nature the law of necessity or causality may always be superseded or overruled by the law of fitness to an end. If this be the case even in nature, how much more completely in the moral world. With regard to the existence of God, he says: “This explanation of creation is so natural, forces itself on one with such vehemence, that no reasonable man would ever think

of questioning it, if he were not led to do so by the sophistry of passion or interest.

Stölting: Beiträge zur Exegese der Paulinischen Briefe. Four essays, on the fifth chapter of Romans, on Galatians ii. 19, 20, on 2 Thess. ii. 1-12, and on Galatians ii. 1. The last embraces, also, a new construction of the chronology of the life of Paul. The author intends his investigations to supplement and correct the commentary of Meyer on the passages in question. They are worthy of attention.

Fabo: Skizzen aus der Geschichte des ungarischen Protestantismus. Nine essays, by as many different Hungarian pastors, on various points in the history of the Protestant churches of their country. They can scarcely fail to interest those who take an interest in Hungary and its religious history.

B. ENGLISH AND AMERICAN WORKS.

HITCHCOCK'S NEW AND COMPLETE ANALYSIS OF THE HOLY BIBLE; or, the Whole of the Old and New Testaments arranged according to Subjects, in Twenty-seven Books. On the Basis of Matthew Talbot, as improved, with Indexes, Tables, and other Valuable Matter, by Nathaniel West, D.D. Illustrated with Steel Plate Engravings and Maps. The Engravings are from Original Drawings by the Celebrated Artists, Thomas Nast and F. B. Carpenter. Together with CRUDEN'S CONCORDANCE TO THE HOLY SCRIPTURES, revised by Dr. John Eadie, D.D., LL.D., Professor of Biblical Literature to the United Presbyterian Church, Scotland. The whole designed to facilitate the study and to promote the better understanding of the Word of God. Revised and Edited by Rev. Roswell D. Hitchcock, D.D., Washburn Professor of Church History in the Union Theological Seminary, New York City. Including also a Pronouncing Dictionary of Scripture Proper Names; an Interpreting Dictionary of Scripture Proper Names; Tables of Scripture Measures, Weights, and Coins, with full Explanations; a Dictionary of Religious Denominations, Sects, Parties, and Associations in the World; a History of the Bible; and a Family Record. New York: A. J. Johnson. 1870.

Besides the valuable indexes, dictionaries, and tables enumerated on the title page, this work is essentially double. It contains an *Analysis of the Bible* and a *Concordance*; the latter being that of Cruden, revised by Dr. John Eadie. The Analysis is on the basis of Matthew Talbot's "Analysis of the Holy Bible," as reproduced in America, with additions and improvements by Dr. Nathaniel West. The two main elements which determine the value of a topical arrangement of the texts of scripture are, first, the logical arrangement of the subjects; secondly, the accuracy with which the several texts are referred to their appropriate heads. As to the logical arrangement of subjects, whoever compares the

twenty-seven books of the present analysis with their two hundred and forty-two chapters and two thousand two hundred and forty-nine sections, will doubtless be convinced that, in this respect, it is a great improvement upon its predecessors. For the plan adopted in the present analysis which contemplates the reference of *every verse* of scripture to a *single head*, it is, perhaps, as perfect an arrangement as could be made. At least, no one ought to affirm the contrary until he has shown himself able to produce a better arrangement.

Looking, now, to the classification of the several texts of scripture under their appropriate heads, the first thought that strikes us is the immensity of the task. Whoever has attempted the topical arrangement of even a single book — the Proverbs of Solomon, for example — must have satisfied himself of the extreme difficulty of such an undertaking. How much greater, then, the labor of arranging topically all the verses of the Bible, from Genesis to Revelation! And the difficulty of the work is increased by the plan of using each text of scripture but once. For what Cicero says of the liberal arts — that “they all have a certain common bond of connection, and are linked together as by a certain internal relationship,” — holds pre-eminently true of the doctrines and precepts of revelation. They are so many-sided, and connected with each other in so many ways, that a text may be often referred as legitimately to one as to the other of two given heads, and ought, in truth, to be comprehended under both. Of this difficulty Dr. Hitchcock is well aware; and he has provided for it, in a measure, by a system of cross references. The illustration given in the Publisher’s Announcement is from p. 477, under Book xviii. § 97. We copy the first three specifications :

“§ 97. The Hebrew Woman’s Position.

(1. SHE MIGHT GO UNVEILED.)

See *Gen.* xii. 14; xxiv. 16–25; xxix. 11; 1 *Sam.* i. 13.

(2. AND ALONE.)

See *Deut.* xxii. 25–27.

(3. MIGHT CONVERSE IN PUBLIC.)

See *Gen.* xxiv. 24, 45–47; xxix. 9–12; 1 *Sam.* ix. 11.”

It is true that the student, by turning to the texts specified, can find the information of which he is in search. But if the passages were set down before his eyes, five sixths of his labor would be saved; at the expense, however, of making the volume more cumbrous. When we consider the immense number of texts to be referred, we cannot be surprised to find some oversights. The passage: “They that sow in tears shall reap in joy,” etc. (*Ps.* cxxvi. 5, 6), is arranged under the head of “Industrial Employments and Products,” whereas it ought, in our judgment, to rank, with *Gal.* vi. 9, under the title of “Temporal and Eternal Rewards. So *Matt.*

ix. 17, with the parallel passages, should, as we think, stand not under the title of "Wine" (which is bringing in the idea of the *Concordance* for that of the *Analysis of Subjects*), but under some head embracing the idea of prudence in the introduction of changes. But these imperfections, as they appear to us, do not diminish our appreciation of the great value of the work. With its concordance, its full indexes, its tables, and other apparatus, it constitutes a rich treasure, of which the biblical scholar will gladly avail himself.

We add a few words respecting the topical arrangement of scripture, which we wish to be understood as being no criticism on the analysis noticed above, but simply an independent attempt to indicate the grand end to be aimed at. We should be glad, then, to see an arrangement of the doctrines and precepts of the Bible without any effort to include every verse, or even section, of its contents. We do not mean to intimate that any part of God's word is without its uses. "All scripture is given by inspiration of God, and is profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness; that the man of God may be perfect, thoroughly furnished unto all good works." But it does not follow from this that all scripture may be conveniently and profitably put into an arrangement like that which we are contemplating, which is designed, not to *supersede*, but to *aid* the study of God's word in the form in which he himself has given it. We would omit, for example, the genealogical tables, most of the preparations made by David for the building of the Temple, the details of Ezekiel's vision of the new Jerusalem, with its temple and appointments, and many other details which it is not necessary to specify; not because these things should not be studied, but because they can best be studied as they stand in the Bible. In the topical arrangement of texts we would have strict regard to the spiritual truth or duty contained in them. For example, the psalmist's words, "He sendeth the springs into the valleys, which run among the hills" (Ps. civ. 10), should stand under the head of "God's Works in Nature"; but the promise in Isaiah xli. 18: "I will open rivers in high places, and fountains in the midst of valleys; I will make the wilderness a pool of water, and the dry land springs of water," under that of "God's Works in the Kingdom of Grace." In the case of many topics, in addition to the texts arranged under them, might be added some references to the historical illustrations of them in scripture. Thus, for "Alliances with the Wicked" a pertinent reference would be to Jehoshaphat's affinity with Ahab. We think, also, that *duplicate*, and even *triplicate*, arrangements of some texts would add to the completeness of the work, without making it too cumbersome or expensive for common use. It seems to us that a manual of the kind indicated, carefully prepared, and of moderate size and expense, would be received by biblical students as a valuable help in the study of holy scripture — a help not made superfluous by any work that has as yet appeared.

ANALYTICAL COMMENTARY ON THE EPISTLE TO THE ROMANS; tracing the Train of Thought by the Aid of Parallelism; with Notes and Dissertations on the Principal Difficulties connected with the Exposition of the Epistle. By Rev. John Forbes, LL.D. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark. 1868.

Dr. Forbes, of Edinburgh, is not unknown to the readers of this journal, and his Commentary on Romans cannot fail to make him still more widely and favorably known in this country. In 1854 he published a volume with the title "The Symmetrical Structure of Scripture; or, the Principles of Scripture Parallelism exemplified in an Analysis of the Decalogue, the Sermon on the Mount, and other Passages of the Sacred Writings." In that work he expresses the belief that Bishop Lowth's discovery of the parallelism of scripture furnished "one of the most valuable aids ever presented to the interpreter, and calculated, when its principles have been more fully developed, to throw a new and clearer light on a great part of the sacred volume."

This system of parallelism, he holds, is not confined to Hebrew Poetry, but extends to prose also, and pervades a large part of both the Old and the New Testaments. He claims that parallelism is not the only, or even principal, formal characteristic of Hebrew poetry, but that there is, as in other languages, "a definite metrical rhythm of sound"; and hence from the presence of parallelism we are not to infer that any composition is poetical. Several examples are given in which, it is claimed, the "rhythmical flow" is easily detected by the ear. We cite a single specimen — the first two verses of Ps. cxxvi.

1. B'shūv' Y'hōvah' — eth-shivath' Tziōn',
Hayi'nu k'chol' mīm'!
2. Az' yimmalē' — s'choq' pinu',
UT'shone'nu rinnah'.
Az' yom'ru' vaggoim'
Higdil' Y'ōvah-lašsoth' im ēl'eh.

The late Professor B. B. Edwards, and few modern scholars entered more fully into the very soul of Hebrew poetry, says of it: "Ingenious and laborious efforts have been made to restore a metrical arrangement, which, as it is argued, has been lost. But these attempts have been altogether fruitless. . . . The free spirit of an old Hebrew would scorn to have his thoughts subjected to a severe criticism, or made obedient to the nice laws of euphony" (Mem. Vol. ii. p. 391). Dr. Forbes thinks that the reason why scholars have failed to recognize the metrical rhythm in Hebrew poetry is, that they have searched for it in a regular succession of long and short syllables, as in classical languages, rather than in accent, as in modern languages. This point, however, is not material. If Hebrew poetry be destitute of all metrical structure, it does not follow that paral-

lelism is not found in Hebrew and Greek prose. This is simply a question of fact, to be determined by induction.

Dr. Forbes does not claim to have discovered any new principles of parallelism, but only to have made an application of those developed by Bishop Lowth, Bishop Jebb, and others, to portions of the scriptures where we should least have expected them to apply. He mentions five principal species of parallelism :

1. *Synonymous*, or *Gradational*; in which the second or responsive clause is not tautological, but always diversifies, and usually adds to, the meaning of the first clause (Isa. lv. 6, 7; Ps. i. 1; Matt. v. 4).

2. *Antithetic*; where "two lines correspond with one another by an opposition of terms and sentiments" (Prov. xxvii. 6; x. 1).

3. *Synthetic*; in which there is similarity in the form of construction — noun answering to noun, verb to verb, member to member, negative to negative, interrogative to interrogative (Ps. cxlviii. 7-13; 2 Cor. xi. 22-27).

4. *Introverted*; in which the first line is parallel with the last, the second with the penultimate, etc. (Ps. cxxxv. 15-18; Jer. ix. 4). Closely allied to this last form is the *Epanodos*, literally, *a going back* — speaking of subjects in an inverted order, of the last first, and of the first last (Matt. vi. 24).

5. *Numerical* — "the employment of special numbers to impart symmetry to the composition, and occasionally to stamp their symbolical significance on the particulars enumerated (Ps. xxviii., xxix., each divided into three parts or strophes).¹

He arranges the whole Epistle to the Romans in parallelism; although he confesses that it "may admit of a very reasonable doubt" whether "every part of it was designedly so composed" by Paul; but deems it incredible that the appearance of symmetrical order in so many passages was accidental.

The first feeling of most persons will doubtless be, that it is extremely improbable that in composing a friendly epistle the apostle would be consciously governed by such a complicated and artificial system of rules. It is not, however, unreasonable to suppose that a person of a logical and fervid mind, and especially one familiar with Hebraistic modes of thought, would unconsciously exhibit in his writings traces of that parallelism which characterizes Hebrew poetry, and appears also in much of the Old Testament prose. It must be confessed that our author makes it evident that there is an element of parallelism in the Epistle to the Romans, which may be, to some extent, serviceable in the interpretation of this difficult portion of scripture. His analysis and parallelistic arrangement of the text certainly make it easier for the student to comprehend the main scope

¹ For a full statement and illustration of the different kinds of Parallelism, see "The Symmetrical Structure of Scripture" pp. 17-46.

and design of the apostle, and to follow him through the successive stages of his argument. His "Notes and Dissertations" on difficult passages evince great logical and critical acumen. The entire volume is well worthy of the attention of biblical students, and worthy to stand beside the commentary of Dr. Hodge on the same Epistle, with which it does not on all points agree. Although the work of a Scotchman, and of a distinguished minister of the established church of Scotland, it fails to find in the Epistle to the Romans all the peculiarities of the Scottish or Princetonian theology. We may, perhaps, hereafter speak more at length of the exegetical and theological character of the "Analytical Commentary."

A CRITICAL AND EXEGETICAL COMMENTARY ON THE ACTS OF THE APOSTLES. By Paton J. Gloag, D.D., Minister of Blantyre. 2 Vols. 8vo. pp. 439, 456. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark. 1870.

The Book of Acts is the proper sequel of the Gospels, as it is the introduction to the Epistles. Viewed in this relation, the study of it assumes a greater importance than is usually attached to it. Though chiefly narrative in its form, and in this respect differing from the Epistles, which are doctrinal and practical, it still requires much illustration in order to be well understood. It "touches at every point on the history of the world. Countries and cities renowned in ancient times were visited by Paul and his companions," the past history and customs of which must be made subjects of study. The authorship, too, has of late been called in question. One writer supposes that the Acts, as well as the Gospel of Luke, were written by Timothy, and that Luke was only a transcriber. The authorship of a part is claimed for Silas; and, indeed, Silas and Luke are held to be the same person. And, beyond even this, some writers of the Tübingen school give the Acts a mythical character, supposing it to be written towards the middle of the second century, by some disciple of Paul. Such positions indicate that there may still be room for another commentary on the Acts.

The author is a parish minister of Scotland. He has brought to the preparation of the work a large acquaintance with the best commentators on this book, as well as with the various monographs designed to elucidate particular parts. A new translation is given, from the seventh edition of Tischendorf's text. Where this text differs materially from the Textus Receptus, the reasons for the difference are given in the Critical Notes.

The translation does not generally depart greatly from the Authorized version, and usually conveys correctly the meaning of the original. Sometimes, however, it is less neat; for example, ii. 38: "in order to the remission of sins," instead of "for the remission of sins"; ii. 40: "be ye saved from this generation," for "save yourselves from this generation" (the passive of the verb meaning to save one's self); vii. 60: "retain not this sin to them," for "lay not this sin to their charge"; viii. 25: "evan-

gelized many villages of the Samaritans," for preached the gospel in," etc.

The commentary is not philological, nor doctrinal, nor homiletical; it is principally exegetical, aiming to bring out clearly and fully the meaning of the writer. "The meaning of the text has been carefully examined; and all information which the author could gather from external sources has been brought to bear on its elucidation. The apparent discrepancies between the Acts and other authorities, and, in short, all those difficulties which are started by Baur and De Wette, have been met, and never, in a single instance, wilfully omitted."¹ Though the work is not doctrinal, the author is a firm believer in miracles and in the resurrection of Christ, and his interpretation throughout is "diametrically opposed both to the rationalism of Kuinoel and to the mythical explanation of the Tübingen school."¹

In the execution of his general object the author has been very successful. The commentary is full, clear, comprehensive, indicating an appreciation of the points which need elucidation. It gives evidence of good taste, large and scholarly views, patient weighing and balancing of difficulties, and great fairness in the results reached. The interpretations thus arrived at, we are confident, will command the assent of the thoughtful student. Extended as the work is, one would hardly wish the pages diminished, so well is the interest sustained to the end.

In addition to the commentary, various important and difficult questions are treated separately; such as the Gift of Tongues, Nature of Hades, Stephen's Speech, James the Lord's Brother, Paul's second Imprisonment at Rome, etc.

The printing is generally very accurate. There is occasionally a mistake in a Greek word, and in Vol. ii. p. 230, Cenchrea is said to be the *western* port of Corinth, instead of eastern. The volumes have an unusually attractive form, and are furnished in this country by Messrs. Scribner, Welford, and Co., New York.

STEPS OF BELIEF; or, Rational Christianity maintained against Atheism, Free Religion, and Romanism. By James Freeman Clarke. 12mo. pp. 311. Boston: American Unitarian Association. 1870.

Dr. Clarke's books, on account of their literary merits, if nothing else, are always very attractive reading. We should be truly glad if every man who wishes to communicate important truth, and especially religious truth, could do it in a manner so certain to engage attention and to be readily understood, without ever violating the purest taste. An attempt is made in this book to trace the progress of a man from the lowest stage of unbelief, even as to the existence of a God, onward through theism and

¹ Preface.

Protestant Christianity. We do not suppose that Dr. Clarke aimed to give an exhaustive treatment of the various subjects which came under his notice, or to meet thoroughly all the demands of scientific scepticism. Yet, relatively to that class of minds which he had in view, he has, on the whole, been quite successful. He has certainly, without meaning to do so, placed the man whose progress he traces in such a position that we do not see how he can fail to advance to the most undoubting belief in evangelical Christianity. We do not see why he should stop at the place where Dr. Clarke leaves him. If Christianity presents any claims to our belief, it does so on the strength of the miracles which its Founder performed; and if these miracles attest the divine origin of any portion of Christianity, they attest the divine origin of the whole; and if any doctrines are plainly included within the domain of Christianity, those which are commonly styled evangelical are thus included. Dr. Clarke, it seems to us, discriminates between one portion of what is contained in the Bible and another, in a way that he is not authorized to do. In common with many writers of his sect, he seems to treat the scriptures somewhat in the same manner as the *Iliad* of Homer has at times been treated. After it has been conceded that all which we know concerning the siege of Troy, and of the heroes who were engaged in that siege, is derived from the *Iliad* and from other works of the same poetical cast, we are called upon to reject a certain portion as imaginary, and to accept another portion as historically true; and all this without our being furnished with any criterion by which to make the required discrimination. We have just as satisfactory proof, so far as our only sources of information go, of the supernatural invulnerability of Achilles, as we have of his being a native of Thessaly. We may as well believe the one as the other. Just so we have no better evidence that there existed such a personage as Jesus Christ than we have that he was, in the orthodox sense, an incarnate God; than we have that all the other orthodox doctrines are true. If we may rely on our only sources of knowledge, all these doctrines are equally entitled to our belief. We do not see why Dr. Clarke stops where he does.

We quote one sentence from this book, as alone worth more than its whole cost: "At present, we do not see that free religion can offer us any motive, insight, purity, or humanity, which Christianity does not contain in a much fuller degree."

BOSTON LECTURES, 1870. Christianity and Scepticism. 12mo. pp. 406.

Boston: Congregational Sabbath-School and Publishing Society.

This book is honorable alike to the talent and scholarship and piety of New England. The Lectures of which it is made up were listened to with much interest; but they will be read with more interest and with greater profit. They are not written, as they ought not to have been, in

what is called a popular manner. They were expected to be understood thoroughly and appreciated only by those who were disposed to think, and who were eager to ascertain the actual strength of the foundation on which Christianity rests; or by such as might honestly doubt as to the divine origin of Christianity. They are admirably fitted to meet the wants of these classes. The writers evidently had no fear that the foundations of our common Christianity could be examined too sharply. They had no disposition to conceal, either from themselves or from the public, the strength of the enemies they were to encounter. They write in that cool, dispassionate, dignified manner in which men inevitably write who entertain no question of the goodness of their cause. Being scientific men, they can appreciate the force of scientific objections; and they know that nothing is more hurtful than to give to such objections insufficient answers. They have treated their opponents in the most candid manner, carefully abstaining from any language approaching that of vituperation, indulging only in the rarest instances in a strain of even gentle humor. The conclusion to which every thoughtful and candid reader of these lectures will come, we must suppose, can be no other than this: that if any religious doctrines can be proved to be true, those of Christianity can; that, in view alike of all which we know to be true and of all which we can only conjecture to be true, in view of all that we hope and all that we may fear, in view of all our wants, whether we become extinct when the body dies, or are to live forever, Christianity presents the strongest claims to our belief.

It was not to be expected that these lectures would be of equal merit. We have been most attracted by that of Professor Mead on the Uncertainties of Natural and Religious Science, and that of Professor Porter, on the Argument for Christianity, Complex and Cumulative. In the former, Professor Mead turns the weapons of the enemy against himself with singular adroitness and power. In the latter, it is made very clearly to appear that not only has each argument for Christianity much force when considered separately, but that each gives to, and receives from, all the rest an additional force.

PATER MUNDI; or, Modern Science testifying to the Heavenly Father.

Being in Substance Lectures delivered to Senior Classes in Amherst College. By Rev. E. F. Burr, D.D., Author of "Ecce Coelum." First Series. Second Edition. 12mo. pp. 294. Boston: Nichols and Noyes. 1870.

If it was the special aim of these lectures to deepen the impression of God's existence and character in the minds of young men, all of whom were already believers, we must pronounce them happily adapted to this end. But if their aim was to convince the sceptical, or to furnish young men with weapons with which they might contend with scepticism, they

cannot, we think, be said to be remarkably well fitted to secure their object. The rhetorical element is much more prominent than the logical. The actual force of the argument is sometimes lessened by want of precision, and by too great profusion of illustration. The style is more ornate, more fervid and impassioned and vehement than is suited to a book meant to carry the assent of the reason. The utmost possible intenseness is given to most of the statements, and the arguments amplified to the widest extent—a mode of writing less calculated to secure conviction than to awaken doubts of the writer's confidence in the goodness of his cause.

We notice one or two incautious assertions. It is said, on page 58, that "a *preponderance* of probabilities in favor of God and his message may be a prerequisite to faith." We think this incorrect. There are certain propositions, and among the most conspicuous are those of the being and character of God, which we are under obligations to admit even on the supposition that their truth is merely possible. This we conceive to be the doctrine laid down by Butler in the Preface to the Analogy, and yet more decisively in the opening chapter of Dr. Chalmers's Natural Theology. We cannot but think that Dr. Burr, in taking the position stated above, has lost a very great advantage in the contest with atheism; whereas, on our principles, theism and orthodoxy in general have an argument in their favor of overwhelming force. Unless the impossibility of the truth of theism can be demonstrated, it has the strongest claim to every man's immediate acceptance.

The author will do well, in the event—which we surely trust will occur—of his book's reaching another edition, to curb certain rhetorical propensities. There are too many strange and uncouth words, and particularly compound words; such, for example, as "thunderous," "basal," "incarnadined," "usefulnesses," "fortitudes," "patiences," "faithward," "the sparrow-watching, hair-counting, thought-weighing God." There is a strained elaborateness, a mannerism, a somewhat excessively artificial structure, now altogether too apparent in his manner of writing.

Notwithstanding these criticisms, this is one of the books which can afford to be found fault with. It is adapted to do much good, and it will, we hope, be widely read.

CLASSIC BAPTISM. An Inquiry into the Meaning of the Word *Βαπτίζω*, as determined by the Usage of Classic Greek Writers. By James W. Dale, D.D. 8vo. pp. 354. Philadelphia: William Rutter and Co. 1868.

An Inquiry into the Usage of *Βαπτίζω* and the Nature of Judaic Baptism, as shown by Jewish and Patristic Writings. By James W. Dale, D.D. 8vo. pp. 400. Philadelphia: William Rutter and Co. 1870.

The subject treated in these two volumes has here been discussed with more thoroughness and breadth of research than have before been brought

to it in this country. The classic use of βαπτίζω and βάπτω is determined by a very full examination of Greek classic writers. The result is that the words are clearly shown not to be absolute equivalents, as has been claimed — that the former does not, like the latter, necessarily mean *to dip*.

In Judaic baptism the discussion is carried forward in the same searching manner; and it is found that the Jewish writers in the Septuagint and Apocrypha, Josephus, Philo, as well as the church Fathers, corroborate the meaning given to the word in question by Greek classic writers. It is clearly established that “baptize” means to purify ceremonially, and that it in no way necessarily implies immersion or dipping; it being sometimes used without any reference to water, as “baptized by heifer ashes,” “baptized by the sprinkling of the blood of the lamb.”

The discussion indicates great ability, originality, patient investigation, fair-mindedness, clear discrimination, and has done an invaluable service to the cause in whose defence it was undertaken. One more volume, treating of the character of the Baptism of John, or Christian Baptism, will conclude this very elaborate discussion.

After the main positions of the advocates of immersion have been turned by these arguments, they may be well satisfied to find authority for their own usage, without denying to other denominations, who differ from them, the validity of theirs.

AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS. By Alexis De Tocqueville. Translated by Henry Reeve, Esq. Revised and Edited, with Notes, by Francis Bowen, Alford Professor of Moral Philosophy in Harvard University. 12mo. pp. 559. Boston and Cambridge: Sever, Francis, and Co. 1870.

The Publisher's Advertisement prefixed to this work, informs us that it is identical with Vol. i. of De Tocqueville's “Democracy in America.” “It is issued in the present style to furnish the most valuable portion of the work in a cheaper and more popular form, and with especial reference to its use as a text-book.”

We think the book is a successful abridgement of the celebrated work of De Tocqueville. A work which has been so long before the public as this, and which is recognized as almost a standard upon the subject of which it treats, is hardly to be reviewed like a new work. As Professor Bowen, however, has altered the work to the form of a modern text-book, added notes of his own, and made probably some changes in the matter of the book, we will venture a word of comment upon it.

In the first chapter the author examines the geography of our continent, points out the natural boundaries of the different states, and shows that the various parts of our country are adapted to produce different elements of civilization. The origin of our commonwealth is then alluded

to, and it is shown that the pilgrims brought to our shore the germs of our democratic institutions.

After this introduction, the author proceeds to take to pieces the present fabric of American society. The unit of our nationality is the township. A township is, in fact, a little republic, and the government is built from a multitude of townships, as an edifice consists of a large number of bricks and stones. A number of townships united constitute a state, and each one of the United States is a little nation — a nation within the nation. The writer then passes to the union of the states, a subject which involves the discussion of our whole federal constitution. The real position and power of Congress is pointed out, checked as it is by the sentiment of the people below, the influence of the press, and the presidential veto. The position of an American president is contrasted with that of an European king. The former has often the greater power, but it is of shorter duration; he has not time to carry out extensive schemes, and is tempted to administer the government more with reference to his own re-election than for the good of the people. The real ruler of America, the majority of the people, is then examined, and it is shown that in result the majority often acts the part of the worst tyrant, controlling each man through his hopes of promotion, and compelling him to avow or suppress certain sentiments, or lose his hopes of popular favor. The author thinks that the Americans are rendered as servile, through their fear of one another, as the Europeans through fear of a king. There are, however, some powerful checks to the tyranny of the majority, such as trial by jury and the entire influence of the legal profession.

This profound thinker considers the religion of America and the freedom of each one to choose his own religious opinions to be the real source of our democratic principles. He shows that when any part of the people possess the right of suffrage it soon becomes universal. Each additional number that obtain it are eager to vote it to the rest, and all electoral restrictions are soon broken down. The author concludes his work by an able comparison between a democratic and an aristocratic government. A democratic state is vastly more favorable for the development of individual enterprise and wealth, while on account of its superior centralization, an aristocratic government is better adapted for military power, and, indeed, to execute all national projects. An aristocracy is more apt to retain talent and character in its service, while a democracy is continually thwarting eminent men and promoting mediocrity, except at those times when the state is in immediate danger. In the last chapter the author predicts the future of the Indians and Negroes, and expresses the opinion that the United States is adapted to become a great naval power.

In examining this book we are astonished to find a mere traveller gaining a knowledge of our institutions such as few of our trained states-

men possess; and, though his conclusions are sometimes fanciful, most of them are acute, original, and profound. We are glad to see the volume presented as a text-book for the American youth. Wise is he who makes himself familiar with it; for it is one of those works upon the study of which no amount of time can be misspent. Most of the work was written thirty years ago, and we can now compare its predictions with the facts; yet history has strikingly verified most of its prophecies; occasionally one of them has fallen wide of the mark. The work has been translated into clear and vigorous English; the notes of the American editor are good, and we wish they were even more numerous; while the type and appearance of the work reflects credit upon the publishers.

AMERICAN POLITICAL ECONOMY; including Strictures on the Management of the Currency and the Finances since 1861; with a Chart showing the Fluctuations of Gold. By Francis Bowen, Professor in Harvard College. 12mo. pp. 495. New York: Charles Scribner and Co. 1870.

To understand fully, or to comprehend but partially, the great political and financial issues to be decided sooner or later in our own country, is the duty, as it should be the desire, of every one. It has been considered the prerogative of a privileged few to instruct the world in all matters which pertain to general governmental policy, and it has been the custom to receive those dicta as unquestionable. But men are beginning to think more on these subjects, and to call for text-books which do not carefully elaborate, but rather simplify, the steps which must be taken in order to master the subjects themselves. To meet a want like this Professor Bowen's work is very acceptable. We have heretofore been dependent almost entirely upon foreign authors for our instruction in social and political science; these writing, too, at a time when many of the questions which are now so pressing, were of but little importance.

We begin to feel — foolishly, perhaps — that we should evolve theories of our own, or, rather, claim as our own much that has been merely floating literary capital. Perhaps it was with some such idea that the work has been entitled "American Political Economy," as meaning to deal with the subjects which are now of vital interest to us as a nation. While the questions discussed are many of them open to much argument, and cannot be settled for many years — such as Protection *versus* Free Trade, Taxation, Wages, etc. — we cannot enter into any extended review of the author's ideas upon these subjects. We can only say that, whatever may be the final decision, he has done a valuable service to the country in placing before us in so readable and attractive a form the general principles of this intricate problem.

BELIEF — WHAT IS IT? or, the Nature of Faith, as determined by the Facts of Human Nature and Sacred History. 8vo. pp. 301. Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood and Sons. 1869.

‘The task, attempted in this book, is to make a natural history of religious faith, describing the matters with which religious faith occupies itself, and the mental experience of its dealing with them. . . . The general result arrived at is that faith cannot be intelligibly defined by any of the conventional terms or short expressions generally used as sufficient in speaking of it, but can only be described by its experienced consciousness, and that man’s religious faith is his habitual emotional thinking of the historical manifestations of God’s love to him; associating these with the person of the Son of God in such a manner as to make his believing a life whose essence is union of affection and of conscious spiritual sympathy with him.’

The subject of this work, as thus stated, is one of undoubted interest and importance; as much so, perhaps, as the *Natural History of Enthusiasm*. But it cannot be concealed that the execution of the task by no means corresponds to its importance. The book is very badly written. We have not for a long time read one of which this could be said with so much truth. The sentences quoted above are better than the average, as specimens of its style. It reminds us, in this respect, of a sermon noticed by Sydney Smith in the old *Edinburgh Review*, which, he tells us, by its intolerable dulness threw its reviewer into so profound a slumber that the most powerful stimulants failed to arouse him, until the sermon itself was carefully removed from the room. The rhetorical faults of this book are inexcusable. We doubt if a man has a right to inflict on the community a book so badly written. The law on this point seems to us to be perfectly plain, and it ought to be rigidly enforced. The ability to write in a tolerably good English style stands, in point of merit, about on a par with personal cleanliness. The man who has it may deserve little praise. The man who is without it should not show himself in public. If a man has something on his mind which he wishes to say, but is unable to express it properly, let him tell it to some intelligent friend, by whom it may be communicated to the world.

This book, we are convinced, would be highly valued if it could be carefully rewritten, nearly all its sentences remodeled, and its bulk reduced about one third.

FRIEDRICH WILHELM KRUMMACHER. An Autobiography. Edited by his Daughter. Translated by Rev. M. G. Easton, M.A. With a Preface by Rev. Professor Cairns, D.D., of Berwick. 8vo. pp. 350. New York: Robert Carter and Brothers. 1869.

The author of “Elijah,” “Elisha,” and “David,” and the court preacher at Potsdam, is not unknown to our readers. But, much as they may have

known of him by his works, this graceful autobiography will give a fuller and more appreciative view of its distinguished author. It unfortunately extends only to the year 1848. But "the blank of the last twenty years of his life is filled up by communications in which, for the most part, he speaks of himself."

In the autobiography he gives early recollections of his father, the author of the "Parables," and of his rural ministry; pictures of the genial home influences under which he grew up; of his school life, early Christian training, first religious impressions, religious teachings at school; of his university life at Halle and Jena; of his successive fields of labor on the Rhine—"probably the best and liveliest description anywhere to be found of Rhenish Christianity." His picture of his struggles and difficulties in his opening ministry in Berlin "affords the deepest glimpses into the moral state of the Prussian capital, and the working of the gospel, under new and trying conditions, upon its various circles."¹

The graphic sketches of the professors under whose instructions he was brought are illustrative of the strong rationalistic influences of the times, as well as of his independence and firmness in resisting them and in adhering to his own convictions of truth. We regret that we have not space to give extracts from these sketches.

The volume is one of rare interest, both on account of the eminence of the subject and the character of the times of which it treats.

LIFE OF JAMES HAMILTON, D.D., F.L.S. By William Arnot. Edinburgh. Second Edition. 12mo. pp. 600. New York: Robert Carter and Brothers. 1870.

The minister of Abernethy, Edinburgh, and Regent Square, London, is more generally known in this country than most of the British preachers. His "Life in Earnest," "Emblems from Eden," "The Royal Preacher," "Memoir of Lady Colquhoun," etc., have been widely read and greatly admired here, and will give a peculiar interest to the biography as it now comes to us. Mr. Arnot, himself an eminent clergyman, has drawn a full-length portrait of his friend, in a style of great beauty and finish. Dr. Hamilton, who was an earnest and successful preacher, a self-denying and genial man, deserves such a tribute as is here given to him. The volume will be read with unusual interest and profit.

MEMOIR OF THE REV. WILLIAM C. BURNS, M.A., Missionary to China from the English Presbyterian Church. By the Rev. Islay Burns, D.D., Professor of Theology, Free Church College, Glasgow. 12mo. pp. 595. New York: Robert Carter and Brothers. 1870.

The subject of this Memoir was born April 1, 1815. He received his academic education at the Aberdeen Grammar School, under Dr. James

¹ Preface.

Melvin, the Scottish Arnold, and at Marischal College. At first he intended to study law; but after his conversion he at once entered on a course of preparation for the ministry. He preached as an evangelist, with great earnestness and success, at Dundee, Perth, Aberdeen, Newcastle, Edinburgh, and Dublin. In September, 1844, he came to Canada, where he spent two years, preaching at Quebec, Montreal, Kingston, Toronto, Niagara, and many other places. In 1847 he went to China as a missionary, and was at different times stationed at Canton, Amoy, Shanghae, Peking, etc., where he was a most faithful missionary till his death, in 1868.

Few preachers have been more earnest and self-denying in the service of their Master. No obstacles, no threats, no violence checked his endeavors to do his duty. In this, as well as in his general devotion to his work, he strongly reminds us of the Apostle Paul. Of his labors at Edinburgh, one who knew him well writes: "With him the winning of souls was a passion, calm, but intense, consuming. . . . He cast his net into all waters. He wished to get access to the soldiers in the castle. He visited the barracks, distributed tracts, and invited them to his open-air meetings in High Street. He frequently visited the shelter, the jail, the bridewell, the Magdalene Asylum, the Orphan Hospital, the Dean Bank Institution, and preached to the inmates. Wherever the lost or neglected were to be found, he was there. From the very refuse of society he gathered jewels for Emmanuel's crown. Very touching to see him, as I have done, giving tracts and speaking tender words to the fallen."¹

While in Canada he preached in churches, barrack-rooms, and hospitals; in the highways and squares. At some places he met with great opposition. He was disturbed in his services by loud noises; dirt, stones, and mud were thrown at him. "His coat was torn, his hat knocked off and trampled on the ground, and his pocket Bible, his constant companion, torn from his hand. A stone, thrown with violence, inflicted a severe wound on his cheek, and it bled freely. A few of the 93d rushed through the crowd, and one in anxiety said: 'What's this? What's this?' Smiling, he replied: 'Never mind; it's only a few scars in the Master's service. He was carried into the medical chamber of Dr. Macnider, near at hand, when that beloved Christian physician sewed up the wound. He came forth speedily, as if nothing had taken place, and, looking round calmly from his reassumed position, he exclaimed, in the words of the great Apostle of the Gentiles: 'I bear in my body the marks of the Lord Jesus.'"² This is the Christian spirit and the heroic devotion of the man.

The portrait of this eminently devoted preacher and missionary, faithfully and delicately drawn by a brother's hand, cannot fail to stimulate to increased fidelity and earnestness all who may study it.

¹ p. 231.² p. 267.

THE

BIBLIOTHECA SACRA.

ARTICLE I.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE JEWISH SACRIFICES.

IN the *Bibliotheca Sacra* for January, 1859, an Article appeared on Jewish Sacrifices. The Article which follows is meant as a sequel to that. The materials for it have been derived from the chapters of Bähr's *Symbolik des Mosaischen Cultus* which relate to sacrifices. The writer undertakes to do nothing more than exhibit Bähr's views, assuming no responsibility as to their correctness.

Two classes of religious rites were prescribed in the Levitical law — sacrificial rites and rites of purification. The former were obviously the more important and significant; the rites of purification, for the most part, deriving their efficacy from the sacrifices with which they were required to be connected. It is with sacrifices exclusively that we are now concerned.

The origin of sacrifices is not to be referred to the time of Moses. They are known to have been in use in the patriarchal age, and even at a period yet more remote — that of Cain and Abel. And, indeed, the allusion to sacrifices as performed by Cain and Abel is in such terms as to give ground to the supposition that they were not then performed for the first time. In short, sacrifices seem to have been the earliest, the most general, and certainly the most significant form in which religious homage has been expressed. The form of the sacrificial rites, at the earliest

date at which we find any traces of them, is substantially the same as that which has prevailed in all subsequent periods. The objects meant to be offered in sacrifice were burned in certain sacred places. Yet, along with the general uniformity, some diversity was allowed. No fixed, definite rules were observed. Every man who offered a sacrifice did what the nature of the rite seemed to him to require, or what his own inward religious feeling prompted.

The Levitical law, which in general did away with whatever wore the aspect of caprice and arbitrariness, aimed especially to give a definite form to those rites in which its own significance may be said to have been concentrated, and which contained within themselves every element of religious homage—the rites of sacrifice. It laid down the most minute rules in reference to these; so that what had hitherto been most simple became much more comprehensive and more variously expressive. The most trivial features of these rites seem to have been very carefully attended to. Those who esteem all sacrifices as a mere outward ceremony, or as the outgrowth of superstitious views of the nature and character of the Divinity, will be apt to regard what we have here said was done by Moses as a step backward towards the darkness and ignorance of a barbarous age. But, unless we are to regard the whole Mosaic ritual as such a backward step, we ought not to regard what was done in relation to sacrifices in such a light. What the Mosaic law may be said to be in general—an instructor, a schoolmaster—the law of sacrifices may be said to be in a more precise and peculiar sense. By means of its nicely adjusted and comprehensive ritual, the law becomes a teacher of outward religion; preserving men from a comfortless, because a meaningless, superstition; prescribing to every rite its exact form and limit, and a real and momentous significance. It becomes, at the same time, an instrument of inward religious culture, by imparting a healthful religious knowledge. It is doctrine; but doctrine in the form of symbols, deeds, facts; just such as was most happily suited to the needs of the people and the age. As

associated with a ritual like that enjoined by Moses, as constituting its very substance, sacrifices, instead of being stigmatized as a step backward, should be viewed as a step in advance. It is true that sacrifices ceased at the time of Moses to be the simple rite which they had formerly been; but in losing their simplicity they sustained no damage. A thing does not, as a matter of necessity, approach the more nearly to completeness and perfection in proportion as it becomes simple.

Three points relating to the subject of sacrifices require a moment's attention in this place—the matter of the sacrifice or the object offered; the rites by which the offering was accompanied; the different purposes which the whole process was in different cases meant to effect.

The matter of sacrifices consisted partly of animals and partly of the productions of the soil. There arose from this the distinction of bloody sacrifices and those which were not bloody. Not all animals nor all vegetable productions were allowed to be used in sacrifices. The use of unclean animals was expressly interdicted; and of clean animals, oxen, sheep, and goats are particularly mentioned as suited to sacrificial purposes. It was required that the animals meant to be sacrificed should be of a certain age, and free from blemish or imperfection. In certain cases, also, the sex of the animal was fixed. It was sometimes permitted to substitute doves in the place of the animals usually offered. The number of animals proper to be offered, in particular cases was carefully stated.

The sacrifices not bloody consisted of fine meal of different kinds, and bread. Oil was to be mixed with the meal, or to be poured upon the cake. After the settlement of the Israelites in Canaan, wine was employed, as were also salt and incense; while honey and leaven were invariably forbidden. The sacrifices not bloody are to be regarded as mere appendages of the bloody; the quantity of the material used in them varying according to the kind of sacrifice with which they were joined.

The rites with which the offering was accompanied were substantially these: The individual proposing to offer a sacrifice presented the victim at the altar, and, having first solemnly placed his hands upon its head, put it to death. The priest then either poured the blood into a vessel, or else sprinkled it in different places, according as the particular nature of the sacrifice required the one or the other to be done. After the skin of the animal had been removed, the flesh was, in most cases, burned on the altar, either in whole or in part. What was not burned was afterward eaten, in some cases by the priest alone; in others, by the priest and the person by whom the offering was presented. In certain instances no part of the animal was eaten, but the whole was burned without the camp.

The purpose meant to be answered by sacrifices was in all cases substantially the same; and yet there was in some respects a variety — certain sacrifices having in view a special subordinate end; and in such instances the forms and attendant rites were so changed as to adapt themselves to this special purpose. In this way the Levitical law came to recognize four varieties of sacrifices or offerings — burnt-offerings, thank-offerings, sin-offerings, and trespass-offerings. There were certain rites which were common to all these varieties; such as the imposition of hands, the putting to death, the sprinkling of blood, and the burning. The sprinkling of the blood was in different cases performed in a different manner; a peculiar significance being supposed to be attached to each different mode. A peculiar kind of animal, also, was required to be used in each of these varieties.

It was not to be expected that the provisions of the Levitical law relative to sacrifices would escape the assaults of rationalistic criticism. A ritual so rich, a ceremonial law so copious and minute, with all its parts so thoroughly perfected, and adjusted to each other with so much exactness, it is maintained, ought not to be considered as the work of one man, and especially of one who lived at a period so remote as that of Moses. Some scattered portions, the

rude outline, may be referred to Moses; but it is impossible that it should have reached the finished form in which we find it developed in the Pentateuch before the reign of Solomon, or even before the captivity.

If we ask, now, for the historical basis of this criticism, the reply we receive from the older assailants of the Pentateuch is, that the silence of the Book of Judges in regard to sacrifices is sufficient proof that the law of sacrifices could not have been in force in the ages anterior to the judges. De Wette, however, who does not by any means rank among the gentlest assailants of the Pentateuch, disowns this argument. It is not at all certain, he alleges, that, because we detect no traces of sacrificial laws during the period of the Judges, we must hence infer that the sacrificial laws were not in force at the time of Moses. Our knowledge of the religious usages of that dark period is not sufficiently accurate to afford a foundation for any such inference. Rites may have been in use of which no record has been transmitted. In short, the non-existence of a law at the time of Moses cannot be argued from its non-observance at a subsequent period. Yet De Wette, with evident inconsistency, allows in some cases the validity of the very inference which he here condemns as illogical. But if a portion of the Levitical law may have fallen into disuse at the period of the Judges, on account of the abnormal character of that period, and still its Mosaic origin not be denied on that account, why must we draw a different conclusion in other cases which, to all appearance, are precisely analogous? By the application of what test are we to discriminate the Mosaic from the post-Mosaic portions of the law? No attempt to apply such a test hitherto has been successful. On the contrary, Bleek has shown (*Studien und Kritiken*, 1831) that certain parts of the Levitical law — the sacrificial precepts, in Lev. i.–vii., the law of the great day of atonement, the law relative to leprosy and its purification — could have been promulgated by no other person than Moses. His reasoning on this subject can be refuted only by violence.

Now, if we can succeed in demonstrating a close connection between those portions of the sacrificial law which can thus be proved to be of Mosaic origin, and others whose origin is in dispute, shall we not be justified if we trace these latter portions to the same source? This internal connection being demonstrated, one principle evidently pervading the whole law, we must either reject the Mosaic origin of the whole, or concede it to the whole. But the former of these two things we cannot do, unless we are prepared to deny the validity of all historical proofs in relation to any subject.

The particularity and copiousness of the sacrificial precepts of the Levitical law have been insisted on as an objection to its Mosaic origin. Traces of the frivolous spirit of the Pharisees, and the gnat-straining tendency of the Rabbins can, it is said, be detected in them. But, in the first place, even a hasty glance at the rabbinical commentaries of the Talmud will reveal too palpable a contrast between them and the Pentateuch to admit of their being supposed for a moment to have been composed at the same time, or by the same author. Again, the minuteness and copiousness of the Mosaic religious precepts is not a characteristic peculiar to them. It is a common characteristic of the religious statutes of ancient nations. It seems to have been conceived that whatever was to have the character of law must leave no room for inference, but must make specific reference to the most minute transaction to which it could be supposed to be related. A comparison of the religious laws of the Hebrews with those of other Oriental nations—the Persians and Hindoos, especially—will be greatly to the advantage of the former. Still further, the objection we are dealing with rests upon the supposition that it was the intention of Moses to inculcate a meaningless ceremonial. But if it can be shown, and beyond question it can be, that the Mosaic precepts are uniformly significant—that they are pervaded by a single vital principle, apparent even in the most minute particular—the objection derived from their alleged excessive scrupulosity will appear to have but little foundation.

An additional word may here be allowed as to the unity of authorship in the case of sacrificial laws of Moses. This unity is denied by many as being impossible. It would seem, however, to be somewhat adventurous to attempt to decide beforehand what Moses—a man by whose side as a religious legislator no other deserves to be placed—could, or could not do. A system of religious laws carried out so consistently as his, comprising so many parts, all most happily adjusted to each other, one would think might much more easily be imagined the work of one powerful intellect, than of many inferior intellects, working without concert, and at intervals of centuries. When De Wette, therefore, on the one hand, denies to Moses the authorship of the sacrificial precepts, and yet triumphantly vindicates the priority in point of date of the three middle books of the Pentateuch to Deuteronomy, he obliges himself to undertake the solution of this difficult problem: the composition at any time between the age of Moses and that of David—a period so abnormal in all its characteristics—of laws copious, compact, and consistent like those of Moses. This problem, it is not too much to affirm, he has not succeeded in solving. He attributes to Moses, as already intimated, the outline and rudiments of these laws, but maintains that they reached finish and completion gradually, and as the result of experience; that the priests, at different periods, employed their leisure in filling out an ideal, such as they hoped might in some subsequent age be realized. It can hardly be believed, however, that Jewish priests, in ages so rude and uncultivated as were those which elapsed between Moses and David, would have acquired any such idealizing tendency as is here supposed, or could have found leisure for gratifying it. It is much easier to believe that one man, standing relatively alone as a legislator, framed the Jewish sacrificial ritual, than that it was the work of priests, working at long intervals and without concert. The ritual, on this latter supposition, would be apt to have had a loose and disjointed character, instead of the compactness and consistency which are now so apparent.

Much stress ought to be placed on the internal unity which runs through this ritual—a unity which is very obvious when the real significance and importance of its various parts are discerned. When this unity comes to be discerned, the hypothesis of a gradual composition of the law, at widely remote periods, and by men of very dissimilar characters, will be seen to be untenable. Our inquiry, therefore, into the nature and significance of the Jewish sacrifices is, in this view, if in no other, one of no small importance. On this inquiry we shall now enter.

Aside from its bearing on the genuineness of the Pentateuch, this inquiry has a direct dogmatic interest; and it is somewhat surprising that it has hitherto received so little attention. The difficulties by which, beyond doubt, this investigation is attended, have not, as one might think would have been the fact, attracted theologians to it. Evidently biblical scholars do not suspect how much yet remains to be done in this field, nor what rich fruit the labor would yield. It need only be added that the inquiry will not be conducted to any profitable issues, unless the investigator adheres closely to the biblical text, and keeps in view the intimate connection in which the sacrificial rites stand with the whole Mosaic worship.

The law of Moses, as we have seen, prescribed four varieties of sacrifices, distinguished from each other by difference of purpose and by different attendant rites. One general idea, however, exists in the midst of all this diversity. Our present inquiry relates to this fundamental idea, common to all sacrifices.

What, then, is the meaning of the term by which, in the law of Moses, sacrifices are designated, both in general and in each of their varieties? This term is קָרְבָּן, for the matter of the sacrifice, and הִקְרִיב for the act of offering. This common term must be supposed to refer to a common element present in all sacrifices. The stem from which both these words are derived, it will be observed, is the same as that of the word used to describe the special function of

the Jewish priesthood — that of drawing near to Jehovah and presenting the sacrificial victim, or causing it to approach the altar. Thus it is apparent that the notion of the priesthood is closely related to that of sacrifice — that the two are, in fact, identical. This notion is that of drawing near to Jehovah for the purpose of procuring fellowship, or, in other words, removing the ground of that estrangement between God and man which has been occasioned by sin, or, still further, for the purpose of rendering men holy. Sacrifices are to be regarded as the means by which this fellowship between God and man is made possible — by which holiness, or a fitness to approach God, is procured. One may easily see, therefore, how erroneous is that conception of the nature of sacrifice which makes its central idea to be the bringing of a present.

Supposing it to be conceded that the idea which we have derived from the term used to designate sacrifices is the true one, the inquiry may still be urged: In what way does sacrifice serve as a means of fellowship between God and man? How does it procure for the sinner a fitness to approach the offended Divinity? There must be, it should seem, a real or a metaphorical adaptedness in the matter of the sacrifice to the production of this effect.

The matter of sacrifices, it must be borne in mind, belonged either to the animal or the vegetable kingdom; and sacrifices, consequently, are either bloody or not bloody. The latter stood to the former in a relation altogether subordinate. They were not used at all in sin-offerings and trespass-offerings, and whenever used appear only as appendages, having no separate significance. The bloody sacrifices, therefore, as no one can doubt, were altogether the more important class. In them the nature and validity of sacrifices were most distinctly and fully exhibited; and to these alone will our attention be directed in the following inquiry.

Fortunately we have one explicit declaration, a careful study of which will render further investigation as to the fundamental idea of sacrifices well-nigh superfluous. This

declaration is found in Lev. xvii. 11. The eating of blood is here forbidden on this ground — that the life of the flesh is in the blood; and Jehovah goes on to say: “I have given it to you upon the altar to make atonement for your souls; for it is the blood that maketh an atonement for the soul.” This passage is specially important on this account, that it does not refer to one species of sacrifice in distinction from others, but to the bloody sacrifices in general.

There can be found nowhere else so explicit and satisfactory a statement as to what constitutes the efficacy of sacrifices. It is the key to the whole subject. That confusion of thought and conflict of opposing theories which now exist on this subject would, in our judgment, have been avoided, if writers had taken their starting-point from this passage, and adhered tenaciously to it. What we have to say in regard to it will be arranged under four heads.

We notice, in the first place, the prominence here assigned to the blood. The passage makes no allusion to the act of offering the victim on the altar, nor to its death, as being the means of atonement, but speaks of the blood as the essential thing, as if the shedding of the blood were the central point of the transaction. Throughout the ceremonial law a similar prominence is given to the blood. The imposition of hands, the putting to death of the victim, the separation into pieces, might be performed by the person who presented the sacrifice; but the priest alone had it for his task to receive and sprinkle the blood. The scriptures are very explicit as to this matter. So, too, no part of the sacrifice was allowed to be carried into the interior of the sanctuary, or into the immediate presence of God, except the blood; and that part of the altar — the horns — which was esteemed its most sacred part, and without which it almost ceased to be an altar, was directed to be sprinkled with the blood. It seems obvious, then, that the blood, and the treatment of the blood in the sacrificial service, were its most essential features.

The testimony of Jewish tradition on this point is very

full and positive. A sacrifice in which one who was not a priest should venture to sprinkle the blood would, on that account, lose its validity. The sprinkling of the blood is declared to be the root, the very essence, of the sacrifice. The standing Jewish rule is, that there can be no expiation except by blood. The great antiquity of this maxim appears from its occurrence in the Epistle to the Hebrews: "Without shedding of blood is no remission." On this account the sprinkling of the blood and the offering of sacrifice are regarded as convertible expressions. It is not, then, the putting to death, but the shedding and sprinkling of the blood, which give to sacrifices their validity. The treatment of the blood is to be viewed as the very radix and principium of the act.

Again, the passage under consideration uses the term "atonement" to define the object and efficacy of sacrifice. This is the technical term used more frequently than any other in the Pentateuch for this purpose. Much, consequently, depends on the right understanding of this term. Its primary, and indeed its chief, meaning is to cover or conceal. "In all our inquiries into the various senses wherein this term is used," says Suskind, "and into the significance of the different ceremonies connected with the act of atonement, this fundamental meaning of the term must be kept in mind." The word occurs in its proper sense only in Gen. vi. 14. In *Piel*, usage has affixed to it the meaning "to atone." Atonement, therefore, in harmony with this statement, must, it would seem, be equivalent to the covering up or concealing of that which God cannot allow to appear in his presence. That which is covered, being no longer visible, may be said to have in effect disappeared, or gone out of existence. Hence, in Hebrew phraseology, to cover up is the same as to remove or annihilate. Thus, in Jer. xviii. 23, it is said: "Forgive not their iniquity, neither blot out their sin from thy sight"; as if the forgiveness of sin and the blotting of it out were convertible expressions. With the Rabbins the word which we translate "to atone" means to deny, or to consider as

not in existence. They denominate a wicked man "a denier of God," because he acts and speaks as if God were not in being. In the act of atonement, therefore, that which is offensive to God, that which creates estrangement between him and men, is put out of sight—in effect, annihilated. Here it may be remarked, in passing, that, in the passage under consideration from Leviticus, atonement is spoken of as the purpose of every bloody sacrifice, without any reference to the particular variety to which it may belong. The inference is, that the idea of atonement lies at the basis of all sacrifices—that it is their essential characteristic. Blood is shed and sprinkled in every sacrifice, and therefore every sacrifice is of the nature of an atonement. Those, therefore, fall into a grave error who confine atonement to sin-offerings and trespass-offerings, to the exclusion of burnt and thank-offerings.

Again, the passage under review not only specifies atonement in a general way as the chief purpose of sacrifices, but defines the term yet more precisely, by stating from whom the atonement proceeds, and to whom it refers. "I have given you," it says, "the blood upon the altar to atone for your souls," that is, "I have appointed the blood for this purpose; I have connected atonement with the blood." Atonement, then, may be said to proceed primarily from God, and to have for its object the souls of men. The scriptures express themselves on this subject in this way, perhaps, more uniformly than in any other. When the discourse is of atonement between God and men, and not between men and each other, the atonement is said to proceed from God. In the passage already cited from Jeremiah God is entreated not to blot out iniquity. When it is affirmed, as in the passage now under consideration, that the blood atones, we are to assign a meaning to the statement such as shall harmonize with the more emphatic expression "I have given it to you for an atonement." So, in the matter of the golden calf, Moses said to the congregation: "You have committed a great sin, and now will I go up unto the Lord; peradventure

I shall make an atonement." Moses does not mean to represent *himself* as atoning for the transgression of the people. He says, rather: "I will pray to Jehovah, and it may be that through my intercession I shall obtain atonement for your sin"; and he immediately goes on to implore of God its forgiveness. In the Jewish ritual, as it was finally established, Jehovah is not represented directly as atoning for sin, so much as the priest who sprinkled the blood on the altar. But it should be remembered that in this transaction the priest appears in his proper character, as a consecrated mediator, acting in the name of Jehovah and by commission from him, indeed, as his vicegerent. This is the reason for which it was held to be even impious for any one except the priest to sprinkle the sacrificial blood upon the altar.

It is God, then, from whom atonement proceeds. Its object is man, or rather the sin by which man has become defiled. So in the passage immediately before us, the phrase "your souls" is a substitute for the pronoun "you." The word "sin" is sometimes used to designate that in man which needs to be atoned for. Lifeless things are sometimes spoken of as the object of atonement, especially such as were used in ceremonial worship; but in these cases it is not the material objects, as such, which require atonement, but some ceremonial impurity which they may have contracted, or some transgression on the part of him by whom they may have been used, and which is represented metaphorically as really inherent in them.

It cannot be noted too carefully that, in no case, is anything in or belonging to God represented as the object of atonement. The uniform style of expression is, that man, or sin in man, is covered or atoned for in the presence of Jehovah; as in Jer. xviii. 23 God is implored not to blot out sin from his sight. The fundamental meaning of the word forbids that God should ever be considered as the object of the transaction described by it. It would be implied in any such use of the word that God was concealed, put out of sight, virtually

annihilated; or rather that there was something in God which required, on account of its moral impurity, to be removed from sight, just as we have already seen that, in Rabbinical phraseology, the term refers to the denial of God, or practical atheism. Jehovah is the Holy One; there can be no sin in him; there can therefore be nothing to conceal or cover up. The principles of the Mosaic economy would stigmatize as blasphemous such a use of the word in reference to Jehovah as would imply the concealment of anything in him. On the contrary, the principles of that economy justify the assertion that the Holy One, on account of his holiness, is at the pains of concealing whatever, without himself, is unholy; that is, destroying it, removing it from his presence. For this purpose he has given blood upon the altar, has instituted measures to annihilate the sin which prevents fellowship with him.

Besides the word of which we have already spoken as the technical term to describe the effect of sacrifice, other terms are sometimes used, though not so frequently. The word "cleanse" is sometimes thus employed. It is very evident that the object of this act can never be anything in Jehovah. Its object must always be found in man. Another expression equivalent to those already referred to is "to bear iniquity." It is found in Lev. x. 17: "Wherefore have ye not eaten the sin-offering in the holy place, seeing it is most holy, and God hath given it to you to bear the iniquity of the congregation, to make atonement for them before the Lord." It is not the sin-offering which is meant to be represented as bearing the iniquity of the people, but the sin-offering is that by which the priests were to bear that iniquity; a phrase which, as before, signifies the act of removing or annihilating. It frequently occurs in this signification; see Gen. l. 17; Exod. xxviii. 38; Num. xiv. 19; Ps. xxv. 18. In the Septuagint, the word is translated in many cases by ἀφίημι. All the ancient translators of the Bible evidently understood the word to mean what we have now stated. In Lev. xvi. 22 the phrase is used concerning the goat to be sent into the wilderness,

on the great day of atonement. The high priest placed on the head of the goat the sins of the children of Israel, which was then said to bear them away into the wilderness.

The passage we have cited states for what end and by what means atonement is made by blood. The life of the flesh is said to be in the blood, for the blood atones by the life. These words have seldom been rightly understood, though the meaning would seem too clear to be easily mistaken. The Lutheran translation of the clause is: "The blood is an atonement for the life"; giving to the preposition "for" the meaning of "instead of." It is rendered in a similar way in the Septuagint; but this is contrary to the usage of the language, which in this respect is uniform. The Hebrew preposition translated "for," when used in connection with atonement and kindred terms, never means "instead of," but always, as in other connections it very frequently does, it points out the means by which atonement is made. Still more incorrect is the translation given by Gesenius and De Wette, "Denn das Blut versöhnt das Leben"; as if the life were the object of the atonement. The particle translated "for" cannot by any means be made to point out the object of atonement. Besides, according to this translation, the conclusion of the verse, "For it is the blood that maketh atonement," would lose its causative character: it would be a needless repetition of words given before. We must, therefore, unless ready to violate the usage of the language, thus translate the expression: For the blood atones by the soul. It is not the matter of the blood which renders it the means by which atonement is made, but the soul, the life, which is united with it.

This is a point of vital importance in reference to the whole subject of sacrifices. If the blood is the essential thing in every sacrifice, it is so because of the soul, the life, which is in it. The life, then, which is in the blood, in reality gives efficacy to the sacrifice. This statement is confirmed by the consideration that according to the passage before us, the object of the atonement effected through the soul or the

life residing in the blood, is the soul of the sacrificer himself. The soul of the thing sacrificed appears as the counterpart of the soul of him who presents the sacrifice. The two stand in a moral relation to each other. In order to a correct conception, then, of the efficacy of sacrifices, we are to inquire into the nature of the soul, or life. What is the soul in beasts and in men; and in what relation to each other do these stand in sacrifices?

The first part of this question finds a ready answer. The Hebrews meant by the term "soul" (נֶפֶשׁ) the animal principle, both in men and in beasts, without which the body is a mere mass of inert matter. For this reason, the word is translated, as in the passage before us, by "life." In man, however, this principle, while in one respect it is identical with that of beasts, is in another of a higher nature. In man it is united on the one hand with the body, on the other with the spirit, and acts with power on both, as in this union lies our capability of passions and desires. As to it we are to trace the purely animal appetites of hunger and thirst, so also are we to trace to it the affections of love and hatred, joy and grief. It is the principle of all that in us which the New Testament means by the term *ἐπιθυμία*, and is in that sense the organ of the will. But since, as consciousness teaches, *ἐπιθυμία* is not pure, it follows that the root out of which it grows can still less be pure. In this respect, as being the source of impure appetites and desires, the life is rather the birth-place and instrument of sin; and as it has a vital connection with both body and spirit, it infects both with its own corrupt nature. By the power of this corruption, thus diffused through his whole system, man becomes estranged from an absolutely pure God. He aims to live, to labor, to find the proper gratification for his sinful appetites, independently of God. It is the principle of selfishness. Hence, by the Rabbins the term is often used in connection with the personal pronouns, as synonymous with self.

Calling to mind now, that sacrifice, as we have endeavored to demonstrate from the primitive use of its more usual

name, is the condition of restored fellowship between Jehovah and man, we see at once that it can serve this purpose when it covers up, virtually annihilates, that in man which has produced the estrangement; that is to say, has removed this innate selfishness.

The answer to the second part of our question, the relation which the life in the blood of the victim sustains to the life in him who presents the sacrifice, is somewhat more difficult. It is evident, on the one side, that there is a likeness, a sameness, between the two; on the other side, the sacrificial blood serving as a means of removing sin and procuring holiness for the sacrificer, it therefore presupposes an antagonism. The sacrifice must be received, then, as having a symbolic and a sacramental aspect; the former, on account of the likeness of the blood of the victim to the life of the sacrificer; the latter, on account of their antagonistic relation to each other. The reality of this symbolic character of sacrifice can hardly be questioned. That character belongs, by almost universal confession, to the Mosaic worship in general, and is apparent even in its minutest features. It must, then, be acknowledged to belong to that which constitutes its most important element, sacrifices. The symbolic character of sacrifices consists in this: the presentation of the life in the blood of the victim on the altar or the scene of the manifested presence of Jehovah, as a sign of the presentation of the life, that is, the self, of the sacrificer to Jehovah. As the bringing near to God of the blood of the victim in sacrifice is its death, so the life of selfishness, or that which is opposed to God, is in sacrifice given up, or dies. But as, in the case of man, this act is not a cessation of being, not anything merely negative, but a death which is in reality life in the highest sense — for the sanctification which is aimed at in this sacrifice to Jehovah, and the restoration of communion with God which is connected with it, is, according to the principles of the Mosaic dispensation, the true life — this death of the soul in sacrifice is the necessary condition of its true life.

The significance of sacrifice may, therefore, be thus described. The life, in the natural sense, the animal principle, which is the root of selfishness, and so of sin, is given up to Jehovah, that by its means the true life may be gained, holiness, communion with God, who alone in the most exalted sense truly is, because he alone is holy. The relation of the life in the blood of the victim to the life of the sacrificer is altogether that of substitution; not substitution in the sense of a formal change, of a transference of parts, or anything outward and material, but simply symbolic; so that the act of sacrificing, when that which it is intended to represent is not actually done on the part of the sacrificer, is altogether empty and vain.

General usage, in nearly every language, authorizes the view we have taken of the nature of sacrifices. The word "sacrifice" is well-nigh universally equivalent with self-denial, giving up of self; yet, unquestioned as is this symbolical character of sacrifices, it must not be made exclusively prominent. It represents only one, and the more subjective and negative, aspect of the notion of sacrifice. It represents a surrender on the part of man, but not an acceptance on the part of Jehovah, and the rendering back to the sacrificer of holiness, or the true life. In this last view the sacrifice gains what we have called its sacramental character. This sacramental character is made prominent in the law, and especially so in the passage in Leviticus now under consideration.

But—and this is now our most difficult question—can this sacramental character be ascribed to the blood of the victim? In the first place, the means of atonement must be distinct from him for whom the atonement is made; something indeed appointed by Jehovah, independently of man, for that purpose. Jehovah alone is absolutely holy, the fountain of holiness, and he only can prescribe the means by which in any case it can be acquired. May it not have been with a view to this, that in the Mosaic economy, the blood of man himself could never be efficacious as an atonement for his trans-

gressions. It is forbidden to be used for this purpose. The act would have been the worst form of idolatry. With the same view, the sacrificer himself could never perform the one act which constitutes the essential feature of the rite. That must in every case be performed by the priest, not as a mere man, but as the vicegerent of Jehovah. In the second place, it appears that while the means of atonement must be distinct from the sacrificer, it yet ought to be of a kindred nature; certainly not opposite or antagonistic. It must be, even though appointed for this purpose by a power wholly independent of man, yet so related to man as to be able to operate upon him—it must be essentially homogeneous, while specifically distinct.

The means of atonement, therefore, though fixed upon by Jehovah, by his own independent choice, is yet not chosen arbitrarily and capriciously. It is a means having an intrinsic adaptedness to the purpose meant to be effected. The relation in which it is to stand to man points out the object on which the choice must fall. That by which the life of the sacrificer is to be atoned for must be itself a life, in some substantial points of view, kindred to ours. But as the latter was the life of a beast, having as such no relation to man as a moral being, this is of a piece with the whole texture of the Mosaic economy. This has the characteristics of a material, imperfect dispensation, carrying in itself the seed of a higher and more spiritual dispensation, and pointing to that. The same was the fact with that outward, ceremonial worship, the most important part of the Mosaic dispensation; and also with the sacrificial blood, the most important element of the worship. These were all in themselves imperfect, incomplete, pointing to something higher and more spiritual than themselves. The blood of the sacrificed, in turn, effected only an external purification. The only complete and real means of atonement is the blood of Christ, the pouring out of which is in effect the giving up of that life, or soul, with which the Eternal Spirit dwelling in Christ was united.

Unless then we are ready to deny a typical character to

the whole Mosaic economy and ritual, we must ascribe that character to the shedding of the sacrificial blood, the most essential part of that economy. We are indeed to watch carefully against that outward and mechanical notion adopted by the older typologists, who overlooked the distinction between the blood and the life which was in the blood. It was the pouring forth of this which constituted in the Mosaic sense the shedding of the blood.

In order to a clear discernment of the typical character of the act now under consideration, we are not required to look at it from a point of view exclusively Christian. It may be discerned from a point of view decidedly anti-Christian. The Jewish theologians unanimously maintain that with the advent of the Messiah, sacrifices are to cease. He is to accomplish in the most perfect manner, the same object which sacrifices had in view. They virtually concede, therefore, their relative incompleteness, and of course their prophetic, typical character. The only difference between Jewish and Christian writers relates to the question, whether Christ is the Messiah, and not to the results of his advent.

Sacrifices, then, in accordance with the views now set forth, whether regarded in their subjective and symbolical character or the objective and sacramental, must be allowed to have, as their intended result, the creation of a fellowship between God and man. They must combine in themselves a subjective and an objective element, and this combination must appear especially in that act, the shedding of blood, which makes the very essence of the sacrifice. In so far as the blood, when it is poured forth, represents the soul of the sacrificer giving itself up to Jehovah, and, at the same time, when sprinkled upon the altar, the means by which the priest atones and sanctifies, one can discern the inseparable connection of atonement and holiness on the part of God with the giving up of the principle of life on the part of man. The former is conditioned on the latter. According to Mosaic conceptions, it would be equivalent to a denial of God's holiness, of the very essence of the divinity, if he were

to admit man to fellowship with himself, count him holy, without the giving up of the principle of self.

Sacrifices, moreover, are always to be considered as vitally connected with the entire Jewish theocracy, which was essentially a covenant with God, whose intended result was the holiness of the nation. Sacrifices were, therefore, in a narrower sense, all that that theocracy was in a wider and more comprehensive view. This connection must never be surrendered; a right apprehension of the nature of sacrifices cannot be arrived at, if one loses sight of this connection.

It is only needful in conclusion to advert very briefly to the relation of bloody and bloodless sacrifices to each other. They form in reality one whole; the latter, however, being subordinate to the former. The idea underlying both is the same. This identity is in a sense outwardly apparent; the body of the slain victim corresponding to the bread or meal or flour, the fat corresponding to the oil, and the blood to the red wine, which, like the blood, was poured out around the altar. On the strength of this identity, bloodless sacrifices were allowed to be used, in certain exceptional cases, as a substitute for the bloody. Still, though of kindred signification and effect, the relation of the former to the latter was always one of subordination.

We have attempted to show that the essential part of the sacrifice is the blood, as being the life of the victim. It is on this that everything turns. An analogy to this truth can be traced in the bloodless sacrifices. The life is said to be in the blood; but it should not be forgotten that the articles employed as bloodless sacrifices did in a very important sense contain the life, because they contained that which preserves and sustains life; and, on this account, the significance of the sacrificial rite, whether the material used were animate or inanimate, is substantially one and the same.

ARTICLE II.

THE FAVORABLE REFERENCES TO THE FOREIGN ELEMENT IN THE HEBREW HISTORY.

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It entered into the plan of God concerning the Jews that they should be an exclusive people. Strict ceremonial requisitions cut them off from close communication with other nations. The sons and daughters of the chosen race were not to form marriages with the idolaters of the surrounding lands. The exterminating policy with reference to several tribes in their neighborhood was the avowed policy. Frequent and deadly wars, hand to hand and knife to knife, must have tended to make the feeling of Hebrew nationality bitter. Perhaps the position of the Hebrews as to other races was not greatly unlike that which the white people of Arizona hold toward the vile and cruel Apaches. All the tribes around them were of a gross and licentious religion, and in the weakness of Israel nothing but the wall of a jealous nationality, with high towers of prejudice, could keep the nation even respectably separate from the world.

But over against this dominant exclusiveness of the Hebrew people some facts are recorded in the Biblical narratives which awaken surprise and pleasure.

If at any point it should seem that the national exclusiveness would be outright and strong and punctilious, that point is the genealogy of the royal and Messianic family. If we look carefully through the names we shall find those of four, and only four, women. Tamar, the first, was a woman of no great self-respect, but she is supposed to have been a Canaanite also. Rahab, the second, could not have held a very high moral position among her own people, but her own people were the devoted heathen of Jericho. We may dislike to mention the third name, Ruth, quite so closely

after the two already written ; she was cast in finer mould ; no suspicion of guilt or impurity sullies her reputation. But she, like the others, was not an Israelite, but a Moabitess, a daughter of the children of Lot. The fourth name is Bathsheba, beautiful indeed, and of pure Hebrew lineage, but the wife of a Hittite. Thus the only women mentioned in this sacred genealogy are all either foreigners or intimately associated with foreigners.

The incidents connected with these women's lives are not suppressed on the holy pages. We might expect that the literary men, the scribes of an exclusive people, would obscure the incidents. On the contrary, the incidents are made noticeably conspicuous. In the case of one of these women, the whole of a book of scripture is devoted to her life. The sacred writer would seem to take pleasure in setting forth the picture of the fair, affectionate, and dutiful damsel of Moab, who, in her honorable poverty, gleaned in the fields of Boaz. His pen is not unwilling ; his Hebrew pride does not protest. We read in the book of the Law : " A Moabite shall not enter into the congregation of the Lord : even to his tenth generation he shall not enter." The sixtieth Psalm says, in a tone of high contempt, " Moab is my wash-pot." The prophets give vent to denunciation of the ancient enemy who would not give bread or water to his fugitive kinsmen when they came up out of Egypt, and who hired Balaam to curse them. Yet, embedded in the same volume of the national records, we find this most pleasing, and withal admiring, memorial of a Moabitess, who became a mother in Israel. So does the philanthropic spirit of the Bible break through the high towers of prejudice, and, even in the earliest dates, anticipate the breadth and charity of the completed revelation.

In contrast, moreover, with the general conduct attributed to the Jews themselves while in the desert, in contrast even with such a personage as Aaron, one is pleased with the picture, half-drawn, of Hobab. He comes into the camp of the wanderers. His salutation and blessing are graceful and hearty. His word of cheer reads like a song. His

practised eye sees how heavily the weight of cares falls on Moses's shoulders. He suggests a system of administration which distributes the burden. When he rises to decamp, the earnest and tender importunity on Moses's part reveals that great leader's appreciation of his success. Yet this man, who humanly speaking saved Moses from wearing out, was one of that race which afterward enticed the people into idolatry, against which the zeal of Phineas burned white, and which, in times still subsequent, overran Palestine like locusts. Hobab was a Midianite; Moses's wife was a Midianite; that great branch of the Levitical family carried down the blood of these Arabs in its veins.

The writer of the Book of the Judges gives us the song of Deborah and Barak, on the occasion of the great victory over Sisera. That song reserves its crown of praise for the head of Jael, the wife of Heber the Kenite: "Blessed above women shall she be" — the original being here given of those sacred words afterward to be adapted to the blessed Virgin. But Jael belonged not to a Jewish, but to a Kenite family. She was, it is likely, of the race of Midian. Still the song falters not in its glowing admiration. It shows no stinginess of prejudice. It hands down the glorious deed of this foreign woman with no reluctance. It might fitly be added, just here, that the unstinted and high compliment which is paid to Jehonadab, the son of Rechab (Jer. xxxv. 6, 7), was bestowed upon one of the descendants of this same family.

The brave six hundred who followed the fair shepherd of Bethlehem into the wilderness of Judea, were refugees from various people. Curious investigations concerning the Cherethites and Pelethites, David's body-guard, suggest that some of these were from the island of Crete. Concerning one of these foreign soldiers a notable incident is recorded. It occurred on the memorable day on which the king was obliged to leave Jerusalem, which he had builded, to the power and lust of Absalom. The hearts of his own tribe were alienated from him, but these foreigners forsook him not. As the guard presented themselves to follow the falling

fortunes of David, he is said to have singled out one of them in particular, saying: "Why goest thou with us? return to thy place, stay with the king (i.e. Absalom); for thou art a stranger and an exile: should I make thee to wander up and down with us? return thou and take back thy brethren." The soldier and chief, thus warmly addressed, made this soldierly answer: "As the Lord liveth, and as my lord the king liveth, surely in what place my lord the king shall be, whether in death or life, even there will thy servant be." Noble answer, come from whom it may. But it came from a countryman of Goliath, from a native of Gath. Did no small hate of the Philistine name keep back this incident, this noble act of devotion paid on that day to the monarch of Israel? This Gittite, at the battle of Mahanaim, in which poor Absalom died, held command in apparent and fit equality with Joab and Abishai.

But this noble answer of Ittai the Gittite is more than matched by the austere and, as it proved, sorrowful fidelity of Uriah, the Hittite. Casual readers think of Uriah as only a common soldier. But of the thirty persons enumerated as the valiant ones of David's reign, this Hittite was one. His sense of military duty was acutely, even severely fine. For, after David's great crime, he sent for Uriah to come home; calling him even away from the desperate warfare before the wall of Rabboth-Ammon, on the other side of the Jordan. The guilty sovereign hoped the soldier would go right home to his own house and wife, and thus his adulterous act be covered. But the stern man from the camp, much as he loved his ewe lamb, all unconscious of the wrong done to him by his prince — would not allow himself to go to his house. He slept at the door of the king's house with the servants. On being asked by David why he went not home, he made that answer which Cromwell — it has been noted by Dean Stanley — applied to his son Richard. "The ark and Israel and Judah abide in tents, and my lord Joab and the servants of my lord are encamped in the open fields. Shall I, then, go into my house? As thou livest, and as thy

soul liveth, I will not do this thing." The king then went so far as to make his faithful servant drunk at his royal table. But Uriah forgot not himself, even in his wine, but slept, as before, at the king's gate. Then it was that David sent back the brave, stern, faithful soldier, with orders to Joab to put him—where he knew that Uriah's courage and honor would not fail to go—in the fore-front of the hottest battle. There the chieftain fell; and, though he was a son of the children of Heth—a pure Canaanite—the Jewish historian has not shrunk from giving this foreigner a name of honor on the sacred page.

All the Hebrew pride, at least in later days, centered on Mount Moriah and the Temple of Solomon there. That pride would not be greatly gratified, it would seem, by making prominent the fact that the place on which that glorious Temple was built had been used formerly as a Jebusite's threshing-floor. Yet the little glimpse we get of Ornan, as with princely courtesy and generosity he offered the goodly site, the threshing-floor for the altar, the oxen for the sacrifice, the instruments of the oxen for wood, gives us pleasing impressions concerning the alien tribe which held so long the strong fortress of Jerusalem. When the Temple came to be built, also, we read of the architect who was employed upon the edifice, that "he was skilful to work in gold and in silver, in brass, in iron, in stone, and in timber; in purple, in blue, and in fine linen, and in crimson; also, to grave any manner of graving which shall be put to him." Such were the splendid qualifications of this man. If the magnificent house showed forth the glory of Solomon and of the Hebrew nation, it showed no less the cunning, elaborate, and marvellous designs and workmanship of "Father Hiram." But Hiram's father was a Tyrian, and he himself was "fetched out of Tyre."

Such are illustrations of the appreciative way in which the scriptures of the exclusive nation refer to the persons and deeds of foreigners. This appreciation came to its breadth of liberality in the manner and speech of him in whose veins,

according to the flesh, flowed the blood of Tamar, of Rahab, and of Ruth, as well as of Abraham and David.

In our Lord's day this exclusiveness had become intense and bitter — the one thing left of the national religion. The Jews were then fiercely proud of descent from Abraham. If they were outwardly obsequious to the Roman, it was because that iron yoke ground them in the dust. Their souls hated it and the Roman also. Whether at home, or scattered abroad in the Greek and Roman cities, they felt toward other nations as the Irish feel toward England. They were ripe for uprisings, seditions, and vain wars of independence. They had no dealings with the Samaritans. The purists at the capital had some contempt for those of their own nation, as the Galileans, who lived on the borders of the Gentiles.

It became our Lord Jesus to be a Jew; to fulfil all the peculiar righteousness of the race to which he belonged; to begin his own work, and to charge upon his disciples to begin theirs, among the Jews; to maintain that "salvation is of the Jews." He came, in this respect, as in every other, "not to destroy, but to fulfil." But in fulfilling the spirit of the old dispensation with reference to foreigners, his words and deeds stand out in genial and startling contrast with the narrow and bitter Judaism of his age.

How beautiful is the character of that centurion made to appear, on the page of the evangelist, who, referring to his own official manner toward his servants, said to Jesus: "Lord, I am not worthy that thou shouldst come under my roof. Speak the word only, and my servant shall be healed." Beautiful, too, was the mingled surprise and delight with which this King of the Jews turned, and said: "Verily, I have not found so great faith, no, not in Israel." Yet this man, though he had built a synagogue, and was a lover of the Hebrew nation, was a Roman.

Still more remarkable was the quality of character brought out in the familiar narrative of the Syro-Phœnician woman who pressed the Jewish Messiah so strongly in behalf of her

daughter. Her answers to the testing questions which were put to her exhibit passionateness of feeling, brightness of repartee, wonderfully tempered with humility and trustfulness. The Master admired the woman whom his disciples would have sent away with impatient contempt. He could call them, even at a much later day, "fools and slow of heart"; but to this heathen he was constrained to say: "O woman, great is thy faith! be it unto thee even as thou wilt."

We get, likewise, from that noteworthy interview at Jacob's well, favorable impressions of that specially despised class of foreigners, the Samaritans. Even the woman of Samaria herself, though her life is revealed as suspicious, is not, at least, repulsive to the reader. But when we blend with this scene that parable which is familiarly known by the name "the Good Samaritan," we are amazed at the favorable picture which Jesus deliberately drew of a man belonging to this alien nation. The scene is on the steep, wild road to Jericho. The object of sympathy is a man who has fallen among thieves, who lies, stripped and half-dead, by the roadside. One traveller saw him, and crossed over to the other side. He was a Jew, and a priest, too. Another came up, even went and looked at the man, but passed by on the other side. He is one of our countrymen, too, and a Levite. Who is the man who not only went to the unfortunate sufferer, but had compassion on him, and bound up his wounds, set him on his own beast, brought him to an inn, and took care of him? The answer was a bold one: He was a foreigner—one with whom you have no dealings. The flesh he touches is as swine's flesh to you. You would not allow him to become a proselyte even. He belongs to that detested people concerning whom one of your later writers has spoken as follows: "There be two manners of nations which my heart abhorreth, and the third is no nation—they that sit in the mountains of Samaria, and they that dwell among the Philistines, and that foolish people that dwell in Sichem." The man in the parable, whom you must admire, was of this abhorred and foolish people.

Such is the appreciation of the foreigner which breathes in the teaching of him who came to the lost sheep of the house of Israel. It is the undertone which has been whispering through the whole scripture, even though its sound be almost lost at times in the louder wrath against sin, and especially against idolatry; or its whisper be kept purposely back because of the hardness of the people with whom it was necessary that this rough experiment of the world's education should commence. It found utterance in the law itself. For there we find that statute, which reads as if it came warm from the legislator's heart: "Thou shalt not oppress a stranger; for ye know the heart of a stranger, seeing ye were strangers in the land of Egypt." "The Lord your God loveth the stranger, giving him food and raiment. Love ye, therefore, the stranger, for ye were strangers in the land of Egypt." This spirit kindled in the glorious visions of the prophets.

But it was reserved for the apostles — pre-eminently for Paul of Tarsus, himself a Hebrew of the Hebrews — to gather all the rays of light in the ancient scripture, and that shone around them from the glorified person and work of Christ, into their burning-glass, and so proclaim to the nations, with the heat of the Christian charity, that "ye are no more strangers and foreigners, but fellow-citizens with the saints and of the household of God," wherein "there is neither Greek nor Jew, circumcision nor uncircumcision, barbarian, Scythian, bond, nor free; but Christ is all, and in all."

To some it may seem strange and circuitous to bring from the Jewish scriptures any pictures which should give lessons to Christians of the nineteenth century with respect to their attitude toward the nations of foreign countries. But, unless we have overrated the interest of the topic which has engaged our attention, those lessons are fresh, weighty, and encouraging.

The tendency to sweeping judgments of classes and races is here effectively rebuked. We may not, indeed, ignore

the fact of certain national characteristics. Those characteristics are marked and unmistakable. But the qualities which belong to man as man, are much more numerous and prominent in all races than are those which distinguish one race from another. When Americans first see Chinese, they are apt to say: "These men are all alike." No conclusion could be more untrue, or, indeed, ridiculous. It is very common, on seeing two or three foreigners, to make up the mind that they stand for the whole race. But if there was an Orpah among the daughters of Moab, there was a Ruth also. The two were very unlike; but they belonged to one nation. Nothing is more repugnant to intelligent Christian charity than to listen to descriptions of representative Englishmen, Irishmen, Germans, Africans, Chinese, as if you could give these several millions of people one neck, and then cut off that neck at one stroke of your masterly generalization.

The scriptural narratives are full of the important principle that in dealing with foreigners we should deal with them as individuals of the common human family. Let the individual make what way he can in the world. Give him room. His accidents of birth, color, race, should not hinder him from doing or attaining anything that his individual ability and effort enable him to do or attain. Let Ruth glean in the fields, though she be a Moabite. Let the young men give her a fair opportunity. If she be thirsty, let her drink. If she seems to be specially deserving, "let fall some of the handfuls on purpose for her." If she be every way a suitable wife for Boaz, who shall forbid her taking her place, though she be a foreigner, in the succession of the promised race? All Philistines were not like the great, overgrown, vain, and impious Goliath. Ittai was noble, modest, faithful, even if he was born in Gath.

True citizenship in America, as it was in Judea, is more a matter of conviction and choice, than of birth and color. No mother in Israel was more thoroughly imbued with Jewish ideas than was Ruth. She had wholly joined her

fortunes to the holy commonwealth. No importunity could prevail upon her to remain in the land of her nativity. What an anticipation and confirmation of Paul's grand words was the reply which this woman of Moab made to Naomi! She said: "Where thou goest I will go, and where thou lodgest I will lodge; thy people shall be my people, and thy God my God. Where thou diest will I die, and there will I be buried." Paul proclaimed: "He is not a Jew who is one outwardly; but he is a Jew who is one inwardly." The truest American is not he who is born on the soil, but the one who adopts in clearest light and purest devotion those principles which distinguish the American institutions.

We might, indeed, be led to expect that some of the most earnest and eminent American citizens and Puritan Christians will be found among foreigners. Our Lord saw no such faith in Israel as he saw in the Roman centurion. David had no soldiers so devotedly Hebrew as were Ittai and Uriah. Hobab was a better Israelite than many a chief whose blood had come all the way unstained from Abraham.

All the impressions of the topic before us fall in with what we are beginning to observe on the field of home and foreign missions. So much has been taught us respecting the wonderful part which, it is supposed, has been assigned to what we are used to calling the Anglo-Saxon race, that many of us—who, perhaps, would find it difficult to make good our own descent from that famous stock—have yet acted as if we had not much expectation of making genuine American Christians and vigorous apostolic churches out of any other people than such as could trace their lineage from some New England family. And on foreign fields, for a long while, it seemed as if some of our good missionaries supposed that it was too much to expect that native converts could manage their own local churches, sustain their own pastors, supply from their own number pastors who could honorably and successfully administer that office, and even become themselves successful missionaries to other races

than their own. We have lived to see these poor views pass away in no small measure. But they still linger with more power than we suspect. They still greatly fetter the effort, because they so narrow the confidence, of our churches. It is needful to cultivate the generous faith, hope, and charity which belong to our religion, with respect to all races of the world. God is marvellously throwing these races together. It is not for any intelligent citizen or Christian or church to cherish the opinion that there is any one peculiar country in which Christian piety or true church order is to prevail, any peculiar race which can be supposed to form free institutions and manage free churches. Even into the Jewish nation and church were incorporated the Moabite, Midianite, Hittite, Philistine, Phenician, Roman, and Samaritan. The fairest graces and virtues grew in their beauty on those stalks. We are not worthy of the Hebrew and Christian history which we inherit unless we expect to gather all classes — Irish, German, Scandinavian, African, and Chinese — into our American churches; unless we expect them to adopt the American school and the American Sabbath; unless we expect them to be as excellent champions of our Puritan Christianity as many of them have already been champions of our American liberty in the Senate and on the battle-field. With this broader conception of what we may expect from foreigners, and of what they may properly expect from us, it is obvious that the home and foreign work of our churches takes on at the same time a vast accession of both undertaking and encouragement.

ARTICLE III.

THE INSCRIPTION OF MESHA, KING OF MOAB.

BY REV. WILLIAM HAYES WARD, NEW YORK.

M. CH. CLERMONT-GANNEAU, interpreter to the French Consulate at Jerusalem, first brought to the knowledge of the world, in a letter dated Jan. 16th, 1870, the existence of a historical inscription by Mesha, king of Moab, who flourished nearly nine centuries before Christ. He has published two *fac-similes* of the inscription, each accompanied by a translation. Himself but an amateur, his work has been taken up by De Vogüé, the learned palaeographer of France, by Derenbourg, a well-known French student of Phenician antiquities, by Schlottmann, the ablest German commentator on Phenician remains, and in England by Deutsch, in a most tantalizing, fragmentary way. Neubauer has published English and German translations; and notes by Renan, Rawlinson, Senior Sachs, Harkavy, and other writers, have fallen under our notice. As the inscription is in itself of so great interest and value, and has attracted so much attention, and as the original form of it is inaccessible to the American public, while no transcription into the ordinary Hebrew type has been made in this country, except in one or two Jewish newspapers of narrow circulation, a careful discussion of this manuscript in the light of the best European authorities that have come within our reach, is, we think, called for.

A Prussian, by the name of Klein, was the first to learn, in 1868, that this monument existed in the ancient Dibon. So far as we can learn, he tried to secure it, and perhaps in time might have done so. Captain Warren, of the Palestine Exploration Survey, represents that he was himself restrained from attempting to secure it by his respect to the prior claim of the Prussian. M. Clermont-Ganneau, who had become

aware of its existence, whether independently or through Klein, does not appear, felt no such scruples. The Bedouins of whom he inquired reported the existence in Dhibân, the ancient Dibon, on the east side of the Dead Sea, of a large block of black rock covered with characters. From the descriptions he received he suspected them to be Phenician; and when a rough copy of part of it was brought by an Arab, proving that such was the case, he resolved to obtain an impression at any price. Accordingly, he sent to Dibon a very intelligent young Arab, Yaqoub Caravacca, accompanied by a couple of horsemen. With some difficulty he obtained leave from the tribe who held possession of it, to take an impression. During the operation, one of those quarrels occurred, so frequent among the Bedouins. Yaqoub was struck with a lance, and the three men, with difficulty, escaped on their horses. But, with an admirable presence of mind, one of poor Yaqoub's companions stripped off the wet paper from the stone, and carried off the torn fragments. M. Ganneau received the impression, but in a miserable condition. The paper was torn and crumpled in drying, and it was only by holding the fragments between the eye and a candle, or the rays of the sun, that he was able to detect the characters. M. Ganneau then treated with the sheikh of the powerful tribe of Beni-Sakher to secure for him the stone, paying him in advance two hundred medjidies, and running a great risk of never seeing stone or money or Arab again. In two weeks the honest sheikh brought back the money, saying that it was impossible to get the stone, as the owners of it had broken it up, having got the impression that the Turkish government was somehow making it a pretext to interfere with their liberty. More probably they found that the stone was of value, and thought that if broken up they could obtain more for a score of rocks than for one. Fire and water had done the vandal work. Some time later M. Ganneau received from another sheikh excellent impressions of the two larger fragments, and several small fragments of the stone itself with the actual characters on them.

Captain Warren also received from an Arab whom he employed impressions and fragments. These impressions of M. Ganneau he has published in two *fac-similes*, both of which are before us, and the last of which, in the April number of the *Revue Archæologique*, is the basis of our own, as of other translations. We have carefully compared with this text the photographs of Captain Warren's "squeezes" which we have received. These are all the original sources now available, although there is said to exist a copy of several lines made by Klein. Of the original monument about two thirds, including six hundred letters, are now in Jerusalem, having been secured mainly by M. Ganneau. But they can add very little to what we already have.

The stone was about thirty-nine inches high, twenty inches wide, and twenty inches thick. The engraved face was of about the shape of an ordinary gravestone, rounded at the top, and is indicated quite exactly by the outline of the transcription given on another page. The stone is a very heavy, compact black basalt. Its extreme hardness is the reason why the letters are engraved quite superficially. It is a point of great interest that the words are separated by points, and the sentences by perpendicular lines. This seems to have been, then, an antique way of writing in the Phenician character. It is of the greatest aid in translation.

In the accompanying transcription from the Moabite or antique Phenician character, those letters which are doubtful are indicated by lines above them. Letters in brackets are conjectural readings to fill *lacunae*. The length of the vacant spaces indicates quite accurately the *lacunae* in Ganneau's *fac-simile*; and in this respect the present copy is superior to any transcription that has been published in Europe.

1	אֲנִי מֶשָׁה בֶן כִּמְשִׁי [גִּדְבָּה]. מֶלֶךְ מֹאָב [חֹדֶר]
2	יִבְנִי אֲבִי מֶלֶךְ עַל מֹאָב. שִׁלְשָׁן שָׁה וְאֲנִי מֶלֶךְ
3	חֹדֶר אַחֲרֵי אֲבִי וְאֶעֱשֶׂה הַבְּמִית זֹאת לְכִמְשִׁי. בִּקְרַחַהּ וּב[ת זֶה י]
4	שֶׁה. כִּי הִשְׁעֵנִי מִכָּל הַשְּׁלֹכָן. וְכִי הִרְאֵנִי בְּכָל שְׁנָאִי עֲמִי[ר]
5	י. מֶלֶךְ יִשְׂרָאֵל וַיַּעֲנֵנוּ אֹתוֹ. מֹאָב יִמָּן רֶבֶן כִּיחָאֲנָתָהּ. כִּמְשִׁי בֶּא[ר]
6	צֹחַ וַיַּחֲלֹפֶה בְּנֵה וַיֹּאמֶר גַּם הָאָדָמָה אֲנִי מֹאָב בִּימֵי אִמִּי. אִמִּי כ[נ]
7	וְאִרְאֶה בָּהּ וּבְחַתָּהּ וַיִּשְׂרָאֵל אֲבָד אֲבָדוֹ. עַל־מִי וַיִּדְשֶׁה עֲמִירִי. אֹתוֹ. [אֲרִי]
8	קָה מִחֶדְבָּא. וַיֵּשֶׁב בָּהּ בְּנֵה אֲרַבְעָן שָׁת [יִישָׁב]
9	בָּהּ. כִּמְשִׁי בִימֵי וְאֲבִי אֹתוֹ. בְּעַל מֶעֶן. וְאֶעֱשֶׂה בָּהּ. וְאִ
10	אֹתוֹ קִרְיָתָהּ. וְאִשִּׁי גִדְבָּה [יִישָׁב] כְּאֲרִיץ [קִרְיָתָהּ] מִעַלְמִי. וַיִּבְנֶה לָּהּ. מִלְּךְ [י]
11	שְׂרָאֵל. אֹת [קִרְיָתָהּ] וְאֶלְתַּחְסִּים. בִּקְרַחַהּ וְאֶחָזָה וְאֶחָזָה אֹת כָּל ה[יִישָׁב]
12	[ב]קְרַחַהּ רִיחַ לְכִמְשִׁי. וְלִמְאָב וְאִשְׁבִּי. מִשְׁמֵאֵל
13	הִי. לְפָנַי. כִּמְשִׁי. כְּקִרְיָתָהּ וְאִשְׁבִּי בָּהּ. אֹתוֹ. אִשִּׁי. שְׂרָתָהּ. וְאִשִּׁי [ש]
14	שְׂחָרָתָהּ וַיִּמְרֶה לִּי. כִּמְשִׁי. לִךְ. אֶחָזָה. אֹתוֹ. נִבְחָה. עַל־יִשְׂרָאֵל
15	הִלְכָהּ. בְּלִילָהּ וְאֶלְתַּחְסִּים. בָּהּ. מִרְקַע הַשְּׂחָרָתָהּ. עַד צֶהְרִים וְאֶחָזָה וְאֶ
16	[חֶרֶם]תָּה. וְאֶחָזָה. כָּלָהּ. שִׁבְעָתָה. אֶלְפָן
17	מֵאֵת כִּי. לְאֶשְׁתִּי. כִּמְשִׁי. הַחֶרֶם[תִּיהֶם] וְאֶקַּח מִשְׁם [אֶת]
18	[כ]לָּהּ יִחִיָּהּ. וְאֶקְרַבְהֶם. לְפָנַי. כִּמְשִׁי וּמֶלֶךְ יִשְׂרָאֵל. בֶּא[ר]
19	[אֶת] יִחִיָּהּ. וַיֵּשֶׁב בָּהּ. בְּהַלְתַּחְמָתָהּ. בִּי וַיִּגְרַשְׁתָּהּ. כִּמְשִׁי מִפְּנֵי [נִי]
20	[ו]אֶקַּח. מִמֹּאָב מֵאֶתְּנָן אִשִּׁי. כָּל רִשְׁתָּהּ וְאֶשְׂאֲחָהּ. בִּיחִיָּהּ. וְאֶחָזָה
21	לְסַפְתָּהּ. עַל דִּיבְנָהּ אֲנִי. בְּנִתִּי. קִרְיָתָהּ. חֲמַתָּהּ. חִיעֶרָתָהּ. וְחַמְתָּהּ [ת]
22	הַעֲפָלָהּ. וְאֲנִי בְּנִתִּי שְׂעִירָתָהּ. וְאֲנִי בְּנִתִּי. מִגְדַּלְתָּהּ וְאֶ
23	קָה. בְּנִתִּי. בָּהּ. מֶלֶךְ. וְאֲנִי עֲשִׂיתִי. כָּלֵאִי. הַאֲשִׁרְתָּהּ [מ]יָן בִּקְרַחַהּ [ר]
24	[ת]קָה וְכִי. אֲנִי. בִּקְרַבִּי. חֶקֶר. בִּקְרַחַהּ. וְאִמִּי. לְכָל הַעַם. עֲשִׂי
25	[לכ]סִּי אִשִּׁי. בָּהּ. בְּבִיתָהּ וְאֲנִי. כְּרַחַתִּי. חֲמִכְרַחַתִּי. לְקִרְיָתָהּ. בֶּא[ר]
26	יִשְׂרָאֵל אֲנִי. בְּנִתִּי [ע]רֶר וְאֲנִי. עֲשִׂיתִי. הַמִּסְלָתָהּ. בִּאֲרִיץ
27	[אֲנִי] בְּנִתִּי. בָּהּ. בְּמֵת כִּי הִרְסָהּ אֹתָהּ אֲנִי. בְּנִתִּי. בְּצִרָהּ. כִּי עֲזָבָהּ אֹתָהּ
28	שֶׁה. דִּיבְנָהּ. חֲמִשָּׁן. כִּי. כָּל דִּיבְנָהּ. מִשְׁמַעַתָּהּ וְאֲנִי מֶלֶךְ
29	שִׂאֲתָהּ. בִּקְרַחַתָּהּ. אִשְׁרִי. יִסְפָּחָתָהּ. עַל הָאֲרִיץ וְאֲנִי בִּנְיָ[חִי]
30	וּבְנִתִּי. דְּבַלְתָּהּ וּבְנִתִּי. בְּעַל מֶעֶן. וְאֶשְׂאֲחָהּ. שְׁמִי. אֹתוֹ. מֶ
31	יָהּ הָאֲרִיץ וְחִירְיָתָהּ. יִשְׁבִּי. בָּהּ בִּי
32	[וִי]מֶרֶה. לִי. כִּמְשִׁי. רִדְדִי. הַלְתַּחְסִּים. בְּחִירְיָתָהּ וְאֶ
33	הִי. כִּמְשִׁי. בִימֵי וְעַל הִי עֲשִׂי
34	שֶׁה וְאֶ

- 1 I am Mesha son of Chemosh [nadab] King of Moab, [the D-]
2 ibonite. | My father reigned over Moab thirty years and I reigned
3 after my father. | And I made this high place to Chemosh in Karhah [and
this House of Sal-
4 vation because he has saved me from all the attacks and because he has
caused me to look on all my enemies. | O [m r] i
5 was King of Israel, and he afflicted Moab many days, because Chemosh was
angry with his [land]. |
6. And his son succeeded him, and he also said, "I will afflict Moab." | In my
days he spake thus,
7 And I looked on him and on his house, | and Israel kept continually perish-
ing. And Omri held possession of the land (?) of
8 Medeba. And there dwelt in it [Omri and his son and his grand] son forty
years. [But]
9 Chemosh [restored] it in my days. | And I built Baal-Meon and I made in it
_____ And I [besieged] (?)
10 Kirjathaim. | And the men of Gad had dwelt of old in the land [of Kirja-
thaim]. And the King of Israel built
11 for him [Kirjathaim] | And I fought against the city and took it. | And I
slew all the [men of]
12 the city, a spectacle to Chemosh and to Moab. | And I brought back from
thence the [altar of Jehovah, and put]
13 it before Chemosh in Kerieth. | And I caused to dwell therein the men of
Shiran; and the men of —
14 Sharath. | And Chemosh said to me, "Go and take Nebo from Israel." |
[And I —]
15 went in the night and I fought against it from the overspreading of the dawn
till noon. | And I [took it, and I]
16 [utterly destroyed] it, and I slew all of it seven thousand —
17 — for to Ashtor Chemosh had [I] devoted [them] and I took from thence
the
18 vessels of Jehovah, and I presented them before Chemosh. | And the King
of Israel [built]
19 Jahaz and dwelt in it while he was fighting against me. | And Chemosh drove
him from [before me; and]
20 I took from Moab 200 men, all told; | and I attacked (?) Jahaz and took it,
21 joining it to Dibon. | I built Karhah, the wall of the forests and the wall of
22 the hill (Ophel). | And I built its gates and I built its towers. | and
23 I made a royal palace, and I made reservoirs for the collection of the waters
in the midst
24 of the city. | And there was no cistern in the midst of the city in Karhah;
and I said to all the people, "Make
25 for you each man a cistern in his house." And I dug ditches (?) for Karhah
[in the road
26 to] Israel. | I built [A]roer, and I made the high way to Arnon.
27 I built Beth-Bamoth, for it was ruined, | and I built Bozrah, for it was
deserted (?).
28 And I set in Dibon garrisons (?); for all Dibon was submissive. | And I
filled (?)
29 — in the cities which I added to the land. | And I built
30 — and the temple of Diblathaim, | and the temple of Baal-Meon, and I raised
up there —
31 — the land. | And there dwelt in Horonaim —
32 Chemosh said to me, "Go, fight against Horonaim." | And I —
33 — Chemosh in my days
34 * * * * *

COMMENTARY ON THE INSCRIPTION.

Fortunately the general sense of the inscription is clear. The language is simple and quite Hebraic, and with the exception of a few difficult words, the task of the translator is mainly to exercise his ingenuity in filling out the gaps.

L. 1. M. Ganneau, as we understand, did not find on his impressions even a trace of the last part of the name Chemosh [nadab]. This “-nadab” is but a guess, suggested by a Chemosh-nadab of Moab, whose name occurs on a prism of Sennacherib. The suggestion of supplying [הר] at the end of the line is due to Nöldeke, and is no doubt right. The kings of Edom in Gen. xxxvi. 31–39 are each characterized by the name of their native cities; as Belah of Dinhabah, Jobab of Bozrah, etc. Schlottmann, Derenbourg, and Neubauer had all read “[son of] Ibni.”

L. 3. The word קריחה in biblical Hebrew means *baldness*. In that sense it is used by Isaiah and Jeremiah in their almost identical prophecy concerning Moab. Here it must mean Dibon, or, more probably, a quarter of Dibon,—some bald hill or acropolis that formed part of the town. Thus we have קריפה used in the sense of a bald, bare, Moabite hill, in Num. xxiii. 3, the only case in which the word is used in prose, from קרפה, *to scrape, to rub smooth*. We need a clearer view of the geography of Dibon to understand it fully. The meaning *Esplanade*, given by Ganneau, is quite inadmissible; and it does not suit the context to identify Karhah with Kirheres, as some have done. The missing words at the end of the line are read in various ways. All the students thus far have placed the perpendicular line that separates the clauses after בקריחה, beginning the next clause with the letter ב. We are persuaded that this is wrong, because the perpendicular line in question, which we make a part of a letter, rather than a mark of division, is preceded by the point which separates words; and in no other case in the inscription is a point used with a line. Besides, no suggested filling of the space makes the beginning of a new sentence, except Ganneau's, who says, “[I am called Me]sha, because, etc.” But we cannot conceive how this could be put into the right Hebrew letters to fill the space. Schlottmann and Derenbourg read ב[מרי]שע, “a high place of salvation,” (cf. Ebenezer, a stone of help), and Neubauer, who does not think this good Hebrew, suggests ב[גלל]הרשע, “because of the salvation.” Both of these are strained, and put the dividing line

where there is scarce a comma needed. Nöldeke gives it up as insoluble. The straight line must be part of a letter, because preceded by a dot. It may either be ג, י, ר, or ק. There is no room for other letters which contain this element. The reading we have suggested makes good sense, and there is just room for it. The only other possible reading we can conjecture, is יב[גדרי י]שע, "and I clothed myself with salvation," cf. Ps. cxxxii. 16, a reading which requires a Moabite use of בָּגַד in its original sense of "to cover," for which Hebrew uses לָבַשׁ. We have several parallel instances of the differences between Hebrew and Moabite usage.

L. 4. The word השלכן is very blind; we have translated, "the attacks." Perhaps it is a participle, attackers. The reading is doubtful, but we can suggest nothing better, unless the reading needs correction to המלכן, *the kings*, or השלשן, *the rulers*. At the close of this line all commentators fill up the blank so as to read "Omri." But as this makes the construction a little awkward, Nöldeke suggests that the two doubtful letters may read קס as well as עמ, and that there is barely room for קם[עמר]י, "Omri arose."

L. 5. כיהאנקה is a very awkward word. The sense is plain enough. It would seem that it ought to read כיהאנקה. Perhaps the stone-cutter dropped a ה, or perhaps a י, although we should not expect the imperfect. It is hardly probable that two Yodhs could have been contracted into one, and כיהאנקה is almost equally improbable.

L. 6. Our reading of בן at the end of the line is quite problematical, but, we think, quite as good as that of Schlottmann, who inserts כמש, "In my day Chemosh said, and I will look on him and on his house." Neubauer's אהלך could hardly exist beside the contracted imperative בן, l. 14, and, besides, is too long, as is probably כמש; and we may add, that the shape of the first imperfect letter of the word forbids its being א. In favor of the construction with בן, cf. 1 Kings xxii. 8, אֵל יֵאמֶר הַמֶּלֶךְ בֶּן.

L. 7. It would really seem, if our translation, which is the only easy one, be correct, that we ought to have a full stop after עלם. Derenbourg avoids the difficulty by making עלם here and in l. 10 the name of a town, Almon, cf. Num. xxxi. 46; but this is harsh. The phrase אֲבִירָה עִם כְּמִישׁ אֲבִיר יִשְׂרָאֵל reminds us of אֲבִיר אֲבִיר.

"Woe unto thee, O Moab!

Thou art perishing, O people of Chemosh!"

found in the old song recorded in Num. xxi. 29. We should expect

"the land," or "plain" of Medeba to fill the gap at the end of the line. The doubtful ע or פ at the beginning of the next line suggests עמק, "valley," if the geography would allow, or more plausibly בקע for the Hebrew בְּקָעָה, "a plain." But as Captain Warren's photograph shows no sign of ע, but does suggest the last stroke of צ, very likely the reading should be simply ארץ, "the land."

L. 8. This long gap of about twelve letters is the most unfortunate of any in the whole inscription, as it would have aided us in its chronology. It may be [עמרי ואחרי אהאב], "Omri and after him Ahab his son," as Nöldeke suggests, or it may be [הא ובנה ובן], he and his son and his grandson," as Senior Sachs reads in the *Revue Israelite*, April 21. In this line שח (from שָׁנָה) is certainly "years." It is used in this sense in the second Sidonian Royal Inscription and in the first *Umm-el-Awâmîd* Phœnician Inscription, and yet Neubauer says, in the *Academy* for April, that "in this sense it is neither Hebrew, Phœnician, Arabic, nor Chaldee." For the singular שח instead of the plural, cf. נְשָׁלָשִׁים יוֹם, Num. xx. 29. The passably good suggestion at the end of the line [יחז] "restored it," is from Nöldeke. Schlottmann reads [יחזא], which takes almost too much room; and Neubauer's six letters are quite inadmissible.

L. 9. How the lacuna at the end of this line should be filled we cannot tell. Schlottmann conjectures [וא שחרי] in the sense of "beleaguered." There is too much space for [וא בן].

L. 11. The gap in this line Schlottmann fills with חקר which is too short for the space. Neubauer inserts יעזר, "Jaazer," a pure guess. We prefer to repeat קרייתן, both here and in l. 10.

L. 12. ריה is a contraction for רִיחָה, "a spectacle," a word which we find in the Kethibh of Eccl. v. 10. Derenbourg makes it a similar contraction from the verb רעה = רצה, "to please," and refers to the fact that the name of the Moabitess Ruth is written רעית in Aramaic. The haphazard continuation of this line given in the translation roughly indicates the general sense.

L. 13. The unfortunate break at the end of this line makes it impossible to tell whether שרין means captains, or is the name of a tribe. Nöldeke translates it "Saron(?)," and supposes that the name of the second town or tribe whose people were removed to the captured city, ended in "hereth," which begins the next line. Derenbourg ingeniously suggests that "Shiran" is a name given in the Jerusalem Talmud to Sibmah, and that in Josh. xiii. 19, a *Zareth-shahar* (שחרה, cf. l. 14) is mentioned next to Sibmah.

L. 15. **רָקַע** means "overspreading," from **רָקַע**, "to expand," to spread out," from which sense we have **רָקִיעַ**, "firmament." But we are inclined to accept the suggestion of a writer in the *Jewish Messenger*, and read **מִבְקַע** by the change of one stroke, and translate, "from the breaking forth of the dawn"; cf. Is. lviii. 8, **אֲזַי רָבָקַע**, **כִּשְׁתֵּר אֹרֶךְ**, "then shall thy light break forth like the dawn."

L. 17. The letters **מז**, perhaps **מש**, at the beginning of the line are recovered from Captain Warren's photograph, and are not given by Ganneau. The gap at the end of l. 16 and the beginning of l. 17 is too great to supply except by a wild guess. Possibly there was recorded an offering of these slaughtered captives on the "high place," **מז**[ב], or simply to Ashtor "Chemosh," **מש**[כ]. The combination of the male and female names Ashtor Chemosh is new and remarkable. Whether it represents merely Ashtor of Chemosh, or a deity combining the male and female attributes, is doubtful. The gap in the middle of the line we fill **ההרמ[היהם]**, differently from other commentators.

L. 18. Ganneau entertains no doubt of the important word "Jehovah," which Captain Warren fails to recognize on his squeezes. But a careful comparison of his photographs convinces us that it is actually there. The first word, **וּאֶקְרָבָהֶם**, of which Ganneau gives but two letters, we complete from the photographs. Captain Warren has misread the letters.

L. 20. We translate **רִשָּׁה** "all told"; **רֹאשׁ** being used in enumeration in several Shemitic tongues. So Ganneau and Schlottmann, though Derenbourg, Nöldeke, and Neubauer translate it "captains." Schlottmann reads the next word **וְאֶשְׂאָה**, but it is probably **וְאֶשְׂאָה**, literally, "and I lifted it," i.e. "I suddenly put this little body of soldiers into the city." For the singular suffixes cf. **כָּלִי**, Exod. xiv. 7.

L. 21. Warren's photographs seem to make the first word, **לְסַפֵּר**, as suggested by Schlottmann, but the reading is yet in doubt. The grammatical connection is not clear, and we suspect that the gap at the end of the previous line is larger than is represented, and that the apparent verse division is part of an illegible letter.

L. 22. The first word, **הַנֶּפֶל**, seems to us plain enough on Warren's last photograph. Ganneau does not give it, and Warren reads it wrong. It is strangely illustrated by the "Wall of Ophel," **הַיְמִי הַנֶּפֶל**, cf. 2 Chron. xxvii. 3.

L. 23. The last part of this line is incomplete and very difficult. There is a blank near the end of the line, large enough to contain

two or three letters, which seems to be caused by a flaw in the stone. Perhaps, as in the Inscription of Estmunezer, an original flaw in the stone was skipped by the scribe, so that there is no real gap in the inscription. The word כלאי may mean "prisons," from כָּלָא, "to restrain"; and so Derenbourg reads, "prisons of the men." We make it, אֲשֵׁר [הַיָּם] מֵי, "reservoirs for the outpourings of the waters." We know that אֲשֵׁר and מֵי are used in this sense in the Bible, and only in connection with Moabite country. Perhaps אֲשֵׁר הַיָּמִים, cf. Num. xxi. 15, a fragment of an old local song, will suggest אֲשֵׁר [הַיָּם] מֵי as an even better reading; cf. תְּקִמֹת הַמָּוֶן, Gen. xxx. 38, and מִיבֹל הַמָּוֶן, 2 Sam. xvii. 20.

L. 25. The photograph shows us a ם before אש, where everybody expected כָּל. We therefore read לָכֶם. Probably the ל should go to the previous line. The word מְכַרְחָה or מְכַרְחָה is one of the hardest to explain in the whole inscription. It seems as if it must be derived from כָּרַח, "to cut," which makes the previous word כְּרַחִי, "I cut," and not כְּרַחִי, "I dug"; and yet in despair we have translated the phrase, "I dug the ditches in [the road to] Israel. We think that אֶרֶץ should be read at the end of the line. The three perpendicular strokes that are indicated in the *fac-simile* cannot well read anything else than רַח. Neubauer's א[נשי] cannot fit those strokes, nor is it idiomatic. Schlottmann's conjecture is ingenious א[חיה גֵּם הַ] שְׂרָאֵל, and he renders, "I decreed the prohibition of the fraternity with the people of Israel." This he illustrates by the fraternity, the "*hudhr*" which now exists in Kerek, the modern large town of Moab, between the Mohammedan and Christian quarters of the place.

L. 26. The מסלת בארנן is the מַסְלַת לְאַרְנָן of Isa. xvi. 2.

L. 27. Who must read כִּי הָיָה הָאָרֶץ, although the possible כִּי הָיָה הָאָרֶץ in l. 5, suggests כִּי הָיָה הָאָרֶץ. Warren's photograph relieves the text of doubt. At the end of the line Ganneau reads [עצ] with room for two more letters. This צ may equally well be ו or ר. Derenbourg reads [עצב הא], "for it was deserted." The only difficulty about this is, that it makes the next line rather void of pertinence. He reads it, [ירש], "and the chiefs of Dibon were fifty, for all Dibon was obedient." Schlottmann suggests for the gap in these two lines כִּי עֲצָרֵי בְּהֵמַת אֶשְׁ, "for the men of Dibon, fifty in number, subdued it," which gives a more connected sense, though רִשָּׁה, "chiefs," might be preferred to אֶש. In the Syrian campaigns which occurred at this time, not only the king of Syria is mentioned, but the number of subordinate leaders on either side, as Ahab's 232 "captains of the

provinces," שְׁרֵי הַמְּדִינֹת, and Benhadad's 32 מְלָכִים, or פְּחוּת, or שְׁרֵי הָרֶקֶב.

L. 28. As we have seen, Derenbourg and Schlottmann translate חמטן as a numeral, so also does Nöldeke. Neubauer fills the gap at the beginning of the line with וַאֲחֵמֶשׁ, and translates, "and I garrisoned Dibon with garrisons, for all Dibon was subdued." This assumes the meaning "armed," which nearly all ancient versions give to חַמְשִׁים.

L. 29. The first three legible letters in this line are טאח, possibly מאח. No sort of dot is after מ, so that אח can hardly be the Accusative sign. As Ganneau did not give the first letter, אח has been so regarded by most. Nöldeke translates בקרן, "cattle," a reading which requires us to translate יספתי, "collected," as if it were אספתי; but cf. l. 21 for its meaning. Schlottmann reads ואנקי מל[אתי ישבם] אח בקרן, "I filled with inhabitants Bikran," etc. But we know of no "Bikran," and this ought to be a prominent town. Besides, in accordance with Moabite idiom, we should read ישבן rather than ישבם; but the text requires either מ or ש, and does not close the word with this letter. Neubauer's reading needs no refutation. We are inclined to translate בקרן, etc., "in the cities which I added to the land," comparing l. 21, where a city probably is "added to Dibon." How the gap should be filled we are in doubt. It may record the imposition of tribute, [מ]טאח.

L. 31. Horonaim is used absolutely. It is a great pity that this gap occurs, as we would have learned whether this city was in the north or the south of Moab. If in the north, this is a continuation of the war against Israel; if in the south, it introduces a campaign against Edom. The readings, ישב בה ב[ני רא]י[בן], or ב[ני אר]י[ם], have been suggested, but there is hardly room for either.

L. 32. The remainder of the inscription is mainly illegible. It recounts the command of Chemosh to attack Horonaim, and, doubtless, the successful campaign against it.

RELATION OF MESHA'S PILLAR TO BIBLICAL HISTORY.

Our inscription reads like a leaf taken out of a lost Book of Chronicles. The expressions are the same. The tone of reverence toward the national God is the same. The names of gods, of kings, and of towns are the same. The historical books of the Bible give us the Jewish side of the centuries

of conflict with Moab. Here we have a chapter from the Moabite account of the same long feud.

As history first discovers the Moabites, they possessed the entire eastern side of the Dead Sea, reaching back some twenty miles to the territory of the kindred tribe of Ammon, which occupied the wilder hill country. The stream of Arnon, flowing westerly into the Dead Sea, divides Moab into two nearly equal portions. Just before the invasion of Canaan by the Israelites, the Amorites had seized the entire Moabite country north of the Arnon, and it was from the Amorites that the Israelites took it. The Arnon valley is deep and broad, and an excellent line of defence, and, so far as we know, was never crossed by Amorites or Israelites in their wars against Moab, unless David did so, in the campaign so briefly recorded in 2 Sam. viii. 2. No doubt a large Moabite population was found by Moses in these cities of Northern Moab, which had just been taken by Sihon from "the former king of Moab," probably Zippor, the father of Balak; at least, we may judge so from the fragment of the very early song preserved in Num. xxi. 27-30, of which the twenty-ninth verse reads:

"Woe unto thee, Moab!
Thou art undone, O people of Chemosh!
He hath given his sons that escaped
And his daughters into captivity
To Sihon, king of the Amorites."

But the Moabites never forgot that this was their ancestral country. Three hundred years later, when the king of Ammon seems to have headed a confederacy of the sons of Lot, he demanded this northern region of the Israelites; but Jephthah insisted that not Jabbok, but "Arnon, is the border of Moab" (Judg. xiii. 18).

The Moabites were a more peaceable, pastoral people than the Ammonites, and the story of Naomi and Ruth indicates a neighborly feeling between them and the Israelites. It may be a continuance of this relation, as well as David's own descent from Ruth the Moabitess, that led him to place

his parents in this country (1 Sam. xxii. 3, 4). The fact that the king of Moab now lived in Mizpeh, the place of Jephthah's residence, shows that the Moabites had succeeded in regaining their ancestral domain. But David reconquered the country in a very sanguinary war, which the history treats with remarkable brevity. Very likely, as Ganneau suggests, it was no special offence, but state policy, which compelled David to give back to the tribes of Reuben and Gad the territory which they had lost north of the Arnon; although Jewish tradition refers it to a breach of faith on the part of the king of Moab, who had killed David's parents.

On the division of the twelve tribes, Edom, on the south of the Dead Sea, fell to Judah, while Moab and Ammon fell to Israel. Ammon soon became independent, and probably Moab not long after. The Reubenites do not seem to have been a warlike tribe, and no doubt were forced soon to yield the sovereignty of their country to Moab. "Unstable as water, thou shalt not excel," was Jacob's description of the tribe, and Deborah complains that, in the war against Jabin, Reuben abode "among the sheep-folds," and that "for the divisions of Reuben there were great searchings of heart." Our inscription mentions only the "men of Gad," and by stating that Omri took possession of this region, it leaves us to infer that before this time the Moabites had recovered their control. It is probable that contiguous towns often had almost exclusively a Moabite or an Israelite population; while in others, perhaps, there was an Israelite and a Moabite quarter.

Omri was a man of more mark than most readers would suppose. He seems to have been the commander-in-chief of Baasha's army in his extensive campaigns, the murder of whose son Elah, but little more than a year after Baasha's death, found Omri commanding at Gibbethon in a long war against the Philistines. He could hardly have been fighting in this region south of the territory of Judah, except with the consent and aid of King Asa of Judah, and perhaps as general of the two armies. At any rate, we hear nothing

of any war against Judah after the death of Baasha; and Omri, who seems to have been a statesman, as well as soldier, always lived on friendly terms with Judah, and bequeathed this new policy to his descendants so long as they occupied the throne. It would not be strange if Asa's help may have secured him his success in his four years' contest for the throne with Zimri and Tibni. It was Omri that moved the capital from Tirzah to the city of Samaria, which he built; and, though known in the Bible as Samaria, his capital was known to the Assyrians, and is mentioned in their annals, as *Bit Omri*, the House of Omri. He is the only king of Israel before the warlike dynasty of Jehu whose might, גִּבּוֹרָתוֹ, is spoken of (cf. 1 Kings xvi. 27). His expedition against Moab is not mentioned in the biblical account; but we learn from our inscription that "he afflicted Moab many days."

We learn from the Bible that this dominion lasted through the reign of Ahab, and that Mesha paid an annual tribute of one hundred thousand lambs and one hundred thousand fleeced rams; a number almost incredible, especially as compared with the seven thousand seven hundred rams and seven thousand seven hundred he-goats given as tribute by the Arabians to Jehoshaphat (cf. 2 Chron. xvii. 11). With this number may also be compared the spoil taken by Moses from the Midianites in the war in which Balaam was slain, and in which it would seem that Midian and Moab were confederate, as they were in the sin of Peor. In this war, in which nearly all Midian was ravaged, if we may judge from the fact that thirty-two thousand unmarried girls were captured, the entire number of sheep captured was six hundred and seventy-five thousand (cf. Num. xxxiv. 32), but a little more than three times Mesha's annual tribute. On the death of Ahab, Mesha refused to pay this tribute (cf. 1 Kings i. 1), giving rise to the war for which Ahaziah may have made preparations during his brief reign, but which was not begun till the reign of Jehoram his brother, or, at least, was not carried on till that time with any vigor on the part of Israel.

Here we meet with a chronological difficulty. Our inscription says (l. 7, 8) that "Omri took possession of the plain (?) of Medeba, and dwelt in it his son forty years." The missing dozen letters may be simply *Omri and Ahab* "*his son*," or, perhaps, *He, and Ahab his son, and Jehoram the son of "his son."* At any rate, forty years of subjection are recorded; and we should expect, not round numbers, but accurate dates, on such a monument as this. But by no stretch of computation is it possible to make the campaign of Jehoram and Jehoshaphat against Moab, recorded in 2 Kings iii., or the battle of Jehoshaphat against the Moabites, Ammonites, and Edomites, recorded in 2 Chron. xx., fall more than some thirty-five years after the accession of Omri.

Whether these two campaigns belong to one war it is impossible to say with certainty, though they appear to be separated by the interval of several years. It seems to be represented (2 Chron. xx. 35) that Jehoshaphat's battle against the Ammonites, Moabites, and Mount Seir took place during the reign of Ahab, and so before the rebellion of Mesha. One battle took place at Tekoah, but a dozen miles south of Jerusalem; while that recorded in 2 Kings occurred after the army had gone around the southern border of the Dead Sea. At least one year, and probably several, intervened between the two battles. In both a complete victory is claimed, and yet in neither is it represented that the territory of Moab was permanently occupied. In the campaign recorded in 2 Kings, Jehoram, king of Israel, Jehoshaphat, king of Judah, and the viceroy of Edom (there was no king of Edom in the reign of Jehoshaphat), instead of attacking the rebellious Mesha by the shortest route from the north, went through Edom to the southern border of Moab, going round the Dead Sea. Whether this was to avoid the necessity of taking the wild Edomites through Judea, or for the purpose of relieving by this diversion the towns in the land of Gad and Reuben that may have been attacked by Mesha, we cannot say. After suffering severely from lack of water

in the wilderness, they completely ravaged the land of Moab as far north as Kir-hasereth, ten miles south of the Arnon. Here Mesha was besieged, and, in his extremity, sacrificed his son and heir to Chemosh in the sight of the besiegers. This must have frightened the superstitious Ammonites, and had a scarcely less effect on the armies of Jehoram and Jehoshaphat, which raised the siege, and returned home, probably by the same route that they came, though it is quite possible that they went northward, traversing all Moab. The question is, whether it was before or after this disastrous campaign that Mesha gained the victories which he celebrates.

Schlottmann makes a curious calculation, by which he allows forty years from the accession of Omri to that of Jehoram. He says the four years of Omri while fighting Tibni, the twelve of his undisputed reign, with the twenty-two of Ahab, and the two of Ahaziah, make the forty required by our inscription. But there are two errors in this computation. First, every fraction is counted in the Bible as a whole year, so that Ahaziah, who began his reign in the seventeenth, and ended it in the eighteenth year of Jehoshaphat, is said to have reigned two years; and, secondly, a comparison of the dates of the death of Elah (in the twenty-seventh year of Asa) and of the death of Omri (in the thirty-eighth year of Asa) would have shown that the latter must have reigned even less than twelve years, instead of sixteen.

Accepting the biblical chronology as correct, the forty years during which our inscription asserts that the kings of Israel afflicted Moab must have extended from the reign of Omri through that of Ahab and that of Ahaziah, and nearly through that of Jehoram. It is possible that Omri's subjugation of Moab may have occurred while he was general of the army of his warlike predecessor, Baasha; but if it occurred during his own reign, it is difficult to see how he could have found leisure for such a campaign during his three or four years' struggle with Tibni. This leaves not more than eight years (he reigned less than twelve), sup-

posing him to have taken no time to organize his government and recuperate his strength. Allowing, then, four years for his contest for the throne, and remembering that his predecessor died in the twenty-seventh of Asa's reign of between forty and forty-one years, and that Jehoram ascended the throne in the eighteenth year of his successor, Jehoshaphat (the date given 1 Kings i. 17 is an evident mistake, cf. 2 Kings iii. 1), and we have but twenty-eight years intervening before the accession of Jehoram over Israel. Both Derenbourg and Nöldeke suppose the victories recorded by Mesha to have taken place in the short reign of Ahaziah, and quote in proof (2 Kings i. 1) that Moab rebelled after the death of Ahab. If he then refused to pay any further impost, nothing would have been more natural than for him to cross the Arnon, and attempt to recover his ancestral territory. If such were the case, it would give an explanation of the fact that the allied kings attacked Moab by the difficult route from the south, instead of by the easier and shorter route from the north; for, if Mesha already held the Reubenite territory and the fords of the Jordan, it would have been difficult to cross it in his face, and it might be desirable, by attacking him from the south, to draw him off from the region which he had overrun. But this could have been scarce thirty years after Omri began his undisputed reign. If the figures given by Mesha and the dates of the Bible are all correct, it will be necessary either to suppose Omri to have conquered Moab while general of Baasha's army, as Joab conquered Ammon while David remained at Jerusalem, and thus bring the period of Mesha's victories within the reign of Ahaziah, or the first of Jehoram's reign; or else to suppose that our "forty years" began in a victory of Omri during the last of his reign, and then to carry the end of the period into the last of Jehoram's reign, or the first of Jehu's. There is some probability of the latter, as we are told that in Jehu's time God began to diminish the territory of Israel (2 Kings x. 32), and that then the Syrians smote the region east of Jordan "from Aroer, which is by

the river of Arnon, and Gilead and Bashan." It would be strange to have such language used if the region of Aroer and Arnon had for ten years been Moabite territory; and we may be confident that when Hazael with his Syrian army was ravaging the north of this region, the king of Moab would have been his willing ally in the south. The main objections to this view are, that no reference is made in our inscription to the campaigns recorded in scripture, and that Mesha's reign is thus considerably prolonged. But as his oldest son was but a boy, as we must believe, when he was sacrificed, during the first part of Jehoram's reign, this may give us no difficulty. We are inclined to agree with Senior Sachs (*Revue Israelite*, Apr. 21) in this arrangement of the chronology, which refers our monument to the very close of Omri's dynasty, or the beginning of that of his successor. If we are told that it was a "son" of Omri who, according to our inscription (l. 8) continued to afflict Moab until the end of the "forty years," we may reply that even Jehu is mentioned in the records of the Assyrian wars as a "son of Omri," so strongly did that king leave his impress on the nation.

LINGUISTIC PECULIARITIES.

It has been said of the Phenician inscriptions that their language differs so little from Hebrew as to deserve the name rather of a dialect than of a separate language. Much more is this true of the tongue of Moab, as here exhibited. So closely does it resemble biblical Hebrew, that there is scarce the least difficulty in translation, where the reading is clear; and even the idioms are the same. In the conjugation of הִלֵּךְ and of לָקַח we have the same contractions as in Hebrew; the Hiphil conjugation occurs repeatedly, not replaced by an Arabic Aphel or a Phenician Iphil; the verbs פָּעַל, פָּעַל, and פָּעַל are contracted as in Hebrew; the article is freely employed; and such idioms as "he has caused me to look on all my enemies" (l. 4) sound very familiar.

In verbs we find two very interesting variations from He-

brew, one of which is the Hiphtaal conjugation הִלְחָח. This corresponds to the eighth conjugation of Arabic, and is one of a series of *t* conjugations which we find fully developed in the Ethiopic and the Assyrian, though they do not appear in Hebrew in their normal form of the *t* following the first radical of the simple conjugation, except in verbs beginning with a sibilant.

Another peculiarity which the Moabite dialect shows, in common with the Arabic and Coptic, is one that has not been suggested, so far as we have seen, except in private correspondence by Professor C. M. Mead, of Andover, but in reference to which we entertain no doubt. It is the retention of the original form of the verbs לִי, which have in Hebrew been softened to לִי. Nöldeke explains the final י in such forms as וִינִי (l. 5), and אִנִּי (l. 6), as the suffix of the third person singular; the regular object being anticipated by the suffix, as is the practice in Syriac, and thus expressed doubly. But the Moabite language shows in no other respect an assimilation to Aramaic peculiarities, but rather to those of the southern Shemitic family; and it is much more probable that the original root has here been preserved.

The plural is formed in י, probably יִי; and the dual in י, probably יִי. The dual צִהִים, (l. 15), should probably be read צִהִי, as מ and נ are easily confounded.

The suffix of the third person sing., mas., is ה, probably הִי, as is not uncommon in Hebrew; cf. קָבָה, Num. xxiii. 8, though the prophecy of Balaam in most cases now gives us the modern Hebrew הִי. Thus also we have in l. 14, קָבָה for the Hebrew קָבָה, corresponding to the familiar שָׁלַח and שָׁלְמָה. The feminine termination of nouns seems to be generally ה, though we clearly have בָּמָה for בָּמָה. The Moabite שָׁמ corresponding to Hebrew שָׁמָה, is from שָׁמָה, like Hebrew בָּמָה from בָּמָה.

The orthography is more contracted than in Hebrew, but less so than in Phœnician. We have the full form from מְלָכָהּ, where the Phœnician has only מְלָכָה, and פָּנִי, where Phœnician

has פֶּנֶ. And yet we have, as in Phenician אנכי for אנכי, probably because the final הִי, which we know really existed in Phenician as in Hebrew, was unaccented. In the middle of a word the contracted form is the rule; as הוא for הוא, אִישׁ for אִישׁ, מִגְדֹּלְהִיָּה for מִגְדֹּלְהִיָּה, יָמִים for יָמִים, רִאשׁוֹ for רִאשׁוֹ, בֵּית for בֵּית, etc. In the case of הַיָּבֵן, הַיָּלֵה, and הַיָּרֵךְ, the י or י had consonantal, or at least diphthongal power. In זאת we seem to have a clear case of a quiescent letter, as also in בְּרִיחָה, l. 25, cf. וַיִּבְרָח, l. 7, and בַּח, *passim*.

In the syntax we find no deviation from the Hebrew, except it be the failure to repeat the article in הַבְּמִית זֶאת, l. 3; and this is not without Hebrew analogy, cf. הַדֹּר זֶה, Ps. xii. 8. In Phenician the article is seldom repeated; e.g. הַשַּׁעַר זֶה, *this door*, Umm. 1, 3.

THE FORMS OF THE LETTERS.

From an inscription like this of Mesha, dating back to the first half, and probably the first quarter, of the ninth century before Christ — the oldest purely alphabetical monument in existence¹ — we might expect to learn something of the history of the old Hebrew or Phenician alphabet — an alphabet of the greatest interest to us, not simply because in it were first recorded the most of our sacred scriptures, but because through Cadmus it has been adopted, with modifications, by ancient and modern civilizations. From it, through Palmyrene or a kindred script, with some modifications from the Assyrian arrow-heads, came the modern Hebrew letters; and the Ionian Greeks, and through them the world accepted the same alphabet bodily, shapes and names, for their own writing.

The importance of Mesha's monument in this respect has been somewhat overrated. We already knew the shapes of

¹ Unless we except an antique agate seal, bearing simply the letters לִשְׁלֹם, *belonging to Shallum*, of which de Vogüé gives a figure (*Revue Archæologique* for 1868, pl. 14). The oldest of the Greek inscriptions of Thera, written in pure Phenician letters, and like Phenician from right to left, are doubtfully referred to the same century as Mesha's monument.

the letters as far back as the seventh century B.C., and some seals and weights may be even earlier. The conclusion of Count de Vögué was generally accepted, that previous to the seventh century B.C. one general alphabet was common to all the region, from Egypt to the Bosphorus, and from the Mediterranean to the Euphrates, and that these letters in their archaic type were characterized by sharp angles and zigzag lines. Our monument proves this for a new race, the Moabites. Their alphabet and language were identical with those of the Hebrews and Phenicians. No doubt the same was true of their brother tribe of Edom, and of all the races which the Mosaic genealogy connects with Abraham, as also of the eleven Hamitic-Canaanite tribes of Gen. x. 15-17. If we could only find similar monuments of the Philistines and of the Rephaim, it would clear up the most perplexing points in Palestinian ethnography.

Taking as a standard the oldest existing alphabetic monuments, such as the Greek inscriptions from the island of Thera, and one at Eremopolis in Crete (which F. Hitzig explained as Phenician!), and the Phenician inscriptions found on some gems and seals, on a bronze lion of Khorsabad, and on the stone of Nora, we find the following variations worthy of attention.

We meet for the first time with the truly archaic ∇ as a simple triangle, exactly the Greek Δ . In most inscriptions ∇ and ∇ are nearly or quite indistinguishable. In his "Die Phönizische Sprache," Schröder gives no separate characters for ∇ , those for ∇ being enough. In some of the older inscriptions, as those from *Umm-el-âwâmid*, we find the stroke at the left of ∇ considerably shorter than in ∇ , and suggesting the form in Mesha's inscription. It is very interesting to find the oldest Phenician, or rather Canaanite ∇ identical with the Greek Δ , and thus indicating the period when the Greek alphabet was borrowed from the East.¹

The form of ∇ , a half-circle from the centre of which falls a straight line (∇), is not absolutely new, but interesting.

¹ Cadmus, ∇ , the East.

Deutsch has connected it with the Greek Υ , but this is doubtful. We have the same form several times, though not uniformly, in the Marseilles inscription, and a γ found on a Babylonian seal, and published by Rawlinson,¹ gives even more exactly the Greek Υ .

The η is our H, with two cross lines instead of one.

The ζ is almost precisely a figure 6.

The ψ is new, and evidently an older form than hitherto found. As ordinarily found in inscriptions, this letter has been likened to a church spire struck by lightning; but here we have the zigzag bolt resolved into three horizontal lines, which are crossed by a perpendicular stroke which represents the church spire. This form strikingly suggests the Greek capital Ξ , though the latter lacks the perpendicular line. But all Greek inscriptions from the fortieth to the seventieth Olympiad retain the perpendicular stroke, so exactly resembling our *Samekh*.

The ϕ is slightly different from old forms, being exactly like the Greek koppa (φ), though the perpendicular stroke often entirely crosses the circle.

A few of the letters show rounded outlines, and so, perhaps, vary from the most antique forms. Thus ϑ is a simple circle, and ϕ , γ , ζ have a circle or a half-circle as an element of their form. The first stroke of ψ and of ϕ is considerably curved, and that of η , μ , and ν is slightly so. The seal of Shallum, referred to in a previous note, has its letters of the most antique form, even more so than our monument, and the ζ is on this agate of Shallum precisely our capital L, instead of having the lower stroke rounded, as cut by Mesha's scribe. Comparing Mesha's alphabet with the archaic Phœnician given by Lenormant,² we find a variation in β , δ , γ , ν , η , ζ , and ψ . The curved lines of ψ and ζ show that Mesha's forms are less antique than those given by Lenormant. Our γ is older than Lenormant's form, and in reference to the others it is difficult to form a judgment.

The only letter wanting in our monument is θ .

¹ Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society. See plate, p. 228, no. xvi.

² Revue Archæologique, 1867.

ARTICLE IV.

ESCHATOLOGICAL STUDIES.

BY PROF. J. A. REUBELT, INDIANA UNIVERSITY.

“THE diversity and confusion in the doctrine of the church [on the subject of eschatology] is due, in part, to the conflict of the views represented in the New Testament itself. . . . It is impossible, I believe, to deduce from the scriptures of the New Testament a doctrine of the life to come; which shall fit all the texts, and satisfy all the demands of the subject; which shall harmonize the Apocalyptic vision of the ‘new earth’ and the new Jerusalem upon it, with Paul’s conception of being raised from the dead and caught up into the clouds to dwell with the Lord in the air; which shall harmonize any doctrine of final resurrection with the words of Jesus to the thief on the cross: ‘This day shall thou be with me in paradise.’”¹

Whoever regards the Bible as *the* book containing an authentic account of God’s self-revelation to man, cannot possibly agree with these utterances of Dr. Hedge, as they presume the existence of contradictions, hence of errors, in the Bible, even the absence of which would not necessarily prove its inspiration. Had he, however, made the same or similar remarks with regard to the eschatology of the church, present or past, he would have uttered an almost self-evident truth. For it is well known that not only the different branches of the church differ in their eschatological views, but also members of the same sects or parties; nor have the views of the same denominations been the same at all times, with, perhaps, the sole exception of the Greek church, whose characteristic, from the fifth century, has been immutability, or rather stagnation. The Latin church boasts, indeed, also

¹ Reason in Religion, by Dr. F. H. Hedge, pp. 373, 374.

of the same unchangeableness, but in vain ; and it is not to her disgrace, that this peculiar boast is unfounded, for where there is life there is progress, there is change — das Fertige is das Todte. It is, moreover, a fact of history, though deeply to be regretted, that in the great Reformation of the sixteenth century polemics, and other improper elements, mixed too largely with the subject under consideration, and prevented the truth, as it is revealed in the Bible, from being comprehended and appropriated in its totality by the Reformed church. — It is proposed to give in the following pages something like a consistent, though necessarily brief, statement of the Bible teachings on the subject of eschatology, setting forth at the same time, as we go along, the leading errors held on the subject, and their causes.

The large majority of Protestants believe and teach that the soul immediately after leaving the body goes to its final resting place — to heaven, if united by a living faith with the Redeemer, to hell, if impenitent and unbelieving ; according to the Roman Catholic church the soul goes to purgatory, if it is, indeed, in a state of acceptance with God, but not yet fit for heaven, on account of the unendured or unremitted temporal punishment due to forgiven sins, where it has to stay until, by suffering, a full fitness for heaven is acquired. These parties admit the resurrection of the body in some form or other, on the authority of the scriptures, without being penetrated, however, it is feared, by a sense of its absolute necessity.

Swedenborg, in keeping with his views of the universe, the nature of God, etc., denied the resurrection of the body, but believed in a setting free by death of the immaterial substance of the body from the coverings of the coarse material body, which immaterial substance serves, according to him, as a covering or body for the soul throughout eternity ; and this view is held by many, in a modified form, who do not accept the other peculiar views of the celebrated Swede. To us it appears, that one great and fundamental error underlies these and other more or less unbiblical views, making

itself felt at every step, although it is by no means consistently carried out in the various systems. This error is, in our opinion, the generally adopted Platonic view of the soul and the body as constituent parts of man ; of the relation of soul and body to each other ; on the nature of spirit and matter. It is well known that, according to Plato, the soul or spirit is a heavenly or divine essence, capable of living by itself in a disembodied state, and even having this disembodied existence for its normal state or condition ; that the body, as consisting of matter, is the source of sin and corruption, contaminating the soul by its very contact, and therefore constituting a kind of prison-house for the soul, for which reason death, or the separation of the soul from the body, is a liberation, a setting free of the former, an advancement to a higher state of existence. It is in perfect keeping with such premises to take it for granted that the soul of the good man goes, immediately after death, to heaven to enjoy full bliss and happiness. The resurrection itself is in this case not denied, but it is merely received on the authority of some Bible passages ; its absolute necessity, as growing out of the nature of the case, and as the necessary sequence of the work of redemption, which, without it, would be both subjectively and objectively not only partial, but even unreal, is neither felt nor admitted.

Now, as we understand the Bible, it teaches from beginning to end, not so much in isolated passages as in its whole tenor, as follows : that God is the absolute author of all things ; that he created both the human soul and body, as absolutely necessary for each other, neither being able to realize its end or destiny without the other, neither being complete or fully happy without the other ; that man came out of the hands of his Creator as a living soul, destined and constituted to become a quickened spirit ; that the process of the spiritualizing of the body by the indwelling spirit would have been gradual,—would have constituted man's time of trial or probation,—and would ultimately have secured the transformation of the earth itself through the element

of divine light and love. In his original state man was, indeed, subject to the possibility, but not to the necessity, of dying; but with the ultimate transformation of the body even this possibility would have ceased. Man fell by his own disobedience, and thereby severed his life-union with his Maker; falling thereby out of the element of divine love into that of divine wrath, and if he had been left in this condition to himself, he would have relapsed into the state, out of which Omnipotence had called him, viz. that of non-entity or unconscious entity. But God, out of compassion for man's wretchedness, decreed to save him, in consequence whereof love mingled again with wrath, and a possibility was afforded to man to be transferred out of this mixed element into that of pure love. As the work of redemption could not be accomplished by any physical process, as it could be accomplished in no other way, it was accomplished by the second person of the Trinity becoming man, in order to go, as such, through that process through which fallen man could no longer go, and to re-open for man a new and never-failing fountain of life. The incarnated God, Jesus, who was not subject to the law of mortality, died a violent death; but both by the laws of his being, and by divine omnipotence, he rose from the dead — the same body that had lain in the grave, was quickened, undergoing, at the same time, a change that was completed by the ascension, thus becoming a spiritual body. By a living faith the believer enters into a real life-union with his Saviour, and becomes thereby a partaker of his life — the sin-ruined image of God in the soul is thereby restored; but as the body, owing to the workings of sin, is no longer fit material for being spiritualized, it must die, and rest in the grave to the resurrection morn, while the disembodied soul is, indeed, in an abnormal and unnatural state, but nevertheless in the presence of Jesus, enjoying as high a degree of bliss as her abnormal condition admits of. There will be a first resurrection, embracing a portion of the sleeping believers, accompanied by a simultaneous change of many living believers: the state of things

thus ushered in is the millennium, during which Jesus and the raised saints will hold intimate intercourse with the living saints, while sin will be checked, Satan being chained. After the lapse of the millennial period the powers of evil will be unchained, and, after a temporary victory, their final and total overthrow will come; then follow the general resurrection and judgment; after this there will be no further change from one state or element to another; believers will be in their raised bodies, in the enjoyment of perfect bliss, in the element of divine love, in the new heaven, and the new earth, in the new Jerusalem; while unbelievers, likewise re-clothed with their bodies, are in the unmitigated element of wrath and wretchedness. This we believe to be the essence of the eschatology of the Bible, and these several propositions we shall now endeavor to establish.

That the subject of the resurrection of the body has lost its proper significance in the religious consciousness of the English-speaking part of the church, appears significantly from the fact, that English theology has not created, nor appropriated to itself, a term pregnantly expressive of the great fact, as transfiguration, glorification of the body, as German theology has done, which uses *Verherrlichung* or *Verklärung des Leibes*, as freely as we use justification or incarnation. But while this is the case with the English religious consciousness more especially, it is a fact, that almost the universal Christian consciousness of our day has lost sight of the *παρουσία*, which held so prominent a place in the consciousness of the primitive church, and of the apostles themselves, of Paul, as well as of the older apostles. The last question the apostles addressed to their risen Master was: "Lord, wilt thou restore at this time again the kingdom to Israel?" and they received the answer: "It is not your (privilege) to know the periods and epochs which the Father has appointed in his own power." Paul (1 Thess. v. 1) uses the very same terms (*χρόνους καὶ καιρούς*): "But of the periods and epochs ye have no need that I should write to you; for you know yourselves very well, that the day of the

Lord cometh as a thief in the night." The Lord before his suffering had most emphatically inculcated the duty of constant watchfulness, arising from the uncertainty of the time of his coming: "Watch, therefore, for ye know neither the day nor the hour wherein the Son of Man cometh" (Matt. xxviii. 13). Our consciousness contents itself with saying, that the experience of eighteen centuries has proved the (partial) error of the primitive church in supposing the coming of Jesus to be nearer at hand than it was, and that each individual's death is for him the coming of the Lord; but the very ease with which we dispose of this apparent difficulty, and put things so totally different in place of each other, shows conclusively that the coming of Christ has lost its proper place in our consciousness; has become, as it were, a dead letter, a painted flame, shows how great is our apostasy from the faith once delivered to the saints. If it had not lost its significance for us we should oftener think of it, and thus realize all the salutary effects which the very uncertainty in which the scriptures leave it is so eminently adapted to produce. It is true, no believer in the Bible as a divinely inspired book will purposely or willingly pervert any of its texts; but as slaveholders succeeded in finding authority in the scriptures for holding, buying, and selling human beings as slaves, so can any unscriptural theory put constructions consistent with itself upon any text of the Bible.

A very fruitful source of error is the denial of the difference between the two testaments or dispensations. In spite of the positive declaration of the Saviour, that the least in the kingdom of heaven is greater than John the Baptist (who was greater than all before him), which, as a matter of course, excludes him from the kingdom, we are told that the Old Testament worthies enjoyed all the Christian privileges, that they are called unhesitatingly Christians, and their condition after death is, of course, assumed to have been identical with the Christians'. In diametrical opposition to the theory combated are also the views of the Old Testament saints as to

their condition after death, which were far gloomier than even those of the Greeks and Romans. On this subject says Delitzsch in his *Biblical Psychology*: "That we read in the Old Testament of no division of hades into hell and paradise, but hear such complaints as Ps. lxxxviii. 11-15, has its ground in this, that in Israel the sense of death as a divine punishment was much keener than elsewhere, and in the absence of positive declarations of Jehovah they dared not to entertain brighter views of sheôl."

We are very well aware, that passages like Isa. xiv. 9 and Ezra xxxi. 16; xxxii. 17, etc. are declared, by the theology which we combat, to be poetical, fictitious figures, that have no truth nor force; the citation of Samuel is got rid of by representing it as jugglery or diabolical deception, or, as was but lately done, as a case of clairvoyance. But it is self-evident, that in this case exegesis is based upon, modelled by dogmatics, and not *vice versa*, as it ought to be. Samuel is not allowed to have been actually summoned from hades, because if in hades, he would not be in heaven, where the theology in question maintains he was, perfectly unconcerned about what the Bible teaches on the subject; Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob must have had on their resurrection bodies when God called himself, in speaking to Moses, their God, because it is taken for granted, that the soul immediately after death puts on its resurrection body; others appeal to this passage for proof, that the disembodied soul is in an unconscious state.

But what was really the state of the departed saints of the Old Testament? Instead of multiplying passages, we shall quote the words of Delitzsch, which he gives as the result of his thorough examination of the subject. He says: "The souls of the Old Testament dead, both of the believers in God the Saviour and of the godless, went into hades. The souls of the former were indeed, in the midst of hades, in God's hands, but, nevertheless, in a state of need of redemption, and under the effects of divine wrath. Their condition excluded the sight of God, and, while it was not a

state of unconsciousness and insensibility, it was a dream-like existence in the (apparent) forms of their former bodies.”¹

Olshausen says, in his comments on Matt. xxii. 15–46 passim: “Although allusions to a continued state of consciousness after death are not wanting in the Pentateuch (Gen. v. 24; xxxvii. 35; xlii. 38; xliv. 29, etc.), yet this life in hades appears as a cheerless one; and the Pentateuch views are entirely different from those of the New Testament (John xi. 25, 26; Phil. i. 23). If Moses and the other Old Testament writers had represented the condition of the disembodied $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ as a desirable one, as Paul did, they would have told what was not true. The New Testament statements concerning the state after death apply only to believers, whose $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ is illuminated by the Spirit of Christ, and thus prepared for the presence of the Lord. But even for believers this state is only a temporary, though relatively happy, one; they long for the redemption — ransoming — of their bodies (Rom. viii. 23; 2 Cor. v. 4).”

To this we may add that, in the times following the last prophets, the views of the Jews on this subject, as well as on many others, underwent considerable change. Their sense of God’s holiness being less keen, both by the ceasing of the prophetic spirit, and in consequence of their more frequent intercourse with the Gentiles, they divided hades into the abode of the blessed and the receptacle of the wicked, answering to the Elysium and Tartarus of the Greeks. These their notions, however, had an objective basis, were founded, in part at least, in truth, as we learn from the parable of Dives and Lazarus (Luke xvi.) The former division was called Abraham’s bosom or paradise, promised by the dying Saviour to the penitent thief, and cannot properly be said to have been in hades, since it was part of hades, as we learn from a number of passages, as John xx. 17; 1 Pet. iii. 19; iv. 6; Eph. iv. 9.²

¹ Bibl. Psych. p. 268.

² We are well aware that these passages have received different interpretations; the reality of Christ’s descent into hades has been flatly denied, and the corresponding article been struck out from the creed; Christ’s preaching to the

Of the departed saints in the new dispensation says Julius Müller: "The apostle ascribes (2 Cor. v. 3) to the soul in its intermediate state — between death and the resurrection — the quality of *γυμνὸν εἶναι*, which state is expressed by other writers of the New Testament by calling the departed *ψυχαί*, or *πνεύματα* (1 Pet. iii. 19; Apoc. vi. 9; xx. 4; Heb. xii. 23). This view undoubtedly implies that certain limits are set to the disembodied soul's manifestation of its life, as also appears from the *καθεύδειν* of the soul, as opposed to *γρηγορεῖν* in life (1 Thess. v. 10, etc.; 1 Cor. xi. 30), of course both in unison with the *ζῆν ἅμα σὺν Χριστῷ*. But this *γυμνότης* does, evidently, not imply that the soul is entirely stripped of all bodily mediation — is a retrogression of the soul into a merely spiritual existence. Some medium of self-manifestation adheres to the soul even after death; but this is such that in it the full reality of human life cannot come to view, and compared with the *σῶμα πνευματικόν* not only, but also with the earthly life, it is a retrogression — a condition less perfect than either."¹

On the same subject Delitzsch says: "That the souls of those that die in the faith of the risen Saviour fall into a real sleep is an idea that has not even the least support in the scriptures; it ought not to be entertained for a moment by a believer in Christ; for believers are at home with Christ, where they longed to be; they are in paradise, where Paul heard inexpressible words; they stand before the throne of God day and night, serving him in his temple, as John sees (Apoc. vii. 15), while he receives the revelation of what

spirits in prison has been denied, and the most forced and unnatural interpretation been given to the texts which plainly teach it; and by the "lower parts of the earth," to which Paul says that Christ had descended prior to his ascension, his incarnation or burial is said to be meant. But we do not deem it worth our while to refute these wild theories, and to establish the true one; the language of the scriptures is plain, and whoever reads it in order to be instructed by it, not to make it fit his own preconceived notions, cannot mistake it. The "lower parts of the earth" is, in the Old Testament language, synonymous with *hades*, and without Christ's descent thither, his death would not have been real.

¹ Doctrine of Sin, Part ii. p. 407.

was to come to pass prior to the final judgment and the glorification of the world. They see God and the God-man. This degree of bliss is at least within their reach, and many souls actually enjoy it; although there can be no doubt that after the resurrection of the body the condition of even the best will be bettered in many respects. The death of those that die in the Lord has only the semblance, no longer the nature of death.”¹ And again: “The redeemed soul’s element of life is the Godhead, into which the Redeemer has returned as the God-man. They were in God, even in this life, as to their inmost personal life; and now, having left this body of sin and death, they are at home with him (2 Cor. v. 6–8). They are naked (2 Cor. v. 3), having put off the mortal body, and not yet put on the glorified body. But they are, at the same time, not naked, for, being in the confines of eternity and infinitude, they are, for this very reason, in the presence of Christ, whom they had put on here, and whose glorified body is in a higher degree than here the earnest of the glorification of their own bodies. This is the great difference between the condition of those that die in faith in the Redeemer and the state in which the Old Testament saints were before their resurrection — that the former are in personal union with the glorified bodily life of the exalted Saviour, which they have for their home, for their tent. But not only this; the grace of God in Christ, which had adorned them, even in this life, with robes of salvation, adorns them also in the intermediate state with garments of glory. The body of Christ, with its doxa, is their garment, in so far as they are within eternity and infinitude, and the white garments promised by Christ to the victors are their garments within time and space as penetrated by eternity and infinitude.”²

In the main we agree with the views expressed by these eminent divines; but both Olshausen and Delitzsch have fallen into slight inaccuracies. The two passages quoted by Olshausen refer, not to the disembodied soul, but to the life

¹ Book of Psalms, p. 366.

² Ibid. pp. 383, 384.

on earth; and Apoc. vii. 15, as quoted by Delitzsch, seems likewise not to refer to the disembodied souls, but may be a vision of what was to take place in the development of God's kingdom on earth, or is a description of a scene transpiring after even the second resurrection. The passages wherein disembodied souls are unmistakably spoken of in the New Testament are very few, and they give but scanty information as to their state or condition, so that we are rather confined to analogy, to the life-connection existing here between Christ and believers, which the Saviour expressly declares is not severed by the physical death (John xi. 26 and passim). To the intermediate state refer the following passages: Apoc. xiv. 13: "Happy are the dead that die in the Lord henceforth; yea, says the Spirit, that they may rest from their labors; but their works follow with them." Their happiness is more of a negative than of a positive character; they are exempt from all sufferings; they have, moreover, the consciousness of having done their duty in life, of having secured their eternal welfare. The same in substance is said to the souls under the altar (Apoc. vi. 9-11). A white robe was given to each one of them, and it was said to them that they should rest yet a little time — *ἀναπαύσονται*. By this robe Delitzsch understands not, as Dante and others do, a garment woven by herself out of air, but the self-manifestation of the soul by means of the power that is peculiar to her.

The apostle Paul speaks in two passages of his own intermediate state (2 Cor. v. 8; Phil. i. 23), which appeared to him, as long as he looked only upon himself in his then surroundings, preferable to his state in the body.

The Roman Catholic church of our day, underrating the resurrection, and carrying out her Platonic views consistently, sends the souls of believers that are not perfect to purgatory; and some Protestants, agreeing in principle here with Rome, assume, on the authority of the badly translated and worse interpreted passage Rom. ix. 28, that the believer who is not

perfect before he dies, is made so by the Lord in, or before, the moment of death.

Says Möhler, in his celebrated Symbolism: "It is a perfect self-contradiction to assume that the soul, whether covered or not, enters heaven while stained with sin. The question, therefore, arises: How is man finally set free from sin, and the principle of holiness within him thoroughly quickened? Or, if we leave this world with any sinful stain upon us, how can we be thoroughly cleansed from it?" His answer is, that this is accomplished in purgatory. But Delitzsch answers: "In him whose inward being is renewed by God's grace, after laying aside the body of sin and death, the life of the spirit, so far checked and impeded, breaks forth in the presence of the realities of the invisible world with such force that everything sinful and its consequences must disappear, as mist before the rising sun."

As to the resurrection of the dead, its reality is readily admitted by the great mass of Catholics and Protestants; but its necessity is scarcely felt. It is admitted into the creed, into the consciousness of the church, on the strength of the positive declarations of the scriptures; it is also allowed to add something to the bliss of the redeemed; but it is, at the same time, taken for granted that the resurrection is something superadded from without, and that the disembodied soul might be fully happy without the resurrection of the body. This theory, Platonic in its origin and essence, comes here in conflict with itself. Platonism, consistently carried out, looks on the resurrection of the body as an impossibility, and as something in itself undesirable, if it were possible. The theory under review would fain do the same thing, and, in order to be consistent, ought to do the same thing. If the relation of the soul to the body is that of the bird to the cage, if death is a setting free of the soul, the re-caging of it is certainly not desirable, no matter of what material the cage is made. That it admits the resurrection on the strength of the declarations of the Bible does not alter the case, but accounts for its ab-

normal position and the doubtful worth ascribed to it. That we represent the common view correctly appears plainly from the following extract, which may be taken as a fair specimen of the general notion about our subject. We quote from the Comprehensive Commentary on 1 Cor. xv. 12-19; the compiler says: "Another absurdity following from this supposition [that there is no resurrection] is that those who are fallen asleep in Christ are perished. If there be no resurrection, they cannot rise, and therefore are lost, even those who have died in the Christian faith and for it. It is plain, from this, that those among the Corinthians who denied the resurrection meant thereby a state of future retribution, and not merely the revival of the flesh; they took death to be the destruction and extinction of the man, and not merely of the bodily life; for otherwise the apostle could not infer the utter loss of those who slept in Jesus from the supposition that they would never rise more, or that they had no hopes in Christ after life; for they might have hope of happiness for their minds, if these survived their bodies; and this would prevent the limiting of their hopes in Christ to this life only. On supposition, there is no resurrection, *in your sense*, no after state and life, then dead Christians are quite lost. How vain a thing were our faith and religion on this supposition! And this would infer that Christ's ministers and servants were of all men most miserable, as having hope in him in this life only (v. 19), which is another absurdity that would follow from asserting no resurrection. All who believe in Christ have hope in him; all who believe in him as a redeemer, hope for redemption and salvation by him; but, if there be no resurrection, or state of future recompence, their hope in him must be limited to this life; and if all their hopes in Christ lie within the compass of this life, they are in a much worse condition than the rest of mankind, especially at that time and in those circumstances in which the apostle wrote; for they had no countenance or protection from the rulers of the world."

This extract, which fairly expresses a widely spread way

of thinking and feeling on our subject, fully justifies our representation of it. It is freely admitted that, if the apostle had reasoned from his own point of view, his conclusions would have been false, and a theology strongly tinged with Platonism will always pronounce them false. To him who considers the body the prison-house of the soul, and death the liberation of the latter, the apostle's reasoning must be absurd, as he can say with great complaisance that the soul that has found, through faith in Christ, pardon and the elements of a life of holiness not only can be, but actually is, happy in heaven, even without the body. But the apostle draws evidently his conclusions, not from the eschatological views which are imputed to his Corinthian adversaries, but from his own views of the subject; for, not to press the fact that only the Stoics and Epicureans denied a self-conscious existence of the soul after death, who were few in number, and most unlikely to be among the first believers in a crucified Saviour, the apostle's whole argumentation does not admit the view assumed in the above extract. For had those Corinthian errorists taken a view of the resurrection as giving alone a self-conscious existence, the apostle could have said simply, and undoubtedly would have said, that the soul can live and be comparatively happy outside of the body; and he would not have been at a loss for proofs for Jews and Greeks. No, the fact is, the apostle reasons from his own views of the resurrection, which his Platonic opponents denied as impossible, or, possibly also, represented as having already taken place; like Hymeneus and Philetus (2 Tim. ii. 18), spiritualizing it so as to destroy its reality. The apostle writes: "But if there is no resurrection of the dead, neither has Christ been raised" (v. 13); "For if the dead are not raised, Christ has not been raised either" (v. 16); "But if Christ has not been raised, your faith is a vain thing; you are still in your sins; then, also, those that fell asleep perished" (vs. 17, 18). We call attention, in the first place, to the fact that in every one of these protases *εἰ* with the ind. is used, representing the apodosis as necessarily

given with the protasis, e.g. "if there be a God, he is good," i.e. goodness is a necessary attribute of the Deity, — without goodness there is no God; hence, without the resurrection of the dead, there is no resurrection of Christ; without the resurrection of Christ, there is no foundation for faith, no forgiveness of sin, and a loss of all the dead. In the apostle's argument the propositions "the dead rise not," and "Christ is not risen" are convertible terms, and we are fully justified in saying: "If the dead rise not, your faith is unfounded; you are yet in your sins; the dead in Christ are lost." But this reasoning our theology denies. Why? Because it conceives of a blessed existence of the disembodied spirit, of which the apostle has no idea. Forgiveness of sin, the restoration of the effaced divine image in the soul, are to the apostle not finalities, but means for a higher end; at most, links in a chain, which derive their real value only through the resurrection of the body. When God resolved to save mankind, this resolve embraced the salvation, the glorification of the body, not less than that of the soul, because the two factors are interdependent. Hence, if there is no resurrection of the body, God's whole plan is nothing, Christ is nothing, and any hope placed in him is nothing. The same train of ideas, and nearly in the same order, we find in Christ's teaching. John xi. 25, Jesus says: "I am the resurrection and the life; whoever believes in me shall live (*ζήσεται*), even if he should have died" (*ἐὰν ἀποθάνῃ*). And: "Every one that lives and believes in me shall surely never die." vi. 40: "But this is the will of him that sent me, that every one that seeth the Son, and believeth in him, shall have eternal life, and I shall raise him up on the last day." According to our common theology, the introduction of the resurrection here is quite gratuitous; whereas, in the train of Christ's ideas it appears as the legitimate complement of the whole process of redemption; eternal life without the resurrection body being neither possible nor desirable.

On Matt. xxii. 32 the Comprehensive Commentary re-

marks: "If when Abraham died there had been an end of him, there had been likewise an end of God's relation to him as his God; but at that time, when God spoke to Moses, he was the God of Abraham, and therefore Abraham must have been alive, which proves the immortality of the soul in a state of bliss, and that by consequence infers the resurrection of the body; for there is such an inclination of the human soul to its body as would make a final and eternal separation inconsistent with the bliss of those that have God for their God." Our author proves, or tries to prove, with this passage, the immortality of the soul; and this is the general use made of it. The advocates of the sleep of the soul appeal to it in proof of their peculiar notion; others infer from it that at the time Jesus uttered these words Abraham, etc., must have been clothed with the resurrection body, whereas the Saviour proves thereby the resurrection as something future. The case supposed by the Sadducees had reference to the future: "Now, in the resurrection whose wife of the seven will she be?" They fancied to make with their supposed case a *reductio ad absurdum* of the resurrection theory. As they recognized the inspiration of the Pentateuch alone, the Saviour calls their attention to a passage which, if understood in all its bearings, demolished their whole position. Whoever sustains a life-union with his Maker cannot be a prey of death, because he is not in the element of wrath, but in that of love; and this includes the certainty of the life of both soul and body. This is taught by the passage, and nothing else. The self-conscious existence of the soul during the intermediate state is neither taught nor denied therein, but must be gathered from other passages.

If the views so far advanced as to the necessity of the resurrection of the body are correct, the very identity of the resurrection body with the natural body is a matter of course. If the soul should receive, immediately after death, or shortly before the final judgment, a new tabernacle, adapted to its constitution and adequate to all its wants, by a creation *de*

novo, as has been held at almost all times by some, and is in our day maintained with more or less assurance, one thing would be certain, viz. that the natural body is not redeemed by Christ. But the apostle declares positively, to quote only one passage out of many, that the body is as much the object of the work of redemption or ransom as the soul or spirit: "We ourselves groan within us, waiting for the (full) sonship, the redemption of our bodies" (Rom. viii. 23). By sin both spirit and body have been exposed to divine wrath, have been placed in the element of the divine ὀργή, and in order to a complete ἀπολύτρωσις, the body, as well as the spirit, must be redeemed. But this ἀπολύτρωσις and the creation of a new body are widely different things. The spirit in being redeemed is not destroyed, and succeeded by a newly created spirit; but its identity, the principle of personality, is preserved amid all the changes which the soul undergoes; and the same is the case with the body, whose identity is also preserved. As there is in the soul a certain something, called by the apostle (Eph. iv. 23) the πνεῦμα τοῦ νοός, which serves as the laboratory of the Divine Spirit, as the point of contact with the divine — so there may be a similar something in the body which proves the germ of the resurrection body; not, however, by a natural or physical process, but by the development of the principle of divine life obtained through faith in the Redeemer. As his body could not be held by the grave, but had to arise to life, to die no more, so the body of believers cannot, owing to their life-union with the Redeemer, remain forever in the grave. — It has been held by individuals at different times, that a like or similar body would answer all the purposes of the resurrection body. So Aeneas of Gaza makes use of the following simile: "If a half-destroyed brass statue of Achilles was totally destroyed and replaced by a golden one, it would be the same Achilles" (ὁφθαίη ἂν χρυσοῦς ὁ πάλαι λαλκοῦς Ἀχιλλεύς, Ἀχιλλεύς μέντοι). That such a view falls far short of the scripture doctrine appears plainly from what has been said. Swedenborg's peculiar views have been

referred to before; and he protested against the ethereal body, which he gave to the saints immediately after death, being called or considered as a resurrection body.

Origen said: “*Λόγος τις σπερματικὸς ἐγκείται τῷ σώματι, ἀφ’ οὗ μὴ φθειρομένου ἐγείρεται τὸ σῶμα ἐν ἀφθαρσίᾳ.*” If from the *λόγος σπ.*, which remains uncorrupt, the rising of the body is to follow by a process of nature, the view must be rejected; but if the *λόγος σπ.* is viewed as likewise affected by sin, like the *πνεῦμα νοός*, but laid hold of by the Redeemer, sanctified and made by divine omnipotence the embryo of the resurrection body, the idea seems to be in accordance with the teachings of scripture. The apostle Paul uses the figure of the grain: “What thou sowest is not quickened if it do not die” (1 Cor. xv. 36). “And what thou sowest, thou sowest not the body that is to be, but a mere grain” (v. 37). “But God gives it a body as he pleases” (v. 38). Here divine omnipotence and the life-principle in the grain are the factors. This simile, like all other similes, does not hold good in every respect; the process being a nature process, and the product or result of the process not going beyond the nature of the parent grain; but these two points are different in the resurrection process, which is a process of grace, and not of nature. The whole subject is an article of faith, having been revealed to the apostle himself by a special revelation (*ἐν λόγῳ Κυρίου*, 1 Thess. iv. 15), and hence is not discoverable by reasoning from any premises, nor by analogy, nor by any advance in science; for here we apply the words of our opponents, only in an inverted order: *Where faith begins, there science ends*; and it can, therefore, not be supposed that any known subject could have been named by the apostle that would furnish a full parallel. But in the case given the co-operation of the two factors — God’s omnipotence working upon the *σπέρμα* of the body, quickening it and raising it in a glorified state to a never-ending life — is sufficient, and answers all demands of the case. Modern science teaches that the material elements constituting the properties of the body — bulk, weight, etc. —

are entirely changed, i.e. replaced by new ones, every seventh year. The ancient Fathers may not have known the exact length of the period in which the total replacement of the old by the new materials takes place; but the fact itself they knew, representing the principle of individual life which remains under all vicissitudes identical, as a rock in the current, against which the flowing waters constantly dash, forming foam and an eddy, leading the beholder to believe that the same particles of the element are constantly whirling around, while, in fact, they flow away, and are constantly replaced by new ones. This principle of life, which we would regard as a part of the (impersonal) spirit of God individualized, constitutes individual identity — the identity of the body; for it seizes upon and appropriates to itself, according to its own laws, the surrounding elements of matter. This principle, now, is as we conceive, laid hold of by Divine Omnipotence, and quickened and surrounded with glorified matter, which it lays hold of and appropriates according to its own individual laws; so that each spirit, on being united with its resurrection body, knows at once that it has entered the identical body from which it was separated in death.

From what has been said, it is sufficiently plain that the resurrection body is not immediately after death created, or raised for the soul. The time when this glorious transaction will take place is as much a subject of divine revelation as the transaction itself. High authorities, as Olshausen and Kurtz, have been referred to as teaching that the soul is immediately after death clothed with the resurrection body; and the following language has been quoted from their writings to sustain the appeal: "The idea of a purely spiritual existence throughout eternity is unknown to the apostle; without corporeity there is no happiness and no endless life of the creature."¹ A created spirit without a corporeal form to confine it to time and space, to bound its being and give it a species of form, must either be eternal, or, since this

¹ Olshausen, on 2 Cor. v.

is inadmissible, be dissipated into nothing and utterly lost. Hence within the province of created life the possession of a body is the condition of all things; without a body, without a fixed abode, the homeless spirit would be carried everywhere, and be dissolved into nothing—be utterly lost” (Kurtz). But it is well known that these two eminent scholars taught nothing of the kind; their language as quoted merely implies their strong conviction that the body is not a prison-house of the soul, but a constituent part of man, without which the soul could never be really happy; also that the disembodied soul creates for itself, after the pattern of the earthly body, some etherial body to serve as its covering unto the resurrection morn. The New Testament represents throughout the resurrection of the body, both in the first and the second resurrection, as future.

There will be two resurrections, viz. the first, which is partial, and the second, which is universal, embracing all mankind.

Of the first, Paul treats in 1 Thess. iv. 15–17, saying: “We that live and are left till the parousia of the Lord, shall certainly not get ahead of those that went to sleep; the Lord himself will come down from heaven, and the dead in Christ shall be raised first; then we, the living ones, shall be caught up with them in clouds, toward a meeting of the Lord in the air.” The dead here spoken of are raised and clothed with the resurrection body, while the living believers put on the same resurrection body over their natural bodies, i.e. they are changed without having previously died. Of the same event treats Apoc. xix. xx. From xix. 19 we learn whom Paul means (1 Thess. iv. 15) by the *περιλειπόμενοι*; from Apoc. xx. 4–5 we learn who will be raised and who not on that occasion; those that will be raised will reign with Christ a thousand years. That the raised saints will be, during that whole period of time, with Christ in the air, as Dr. Hedge supposes, is not intimated by a single word. In the air the meeting takes place, and beyond this nothing is said; it is, moreover, neither said, nor is it probable, that

Christ and the raised saints will be all that time on earth, and maintain a perceptible intercourse with the inhabitants of the earth. Such grossly carnal views have thrown suspicion on the whole event under consideration ; but whoever can get rid of the first resurrection, as detailed here, by his exegesis, can get rid of anything and everything in the Bible which does not suit his fancy. But we may be asked here, what becomes of the second or general resurrection, according to Paul ? We say, that we find the latter indicated, though not detailed, in 1 Cor. xv. 24 by *εἶτα τὸ τέλος*. The *τέλος* takes place not only after the second coming (millennium), but also after the general resurrection, viz. when he shall have surrendered, *ὅταν παραδῶ τὴν βασιλείαν*, the kingdom to God, etc. In v. 25 it is said, that Christ must reign until the Father shall have put all his enemies under his feet (this reign lasts one thousand years), the last enemy that is destroyed is death. The destruction of death follows the general resurrection (Apoc. xx. 12-15) ; *then* the work of redemption is finished — all that could be saved are saved ; and for those that are not saved, salvation is no longer possible ; and *then* transpires what John speaks of in Apoc. xxi. and xxii., and from this we learn what Paul means by saying (1 Cor. xv. 28), “that the Son also shall be subject to him who subjected all things to him, that God may be all in all.” Christ’s mediatorial office ceases, he renders now, as it were, an account to God of his work ; but personally he remains what and who he is, the God-man, or rather the Incarnated God, and the King of the redeemed, throughout eternity.

Before closing this Article we call attention to two more points. Christ is called the first fruits (*ἀπαρχή*, 1 Cor. xv. 23), which has reference both to rank and time. Before Christ no one had risen, and from the nature of the case, could have risen, so as to put on the resurrection body (John xii. 24) ; those individuals that had been raised by Jesus during his ministry, as well as those that had been raised by Old Testament prophets, died again a natural death, so that their case is specifically different from the resurrection

of Christ and that of the dead ; Abraham was in "Abraham's bosom," when God called himself his God, and this was in hades. Nor were Moses and Elias clothed with the resurrection body at the transfiguration. Of Elias it is, indeed, almost universally assumed that he appeared then and there in his resurrection body ; but there is absolutely nothing in the account of the transfiguration by the three evangelists, that legitimately leads to such a conclusion. By Matthew (xvii. 9) the whole event is called a vision (*ὄραμα*) ; Luke says, that the three disciples did not know what they said, meaning that they were in a trance, their powers of reflection being suspended, which state was necessary to enable them to perceive the two visitors from the other world ; but if they had been in their resurrection bodies this would not have been necessary, since the apostles and disciples saw their risen Master so often in a state of perfect wakefulness, and without experiencing any of those feelings of horror which seize upon human nature invariably when it is brought in contact with the spirit world. From 2 Kings ii. 11, etc. it merely follows that Elias was taken away in a miraculous manner from the living, but by no means that he experienced then and there a change similar to that described by Paul in 1 Thess. iv. The whole analogy of faith, and the express language of Paul (1 Cor. xv. 23), moreover, are against this theory. — We have purposely not referred, so far, to the celebrated passage 2 Cor. v. 1-9, not because we think that it contradicts the views advanced in this Article, but because it has received so widely differing explanations that we deemed it best not to refer to it in proof of any theory. Now, however, that we have stated, and, as we think, established our theory, we shall examine it as closely as we can in order to learn its real import. In examining the text and the comments of Christian scholars on it, the conviction has forced itself upon us, that the greatest difficulties arising therefrom have their origin in faulty or imperfect translations. We venture to give the following rendering, with a few explanatory notes :

1. For we know that if our earthly tent-house shall have been taken apart (at Christ's second coming, *ἐὰν καταλυθῇ*, which represents the thing as uncertain; i.e. the apostle does not know whether he shall live or not unto the coming of Christ), we have a building (which is) from God, a house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens (hence, the apostle reasons, we shall not lose anything whether we die before that event or live to see its consummation).

2. For in this (tent-house) we also groan, earnestly desiring to put on (over our natural body) our house from heaven (i.e. we desire to put on the resurrection body without dying, and this involuntary groaning which we have in common with the whole creation (Rom. viii. 19, etc.) is conclusive evidence that our desire shall, in the main, be gratified).

3. Since, indeed, we shall be found (by the Saviour at his coming, if we die before that event) also clothed (with the resurrection body), not naked. (And yet we long to put on the resurrection body over our natural body.)

4. For we, that are in the tent, groan also, being weighed down, since we do not desire to put off (our earthly bodies), but to put on over (them our resurrection body), that the mortal may be swallowed up by the life.

5. But he who has prepared us for this very thing (the being clothed with the resurrection body) is God, who has given us also the earnest of the Spirit.

6. Being, therefore, always of good cheer, and knowing that dwelling in the body we are from home from the Lord;

7. For we walk by faith, not by sight;

8. (But being cheerful, we also prefer rather to dwell out of the body and to be at home toward the Lord.)

9. We, therefore, also strive earnestly, whether we dwell in the body or out of it, to be well pleasing unto him.

The apostle teaches us in this passage, according to our understanding it, the following: he knows, i.e. has the highest degree of certainty, that there is a resurrection body in store for every believer; this his certainty is founded on the sympathy of all nature, which, like human nature, in-

voluntarily longs for a total redemption from all the dismal effects of sin, and this universal longing will be gratified. The apostle does not know whether he shall live unto the coming of Christ; but he apprehends no loss whatever from this ignorance, nor does it diminish his present joy, because he will either live unto the coming of Christ, and if so, be clothed over with the resurrection body without dying, a blessing which he greatly desires; or he will die before that event, in which case he will be raised with the sleeping saints and put on the resurrection body even before the living are changed (1 Thess. iv. 15-17). The apostle's certainty is enhanced by the fact, that it is God who has commenced the work of redemption, and who will complete it, having given to believers the earnest of the Spirit.¹

The foregoing we believe to embody the substance of the eschatological teachings of the scripture, both of the Old and the New Testament, and the impossibility spoken of by Dr. Hedge, to deduce from the New Testament a doctrine of the life to come, which shall fit all the texts and satisfy all the demands of the subject, does, as it seems to us, not exist. The "new earth," and the "new Jerusalem" upon it, find in our doctrine their natural place, being the cap-stone of the whole edifice of redemption; Paul's "conception of being raised from the dead and caught up into the clouds to dwell with the Lord in the air," appears as a link of the wonderful chain of God's redemptive dealings with men; even the paradise promised by the dying Redeemer to the

¹ Our view of this passage agrees, on the whole, with Delitsch (Bibl. Psych., pp. 375, 376). Luther, Calvin, Hofmann, and Olshausen, understand by *ἐνδυσάμεναι* (v. 3), the putting on of the righteousness of Christ, taking *οὐ γύμνοι* as appositional to *ἐνδυσάμεναι*, and translate accordingly: "provided, that we shall be found (by Christ at his coming), as such that have put on his righteousness, not naked" (under which condition alone we shall be changed by him). Julius Müller (Doctrine of Sin, Part ii. p. 405) takes *ἐνδυσάμεναι* = *ἐνδεδυμένοι*, and translates: "Provided that we shall be found by Christ being still clothed with our natural body." But, not to press the fact that the part. aor. is not the same in meaning as the part. perf., this whole view rests on a mistranslation of v. 1, *ἐὰν καταλυθῇ*. Others, again, as Roos, Nitsch, and Martensen, understand by *ἐνδυσάμεναι* a putting on of an intermediate covering of the soul.

penitent thief has its proper place, and we doubt not, that each and every eschatological passage will, on trial, be found to find a natural place in the system, throwing more light on it and thus proving its truth.

We are, at the same time, aware that what we have set forth as the teachings of the Bible contravenes many fondly cherished notions of many good people. The condition which we assign to the disembodied soul, from the moment of its separation from the body unto the resurrection morn, may be especially unwelcome to many; they prefer taking it for granted that the disembodied soul is at once received by a convoy of angels, and conducted before the throne of God, to receive the approbation of the Supreme Judge, and to be perfectly happy at once. Others prefer believing that the soul is at once, at its entering into the spirit-world, clothed with its resurrection body. But with regard to these and similar views, we must say that we do not find them in the Bible; and the Bible is our only source of information on this all-important subject.

As to the possibility of disembodied spirits visibly or audibly reappearing to the inhabitants of the earth, we think that it is presumed in the Bible (Luke xxiv. 39), but, it being altogether useless (Luke xvi. 31), and evidently against the will and law of God, it ought not to be tested by any means whatever.

The foregoing was written when the Westminster Review for October came to hand. It contains a favorable notice of Schenkel's "A Sketch of the Character of Jesus, translated from the German," by which we find our views, expressed in this Article, fully confirmed. Schenkel denies the physical or bodily resurrection of Jesus, while he would fain believe in him as "the risen, the glorified, the exalted One, who is as such the living One in his community, and therefore with his community, until the end of the world." His translator says of the scope of the Essay: "Schenkel's work breathes a different spirit [from that of the works of Strauss and Renan]. He believes in the im-

perishableness and glory of Christianity, and in the incomparableness of the person of the Saviour. He intends, not to destroy, but to build up; not to oppose Christian faith, but to purify and renew it," positions which Schenkel himself will undoubtedly recognize as his own. We say, we find our views confirmed in this Essay; for Schenkel is consistent in carrying out his views of the body and its relation to the soul, which he holds in common with many orthodox, to their legitimate sequences. If the body is a burden to the imprisoned soul, if the soul is set free by death, and can get along, not only without the body, but even fare better without it than in it,—if this be the case, there is certainly no reason why the body should ever be raised; and this applies to the Saviour with as full force as to any son of Adam. And let the *necessity* of the resurrection be disposed of, and there is no difficulty in disposing of its *reality*. So far, then, Schenkel is consistent; but when he attempts to reconcile his theory with the scriptures he evidently fails, and shows great weakness. So he says: "Only thus [i.e. on the supposition that his disciples were convinced of the reality of his physical resurrection], it is thought, can be explained the sudden revival of the faith of the disciples, which by preceding events had been so much shaken." How does he storm this impregnable position? He says: "This entirely overlooks the fact that the women showed courage even before the resurrection of Jesus: that the apostles, on the evening of the first day of the week after the crucifixion, before they had had an appearance of Christ, were, according to the later tradition, assembled (Luke xxiv. 33) in Jerusalem, and therefore were neither scattered nor wholly disheartened." The women went, as early as their religion allowed, to the grave, in order to embalm the body of the beloved Master. In doing this they showed no more courage than many other women have shown under similar circumstances; but who in his sound mind can believe for a moment that they would have proclaimed the fact of their Master's resurrection, if they had found his dead body, as

they expected? But what shall we say of the other remark of Schenkel? Had he read Luke xxiv. 33, 34? And is not the very opposite of what he affirms said there? Did not the assembled eleven and their friends surprise the two remaining disciples with the news that "the Lord has been raised indeed, and was seen by Simon"? Would we not find it natural if the more intimate friends of the Crucified One had once more assembled by night prior to their dispersion, even without any reports as to his resurrection? And did not the words of the women, and especially those of a man like Peter, make it an imperative duty for them to meet? And yet the fact of their meeting under these circumstances is to be a proof that the conviction of the reality of the Saviour's bodily resurrection, on the part of the apostles, was not necessary in order to revive their greatly shaken faith! It is really heart-sickening to see that men of Schenkel's standing should impose so much upon themselves or others, in order to maintain a preconceived notion or theory. Nor does he succeed any better in what he affirms of the importance of the bodily resurrection in the estimation of Paul, when he says: "To a faith resting upon the external fact of a bodily resurrection of Jesus, the apostle Paul has denied all worth; for he says: 'Though we have known Christ after the flesh, yet now henceforth we know him no more thus. If any man be in Christ, he is a new creature; the old has passed away; all has become new'" (2 Cor. v. 16, 17). Had Dr. Schenkel forgotten, when he penned this sentence, what Paul said in 1 Cor. xv. 8, an Epistle which he himself recognizes as genuine? Did Paul know what he was saying? Or had his views, in the short time intervening between the writing of his first and his second letter, undergone a total change as to the importance of the resurrection of the body? The one or the other of these positions Schenkel must take, or admit that he wholly perverts Paul's meaning. That he does the latter, no unprejudiced mind can doubt.

ARTICLE V.

THEORIES OF THE RESURRECTION.

BY REV. J. C. STOCKBRIDGE, D.D., PROVIDENCE, R.I.

IF a man has been living in a pleasant and costly house, and is about to vacate it, it is not an unworthy curiosity which leads him to ask what probably will be the destiny of the mansion in which he has dwelt. Will it remain as it has been? As the process of decay goes on in its different parts, will the work of reconstruction also go on? Or will it at last crumble into ruins, and on its foundations another structure, more elegant, better adapted to meet the wants of its occupant, be reared? These questions have reference to the house of wood and stone in which we dwell. But we, as immaterial beings, live in another house. Erelong we are to depart from our dwelling-place. The "earthly house of our tabernacle" is to be "dissolved." Is it an idle curiosity which prompts us to inquire concerning the destiny of this tabernacle?

In the following pages it is not the writer's purpose dogmatically to state and defend any formal doctrine of the resurrection, but to set forth some of the theories which have been advanced on this subject. It will be seen, in the course of the examination, that the most diverse views have been held by men whose claim to be sincere disciples of the Great Teacher, no one can reasonably dispute; and, therefore, no particular theory can be set forth as a sure test of orthodoxy.

The earliest belief on the resurrection, so far as we can ascertain, may be traced to the sacred writings of the Hindoos. In these writings, however, this belief does not take the form of a distinct doctrine, but is embraced in the system of pantheism which was worked out with such minuteness of detail by the Oriental mind. In so far as that system came

to be received by other nations, who derived their highest culture from the East, the doctrine of a bodily resurrection, followed by an absorption into the Deity of the matter of which human bodies are composed, was necessarily held.

It is a debatable question whether the doctrine is taught in the earlier Jewish writings. Calvin maintains that the oldest of Jewish writers, the author of the Book of Job, firmly believed in the literal resurrection of the body, and quotes the famous passage "I know that my Redeemer liveth," etc. (Job xix. 25, 27), in support of this opinion. It is conceded, however, we believe, by the best biblical critics, that a different and more correct rendering of this passage gives to it such an interpretation as to exclude the idea that the patriarch had any reference to a future resurrection of the body. The language of Jehovah to Abraham on the occasion of the renewal of his covenant with him is supposed by Rabbi Manassah Ben-Israel to furnish proof of a literal resurrection: "And I will establish my covenant between me and thee, and thy seed after thee, in their generations, for an everlasting covenant, to be a God unto thee, and to thy seed after thee. And I will give unto thee, and to thy seed after thee, the land wherein thou art a stranger, all the land of Canaan, for an everlasting possession, and I will be their God." On these passages the good rabbi says: "It is plain that Abraham and the rest of the patriarchs did not possess that land. It follows, therefore, that they must be raised in order to enjoy the promised good, as otherwise the promises of God would be vain and false. Hence, therefore, is proved, not only the immortality of the soul, but also the essential foundation of the law, to wit, the resurrection of the dead." It is hardly to be supposed that the "father of the faithful" put any such interpretation as this on the promise of God. Knapp asserts, without any qualification, that there are no distinct intimations of the resurrection of the body in the writings of Moses or in the Psalms. Passing down to later writers, we find, in Isaiah, a striking passage: "Thy dead men shall live; together with

my dead body shall they arise. Awake and sing, ye that dwell in dust; for thy dew is as the dew of herbs, and the earth shall cast out the dead." Calvin thinks that these words teach the doctrine of the resurrection of the body, without a doubt. Alexander, a high authority, and with him several other expositors, take the ground that the apostrophe of the prophet is figurative, and conveys the idea that "God would raise his people from the dust of degradation and oppression, where they had long seemed dead, though only sleeping." Still, they contend that the figure here used implies that the belief of a resurrection of the body must have been prevalent, otherwise the figure would never have been used—an opinion which those who deny a literal resurrection controvert by calling in question the rhetorical principle assumed, viz. that an image used to describe or represent anything allegorical must be an image commonly known and understood, as otherwise it will not answer the purpose for which it is assumed. As well might we say, it is contended, because Jesus declares to him that overcometh "I will give him the morning star," it appears from hence that the belief that saints will be presented with stars was at that time a common or popular belief. Or, because John says that he saw "a woman clothed with the sun," it appears from hence that to suppose a woman might be clothed with the sun was at that time a common and popular superstition. The second verse of the twelfth chapter of Daniel apparently teaches the doctrine of a literal resurrection: "Many of them that sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake, some to everlasting life, and some to shame and everlasting contempt." It would seem that no words could more plainly teach the doctrine of a literal resurrection; and those who maintain this theory point to it, as they think triumphantly, as a strong proof-text in their favor. On the other hand, it is said that "the evidence, even to a cursory view, of the context, would seem to indicate pretty clearly that the period referred to can scarcely be that of the 'end of the world,' as that phrase is usually apprehended; for

the sequel obviously announces an extended order of events, stretching onwards through a long lapse of centuries to the time, whatever that be, when Daniel himself is to stand up in his lot at the end of days."

It will be seen that there are honest differences of opinion as to whether the doctrine of a literal resurrection is taught in the Old Testament. Traces of the doctrine begin to be found after the captivity. The allusions, however, are few. Indeed, the absence of almost all historical knowledge of the period which intervened between the restoration of the Jews and the advent of our Lord suggests a sufficient reason why we still remain ignorant of the development and progress of religious opinions in that age. Some passages in the Second Book of Maccabees, it is thought, imply a belief in the doctrine. In vii. 9, one of the seven martyrs condemned to die because they refused to eat swine's flesh is represented as saying to King Antiochus: "Thou like a fury takest us out of this present life; but the King of the world shall raise us up, who have died for his laws, unto everlasting life." Another of the seven said: "It is good, being put to death by men, to look for hope from God, to be raised up by him." It may be that these words of the dying martyr convey the idea of a literal resurrection of the body.

Coming down to the time of Christ, we find numerous intimations that it was the commonly received opinion that, as man is a compound of soul, body, and spirit, his highest perfection in the future life could not be attained without a restoration of the primitive condition of his being. While an intermediate state of existence was recognized, this state was represented as being an imperfect one, because the soul was separated from the body. They spoke of it as a state of nakedness, and of the soul as longing to be arrayed once more in its terrestrial garment.

That Christ and his apostles taught a doctrine of the resurrection of the dead, there can be no doubt. But what precisely was *the* doctrine which they taught has given rise to endless discussion. The general theories, subject, as we

shall see, to various modifications, may be reduced to two; viz. the one which regards the resurrection as literal, and and the other which regards it as spiritual.

The baldest, most literal theory is, that at some future time there will take place a "revivication of the human body, after it has been forsaken by the soul, or the reunion of the soul hereafter with the identical body which it had occupied in the present world"; or, as one of the most determined opponents of the literal theory has stated it: "The uniform, orthodox doctrine of the Christian church has always been, that in the last day the identical fleshly bodies formerly inhabited by men shall be raised from the earth, sea, and air, and given to them again to be everlastingly assumed. The scattered exceptions to the believers in this doctrine have been few, and have ever been styled heretics by their contemporaries." It is asserted that the vague conceptions and misapprehensions which prevailed at the time of the advent were rectified by Christ and his apostles, and the gross, sensual ideas which had been entertained on the subject were dissipated by them. We find the subject thoroughly discussed by the Fathers, and very early there came to be used by them the expression *ἀνάστασις τῆς σαρκός*, for the *ἀνάστασις τῶν νεκρῶν* of the New Testament. Justin Martyr maintained the literal theory. Even cripples, he tells us, will rise with the body which they had while on earth, to be perfectly restored by Christ after the resurrection at his second coming. He has some speculations with regard to the relation of the sexes to each other, that have the merit, to say the least, of being somewhat original. Tertullian wrote a treatise "concerning the resurrection of the flesh." To the objection that certain members of the human body will be of no use in the future life he replies, by saying that the members of the human body are not only designed for the mean service of the visible world, but also for something higher. Even on earth, he tells us, the mouth serves not only for the purpose of eating, but also to speak and praise God. He made the following happy discovery, in what manner he

does not inform us, which we commend to the attention of those who maintain what may be called the "germ theory": "The teeth are providentially made eternal to serve as the seeds of the resurrection." The views of Origen, as we might suppose from what we know to have been the tendencies of his mind, were less literal. Gregory of Nazianzen, Gregory of Nyssa, and Basil the Great sympathized with Origen. The former says: "The mortal body is that which perishes; but the soul is the breath of the Almighty, and the deliverance from the fetters of the body is the most essential point of future happiness." Jerome maintains the most literal view. Of the resurrection bodies he says: "*Habent dentes, ventrem, genitalia, et tamen nec cibis, nec uxoribus indigent.*" Augustine, who also held the literal view, has some remarkable speculations on the subject. He thinks that all the raised will have the stature of the full grown man, and, as a general rule, will be thirty years old, this being our Lord's age when he entered upon his public ministry. "Every man's body," he says, "however dispersed here, shall be restored perfect in the resurrection. Every body shall be complete in quantity and in quality. As many hairs as have been shaved off, or nails cut, shall not return in such enormous quantities to deform their original places; but neither shall they perish; they shall return into the body, into that substance from which they grew." But to what part of the body they shall return, or how a fearful disfigurement of the body is to be prevented by the addition to it of so large an amount of matter, he does not inform us. He arrives, after much sage reflection on the subject, at the conclusion, that the resurrection will take place towards evening, assigning as his reason what would hardly be recognized by modern astronomers as a very potent one, that, before the resurrection can take place, the heavenly bodies which rule over matter must first cease to move, and that would be about sun-down. Some of the later followers of Origen, we are told, "held that the resurrection bodies would be in the shape of a ball—the mere heads of cherubs."

The speculative tendencies of the mediaeval doctors found an extended field over which to expatiate in the discussion of the doctrine under consideration. Such questions as the following were themes of most thoughtful and earnest inquiry: "Will the resurrection be natural, or miraculous? Will each one's hairs and nails all be restored to him in the resurrection? When bodies are raised, will each soul know its own body, and enter it, or will the power of God distribute them as they belong? Will the deformities and scars of our present bodies be retained in the resurrection?" Thomas Aquinas maintained that "no other substance would rise from the dead than that which existed at the moment of death"; a conclusion from which one shrinks a little when he thinks that the body which he may happen to have at death would be the last one he would choose to be the habitation of his soul through the ages of eternity.

From what has been said, it will be perceived that both the literal and the spiritual theory were held, the one by some of the ablest earlier theologians of the Christian church, and the other by names equally honored and renowned. Those who adopted the literal theory, certainly, were not sparing in their speculations on the subject, giving us very minute details of what, in their judgment, would be the peculiar characteristics of the resurrection bodies that should come forth from the earth and the sea. Those who held the spiritual view avoided this minuteness of detail, without doubt, for the simple reason that there was so little that was tangible that they could grasp.

If, now, we come down to more modern times, we find both the theories to which we have referred held by writers on the subject. Sometimes the literal theory has been presented with a nakedness and strictness of conformity to what seems to be the meaning of some passages of scripture, that leave no doubt where we ought to rank him who sets it forth. President Davies makes use of the following language, which it is evident he wishes to be received by no means as a rhetorical flourish, but as a plain statement of

what is to take place in some distant period in our world's history: "Now, methinks, I see, I hear the earth heaving, charnel-houses rattling, tombs bursting, graves opening. Now the nations underground begin to stir. There is a noise and shaking among the dry bones. The dust is all alive and in motion, and the globe breaks and trembles as with an earthquake while this vast army is working its way through and bursting into life. The ruins of human bodies are scattered far and wide, and have passed through many and surprising transformations. A limb is in one country, and another in another, here the head, and there the trunk, and the ocean rolling between." In a foot-note President Davies says: "This was the fate of Pompey, who was slain on the African shore. His body was left there, and his head carried over the Mediterranean to Julius Caesar." "Multitudes have sunk in a watery grave, been swallowed up by the monsters of the deep and transformed into a part of their flesh. Multitudes have been eaten by beasts and birds of prey, and incorporated with them; and some have been devoured by their fellow-men, in the rage of a desperate hunger or of an unnatural, cannibal appetite, and digested into a part of them. Multitudes have mouldered into dust, and this dust been blown about by winds, and washed away with water, or it has petrified into stone, or been burnt into brick, to form dwellings for their posterity; or it has grown up in grain, trees, plants, and other vegetables which are the support of man and beast, and are transformed into their flesh and blood. But, through all these transformations and changes, not a particle that was essential to one human body has been lost, or incorporated into another human body so as to become an essential part of it. And now, at the sound of the trumpet, they shall all be collected, wherever they were scattered; all properly sorted and united, however they were confused, atom to its fellow atom, bone to its fellow bone. Now, methinks, you may see the air darkened with fragments of bodies, flying from country to country to meet and join their proper parts."

“Scattered limbs, and all
The various bones, obsequious to the call,
Self-moved, advance — the neck, perhaps, to meet
The distant head; the distant legs, the feet.
Dreadful to view, see, through the dusky sky,
Fragments of bodies in confusion fly
To distant regions, journeying there to claim
Deserted members, and complete the frame.
The severed head and trunk shall join once more,
Though realms now rise between, and oceans roar.
The trumpet's sound each vagrant mite shall hear,
Or fixed in earth, or if afloat in air,
Obey the signal wafted in the wind,
And not one sleeping atom lag behind.”

No one, in reading this passage, can doubt that President Davies held the doctrine of the literal resurrection of the body in the most literal way. It may be said that this distinguished divine had a remarkably vivid imagination, and that he did not mean that this should be taken for sober, simple reality. But we quote from two writers of more recent times, neither of whom can be charged with presenting the workings of fancy for the assertions of honest conviction. The venerable Dr. Spring, in his work on the “Glory of Christ,” says: “Whether buried in the earth, or floating in the sea, or consumed by the flames, or enriching the battle-field, or evaporate in the atmosphere, all, from Adam to the latest born, shall wend their way to the great arena of the judgment. Every perished bone and every secret particle of dust shall obey the summons, and come forth. If one could then look upon the earth, he would see it as one mighty, excavated globe, and wonder how such countless generations could have found a dwelling beneath its surface.” And President Hitchcock sets forth his view of the resurrection in language equally striking: “When the last trumpet shall sound, the whole surface of the earth will become instinct with life — from the charnels of battle-fields alone, more than a thousand millions of human beings starting forth, and crowding upward to the judgment-seat.”

We think no one can mistake the theory which these eminent and godly men mean to present. It is evident that they believed that the construction of the scripture passages is to be made so literal, that all that is said about bones flying through the air, heads buried in one place flying to meet trunks buried in another place, is not mere imagination, but simple fact, and that these fearful phenomena will certainly take place. Their occurrence being suspended upon the fiat of a divine, omnipotent will, there can be not the least shadow of doubt they will take place.

As a modification of the strictly literal theory, we find another set forth in the *Bibliotheca Sacra*, for January, 1853. The Article, which is an exceedingly able one, was written by Professor D. R. Goodwin, then of Bowdoin College, in reply to one which appeared in the *Democratic Review* of September, 1849. The writer of this latter Article took very strong ground against the literal theory of the resurrection, urging with apparently great force the grave philosophical difficulties in the way of such a resurrection. Professor Goodwin's statement is this: "In order to a proper resurrection of the body it is not necessary that the body raised should be identical with any former body whatever, in such a sense as that it must consist of precisely the same elementary particles, neither more nor less, arranged in precisely the same combinations and relationships." He then proceeds to present what he says he will not dignify by the name of a theory, but only as an hypothesis among many hypotheses: "The principle of animal life in man is presumed to be distinct from the intelligent and immortal spirit; but, as it is not itself a substance, when abstracted entirely from the body, it ceases to be. Now, we will suppose, on such premises, that in the economy of human nature it is so ordered that when the spirit leaves the body this vital principle is neither lost nor annihilated, on the one hand, nor, on the other, able to keep up the functions of the animal system, but lies dormant, in connection with so much of the present natural body as constituted the seminal principle or

essential germ of that body, and is to serve as a germ for the future spiritual body; and this portion may be truly body — material substance — and yet elude all possible chemical tests and sensible observation, and all actual physical dissolution. On the reunion of the spirit with this vital dormant principle and its bodily germ, we may suppose an instantaneous development of the spiritual body, in whatever glorious form God shall see fit to assign it. Such a body, so produced, would involve a proper resurrection of the present body. The new body would be a continuation of the old, a proper development from it. The germinal essence is the same; the vital principle is the same; the conscious spirit is the same. The organic connection between the two is as real as that between any present body and the seminal principle from which it was first developed in the womb, as that between the blade of wheat and the bare grain from which it grew.”

This hypothesis of Dr. Goodwin is certainly an ingenious one, perhaps we may say, plausible. It relieves the literal theory of the resurrection of many of the objections which those who reject it bring against it. We see no more legs and arms flying through the air from continent to continent. Headless trunks no longer wait for the heads from which they have been severed, and the myriads of particles which once entered into the formation of the human system, scattered through infinite space, return not to effect the reconstruction of the body raised from the grave. Still, the philosophical difficulties are not removed, any more than they are in the baldest literal theory. They may be somewhat more refined, but they are yet there. For he who questions the truth of the literal theory asks: *What* and *where* is this germ out of which the future resurrection body is to be developed? Does it leave the body “in articulo mortis”? If this germ be a material substance, as it would seem it must be, if it “leaves” the body, then it must have the properties of matter. It can therefore be seen and handled, or in some way be subjected to the tests of the senses.

Has any one ever seen it, and if so, what is its appearance? If it does not escape from the body at death, what becomes of it in the process of complete corruption which goes on? If out of this germ one body has already been developed, why may there not be just reason to suppose that another body has sprung from it in the past, as to suppose that another body will spring from it in the future? And if one, then an indefinite series in the past to be followed by an indefinite series in the future? Moreover, if the law of nature remain unaltered, the body to be developed will be like the one that has been developed, with reference to which we can certainly say that God made it to be adapted to the sphere of earthly existence—to live on the earth, to feed from its fruits, to increase and multiply,—in short, to perform all the functions appropriate to a being who is to live and act on the globe which it was fitted by divine wisdom to inhabit. Unless, then, the other world be like this, such a body would not be adapted to it. If we adopt a “physical theory of another life,” it must be such a theory as will allow for the action and full play of the members of the human body as now constituted. The opponents to a strictly literal theory ask: Are you prepared to adopt such opinions as these? When our Lord says that in the other world “they neither marry nor are given in marriage, but are as the angels of God,” does he not necessarily imply that there will be a most radical change in those who are permitted to enter the heavenly state?

Before closing that part of our subject which has reference to the literal theory, let us refer to the views of two divines held in high repute among English theologians. The first is Richard Baxter, the depth and earnestness of whose piety will be questioned by no one who is familiar with his writings. It will be seen that he is far from maintaining the views which have been set forth by some of the writers from whom we have quoted. “The union of the natural soul with the body which has been formed anew is the resurrection.” “Baxter,” says Dr. G. P. Fisher,

“indulged in curious speculations on the mode of the resurrection. He conjectures that the vital principle [*anima vegetativa*] is pure, ethereal fire, and that a portion of this fire adheres to the perishing body, another portion is indissolubly connected with the mind, and forms a spiritual organism. The subtile flame which invests the soul has only to touch the dust, and the body is restored to its pristine life and proportions.” We take an extract, also, from the writings of William Archer Butler, late Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Dublin. Referring to a class of objectors who assert the impossibility of the recovery of the earthly body, or any part of it, he says: “those who think this difficulty really unanswerable have but to conceive the resurrection body a totally *new* organization, and the objection at once disappears. But those who consider this solution an evasion of the scripture doctrine have merely to reflect that the resurrection of the same body will only require that that *small portion* of the frame which is essential to existence at any period of our life (for the body, we know, is in incessant change) should be preserved for each individual, and attached to the separated spirit. The whole mass of material necessary for this purpose to all the past and future generations of mankind would be but a speck upon the surface of the globe. It would require a secret arrangement of Providence to prevent a confusion of the portions intended for each; but it cannot with any plausibility be pretended that the formation of a field of grass, which requires much the same accurate distribution of the particles of matter, is not a difficulty to the divine agent as insuperable as this.” It will be admitted, we think, that the views of Baxter and Butler are more subtile and refined than those held by theologians represented by such men as President Davies.

Before passing to the consideration of what may be called the spiritual theory, it may not be amiss to glance for a moment to the views of that profound thinker and writer, Archbishop Whately. “It is not a little remarkable,” he

says, "that the prevailing opinion should be (as I believe it is) that the very same particles of bodily substance which are laid in the grave, or otherwise disposed of, are to be reassembled and reunited at the resurrection, so as to form, as it is supposed, the same body in which the soul resided before death, and that scripture teaches us to believe this. This is not a notion authorized by scripture, and liable to many objections hard to be answered." The theory of Whately does not make it necessary that into what the apostle calls "the glorious bodies" of the saints in heaven there should enter a single particle of the old body, not even the "germ" of Dr. Goodwin. "Some, I believe, cling to the notion," he says, "that the same bodily particles must be reunited at the resurrection, from an impression that otherwise it could not be called 'a resurrection of the body.' I find no fault with them for believing this; and if they insist that the phrase 'resurrection of the body' ought not to be used except to express this sense, though I do not agree with them, it would be foreign to the present purpose to discuss that question, since the interpretation of scripture is not concerned in it; for throughout scripture the phrase 'resurrection of the body,' or 'resurrection of the flesh,' nowhere occurs." He then makes use of the following illustration: "If any one's house, for instance, were destroyed, and another man promised to rebuild it for him, he would not be considered as failing in his promise because he did not put together all the former materials. If the materials were equally good, and if the man were put in possession of a house not less commodious and beautiful than he had before, that would be to all practical purposes sufficient. Those who sleep in Christ will be raised up with bodies which they will feel to be their own, and which will, for that reason, be their own, but which will be far different from the 'earthly tabernacles' (that is, tents) of flesh and blood in which they dwelt here, and will be made like unto the 'glorious body of Christ.' If we are to enter on a new kind of existence, we must be qualified for it by a new kind of body."

Having thus considered the literal theory of the resurrection under the threefold aspect of reconstruction from the actual particles which formerly composed the body, reconstruction from a germ lying unvitalized during the intermediate state, and reconstruction from entirely new materials, we pass on to an examination of the spiritual theory.

The doctrine of a literal resurrection was very early opposed. The Gnostics rejected it, as, from the views which they held respecting matter, it might be supposed they would do. Indeed, nearly all the sects that were denounced as heretics by the orthodox church denied a literal resurrection of the same body. Those who maintain the spiritual theory, first of all, enter upon a critical examination of the expression *ἀνάστασις τῶν νεκρῶν*. They think that they find in the word *ἀνάστασις* only the idea of future existence; and the sentiment is meant to be conveyed by them that “the person—the sentient, intelligent being who now yields to the universal sentence, and appears to become extinct.—shall again be restored to life by entering immediately upon another sphere of existence. This existence will, indeed, be in a body, but it will be a spiritual body—some exceedingly refined and ethereal substance with which the vital principle is connected, but of the nature of which we are ignorant, and which we denominate ‘body’ from the inadequacy of language to afford any more fitting term.” The word *ἀνάστασις*, translated ‘resurrection,’ it is contended, denotes, not a rising of the material body from the grave, but simply existence beyond the grave. It is thought that the word is very clearly used in this sense in the controversy of our Lord with the Sadducees, who attempted to puzzle him with reference to the future condition of the wife who had had seven husbands. The Sadducees, supposing that, of course, he held to the Pharisaic idea of a literal resurrection of the body, presumed that they would confound him by proposing the question they put to him. His answer is deemed to be sufficient proof that he did not hold the Pharisaic dogma of a future literal resurrection of the identical buried body:

"As touching the dead, that they rise, have ye not read in the book of Moses, how in the bush, God spake unto him, saying: I am the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob? He is not the God of the dead, but the God of the living." 'You mistake,' he says to these captious inquirers, 'you mistake the doctrine in two points. You do not rightly comprehend, in the first place, the nature of the state in which the raised are. Your gross, sensual ideas respecting it are all out of place. They who enter that state become *ὡς ἄγγελοι*, like the angels. You err, in the second place, in supposing that there can be no resurrection but that which you think will take place at some far-off, indefinite period. The pious dead have already risen. The patriarchs are now with God.' Martha, standing by the grave of Lazarus, her mind dwelling on the Pharisaic doctrine of a coming of the bodies of the dead, exclaims: "I know he shall rise again in the resurrection at the last day." Jesus replies: "I am the resurrection and the life. He that believeth in me, though he were dead, yet shall he live, and whosoever liveth and believeth in me shall never die." It is contended that these words involve the theory of a spiritual, rather than a literal, resurrection of the dead.

The spiritual theory is thus developed by Rev. E. H. Sears, in his "Foregleams of Immortality": Man's resurrection is the putting forth at death of new existence, just as the decaying seed puts forth the blade. Its decay is necessary, in order to release the life and beauty that were impressed within its foldings. Death and resurrection describe processes, one the inverse of the other, but the former helping on the latter, and preparing its triumphant way. Our future being is insouled and inurned in our present. The spiritual body is included elementally in our present mode of existence, with its perceptive powers all ready for their enlargement. The soul is not a metaphysical nothing, but a heavenly substance and organism, fold within fold. The material falls off, and the spiritual stands forth.

and fronts the objects and breathes the ethers of immortality."

And thus, according to this view, the resurrection really takes place immediately at death. There is no long waiting, while the body is returning to the dust, and its particles are scattered throughout the universe, at length to be brought back and formed anew into what is called a spiritual body. The theory takes us out of the graveyards, and away from the corruption and dismal horrors of the tomb. It declares that at death we go out of the tabernacles in which we have dwelt, and with which we shall have nothing more to do than the worm with the covering in which it has lived until it has emerged into its butterfly condition. These bodies have already performed the functions assigned them by God. But we are not only "unclothed," but at once "clothed upon" by our house from heaven. At once the spiritual body is inhabited by the soul which has gone forth from its earthly tent, a new organism, in the construction of which no atom of the old material body enters, and which is as different as it is possible to conceive from that old body.

It will be seen that the theory does not accord with that usually laid down in the standards of orthodox faith, and it is considered downright heresy. It may be interesting to see how the advocates of the theory interpret those passages of scripture which are regarded as being such strong proof-texts in favor of the literal theory. And as the fifteenth chapter of 1st Corinthians is more largely occupied with a discussion of the doctrine than any other part of the New Testament, special attention is directed to the interpretation of this chapter, and it is believed that all the statements of the apostle best harmonize with the spiritual theory. The apostle says: "Every man in his own order. Christ the first-fruits, and afterwards they that are Christ's at his coming." The advocates of the spiritual theory reason thus: "As the first-fruits of the harvest are a sample of the whole, and being presented in the temple denominate the remainder pure and holy, so Christ, who after his resurrection was

presented in the heavenly temple, may be justly regarded as an exemplar and type of the state of those who fall asleep in him, and an argument that they are not, as dead bodies were, among the polluted things of the world, but holy to the Lord, and admitted to his presence. The whole harvest began to be gathered in immediately after the presentation of the first-fruits, and it would be a very violent construction of the analogy to suppose it to imply that hundreds and thousands of years might elapse between the resurrection of the grand Precursor and that of the mass of his followers."

"But some man will say, How are the dead raised, and with what bodies do they come?" This is the question which the believers in a literal resurrection propose; and the answer the apostle gives is very pointed, and at the same time subversive, it is thought, of the literal theory. "Thou fool, that which thou sowest is not quickened except it die; and that which thou sowest thou sowest not that body that shall be, but bare grain, it may chance, of wheat or some other body." If the perfected plant is not the identical seed raised up, with no loss of its particles, out of the ground, so the spiritual body of the saint in glory is not the identical body raised from the grave. But here the advocates of the spiritual theory have to meet the "germ" hypothesis. It is very clear that the new plant rises from the outgrowth of a germ in the old one. "We do not see," say they, "but we must be forced to the admission of some kind of germ, which is developed from the one that is the nucleus, the essential vital principle, of the other." We have already intimated that those who cannot accept the bald literal theory fall back upon this idea of the expansion of a germ in every body that is buried, out of which germ comes the new resurrection body. This germ is regarded by the literalist as being material, although there is a variety of opinion as to the character of the matter of which it is composed. The old rabbis taught that there is an immortal bone in the human body, called by them "luz" — "ossiculum luz" —

which is the germ of the resurrection body. They maintained that this bone one might burn, boil, bake, pound, bruise, or attempt to bruise, by putting it on an anvil and submitting it to the strokes of the sledge-hammer, but all in vain. Anatomists, we believe, have thus far been unable to discover this bone. We have already seen that one of the Fathers held that the teeth are immortal. As from those of Cadmus armed men sprang, so from ours will the resurrection bodies be developed. Mr. Samuel Drew, who wrote on the "Identity and General Resurrection of the Human Body," adopts the germ theory, although he does not pretend to decide in what part of the body the germ is. His theory, in brief, is this: "There are four distinct stages through which those parts constituting the identity of the body must necessarily pass, in order to their attainment of complete perfection beyond the grave. The first of these stages is that of its elementary principles; the second is that of an embryo in the womb; the third is that of its union with an immaterial spirit, and with the fluctuating portions of flesh and blood in our present state; and the fourth stage is that of its residence in the grave." Out of some material germ which will be in the grave he supposes the new body will be recreated, and, being taken possession of by the soul, will be the spiritual body of the saints in glory. Dr. Edward Hitchcock, while showing the utter impossibility of a literal resurrection of identical particles, holds to a germ theory. He says, speaking of the two bodies: "It is not necessary to suppose that more than a millionth part of a ten thousand millionth part is common to them both; but this atom, however minute, serves as an infinitesimal germ for the future body." He is obliged, however, to do violence to the analogy which is seen in the natural world. Here the uniform law is that seeds invariably produce their likes. But from this germ, residing somewhere in the human system, there is developed a body totally unlike the old body. The resurrection body will not be flesh and blood, will not be subject to pain or decay. It will be immortal, and possess

powers and capacities of which we can form but the very faintest conception. Noticing this theory of Dr. Hitchcock, Mr. Sears says: "The reader will perceive that the doctrine as here modified by Dr. Hitchcock differs essentially from the old traditional one, and that he comes within an 'infinitesimal' particle of clearing himself from the church-yard altogether. But for the 'millionth part of a ten thousand millionth' part, his theory and what we have unfolded as the Bible theory might easily be made to blend together. But naturalism in theology, though infused homoeopathically, gives its cast to the whole, and colors the entire conception of the future life." Dr. Hitchcock proceeds a step further, and ventures upon some ingenious speculations respecting the constitution of the body which we are to have at the resurrection. He thinks it not improbable it may be composed of that third substance, distinct from matter and spirit, known as luminiferous ether. It may be that some portion of this ethereal substance is connected with every human organism, and, under special divine direction, kept in a state of isolation till the resurrection, when, developing itself as the germ of the new body, it may be taken possession of by the soul. Of course, those who maintain the strictly spiritual theory decline to accept this explanation of the resurrection. A writer in the *Bibliotheca Sacra* for November, 1845, denies a literal resurrection of the dead from the graves to which they have been consigned. He contends that not even a single particle of our present bodies will enter into our resurrection bodies. He does not refer even to a germ out of which the resurrection body will be developed. His view is that there is in every vital organism what he calls a "uniting power" — a power to attract from the outward world whatever may be necessary for the constitution of the body which God may propose the soul should inhabit. In the distant future, when the resurrection day shall come, each soul, by virtue of this "uniting-power," shall attract to itself whatever may be necessary to constitute what the apostle denominates "the spiritual body." "We are out of

the graveyards at last, then," exclaims Mr. Sears, in his notice of this theory. "Theology is free from the charnel-house, and can escape the smell of corpses, orthodoxy itself being judge. The umbilical cord that held her to corruption and the clay-pits has become not only 'infinitesimal,' but is completely sundered. Thank God for that! Now she can fly, or she can run. If we carry along with us the 'uniting power,' retaining that after death, we can draw up by it the elements of our new body wherever we please—from the air, from the sun, from Sirius, or from some paradise unknown. Not even the smallest germ need come out of the grave, and so farewell to its contents forever."

It will be seen in what manner those who hold the spiritual theory of the resurrection of the dead interpret the scriptures. Many of those passages which seem to teach a literal resurrection, they explain as manifestly referring to the awaking of the "dead in trespasses and sins" to a newness of life in Christ Jesus. Thus the words of our Lord "Marvel not at this; for the hour is coming in the which all that are in the graves shall come forth," etc., are thus interpreted. It is said that the verb *ἐρχεται* denotes an order of events just on the eve of occurring. If our Lord meant to speak of what was to take place at some far off, indefinite period, he would have used the word *ἐλεύσεται*, *the hour will come*. They urge, moreover, that if we adopt the theory of a literal resurrection, then we must say that all men are now in the graves, buried there as conscious, sentient beings, since the word used to point them out is *πάντες*. Would not our Lord have used the expression *πάντα σώματα*, they ask, if he intended to say that the dead bodies of the departed would hereafter be raised out of the grave?

It would be doing injustice to the subject now under consideration not to refer to the different views which are held on the relation which the resurrection of Christ holds to that of his disciples. Those who maintain the theory of a literal resurrection hold that Christ rose out of the tomb of Joseph of Arimathea in the same natural body which was

laid in the tomb; that, if any change took place previous to the ascension, it was but a partial change; that in the ascension he carried to the heavenly world a body still bearing the marks of his crucifixion, although in many remarkable respects it differed from the body in which he lived on earth. This, it is said, is the type and resemblance of our resurrection. As his body came forth from the grave, so will ours come forth. It matters not how many thousand years it may have been since these bodies have laid in the tomb, they shall come forth, and be transformed into the likeness of his glorified body. "If Christ actually rose in his material body," says Prof. Bush, "in the self-same body in which he was crucified, it doubtless affords some countenance to the idea that his people are also to rise, in like manner, in the bodies which they laid down in death."

As may be supposed, then, the advocates of the spiritual theory deny that the material body of Christ rose. They contend that the crucified body returned to its original gaseous elements in the tomb, and disappeared entirely, and that he rose in the spiritual body. In this body he appeared to his disciples only at certain times, when their spiritual senses were opened to apprehend him; and his apparent ascension was merely the shutting again of this faculty of spiritual sense, so that they saw him no more. Such a theory explains, it is said, the sudden and mysterious appearances of the Saviour to his disciples. In harmony with this view, it is asserted that the ascension really took place on the very day of the resurrection, and that for forty days he was from time to time making his appearance to the disciples in such ways as to make upon their minds the deepest impression of his present existence and interest in them and in the work which they were to perform. Paul refers to his having seen the Lord Jesus as a proof of his apostleship. He was thus a witness of the resurrection. But this appearance was substantially similar to the manifestations made during the forty days; and if this was in the spiritual body with which he ascended to heaven, so

were those other appearances made during the forty days. The inference is a very obvious one, that if Christ rose out of the grave, and at once ascended into heaven clothed with a spiritual body, so will it be with his followers. Immediately at death, having laid down the earthly tabernacle, they will be "clothed upon with their house which is from heaven."

Other writers who reject the literal theory are not prepared to adopt that which we have just been considering. They think that Christ rose in the natural body, but that it was changed for the glorified or celestial body during the forty days. Some suppose the change to have occurred at once; others, that it was gradual; still others, that it did not take place until the ascension. Those who hold the spiritual theory maintain that the change was entirely a spiritual one — that the gross, material body was at length superseded by the spiritual body, and, the transformation having been fully accomplished, our Lord ascended to heaven. This delay of forty days was for wise purposes, which are obvious. No such delay, however, will hold back the soul of the departed saint; but he will at once take on his new spiritual body.

From what has been written in the foregoing pages, it will be seen that there is great diversity of sentiment on the subject of the resurrection of the dead. Probably entire harmony of view will never be reached, until the light of eternity dispels our ignorance. We shall then learn what was the precise meaning which the inspired writers attached to the words to which they gave utterance. If the soul shall at once enter the new spiritual house which the divine Architect has prepared for its indwelling, this falls in with many analogies which we see in this world. If countless ages shall roll away, and then Omnipotence shall reunite the spirit to a body whose perfect personal identity shall at once be recognized, who may dare to say that this will not accord with the highest wisdom of him who "doeth all things well"?

ARTICLE VI.

DR. FORBES ON ROM. V. 12-21.

BY REV. DANIEL T. FISKE, D.D., NEWBURYPORT.

SEVERAL years ago Rev. John Forbes, LL.D., of Edinburgh, a distinguished minister of the Established Church of Scotland, published a work on "The Symmetrical Structure of Scripture." In that volume he appeared as an advocate of a theory, advanced by Bishop Jebb, that "Parallelism" is not simply a characteristic of Hebrew Poetry, but extends to prose also, and, "being perfectly independent of any peculiarities of the Hebrew language, is by no means confined to the Old Testament, but pervades a great part of the New."

In his recently published Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, the same learned divine has applied the principles of "Parallelism" to the interpretation of that difficult portion of the Scriptures. He arranges the text in parallel lines, grouped in sentences and paragraphs, according to a careful analysis of the contents of the Epistle. This arrangement, as a "mere tabulated form," is certainly convenient, enabling the eye more readily to mark the progress of the apostle's reasonings, his transitions, and the mutual relations of the different parts of the argument. We very much doubt, however, whether Paul in writing this friendly letter to the "saints" at Rome, was consciously governed by the rules of any such elaborate and artificial system of composition as Dr. Forbes finds in it; and we should be very slow to accept an exegesis of any passage which rested solely on the demands of such a supposed system.

Dr. Forbes does not aim "to furnish an exhaustive Commentary, but to illustrate those passages alone which parallelism seems to place in a new light." For proof of the utility of parallelism he refers especially to chap. v. 12-21; and he asks particular attention to "the perfect order and perspicuity which it introduces into what has generally been

considered a very intricate and perplexed passage." No better test, surely, could be appealed to. All commentaries on Romans stand or fall by this passage. We propose to review the results of the examination of it which Dr. Forbes has made by the aid of parallelism.

The parallelistic arrangement presents the passage in this form ; the parenthesis in vs. 15, 16 and 17, being omitted.

- A** { 12" Ὡςπερ δι' ἐνὸς ἀνθρώπου
 ἡ ἁμαρτία εἰς τὸν κόσμον εἰσῆλθεν,
 καὶ διὰ τῆς ἁμαρτίας ὁ θάνατος,
 καὶ οὕτως εἰς πάντας ἀνθρώπους ὁ θάνατος διῆλθεν,
 ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον.
- B** { 13 ἄχρι γὰρ νόμου ἁμαρτία ἦν ἐν κόσμῳ,
 ἁμαρτία δὲ οὐκ ἐλλογεῖται μὴ ὄντος νόμου.
 14 ἀλλ' ἐβασίλευσεν ὁ θάνατος ἀπὸ Ἀδὰμ μέχρι Μωϋσέως
 καὶ ἐπὶ τοὺς μὴ ἁμαρτήσαντας ἐπὶ τῷ ὁμοιώματι τῆς
 παραβάσεως Ἀδὰμ.
- C** ὅς ἐστιν τύπος τοῦ μέλλοντος.
- D** { Points of disparity in the comparison
 stated in verses 15, 16, 17.
- C** { 18 { "Αρα οὖν ὡς ἐνὸς παραπτώματος
 εἰς πάντας ἀνθρώπους εἰς κατάκριμα,
 οὕτω καὶ δι' ἐνὸς δικαίωματος
 εἰς πάντας ἀνθρώπους εἰς δικαίωσιν ζωῆς·
 19 { ὥςπερ γὰρ διὰ τῆς παρακοῆς τοῦ ἐνὸς ἀνθρώπου
 ἁμαρτωλοὶ κατεστάθησαν οἱ πολλοί,
 οὕτω καὶ διὰ τῆς ὑπακοῆς τοῦ ἐνὸς
 δίκαιοι κατασταθήσονται οἱ πολλοί.
- B** { 20 Νόμος δὲ παρεῖσθην
 ἵνα πλεονάσῃ τὸ παράπτωμα·
 οὐ δὲ ἐπλεόνασεν ἡ ἁμαρτία
 ὑπερεπερίσσευσεν ἡ χάρις,
 21 ἵνα ὥςπερ ἐβασίλευσεν ἡ ἁμαρτία
 ἐν τῷ θανάτῳ,
 οὕτω καὶ ἡ χάρις βασιλεύσῃ διὰ δικαιοσύνης
 εἰς ζωὴν αἰώνιον
 διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ τοῦ Κυρίου ἡμῶν.

The passage thus arranged, forms what Dr. Forbes calls an *Epanodos*, or "Introverted Parallelism," in which the first member, A, corresponds to the last A; the second, B, to the next to the last, B; etc.

I. GENERAL SCOPE AND DESIGN OF THE PASSAGE.

According to our author, "much of the obscurity that has attached to this passage has arisen from inadequate apprehension of the place which it holds in the argument of the apostle." He regards it, not as an episode, or mere illustration, "but as the grand central point and focus towards which all the lines of his [Paul's] argument converge; in which all that he has hitherto said finds its culmination, and from which the succeeding chapters (vi. vii. viii.) naturally branch forth as simple corollaries."

He thinks that the apostle gave "an epitome of the whole doctrinal portion of the Epistle," in i. 16. Paul there says that he is not ashamed of the Gospel of Christ, for three reasons.

1. *Its universality.* It is for Greek, as well as for Jew; designed to meet a universal want of mankind. This point is discussed in i. 18-iii. 20, where it is proved that there is "none righteous, no not one;" that "all the world" are "guilty before God." And, as all are involved in sin, so the provisions of the gospel are for all.
2. Its condition is *faith*, not works. Its blessings are secured by "every one that believeth." This point is discussed in iii. 21-iv. 25.
3. It is "the *power* of God," to accomplish what the Law was *power*-less to accomplish — complete salvation. This point is treated in chapters v-viii.

These three topics are repeated in verse 17.

(1) The gospel reveals the great need of "every one"; "the righteousness of God" contrasted with the "all *un*-righteousness of man."

(2) This righteousness is appropriated by faith, begins and ends in faith, "from faith to faith."

(3) It is the power of God, by which all who believe "*live*." The quotation from Habakkuk (ii. 4), summing up all three topics, and forming the apostle's text, ὁ δὲ δίκαιος ἐκ πίστεως ζήσεται. "The *Righteous*, by *Faith*, shall *Live*."

The first two topics having been already discussed, in the fifth chapter the third and principal topic is reached, viz. the *life-giving power* of the gospel. Expositors generally, by mistaking the connection of this chapter with what precedes, have entirely missed the great object of the apostle in vs. 12-21, which is not merely to repeat and illustrate the doctrine of justification by faith, already stated; but, to show that the union of believers with Christ is such that "his righteousness and life enter into their being so thoroughly as finally to overcome and displace the sin and death introduced by Adam." Most commentators suppose that the transition from justification to sanctification is made at the beginning of the sixth chapter. Dr. Forbes thinks that it is made at the beginning of the fifth chapter, and that the main topic of this chapter is not *imputed*, but *imparted* righteousness; illustrated by reference to the consequences of the sin of Adam.

12. "As by one man

Sin entered into the world,

and *Death* by sin : [even so]

21. Grace reigns through *Righteousness*

unto eternal *Life*,

By Jesus Christ our Lord."

Sin and Death by Adam; Righteousness and Life by Christ. The apostle is not ashamed of the gospel, because it thus provides a complete remedy for the evil which has come upon the race. Not only is it for "*all*," requiring no impracticable condition, simply "*faith*," but it is the "power of God unto *salvation*;" it saves from the great and universal evil, "*sin*," as well as from its inseparable consequence, "*death*." This thought, that through faith in Christ men are saved not merely from the penalty incurred by sin, but from sin itself, is carried forward to the close of the eighth

chapter, and is the leading and central thought of the Epistle.

That, in the main, Dr. Forbes is correct in his analysis of the apostle's argument, and that he has indicated the true position and scope of the passage under consideration, (v. 12-21), we are constrained, to believe. His exegesis of the more difficult portions of the passage is clearly indicated, as it is largely determined, by his view of its position in the argument, and of its general scope. Dr. Hodge claims that his interpretation of the phrase πάντες ἡμάρτον (vs. 12): making it mean, all sinned putatively or representatively in Adam, "is required by the whole scope of the passage and drift of the argument." And the scope of the passage he declares to be, "to illustrate the doctrine of justification on the ground of the righteousness of Christ, by a reference to the condemnation of men for the sin of Adam."¹ Dr. Forbes denies that the doctrine of justification is the main topic under discussion. He attempts to show, and we think does show conclusively, that the scope of the passage is broader, and includes sanctification as well as justification; complete salvation, righteousness *imparted* as well as righteousness *imputed*. Here is a fair issue between the two learned commentators. Dr. Hodge assumes that the scope of the passage is limited to justification; but until he can justify this assumption by a careful analysis of the apostle's argument the advantage will remain with the Scotch divine.

Dr. Forbes having stated what he conceives to be the general scope of the passage, proceeds to develop more particularly the meaning of its several parts. It is proposed to examine his views only so far as they bear upon the two principal points presented in the passage, viz. the relation of Adam to the race, and the relation of Christ to believers.

II. THE RELATION OF ADAM TO THE RACE.

In the twelfth verse, the apostle asserts that, "By one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin." Dr.

¹ Commentary on Romans (ed. 1864), p. 239.

Forbes distinguishes between *παράπτωμα* and *ἁμαρτία*. The former, "transgression," "belonged to Adam alone properly, and is only imputed to his posterity"; the latter, "sin" or "the principle of sin," entered into his and our nature, and "equally affects us as him." Not guilt or imputed sin, merely, is meant by *ἁμαρτία*, but "sinfulness," or inherent corruption, which, entering by Adam's one act of transgression, as through an open door, extended not only to his nature, but to the nature of all his descendants.

If this distinction be just, and the argument founded on it be valid, why does it not wholly exclude from *ἁμαρτία* the idea of "imputed sin"? If anything of Adam's is imputed to his posterity, it is his *παράπτωμα*, and not his *ἁμαρτία*; and if anything is transmitted to them, it is his *ἁμαρτία*, and not his *παράπτωμα*. Yet Dr. Forbes inconsistently admits that *ἁμαρτία* includes "guilt," or "imputed sin," as well as "corruption of nature."

"*And death by sin.*" As, according to our author, "sin" means "the principle of sin," or sinfulness, so "death" means "the principle of death," or mortality; but he is hardly consistent in his representations of their relations to each other. Sometimes he speaks of sin as the "cause," and death as the "effect," or sin as "the cause leading to God's judicial sentence of death." And the words of the apostle would seem to mean this, or at least to denote some kind of a causal relation. As in the previous clause *διὰ* with the genitive (*ἐνὸς ἀνθρώπου*) denotes that Adam was, in some sense, the cause of the entrance of sin into the world, so here, with the same case (*τῆς ἁμαρτίας*), it would seem to denote that, in some sense, the sin caused by Adam is the cause of the entrance of death into the world. Sin came *by* Adam, and death came *by* sin.

But in other statements Dr. Forbes overlooks, or denies, the immediate causal relation of sin to death, and makes them both sustain the same relation to Adam. He says: "By his [Adam's] transgression the principles of sin and death entered into man's nature, and extended over all";

and again, "St. Paul's representation is, not that Adam's sin entered into and corrupted all, and that, *on the ground* of this corruption, their condemnation to death is to be ascribed, not to his sin, but to their own [*mediate* imputation]; but that through Adam, as the primary source, both sin and death entered simultaneously into all his offspring." This seems to imply the very opposite of what he had before asserted, that sin is "the cause leading to God's judicial sentence of death"; and that death is to be attributed, not to *ἀμαρτία*, whether in Adam or his offspring, but solely to the *παράπτωμα* of Adam. Death comes, not, as the apostle says, *διὰ τῆς ἀμαρτίας*, but *διὰ ἐνὸς ἀνθρώπου*, or *διὰ τοῦ παραπτώματος ἐνὸς ἀνθρώπου*, which the apostle does not say; but which is precisely the view of Dr. Hodge.

Dr. Forbes gives us no definition of "death." Sometimes he seems to make it refer solely to physical death, and again to include all penal evil; but holds that it is always *penal*. If we ask, "Of what is it the penalty?" he at one time answers, *ἀμαρτία*, and of course *ἀμαρτία* is not included in *θάνατος*; again he answers, "the *παράπτωμα* of Adam," and then *ἀμαρτία* may be a part of the penalty, *θάνατος*, although he nowhere affirms that such is the case. The Princeton divines hold that "corruption of nature" is a part of the "death," judicially inflicted on the race, on account of Adam's sin imputed to them. Consistency required Dr. Forbes either to adopt the same view, or else to adhere to the position that corruption of nature (*ἀμαρτία*), and not Adam's "transgression," is the cause of death, or the ground of its judicial infliction on the race.

Having stated generally that death entered the world by sin, the apostle reiterates the statement with this difference, that the *universal* prevalence of *death* is in consequence of the *universal* prevalence of *sin*.

"And so death passed upon *all*,
For that *all* have sinned."

The word "sinned" (*ἥμαρτον*), Dr. Forbes thinks must take its meaning from the word "sin" (*ἀμαρτία*), in the preceding

clause, and as this means "inherent depravity, or corruption of nature," so "sinned" must mean "were corrupt or sinful," and "cannot be limited to the idea of sin merely *imputed*," as Dr. Hodge maintains, "but must include sin *inherited* and *communicated* also." But why this double meaning of the word? If it refers to *inherited* sin, why make it refer at all to *imputed* sin, especially as it is, according to our author, παράπτωμα, and not ἁμαρτία, that is imputed? The word, it would seem, must have one simple, definite meaning. "All *sinned*." In what sense? Several answers have been given to this question. Some say "sinned by actual and personal transgression." Others say, "sinned actually, but not *personally* in Adam, his act/being the act of that generic humanity which was in him." Others say, "sinned putatively," in Adam, i.e. his sin was imputed to the race; and Dr. Hodge has the boldness to affirm that this is "the simple and natural meaning" of the word! Others, with Dr. Forbes, making πάντες ἥμαρτον, equivalent to ἁμαρτία εἰσῆλθεν, εἰς τὸν κόσμον, say, "sinned by becoming corrupt, inheriting a sinful nature from Adam." The objection of Dr. Hodge to this interpretation, "That it is contrary to the simple meaning of the words — ἁμαρτάνω in no case having the sense here assigned to it," may well be retorted against his own view. But a more serious objection is that drawn from the use of the historical, or aorist tense, ἥμαρτον meaning, not *are sinful* or *have sinned*, but *sinned*, "expressing momentary action in past time." Dr. Forbes summarily disposes of this objection by referring to a similar use of the same words, πάντες ἥμαρτον, in chap. iii. 23, where the aorist seems to be used with the meaning of the perfect tense, and where it denotes that all, even the Gentiles, are *actual*, not *putative* sinners, and are *personally* guilty before God. He might have shown, allowing to the aorist here its full peculiar significance, and even making it point back to the sin of Adam, that it may yet relate to the universal sinfulness of the race, actual and personal. It is no uncommon thing to represent by this tense future events as having occurred simultaneously with

some other event which made their occurrence certain. If Adam's sin simply involved the certainty that all his posterity would sin, it would be natural to say that when he sinned we all virtually sinned. In that case the aorist tense would be used, though in a somewhat figurative sense, and would not mean that we literally or putatively sinned with or in Adam, but that when he sinned our sinfulness was made so certain that it could be spoken of as having been then incurred. In almost every language we find something analogous to this figurative use of the Greek aorist. Thus we say: "When the Stamp Act was passed in the British Parliament, England lost her American Colonies." "When the Rebels fired upon Fort Sumter, slavery perished." "When Louis Napoleon declared war against Prussia, thousands of lives were sacrificed, and the days of his reign were numbered." And since we must give some kind of a figurative meaning to *ἡμαρτον*, it seems more reasonable to give it a meaning against which there is no moral objection, and which is abundantly justified by the usage, not only of the Greek, but of other languages, than to give it one which conflicts with our fundamental idea of justice, by attributing to the race the guilt of an act of which they are confessedly innocent.

In verses 13, 14, according to Dr. Forbes, the apostle is simply further insisting upon the universality of that sin and death which, in vs. 12 he had asserted, came upon all men by the sin of Adam. In the expression, "For until the law sin was in the world," "The reference manifestly is to the historical existence of sin in the old world." "The law did not introduce it, for it prevailed before the giving of the law." "But should the gainsayer still object that sin is not imputed where there is no law, the apostle stops all further discussion by an appeal to the undeniable principle on which he had already insisted, that where death is, there must be sin as its antecedent cause, and that, consequently, as death had reigned over all from Adam to Moses, the universal prevalence of death proved the universal prevalence of sin,

whether they had sinned, or had not sinned, 'after the similitude of Adam's transgression,' by breaking some positive commandment."

Our author sees no allusion to infants in the phrase, "them that had not sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression." He thinks the apostle's language implies that there were some among those who lived between Adam and Moses, who sinned "after the similitude of Adam's transgression," that is, against a known positive commandment, as, for example, those who transgressed the law given to Noah against murder (Gen. ix. 6). Not only these died, but even those who had not thus sinned, who had only disregarded the law written on their hearts, or had inherited a sinful nature, without any positive law to reveal and take cognizance of it. This interpretation makes *even* (καί) imply that there were two classes of persons who lived between Adam and Moses, viz. those who had, and those who had not, transgressed a positive precept. Other interpreters make it refer to a distinction between those who lived before and those who lived after Moses's day. Death reigned not only over the latter, but *even* over the former, although they had not sinned in the way of transgressing a positive law, as Adam had done. Either of these interpretations seems more natural, and in every way preferable to that which makes the expression, "them that had not sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression," refer to infants, an interpretation which, it would seem, nothing but the exigency of a false theory could ever have suggested.

As verses 15, 16, 17, are parenthetical, designed to show that in some particulars, the comparison between Adam and Christ does not hold, Dr. Forbes reserves them for a separate consideration; and as they cast no additional light on the point now under consideration, viz. the relation of Adam to the race, we will not in this connection dwell upon his interpretation of them.

The comparison between Adam and Christ begun in v. 12, but left incomplete, is resumed and more fully drawn out in

vs. 18, 19; the first member of the comparison being restated thus: "Therefore as by one offence, judgment came upon all men to condemnation" (v. 18). "For as by the disobedience of the one man many were made sinners" (v. 19). These two expressions are equivalent to the assertion in v. 12, that "By one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin, and so death passed upon all for that all have sinned." "Death," or "judgment unto condemnation," "came upon all men," "entered into the world" and "passed upon all men," in consequence of the offence of one man. In v. 12, "sin" (*ἁμαρτία*), consequent on the original "offence" (*παράπτωμα*), is mentioned; but the "offence" is only implied. In v. 18 the "offence" is mentioned, and the consequent "sin" implied; while in v. 19, the "offence," "disobedience of one man," and the "sin," "were made sinners," are both mentioned. Thus both statements agree and observe the same order, viz. "Adam's offence," universal sinfulness, and universal death. The apostle refers "death" to Adam's "offence," as its primary source; and yet teaches the "inseparable connection between "sin and death;" the former always "in logical sequence preceding the latter, and being its judicial vindication."

In regard to the meaning of the expression *ἁμαρτωλοὶ κατεστάθησαν* in v. 19, Dr. Forbes takes issue with Dr. Hodge, and other imputationists. Dr. Hodge says: "*καθίστημι* never, in the New Testament, means *to make*, in the sense of effecting, or causing a person or thing to be other than it was before." "When, therefore, the apostle says that the many were (*κατεστάθησαν*) constituted sinners by the disobedience of Adam, it cannot mean that the many thereby were rendered sinful, but that his disobedience was the ground of their being placed in the category of sinners. It constituted a good and sufficient reason for so regarding and treating them."¹ That is, all men are *regarded* as sinners on account of Adam's sin, and treated accordingly; or, in other words, Adam's sin is imputed to them, and then they

¹ Commentary on Romans, pp. 271, 272.

are treated as if it were really their sin. Our author points out the inconsistency of Dr. Hodge in limiting the expression "made sinners" to imputed sin, after having acknowledged it to be equivalent to the expression in v. 12, "Sin entered the world," where he admits that "sin" "includes guilt, depravity, and actual transgression." He then proceeds to disprove the assertion of Dr. Hodge, as to the meaning of *καθίστημι*, examining first the cases cited in support of it. In the passage Rom. i. 4, where Christ is said to have been "constituted the Son of God," the verb is not *καθίστημι*, but *ὀρίζω*, and of course furnishes no argument in point. The other two passages cited in which the verb in question is found, are Acts vii. 35: "Who *made* thee a ruler and a judge?" and Matt. xxiv. 45, "Whom his lord *made* ruler over his household." "Was either ruler," pertinently asks Dr. Forbes, '*before he was so constituted or made*?' Was he not thereby '*caused to be other than he was before*?' If it be objected '*not in character or nature*,' this is a mere evasion, since neither character nor nature is in question in the change spoken of. The real question is: Does *κατέστησεν*, constituted, mean in either instance, as Dr. Hodge affirms that it does in v. 19, merely, '*made to be regarded as a ruler*,' or '*set down in the rank or category of rulers*,' without implying and involving that he was thereby *made and constituted ruler*?' "

Other passages in which the word occurs, not cited by Dr. Hodge, are then examined: 2 Pet. i. 8, "If these things be in you and abound, they *make* you that ye shall be neither barren nor unfruitful," etc. "Does the possession of the virtues enumerated by St. Peter not '*cause*' their possessors to be in character and nature other than they were before?" James iv. 4, "Whosoever will be a friend of the world *is* (*καθίσταται*, constitutes himself) the enemy of God." "Does the verb mean merely '*makes him to be regarded and treated as an enemy*,' '*places him in the category of enemies*,' without implying and involving that he is really an enemy of God?" "

Had Dr. Forbes extended his examination to all of the twenty-one passages in the New Testament in which this word occurs, he would only have shown more clearly the utter groundlessness of Dr. Hodge's assertion in regard to its meaning. But had he been driven to admit that it never, in the New Testament, means *to make*, in the sense of effecting or causing a person or thing to be, in its character or nature, other than it was before," he might have insisted that it cannot have the meaning which Dr. Hodge ascribes to it, who says that in v. 19 it means that all men are "regarded and *treated* as sinners," when they are not really such. Can it possibly have this meaning even in the passages cited by himself? "Who made thee a ruler and a judge"? Did Moses mean "who *regarded* and *treated* thee as a ruler and judge," when you were not such? Again, "Whom his lord made ruler over his house." Did Jesus mean that the lord merely *regarded* and *treated* his servant, as ruler or steward, when he was not such at all? Or, to take other passages already referred to; did James mean merely that if a man would be a friend of the world, he would make himself *appear* to be the enemy of God, be so *regarded* and *treated*, when he was not such in reality? Does Peter mean that they, in whom certain Christian virtues should abound, would put themselves into the category of the fruitful ones, while they would really be barren and unfruitful?

Manifestly neither the negative nor the positive part of the assertion of Dr. Hodge can stand. The meaning which he says καθίστημι never has in the New Testament, it often does have; while the meaning which he says it always has, it never has.

Dr. Forbes interprets ἀμαρτωλοὶ κατεστάθησαν consistently with the meaning given to ἀμαρτία and ἥμαρτον. "By one offence judgment came upon all men to condemnation," "For," or because (γάρ) "by the disobedience of one man many were *made sinners*," i.e. were made partakers of his sinfulness; inherited from him a nature which sin had invaded and made inherently corrupt.

Having thus examined our author's interpretation of this passage, so far as it bears on the question of the relation of Adam to his posterity, we are prepared to state and estimate his theological position on this subject. He holds as follows: (1.) In consequence of Adam's transgression, his nature became corrupt and sinful, and he was subject to death. (2.) This sinfulness, or corruption of nature, is entailed upon the race, not by a judicial sentence, and as a penal infliction upon the guiltless, but by "a necessity of nature"—"that which is born of the flesh being necessarily flesh—the branches necessarily partaking of the corruption of the stem." (3.) Condemnation, or death, on account of Adam's imputed sin, came upon the race simultaneously with corruption of nature; "the branches, by sharing in the sinfulness of the stem, necessarily and justly sharing in the sentence pronounced against it." (4.) The condemnation of the race to death, "though it be through Adam's transgression, is not a merely arbitrary sentence, but receives its full vindication, from the existence in each individual of corruption and sin."

Are these views self-consistent? and, wherein do they agree with, and wherein differ from, the views held by that class of theologians represented by Dr. Hodge? That they are not, throughout, self-consistent is evident from the fact that the condemnation, or death of the race, is ascribed both to the transgression of Adam and to their own inherited sinfulness. It is repeatedly said that sin and death are both the result of Adam's transgression, and came upon the race *simultaneously*; and yet, the inherited sin of the race is said to be the "cause leading to God's judicial sentence of death." But how, of two things proceeding simultaneously from a common cause, can one be the cause of the other? If inherited sin leads God to inflict death on the race, then how can the transgression of Adam be the cause or ground of its infliction? Again, it is said, that sin and death which came upon Adam in consequence of his transgression, making his nature corrupt and mortal, are both conveyed to the race by the transmission of that nature. But that nature is transmitted, not

by a judicial act, but by a natural law, or "a necessity of nature"; how then is death *penal* at all? or, at least, how is it any more penal than is inherited sinfulness? If they are both simultaneous effects of a common cause, it would seem to follow that they are both penal, or neither of them. Again, it is said that the inherited sinfulness of the race is not the judicial ground or reason of their condemnation to death; but is the vindication or justification of their condemnation. This is a point upon which Dr. Forbes lays great stress. It is the most marked peculiarity of his views on this subject; and is put forward with great confidence, and with great variety of statement. God condemns men for Adam's sin; not because they inherit a sinful nature from him, but their inherited sinfulness fully vindicates his condemnation of them! Condemned for one sin they never committed, and their condemnation justified by the existence of another sin, which came upon them, not by their own free choice, but by "a necessity of nature"! We cannot understand either the logic or morals of such a statement; nor can we suppress our surprise that a man of Dr. Forbes's acumen should deliberately make it, and allow it to stand in type. It is as if we should justify a judge in condemning a man for a murder committed by his father, on the ground that the man is a thief; or, to make the cases more nearly parallel, on the ground that the man inherits an avaricious disposition from his father! It is a principle of jurisprudence, and of common sense, that a penalty can find its vindication only in the offence for which it was inflicted. If we are condemned for the one offence of Adam, then that offence, and nothing else, is the vindication of the sentence; but, if we are condemned for our own sinfulness, then our own sinfulness, and nothing else, is the vindication of the sentence.

Dr. Forbes professes not to discard the common doctrine of imputation, but only to reject that interpretation of Rom. v. 12-21, which many have regarded as the main support of that doctrine. He observes: "We scarcely need say that it is not to the doctrine of imputation in itself that we object."

“It seems strange and illogical that this doctrine should ever have been questioned by those who admit that it is for Adam’s sin that his race is condemned.” “To say that a man is condemned, presupposes that guilt has been imputed to him.” “Now” (according to the connection of ideas so familiar to St. Paul) ‘in Adam all die’—infants die. But ‘death is the wages of sin.’ Whose sin? Not their own, for infants are incapable of personal sin. They are condemned to death therefore for Adam’s sin. In other, and equivalent terms, *The guilt of Adam’s sin has been imputed to them.*”

We are surprised at two things in this statement: First, that Dr. Forbes should limit the word “death,” as the wages or penalty of sin, to physical death. Infants do *not* die in the sense which the apostle gives the word in the expression quoted from him. Secondly, that he should affirm that “infants are incapable of personal sin,” when elsewhere he says, “By natural birth *sin* is an essential part of our nature, so that however unseen and undeveloped in unconscious childhood, the moment we come to act for ourselves its existence and pernicious influence become manifest.” Again: “Through Adam they were ‘*made sinners*,’ and, ‘that which is born of the flesh being flesh,’ and necessarily corrupt, were *justly* punished. Like branches that spring from a corrupt root or stem, they share with it in its corruption, and consequently in its sentence of extermination.”

Evidently Dr. Forbes does not hold such a doctrine of imputation as the Princeton divines hold. According to Dr. Hodge, Adam was the federal head and legal representative of the race, so that his act of transgression was putatively their act; that is, it was the judicial ground or reason why death passed on all men; and death includes “all penal evil—death, spiritual and eternal, as well as the dissolution of the body. His sin being regarded as their sin, that is, as belonging to them as well as to him, the same penalty is due to them as to him; and as he lost the favor of God, and became inherently corrupt and mortal, so they begin exist-

ence subject to the same terrible evil — loss of the divine favor, inherent corruption and physical death — to issue, as with him, so with them, unless grace intervene, in eternal death.

Dr. Forbes's idea of Adam's representative character differs from that of Dr. Hodge. He regards Adam as a *typical* rather than a *legal* representative of the race. We see human nature — our nature — acting in him. Had we been in his place, we should not have acted differently. "What Adam did, therefore, each can with truth feel and say, I did. His sin was my sin. When Adam fell, I fell. I can take the guilt and shame of Adam's fall to myself, as being the fall of our common nature." "His transgression and our participation in its results, sin and death, are but an *anticipation* of what we should have brought upon ourselves." That is, Adam represented us in this sense, that, had we been in his place, we should have done precisely as he did. Therefore, we are regarded as having had our trial in Adam, and as having fallen and incurred the sentence of death. We are condemned; not because he sinned, but because we in his place should have sinned; not because he was our legal representative, we coming under all the penal obligations which he incurred; but because he was our natural or typical representative, showing how we should have acted had we been placed in the same circumstances.

Again, Dr. Forbes excludes from the penalty, or death inflicted on the race in consequence of Adam's transgression, "inherited corruption." Sin and death come upon all men through Adam; the latter as a "judicial infliction," the former by a "necessity of nature." To suppose sin, or "inherent depravity," to be entailed as a judicial infliction for Adam's sin would, he thinks, "make God the direct author of sin," and would represent him as acting in an "arbitrary manner, condemning men to the most dreadful of all evils while yet innocent."

An advocate of the old doctrine of imputation would doubtless say, that when you have stricken out the idea that

Adam is our "legal representative," and also the idea that "inherent depravity" is penal, there is but little of the doctrine left; and he would naturally be disposed to ask: "How is God any more the author of sin, on the theory that inherent depravity comes upon the race as a 'judicial infliction,' than he is on the theory that it comes by 'a necessity of nature,' or by a 'natural law which God has established'?" And how is it any more 'arbitrary' to condemn men, for the sin of Adam, to the most dreadful of all evils, than it is to oblige them, on account of Adam's sin, to begin existence with a sinful nature, which is certainly one of the most dreadful of all evils?"

III. THE RELATION OF CHRIST TO BELIEVERS.

Adam is a "type" of Christ. As all the evils which come upon the race are traceable to the former, so deliverance from these evils and the bestowal of all blessings are traceable to the latter; and as sin is the principal evil derived from Adam, so deliverance from sin, or righteousness, is the principal blessing derived from Christ; and as by "sin" the apostle in this passage means not merely imputed, but also imparted sin, so by "righteousness" he means not merely imputed, but also imparted righteousness, or sanctification. This, as Dr. Forbes shows in indicating the general scope of the passage, is the point which the apostle had reached in the course of his argument. Having proved that the provisions of the gospel are for *all*, designed to meet the universal sinfulness of men, and having proved that they are conditioned on *faith* in Christ, not on works of the law; the justification of sinners being wholly and of necessity a matter of grace, he reaches in chap. v. the main reason why he is not ashamed of the gospel; viz. it is the power of God to save men from *sin* — the sin which, entering the world through Adam, extended to the whole race. Justification is incidentally treated as being inseparably connected with sanctification; just as death is represented as being inseparably connected with sin. But the two leading thoughts of the

passage are *sin* and *righteousness*; sin communicated by Adam; righteousness communicated by Christ; death communicated simultaneously with sin, but in logical sequence following it; justification communicated simultaneously with righteousness, but in logical sequence preceding it. This, Dr. Forbes thinks, is clearly the meaning of vs. 18, 19, where the comparison between Adam and Christ, begun in vs. 12, is taken up and completed. Regarding the particle *γάρ*, *for*, as confirmative rather than causative, and as connecting each of the two clauses of vs. 18 with each of the two clauses of vs. 19.

As the declaration (vs. 18): "By one offence judgment came upon all men to condemnation," finds its vindication in the statement (vs. 19): "By the disobedience of one man many were *made sinners*; in like manner the declaration (vs. 18): "By the righteousness of one the free gift came upon all men unto justification of life," finds its vindication in the statement (vs. 19): "By the obedience of one the many shall be *made righteous*; and the expression *made* righteous means, not "regarded and treated as righteous," but made inherently righteous, just as the expression *made sinners* means, not "regarded and treated as sinners," but made inherently sinful. As through our connection with Adam sin becomes, by natural birth, a part of our nature, so through our connection with Christ righteousness becomes, by spiritual birth, a part of our nature. The sin derived from Adam may at first be undeveloped, but is sure to manifest itself and become all-pervading as our faculties unfold; so the righteousness derived from Christ is, at first, only an imperceptible germ, but it is sure to expand in due and orderly development; "first the blade, then the ear, and finally the full corn in the ear."

This righteousness of believers is not the judicial cause or ground, although it is the vindication of their justification. Men are not justified because they are righteous, but they are righteous because they are justified; yet their justification and righteousness come through Christ simultaneously

as to time. The imputation of Christ's righteousness, or justification, is not a mere outward and arbitrary forensic act, which has no immediate corresponding reality. "In justification God's word and act are simultaneous. While he declares the sinner righteous for the sake alone of Christ's all-perfect righteousness, he, at the same time, makes a complete change upon the heart, and turns it from the love of sin to the love of holiness." "Justification, we maintain, *involves* and *suggests* the idea of a change not of state alone, but of character also. If God justifies a man — *δικαιοῖ*, pronounces him righteous — he is, and must be, what God calls him, *δικαιος*, righteous." "God's judgment as well as that of an earthly judge must be according to truth. Since it cannot, like the sentence of the latter, be true *retrospectively*, it must be true *prospectively*. In justification God pronounces not what *was*, but what *is to be*. His word is creative. He justifies, and the man is just, in the eye of that God who sees the end from the beginning. He declares him righteous, and immediately he becomes righteous; not in word only, but by a mighty change that has passed upon him, involving, as the germ does the blossom and seed, his full and final sanctification."

That we may be sure of doing justice to Dr. Forbes's view on this subject we quote his summary of the meaning of the entire passage: "What the apostle teaches is, that *all the evil* (the moral element, sin, and the judicial element, death), originates with, and comes through the man, simultaneously as to time; and that *all the good* (the judicial element, justification of life, and the moral element, righteousness unto sanctification), originates with and comes through Christ simultaneously as to time; but that in logical sequence, on the contrary, in the case of man, the *moral* element (sin, which is all his own) comes first, and the *judicial* element (death, in which God has his part), comes second, as the consequence; whereas in the case of Christ the *judicial* element (justification of life) comes first, as the cause, and the moral element (righteousness unto sanctification) comes second, as the consequence."

And now we are disposed to ask the same questions in regard to Dr. Forbes's views of the imputation of Christ's righteousness that we asked in regard to his views of the imputation of Adam's sin, as developed from this passage. Are they self-consistent? How far do they agree with the doctrine of imputation held by the Princeton divines?

Dr. Forbes attributes both the justification and sanctification of believers to the righteousness of Christ imputed to them, as their common cause or source; and yet he speaks of justification as the "cause" of sanctification. But if two streams flow simultaneously from a common fountain, how can one be the cause or consequence of the other?

Again, he says: "When God justifies a man, or pronounces a man righteous, the man must be what God pronounces him; that is, must be righteous, and yet it is the *ungodly* whom God justifies." Can a man be ungodly and righteous at the same instant? If God justifies the ungodly and his justifying act changes the ungodly man into a righteous man, then his righteousness is subsequent to, and not simultaneous with, the justifying act.

Again: Dr. Forbes holds that this imparted righteousness is the vindication of the divine procedure in justifying men on the ground of Christ's imputed righteousness. But if the imputed righteousness of Christ is a good and sufficient reason with God why he should justify men, then his justifying act needs no other vindication. But if it does need some other vindication, and if the imparted righteousness of believers is that vindication, then is that righteousness in part, or in whole, the ground or reason of their justification, and they are not justified by the righteousness of Christ alone imputed to them. The real question is: Why God justifies and sanctifies men; or, why he justifies men, thereby insuring their sanctification? And the answer must be found, not in the sanctification, which is a part of the bestowed blessing, but in the righteousness of Christ, or in the infinite grace of God, which could consistently, in view of the righteousness of Christ, *save*, i.e. justify and sanctify, believers.

Again: in justification, according to Dr. Forbes, God's judgment does not, after all, answer to the reality. He pronounces the believer righteous *now*; and yet his righteousness is almost wholly *prospective*. If the two things are to agree, so that the one shall vindicate the truth and justice of the other, then must the justification be just as *prospective* as the righteousness; and the righteousness must be just as immediate and complete as the justification.

How far does Dr. Forbes agree with Dr. Hodge in regard to the imputation of Christ's righteousness? He says: "Believers in Christ are justified, or pronounced righteous; that is, righteousness is imputed to them. Whose righteousness? Not their own; for that cannot justify, being imperfect. It is, therefore, *Christ's righteousness that is imputed to them.*" Dr. Hodge says: "In justification, according to Paul's language, God imputes righteousness to the ungodly. This righteousness is not their own; but they are regarded and treated as righteous on account of the obedience of Christ. That is, his righteousness is so laid to their account, or imputed to them, that they are regarded and treated as if it were their own, or as if they had kept the law."¹

These statements of the two divines seem to be identical in meaning. Believers are justified solely on account of Christ's righteousness imputed to them; and not at all on account of their own inherent righteousness. But in other statements a diversity of views becomes apparent. Dr. Forbes says: "Justification *involves* and *suggests* the idea of a change not of state alone, but of character also." Dr. Hodge says: "Imputation does not alter the moral character. . . . Neither does it imply that his (Christ's) righteousness becomes personally and inherently ours; or that his moral excellence is in any way transferred from him to believers."² Dr. Forbes attributes to the very act of justification an efficacy which insures the sanctification of believers, making them what they are declared to be, *righteous*. Dr. Hodge does not deny, but would readily admit, that all

¹ Commentary on Romans, p. 287.

² Ibid. pp. 279, 280.

who are justified are gradually sanctified, and made inherently righteous; he would not, however, make their justification either the cause or vindication of their sanctification, but would refer both to the grace of God, which on account of the righteousness of Christ is bestowed upon believers.

According to Dr. Forbes, unless the idea of sanctification is involved in justification, the veracity of God is impeached. If he declares men righteous, the declaration is false, unless it makes them inherently and potentially righteous. To this Dr. Hodge replies, that, although the believer be personally most unrighteous, "God's judgment in pronouncing him righteous is none the less according to truth. He does not pronounce the sinner subjectively righteous, which he is not, but forensically righteous, which he is, because Christ has satisfied the demands of justice in his behalf.¹ Dr. Forbes thinks there is little comfort and joy in the doctrine of justification "so long as it is conceived that by a mere forensic act alone, and legal fiction, Christ's righteousness is imputed to the penitent, without any real change immediately and necessarily passing on the believer himself." "Only, then, when the believer comes to the full apprehension of the truth, that, as really and truly as by natural birth, sin is an essential part of our nature, even so by the spiritual birth and vital union with Christ, righteousness becomes an inherent part of the believer's nature, will he experience the full joy and peace in believing which this blessed truth is fitted to impart." This statement implies that Dr. Forbes attaches more importance to the *moral* than to the judicial element in salvation. A justification, except it be viewed as involving or insuring sanctification, he deems of little practical value. The Princeton divines, and men of that school, lay the stress upon the *judicial* element. Deliverance from condemnation, legal justification, is by them put first and foremost, and dwelt upon as the principal thing. Dr. Forbes, on the contrary, as he believes sin to be the chief evil brought upon the race, so he believes deliverance from sin, or sanc-

¹ Commentary on Romans, p. 288.

tification, to be the one thing needful. Justification, or deliverance from death, he admits, is first in logical order, whereas its inseparable attendant or consequence, personal righteousness or deliverance from sin, is first in importance. The difference between him and Dr. Hodge in regard to this branch of the doctrine of imputation seems to be a difference, not as to the nature or ground of justification, but as to its connection with sanctification, and the relative importance of the two.

In his exegesis of the passage under consideration, he is undoubtedly right in so far as he makes the leading thought to be, not *imputed*, but *imparted*, righteousness through Christ; salvation from sin, as well as from death, resulting from sin. And he has rendered an important service to theology and practical religion by showing so clearly that it is upon salvation from *sin* that the apostle lays the chief stress. As sin is a greater evil than punishment, so deliverance from sin is a greater blessing than deliverance from punishment. The salvation we need is inward and spiritual, more than outward and forensic. To be pronounced righteous before the law would avail little without being righteous in character.

Dr. Forbes evidently feels the difficulties which attend the old doctrine of imputation, but is, at best, only partially successful in removing them. A sounder philosophy of the nature of sin would, we think, make him a better exegete and a more consistent theologian. It can hardly be otherwise than that a man should have an unmanageable element in his theology who believes that sin is something which can be inherited precisely as are physical qualities, becoming by natural birth "an essential part of our nature."

There are many things in Dr. Forbes's Commentary which indicate a mind feeling for the way that leads from Scottish theology to New England theology, which was opened by President Edwards. In some respects his theological status seems to resemble that of President Edwards when he was so earnestly laboring to develop a "consistent Calvinism."

He retains the old terminology, but cannot retain, unmodified, the old doctrine. He is a thorough Calvinist, but is not yet, according to the New England standard, a "consistent Calvinist."

We have not attempted to show how he has employed parallelism to reach his exegetical conclusions. Indeed, allowing that his theory of parallelism is true, and is exemplified in this Epistle, we can but think that he greatly overestimates the advantages which, as a commentator, he derives from it. His fine power of analysis renders any such aid needless; and results which he credits to the principles of parallelism, we can but think are due to his own logical and philological skill.

ARTICLE VII.

REVELATION AND INSPIRATION.

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NO. VII.

ANTECEDENTS OF THE GOSPEL HISTORY.

FROM the great central truth of our Lord's supernatural manifestation, we legitimately infer, as has been shown in a previous number, the probability of *subsequent* supernatural revelations, such as those recorded in the Acts of the Apostles, and everywhere implied in the apostolic Epistles. With even greater certainty may we infer the existence of *antecedent, preparatory* revelations. Consider, for a moment, how much is implied in the great historic fact that the Father sent his Son to be the Saviour of the world, and that he certified to men his heavenly mission, as well by the supernatural character of his teaching as by the stupendous series of supernatural works which he performed. It establishes at once the fundamental principle that supernatural interposition enters into the plan of the divine

government; that it is not, as some would have us believe, a government of pure natural law, behind which the Creator hides himself forever, and through which alone his existence and attributes can be inferred; but rather a government administered in the interest of the rational intelligences whom he has made capable of having communion with himself, and to whom he holds the relation of a moral governor. If their wants require immediate manifestations of himself, outside of the laws of nature, such manifestations will be made, and their supernatural character certified to those who receive them. Since, moreover, the whole order of providence, as well as of nature, is "first the blade, then the ear, after that the full corn in the ear," we infer, naturally enough, that such a mighty supernatural manifestation as we have in the appearance of Jesus of Nazareth, which is certainly "the full corn in the ear," must have been preceded by "the blade" and "the ear." More reasonable would it be to believe that the fields white for the harvest had been preceded by no seed-time, than that the way for the advent of the Son of God had not been prepared by previous supernatural revelations.

Then, again, it was not by chance that the Messiah appeared, not in Egypt in the days of Pharaoh, nor in Nineveh or Babylon or Greece or Rome, but among the Jewish people, who alone were prepared for his advent.

That a belief in the unity of God and in his infinite perfections, not to specify other particulars, was a necessary foundation for the peculiar doctrines of Christianity, all of which are overlaid by that of trinity in unity, is self-evident. Now, this belief was peculiar to the Jews, in contrast with all the other ancient nations; and it was held, moreover, not simply as a speculative doctrine by a few philosophers, but in a practical way by the masses of the people, and that, often, in the face of bitter and long-continued persecution. No other example of a whole nation receiving and holding firmly this fundamental doctrine of religion existed in that age; and no adequate explanation of this grand fact has

ever been given, except that it was brought about by a series of supernatural revelations, such as are recorded in the Old Testament. The attempt to account for it from the original peculiarity of the Hebrew mind¹ is simply an absurd expedient, adopted only to avoid the admission of the supernatural element in the history of the Israelitish people. Admit the historic reality of the divine revelations recorded in the Hebrew scriptures, and we see at once *how* the way for the Saviour's advent was prepared, and *why* he was of the seed of Abraham according to the flesh. Deny the historic reality of these preparatory revelations, and we have a mystery, but not one of divine origin. It is simply a man-made mystery, created in the interest of those who have decided beforehand that the true supernatural is an impossibility, and that, accordingly, its existence anywhere in the line of human history must be stoutly denied in the face of all possible evidence.

But the impossibility of the attempt to dis sever the revelations of the New Testament from the preparatory revelations of the Old appears most clearly when we consider the *explicit declarations* of our Saviour, and, after him, of his apostles, on this point. If we know anything whatever concerning the teachings of our Lord, we know that he constantly affirmed that he had come in accordance with the prophecies of the Old Testament. It is not necessary here to anticipate the question of the inspiration of the record. We need only assume (what we are abundantly warranted to do, as has

¹ As is done by Renan: "La conscience sémitique est claire, mais peu étendue; elle comprend merveilleusement l'unité, elle ne sait pas atteindre la multiplicité. Le *monothéisme* en resume et en explique tous les caractères." "The Semitic conscience is clear, but narrow. It has a marvellous comprehension of unity, but cannot attain to the idea of multiplicity. *Monotheism* sums up and explains all its characteristics." — *Langues sémitiques*, i. 1, where one may see much more to the same purport. In accordance with his fundamental principle, that no such thing as a supernatural element exists in human history, Renan makes the religion of the Hebrews simply a natural development from "the Semitic conscience"; and that in the face of a stupendous system of supernatural revelations, culminating in the appearance of Jesus of Nazareth, and as well attested as historic facts can be.

been shown in previous numbers) that the evangelists were honest and competent men, and that they have faithfully reported the substance of our Lord's teaching. If there were in his discourses only here and there a remote allusion to the prophecies concerning him contained in the Hebrew scriptures, there might be some show of reason in the hypothesis that the disciples misapprehended their Master's meaning. But his declarations on this point are so numerous and explicit that such an explanation is not to be thought of for a moment. It was with two of them a matter of personal knowledge that, "beginning at Moses and all the prophets, he expounded unto them in all the scriptures the things concerning himself"¹; and with all of them that he said, after his resurrection, in reference to his past teachings: "These are the words which I spake unto you while I was yet with you, that all things must be fulfilled which were written in the law of Moses and in the prophets and in the Psalms concerning me."² Notice that our Lord, in this last instance, refers, not to certain specific declarations, but to the broad current of his teachings. That in him were fulfilled the prophecies and types of the Old Testament appears in every variety of form in the writings of the New. The Hebrew scriptures constitute, so to speak, the warp into which the Saviour wove the web of his daily instructions. "Think not that I am come to destroy the law or the prophets: I am not come to destroy, but to fulfil."³ Here we have the shuttle of the New Testament flying in the warp of the Old under the Saviour's own hand, and lengthening out the gospel web from day to day. If, now, a stray thread or two of Hebrew prophecy had found its way into this warp, unlike all the rest in substance and color, we might, perhaps, attempt to dissect it out as something foreign and accidental. But we find, upon examination, that the warp itself is made up of Old Testament materials; and to dis sever all these from our Lord's discourses would be to remove all the threads of the warp, and

¹ Luke xxiv. 27.² Luke xxiv. 44.³ Matt. v. 17.

then the web itself would be gone. There are some who seem inclined to treat the New Testament with much respect, while they speak disparagingly of the Old. We should like to ask them whether they do or do not believe that Christ and his apostles claimed to stand on the platform of the Old Testament. Did any unbiased reader ever gain from the perusal of the New Testament any other idea than that Jesus of Nazareth came in accordance with a bright train of supernatural revelations, going before, and preparing the way for his advent? The answer is, No. This idea is so incorporated into the very substance of the New Testament that it must stand or fall with it.

But there is another and a deeper view of the unity of the plan of redemption. We find the Old Testament thickly sown with those great principles which underlie the gospel, and the removal of which would be the removal of its very foundations. Here we specify the following particulars:

1. *The fallen condition of man*, which is the substratum of the plan of redemption through Christ. From the opening chapters of Genesis we learn that alienation from God, with the extreme wickedness that necessarily accompanies it, is not the original condition of the race. Man's normal state, if we may so speak, is that of holy communion with God. In that state he was created; from that state he fell; and to that state it is the end of the gospel to restore him. "For this purpose the Son of God was manifested," says the bosom disciple, "that he might destroy the works of the devil."¹ These are the very works described in the narrative under consideration, namely, the seduction of man from his allegiance to God, with the misery and death that followed. The primitive Hebrew narrative contains, then, the key to the plan of redemption. So it is plainly regarded by the writers of the New Testament. The apostle Paul makes the universality of man's fallen condition through the sin of Adam the platform on which is built the universality of the provisions of salvation through Christ. "As by

¹ 1 John iii. 8.

the offence of one judgment came upon all men to condemnation, even so by the righteousness of one the free gift came upon all men unto justification. For as by one man's disobedience many were made sinners, so by the obedience of one shall many be made righteous."¹ "Since by man came death, by man came also the resurrection of the dead. For as in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive."² How could the original transaction of the fall through the wiles of the devil, and the manifestation of God's Son to destroy the works of the devil, be more indissolubly bound together, as parts of one great whole, than in these words of an inspired apostle? It should be added that the Saviour himself recognizes unmistakably the primitive transaction in Eden, when he says of the devil: "He was a murderer from the beginning, and abode not in the truth, because there is no truth in him. When he speaketh a lie, he speaketh of his own; for he is a liar, and the father of it."³ He was the first who uttered a lie in this world, and thus he is the father of it; and by lying he seduced the human race into sin, and thus made himself their murderer; for "the wages of sin is death," "and so death passed upon all men, for that all have sinned."

2. *The Abrahamic covenant* connects itself immediately and indissolubly with the mission and work of Christ. It was made with Abraham, not for himself and his posterity alone, but for all mankind: "In thy seed shall all the nations of the earth be blessed."⁴ It was, moreover, purely spiritual in its character, the condition of its blessings being faith alone. Paul urges, with great force, the fact that this covenant was made with Abraham before his circumcision, lest any should say that it was conditioned, wholly or in part, upon a carnal ordinance. Having said that Abraham's faith was reckoned to him for righteousness, he raises the question: "How was it then reckoned? When he was in circumcision, or in uncircumcision? Not in circumcision, but in uncircumcision. And he received the sign of cir-

¹ Rom. v. 18, 19.² 1 Cor. xv. 21, 22.³ John viii. 44.⁴ Gen. xxii. 18.

cumcision, a seal of the righteousness of the faith which he had yet being uncircumcised, that he might be the father of all them that believe, though they be not circumcised; that righteousness might be imputed to them also: and the father of circumcision to them who are not of the circumcision only, but who also walk in the steps of that faith of our father Abraham, which he had being yet uncircumcised.”¹ Words of immense significance! Would that our modern ritualists, who are doting on rites and ceremonies, who seem to be unable to distinguish the outward sign from the inward spiritual thing which it shadows forth, and who practically exalt the letter above the spirit, might study and comprehend the deep and far-reaching force of the apostle’s argument! Under the Old Testament the *seal* did not make the *covenant* valid; for the covenant existed many years before the seal was instituted. Faith was the only condition of Abraham’s justification. Hence the apostle argues that the Gentiles who have Abraham’s faith shall have Abraham’s justification also, though they be uncircumcised. Upon the same broad and spiritual ground he further argues that the blessing of justification pertains not to the literal seed of Abraham, but to those who are his spiritual seed by virtue of possessing his faith: “Therefore it is of faith, that it might be by grace; to the end the promise might be sure to all the seed; not to that only which is of the law, but to that also which is of the faith of Abraham, who is the father of us all, as it is written, I have made thee a father of many nations.”² The historic fact that many nations literally descended from Abraham adumbrated the higher fact that he is the father of all who exercise his faith, and thus inherit his justification.

But again, if we look at the *promise itself* embodied in the Abrahamic covenant: “In thee shall all the families of the earth be blessed,” we find it to be the very substance of the gospel. So the apostle argues: “The scripture, foreseeing that God would justify the heathen through faith,

¹ Rom. iv. 10-12.

² Rom. iv. 16, 17.

preached before [announced beforehand] the gospel unto Abraham, saying, In thee shall all nations be blessed.”¹ It was, in deed and in truth, an annunciation beforehand to Abraham of the gospel; for the incarnation and work of Christ are, according to the uniform representation of the New Testament, nothing else but the carrying out of the covenant made with Abraham—a covenant (1) made for all mankind, (2) conditioned on faith alone, (3) having Christ for its end and fulfilment. Here, then, we have another bond of connection between the Old Testament and the New, and a bond which attaches itself to the very substance of both.

But still further: While God has thus indissolubly linked to the incarnation of his Son this high transaction with Abraham, he has, at the same time, connected it with the first promise made to man in Eden, and thus with the fall of man through the agency of the devil. The promise in Eden was that the seed of the woman should bruise the serpent’s head; the promise to Abraham was that his seed, which is this very seed of the woman, should bless all the families of mankind. This blessing Jesus of Nazareth bestows by bruising the serpent’s head, or, in the language of John, destroying the works of the devil. The two promises are, then, in their inmost nature, one and the same, and their fulfilment constitutes the work of Christ. Whoever has obtained a glimpse of this internal connection between the different parts of revelation, will never again think of separating the Old Testament from the New.

3. *The Mosaic economy* had its end in Christ. Its general scope is thus summed up by the apostle: “The law was our schoolmaster to bring us unto Christ, that we might be justified by faith.”² It is, then, to be judged not absolutely, but with reference to this its high end. The training to which it subjected the Israelitish people was severe; but, rebellious and stiff-necked as they were, and surrounded, moreover, by polytheism and idolatry, all its severity was necessary to

¹ Gal. iii. 8.

² Gal. iii. 24.

fit them for their high office as the covenant people, through whom the gospel should afterwards be given to the world. The rites which it imposed were *burdensome* through their multiplicity; for the nation was then in its childhood and pupilage,¹ and needed to be treated accordingly. As to the objection, so much insisted upon by some, that the Mosaic institutions were *exclusive* in their character — a religion for one nation only, while all the other nations were left in ignorance — it can be answered in a summary way. The Mosaic economy was a *partial, preparatory to a universal, dispensation*. God's plan was to bring one nation into special relation to himself, to root out of it idolatry, and educate it by a series of divinely appointed institutions for the advent of the Son of God, and then to propagate the gospel from this nation as a centre throughout all the earth. It belongs to the objector to propose some better way. As well might he complain of the procedure of a military commander that, instead of spreading his army at the outset over a whole province, he concentrated it on one strong point. Let him wait patiently, and he will find that in gaining this point the commander gains the whole country. Looking at the Mosaic economy, then, with reference to its end, we find it inlaid with three institutions, each of which adumbrates the Messiah, and prepares the way for his advent. These are the prophetic, the kingly, and the priestly.

The *prophetic* institution consisted in an order of men divinely commissioned by God to reveal to the covenant people his will for their salvation. The point of special importance here is, that they were *men addressing their fellow-men in God's name*. From the blazing summit of Sinai God himself spake to the whole congregation. But this mode of communication they could not endure, and they besought him, through Moses, that it might be discontinued: "speak thou with us," they said, "and we will hear; but let not God speak with us, lest we die."² Of this request God approved; and in the promise which he gave in connection with it, he

¹ Gal. iv. 1-3.² Ex. xx. 19.

unfolded, on the side of divine revelation, the whole economy of redemption: "I will raise them up a prophet from among their brethren like unto thee, and will put my words in his mouth, and he shall speak unto them all that I shall command him."¹ How exactly is the prophetic office of Christ here portrayed! He came in human nature, a man like his brethren to whom he was sent, and he spake to them all that the Father who sent him had commanded him. "My doctrine is not mine," said he, "but his that sent me."² "He that sent me is true; and I speak to the world those things which I have heard of him."³ "All things that I have heard of my Father I have made known unto you."⁴ But how did this promise of the Great Prophet to come in the latter day from among their brethren meet the wants of the generation who preferred through Moses the request that we are considering? We answer: the promise that the great antitype should be one of their brethren, contained in itself the pledge that God would hereafter adopt this mode of communicating his will to men in all the preparatory revelations which he should make. The coming of the Messiah in human nature was delayed for many centuries; but God sent as his forerunners a series of prophets, who not only foretold his advent, but *typified his office* in the fact that they were men sent by God to speak to their fellow-men. By this fundamental principle — that God would address man through man — the old and new dispensations are linked together as parts of one great whole.

The *kingly* office of the Messiah connects itself with that of the Old Testament in a special way. Not only did the headship given by God to David and his successors over the covenant people adumbrate the higher headship of Christ, but David had from God the promise, "Thine house and thy kingdom shall be established forever";⁵ a promise which could only be fulfilled in Jesus of Nazareth, "the seed of David according to the flesh," and which was so fulfilled in

¹ Deut. xviii. 18.² John vii. 16.³ John viii. 26.⁴ John xv. 15.⁵ 2 Sam. vii. 16.

him, according to the express declaration of the New Testament: "The Lord God shall give unto him the throne of his father David, and he shall reign over the house of Jacob forever, and of his kingdom there shall be no end."¹ It is true that the people were sharply rebuked for asking of God, through Samuel, a king, because the motives on which their request was founded were low and unworthy, having their origin in an unbelieving and worldly spirit. Nevertheless God granted their petition, because it was his purpose to adumbrate in the kingly office thus established, that of him who is "King of kings and Lord of lords." The victorious might wherewith God endowed David, and his many interpositions in behalf of him and his successors on the throne, were anticipations and pledges of the all-conquering power of David's greater Son, to whom should be given dominion over all nations.²

Of the *priestly* office, with the blood of the sacrifices connected with it, the very substance is the prefiguration of "the Lamb of God, which taketh away the sin of the world."³ By the stream of sacrificial blood which flowed from the Jewish altar was shadowed forth the great fundamental truth of redemption, that "without shedding of blood is no remission";⁴ and by the continued flow of that stream from age to age was further indicated its own inefficiency to take away sin — the fact that it was not itself the expiation that human guilt demanded, but only a type of that expiation. So the writer to the Hebrews argues: "The law having a shadow of good things to come, and not the very image of the things, can never, by the same sacrifices which they offer continually, year by year, make the comers thereunto perfect. For then would they not have ceased to be offered? because that the worshippers once purged should have had no more conscience of sins. But in those sacrifices there is a remem-

¹ Luke i. 32, 33.

² See this subject discussed at large in the *Bibliotheca Sacra* for 1854, in the Article entitled: "The Relation of David's Family to the Messiah," pp. 306-328.

³ John i. 29.

⁴ Heb. ix 22.

brance again made of sins every year. For it is not possible that the blood of bulls and of goats should take away sin.”¹ Christ, on the contrary, offers but one sacrifice, because that has a perfect power of expiation: “Every priest standeth daily ministering and offering oftentimes the same sacrifices which can never take away sins: but this man, after he had offered one sacrifice for sins, forever sat down on the right hand of God.”² If anything is fully taught in the New Testament, it is, (1) the sacrificial and propitiatory nature of our Lord’s death—that he came “to give his life a ransom for many” (more literally, “a ransom instead of many”)³; that his own self bear our sins in his own body on the tree”⁴; that he “redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us”;⁵ that God “made him to be sin for us who knew no sin; that we might be made the righteousness of God in him;”⁶ and that God “hath set him forth to be a propitiation through faith in his blood, to declare his righteousness for the remission” [passing by] of sins that are past, through the forbearance of God, that he might be just, and the justifier of him who believes in Jesus”⁷; (2) that this sacrificial and propitiatory offering of himself on Calvary was adumbrated by the Aaronic priesthood, with its system of bloody offerings. If we receive the New Testament doc-

¹ Heb. x. 1–4.² Heb. x. 11, 12.³ Matt. xx. 28; Mark x. 45.⁴ 1 Pet. ii. 24.⁵ Gal. iii. 13.⁶ 2 Cor. v. 21.

⁷ Rom. iii, 25, 26. Every word of this weighty passage, which the apostle gives, not in a rhetorical, but in a sober, doctrinal form, deserves careful consideration. The original reads thus: “Ὁν προέθετο ὁ Θεὸς ἱλαστήριον διὰ τῆς πίστεως ἐν τῷ αὐτοῦ αἵματι, εἰς ἐνδειξιν τῆς δικαιοσύνης αὐτοῦ διὰ τὴν πάρεσιν τῶν προγεγονότων ἁμαρτημάτων ἐν τῇ ἀνοχῇ τοῦ Θεοῦ, πρὸς ἐνδειξιν τῆς δικαιοσύνης αὐτοῦ ἐν τῷ νῦν καιρῷ, εἰς τὸ εἶναι αὐτὸν δίκαιον καὶ δικαιῶντα τὸν ἐκ πίστεως Ἰησοῦ; and it may be literally rendered: “Whom God set forth, a propitiation, through faith, in his blood, for the manifestation of his righteousness in respect to the overlooking of past sins through the forbearance of God—a manifestation of his righteousness at the present time; in order that he may be just, and the justifier of him that believeth in Jesus.” These words teach, as explicitly as human language can express it, the great doctrine that our Lord offered up himself a sacrifice to satisfy divine justice, and did satisfy it; so that through his propitiatory sacrifice God can be just, while he justifies all who believe in Jesus.

trine of our Lord's sacrificial death, then the divinely appointed priesthood of the Old Testament, with its sacrificial blood flowing from age to age, appears as a shadow indeed, but the shadow of a great and solemn reality. We have in the Old Testament the type, and in the New the great Antitype. Thus the inward, vital connection of the two parts of revelation appears in its full glory. But the moment we deny or explain away the sacrificial and propitiatory nature of our Lord's death, thus reducing its efficacy to the softening, subduing, and winning power which it exerts over the human heart, we make the Levitical priesthood and sacrifices a shadow, not of good things to come, but of a nonentity; and thus we violently disrupt the economy of the Old Testament from that of the New. Christ no longer fulfils in his own person the Levitical priesthood and sacrifices; for if these latter adumbrate anything, it is that of *intercession between God and man through the offering of blood on man's behalf*; just as the New Testament everywhere refers forgiveness of sin to the efficacy of Christ's blood.¹

Since, therefore, the Old Testament has so many and such vital connections with the New—connections not of external character merely, but which enter into the very substance of both; since its whole scope and aim is to prepare the way for the Messiah, to adumbrate his offices, and to educate the covenant people for his coming, we need not wonder at the constant appeals which the Saviour and his apostles make to its pages. It is throughout a perpetual prophecy of the gospel, and so they manifestly regard it.

It would now be interesting to follow out historically the *development in prophecy* of the Messianic idea. We are able to give only the salient points of prophetic revelation, omitting all minor details.

The original promise in Eden: "I will put enmity between thee and the woman, and between thy seed and her seed;

¹ Acts xx. 28; Rom. iii. 25; Eph. i. 7; Col. i. 14; Heb. ix. 12-14; 1 Pet. i. 19; Rev. v. 9; and, more than all, the solemn declaration connected with the eucharistic cup: "This is my blood of the new testament, which is shed for many, for the remission of sins."—Matt. xxvi. 28, and the parallel passages.

it shall bruise thy head, and thou shalt bruise its heel,"¹ received in the wisdom of God a form admitting of indefinite expansion and development. It contained, and was intended to contain, in a germinal way, the whole future history of redemption. Its deep meaning is not to be measured by the little which our first parents could comprehend concerning it, but by the mind of God, who, in giving it, saw the end from the beginning. To their apprehension the curse may have fallen only on the literal serpent; but in the intention of God it came on him symbolically, while its real contents rested on the true author of the apostasy, "that old serpent which is the devil and Satan"²—that primitive murderer and liar, whose seed are all that are like him, and follow him in his persecution of the seed of the woman.³ This seed of the woman, again, is Christ; not in his simple personality, but as the great head of God's kingdom. It is Christ and his body, the church; or, if one prefer to say so, it is the church in Christ, her head. The promise foretells a relentless conflict between these two seeds, in which the seed of the serpent shall bruise the heel of the woman's seed, but never prevail against it, while the seed of the woman shall in the final issue bruise the serpent's head. The reader is requested to notice how absolutely *generic* this promise is. No time is specified. No single person is named, or any line of offspring. It is simply the seed of the woman.

Coming down, now, to Abraham's day, the same promise is renewed to him, with an important limitation: "In thy seed shall all the nations of the earth be blessed."⁴ Beyond doubt "all the nations" are to be blessed in the way specified in the original promise, by the bruising of the serpent's head; and this high office is now assigned to Abraham's seed, but still with no specification of a particular person.

According to the most probable interpretation of Jacob's prophetic words: "The sceptre shall not depart from Judah, nor a lawgiver from between his feet, until Shiloh come"

¹ Gen. iii. 15.² Rev. xx. 2.³ John viii. 44.⁴ Gen. xxii. 18.

(or, "until he come unto whom it belongs." Compare Ezek. xxi. 27); "and unto him shall the gathering" (or, "the obedience") "of the people be,"¹ we have in them, for the first time, an intimation of a personal Redeemer of Judah's line, who is to be the great Pacificator (Shiloh), or the great King to whom dominion belongs, and who shall gather the nations to his standard. But, whatever doubt may rest on the mind of any one in respect to the true interpretation of these words, we have in the promise to Moses already noticed: "I will raise them up a prophet from their brethren like unto thee,"² a clear prediction of a personal Redeemer under the character of a great Prophet, who is to be, like Moses, the Leader of God's people, and the Mediator between them and God.

Passing on, now, to the time of David, we have the memorable promise of Nathan to David: "I will set up thy seed after thee, which shall proceed out of thy bowels, and I will establish his kingdom. He shall build a house to my name, and I will establish the throne of his kingdom forever."³ In the words, "He shall build a house to my name," there is undoubtedly a reference to Solomon and the material house which he should erect on Moriah. But it is this house only as the visible centre of God's kingdom among men; and it is Solomon only as the next after David in a royal line which should reign over God's people forever. Notice that the promise, originally made to the seed of the woman as such, afterwards limited to the seed of Abraham, then to the seed of Judah, is now once more restricted to David's royal line. The seed of the woman, moreover, that is to crush the serpent's head, is invested with a kingly character, and as such it appears afterwards in the Psalms and the prophets. The king that sits on David's throne is invested with universal dominion, and breaks his enemies in pieces with a rod of iron;⁴ he has dominion from sea to sea,

¹ Gen. xlix. 10.

² See the passage at large, 2 Sam. vii. 12-16.

³ Deut. xviii. 15, 18.

⁴ Ps. ii.

and from the river to the ends of the earth; all kings fall down before him, and all nations serve him.¹

His superhuman exaltation is intimated in such words as the following; "The Lord said unto my Lord, Sit thou at my right hand, until I make thine enemies my footstool"²; "I will make thy name to be remembered in all generations; therefore shall the people praise thee forever and ever."³ And, finally, the great truth that it is in *one* of David's descendants that these magnificent promises meet, is fully revealed to us in such predictions as the following: "Unto us a Child is born, unto us a Son is given; and the government shall be on his shoulder; and his name shall be called Wonder, Counselor, mighty God, Father of eternity, Prince of peace. Of the increase of his government and peace there shall be no end, upon the throne of David and upon his kingdom, to order it and to establish it with judgment and with justice, from henceforth even forever"⁴ "And there shall come forth a rod out of the stem of Jesse, and a branch shall grow out of his roots; and the Spirit of the Lord shall rest upon him, the spirit of wisdom and understanding, the spirit of counsel and might, the spirit of knowledge and of the fear of the Lord." Under his dominion universal peace shall prevail, and the earth "be full of the knowledge of the Lord, as the waters cover the sea."⁵

Meanwhile, as the scroll of prophecy is gradually unrolled, offices and attributes are ascribed to this mighty Son of David which are utterly inconsistent with David's position in the theocracy, and to human appearance inconsistent with each other. The priestly office was by the law of Moses restricted to the family of Aaron, and no man of another tribe might presume to usurp its functions. For attempting to burn incense in the temple—an office which appertained to the priests alone, Uzziah was smitten with leprosy.⁶ Yet this king of David's line is by a solemn oath made a priest

¹ Ps. lxxii.² Ps. cx. 1.³ Ps. xlv. 17.⁴ Isa. ix. 6, 7.⁵ For the full description see Isa. xi. 1-9.⁶ 2 Chron. xxvi. 16-21.

forever, after the order of Melchizedek.¹ He “shall bear the glory, and sit and rule upon his throne; and he shall be a priest upon his throne.”² This mighty King, who sits at God’s right hand, and at whose right hand the Lord stands to strike through kings in the day of his wrath,”³ is yet oppressed and afflicted, brought as a lamb to the slaughter, and as a sheep before her shearers is dumb, so he openeth not his mouth. It pleases the Lord to bruise him, and to make his soul an offering for sin; he pours out his soul unto death, and is numbered with the transgressors, bears the sins of many, and makes intercession for the transgressors.⁴ The plot continually thickens, till it becomes to human view an inextricable maze. Yet when Jesus of Nazareth appears, all becomes plain. He unites in himself characters apparently the most incompatible. He is at once the King of kings and Lord of lords, and “the Lamb that taketh away the sin of the world.” All the types and prophecies of the Old Testament, and all the offices of the Mosaic economy—the prophetic, the kingly, and the priestly—find in him their end and their fulfilment. Faith in him is the key which opens all the intricate wards of Old Testament prophecy which otherwise remain shut to human apprehension; and just as the lock and the key are parts of one whole, so are the revelations of the Old Testament and the New.

Our remaining remarks will constitute a transition from the subject of *revelation* to that of the *inspiration of the record*. We have seen that the gospel is built on the platform of the Old Testament—that it is, in truth, but the consummation of a connected series of divine revelations begun in Eden. It is a natural inference that the *record* of these revelations must have come to the covenant people *with divine authority*; and such an experience is fully warranted by the uniform manner in which Christ and his apostles refer to the writings of the Old Testament. We have now in mind, not so much the express statements of

¹ Ps. cx. 4.² Zech. vi. 13.³ Ps. cx.⁴ Isa. liii.

the New Testament, like the celebrated passage: "All scripture is given by inspiration of God"¹ and the apostle Peter's declaration: "For prophecy was not at any time given by the will of man; but holy men of God spake as moved by the Holy Ghost"²—we have not so much in mind these express declarations as the reverential attitude which Christ and his apostles take towards the writings of the Hebrew scriptures, and the confidence with which they appeal to their doctrines and historic statements; in a word, to the manifest assumption which they everywhere make of their infallible authority. No unprejudiced man can read the New Testament without the profound conviction that its authors did thus receive the Old, and that herein they truthfully represented the position of Jesus himself. In this respect no distinction is made between one part of the Old Testament and another. The whole is received and referred to as a divinely authoritative record of God's dealings with men.

Some of the passages already quoted to show the inseparable connection between the Old Testament and the New, are equally pertinent to establish the divine authority ascribed by the Saviour and his apostles to the record. When, for example, the risen Jesus said: "O fools, and slow of heart to believe all that the prophets have spoken," and then,

¹ 2 Tim. iii. 16. So far as the doctrine of inspiration is concerned, it makes no difference whether we render with Calvin, De Wette, Wiesinger, and many others, as is done by our version: "All scripture is given by inspiration of God, and is profitable," etc.; or, after the Syriac, Vulgate, Origen, Luther, and others (except that they take no notice of the *καί*): "All scripture given by inspiration of God is also profitable," etc. In the former case the apostle directly affirms the inspiration of all scripture, and adds that it is profitable, etc. In the latter, he assumes inspiration as an attribute of scripture, whence it naturally follows that it is also profitable. We say, assumes, for with a "Hebrew of the Hebrews" no distinction of scripture into inspired and uninspired could possibly have been thought of. It is of scripture as inspired that he makes the affirmation that it is also profitable. His object, says Huther, is to show "that the scriptures, as inspired, are also profitable (*καί* serves the office of strengthening)."

² 2 Pet. i. 21, where the original runs thus: Οὐ γὰρ θελήματι ἀνθρώπου ἠνέχθη ποτέ (Robinson, *once, formerly*; but better, *ever, at any time*, ποτέ belonging to the preceding negative, as in Eph. v. 29; 1 Thess. ii. 5; 2 Pet. i. 10) προφητεία, ἄλλ' ὑπὸ πνεύματος ἁγίου φερόμενοι ἐλάλησαν ἄγιοι θεοῦ ἄνθρωποι.

"beginning at Moses and all the prophets, he expounded unto them in all the scriptures the things concerning himself"; and afterwards added: "These are the words which I spake unto you while I was yet with you, that all things must be fulfilled which were written in the law of Moses, and in the prophets, and in the Psalms concerning me," he appeals to the record of ancient prophecies concerning himself as invested with divine authority. So, also, in his question to the Pharisees: "What think ye of Christ? Whose son is he? They say unto him, The son of David. He saith unto them, How then doth David in spirit call him Lord?"¹ etc. The words "in spirit" are equivalent to "in the Holy Spirit," that is, under his guidance. Nor is there the shadow of a reason for supposing that the Saviour wishes to distinguish this Psalm from the Psalms as a whole. He simply refers to it as one of the declarations concerning the Messiah made, as are all the rest, "in spirit." Again, in answering the question of the Pharisees concerning the lawfulness of divorce, he says: "Have ye not read that he who made them at the beginning made them male and female, and said, For this cause shall a man leave father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife; and they twain shall be one flesh," etc.² Here our Lord refers, first, to a historical incident in the Book of Genesis, combining the two records of the same;³ secondly, to the divine interpretation of its import, making this authoritative for the relation of husband and wife.⁴ The apostles follow in their Lord's footsteps. "These things," says John, "understood not his disciples at first; but when Jesus was glorified, then remembered they that these things were written of him, and that they had done these things unto him."⁵ "Is there," asks Paul, "unrighteousness with God? God forbid. For he saith to Moses, I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy, and I will have compassion on whom I will have compassion."⁶ He is arguing concerning God's sovereignty

¹ Matt. xxii. 42 seq.² Matt. xix. 4 seq.³ Gen. i. 27; ii. 18-22.⁴ Gen. ii. 23, 24.⁵ John xii. 16.⁶ Rom. ix. 14, 15.

in the distribution of his favors; and he sustains himself by an appeal to the divine record. It is useless to multiply quotations any further. The authors of several books of the Old Testament are unknown; but the record contained in them is never, for this reason, disparaged. All are put on a common basis of divine authority. "What saith the scripture?" With Christ and his apostles this is the end of controversy.

ARTICLE VIII.

THE SILENCE OF WOMEN IN THE CHURCHES — OBJECTIONS CONSIDERED.

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As plausible objections are sometimes urged against the view of the silence of women in the churches, given in the current volume, pp. 336-359, we beg indulgence while we repeat what may be necessary in order to give these objections a full examination, and, as we believe, a conclusive answer. We desire to know the truth; for the truth will make us free.

It is said that we may understand Paul's rules respecting the silence of women in the churches, as given "for his times and circumstances," and not "for all times and circumstances"; that "if he had put in the little clause, 'for all time,' there could be no doubt."

This objection meets us at the threshold, and, if true, opens the pulpit to women. Did Paul impose silence upon women for all time, or only for his own time? That he laid the prohibition upon the Corinthian church only, and that for special reasons, while other churches were free from it, is excluded by the correct punctuation of the passage. Scholars are agreed that it should read: "As in all churches of the saints, let your women keep silence in the churches." This

renders the prohibition universal, so far as the times of the apostles are concerned, and, at the same stroke, sets aside entirely much that is said and written about the temporary nature of these commands. Disorders in the church at Corinth gave *occasion*, but did not constitute the *reason*, for the command of silence; for (1) the men, so far as the record goes, were as disorderly in their speaking as were the women. (2) While Paul meets the disorders of the men in one way, he meets the disorders of the women in quite another way; telling the men to speak "by two or by three, and by course," but forbidding the women to speak at all in the assemblies. (3) No disorder in the church at Corinth could have been the reason why silence had been practised by women in all other churches of the saints. (4) Paul nowhere refers to these disorders as the reason for his prohibitions. Hence we conclude that these disorders in the Corinthian church were merely the occasion, but not the reason, of the commands of silence.

Looking at these commands as rules of conduct given to all the churches during the apostolic age, the question arises: Have they the marks of temporary or of perpetual rules? were they designed for the primitive ages, or for all time? In answering this question we must have regard, not so much to the occasion which gave rise to the command, as to the reasons assigned for giving it. We hold that these rules of silence are universal and perpetual: (1) They contain no limitation of time or territory, expressed or understood. They are universal and perpetual in the terms used to express them. (2) Rules thus given are presumptively universal and perpetual, unless they be founded, expressly or impliedly, on customs, circumstances, etc., which pass away. (3) Though occasioned by disorders in a certain church, these rules are expressly founded in the will of God as revealed in creation, on the prior deception of Eve, and on the law which had itself been founded on the same. The reason of the rules has not, then, ceased; therefore the rules remain in force. (4) The apostle nowhere rests these rules

of silence on temporary grounds, as, in 1 Cor. vii. 26, he rests his advice against marriage on "the present distress." The fact that in the one case he assigns perpetual and universal reasons, while in the other only temporary reasons, is a strong confirmation of the view we have taken. (5) The position of woman under the old dispensations, the fact that neither Christ nor his apostles chose a woman to teach or to preach, the interpretation put upon these rules by the teachings and practice of all divisions of the church down to the present hour with few exceptions during the first and the last century, confirm the perpetuity and universality of the commands of silence. (6) To treat these rules of silence as temporary, is, in our opinion, to invalidate every precept and command of the Bible. For, for what others are more universal and permanent reasons given? (7) The insertion of the little clause, "for all time," would be so foreign to the style of the sacred writers, as to become an element of weakness instead of strength. Critics would regard it as an interpolation. For these reasons we hold the objection to be invalid, and that the injunction of silence is of perpetual obligation. Surely so long as the reasons of a law remain the law exists in force, unless it be expressly repealed.

It may be replied that the principle is still in force, though the form of exhibiting it be changed; that women are to be modest, in obedience, usurping no authority over the men, even now while speaking in the assemblies. If Paul meant no more than this, why did he say more? He told the men to speak in "course"; why did he not tell the women to speak in modesty? Was speaking then "in all churches of the saints" a sign of equality unbecoming the position of women? So Paul regarded it; and so he forbade it. It was not the manner, but the thing itself, that he condemned; and he condemned the speaking itself, because in its very nature, whatever the manner of it may be, speaking in the assembly is inconsistent with the position of women in the churches. Hence all the reasons he gives are reasons against speaking at all in the churches, and not against an offensive

manner of address. We cannot believe that woman's subordination, in the scriptural sense of the term, permits to-day what in Paul's time it absolutely forbade.

It may be said that other general rules are given which are nevertheless modified by circumstances. Though we have the command, "Resist not evil," yet we justify certain forms of resistance, even unto bloodshed and war. This is true; for we have the example of Christ¹ and his apostles² to guide us, as well as the words of Paul: "If it be possible, as much as in you lies, live peaceably with all men."³ Besides, no one doubts that these general rules are still in full force; and that all violation of their spirit is sin, and all violation of their literal sense is exceptional, and should be rare indeed. We are to obey the precept in spirit, always; in letter, generally.

Admitting that the prohibitions under consideration are still in full force, it is said that they apply to the more public meetings of the church, and not to social prayer-meetings. We think they apply to all the meetings of the church, and to all mixed assemblies of men and women. Our reasons are these: (1) The context. Does the context describe a religious assembly to which the prohibition was applied? If so, then the prohibition applies to all similar meetings; for, unless it be applied to the *kind* of meetings described, we have no right to apply it to any meeting whatever. If we can determine the kind of meeting referred to in the context, the extent of the prohibition is found. In 1 Cor. xiv. 26-38, a Christian assembly is described, from which we learn: (a) That men and women and probably unbelievers were present. (b) That the control of the meeting seemed to be in the hands of the membership, and not in the hands of a pastor, no elder or bishop being mentioned. (c) That many, even all males, might take an active part in carrying on the meeting. (d) That women only were forbidden to speak, or prophesy, or teach in it. The meeting here described has no likeness

¹ Matt. xxvi. 51-54; John xviii. 23.

² Acts xvi. 37; xxiii. 3.

³ Rom. xii. 18.

of manner to our church services on the Lord's day, but is, instead, an exact representation of a modern prayer and conference meeting, save that miraculous gifts have ceased, and that our social meetings are more formal than the one here described. It was to such informal, social meetings that Paul referred when he said, "It is a shame for women to speak"; and we contend that it is to such-like meetings that the command of silence now applies.

(2) The circumstances of the early churches. They had no church edifices. They met where they could; in private houses, as well as in more public places. Some of these churches must have been very small. Their meetings resembled our social meetings in private houses in size as in the order of worship. Now these small churches, meeting in private houses, and frequently without a pastor, observed the rule of silence enjoined upon women in their assemblies, as fully as did the larger churches meeting in more public places; for Paul referring to them, says to the Corinthians: "as in all churches of the saints, let your women keep silence in the churches."

(3) The difficulty of applying the rules of silence to any kind of meetings, if not applied to the kind described. If women may now speak in meetings similar in all respects, save the absence of supernatural gifts, to those in which they were once commanded to keep silence, who can prevent their preaching? If, by our interpretation, we open to the voice of women meetings exactly similar to those respecting which Paul enjoined silence upon them, how can we close to them meetings unlike those described? It will be found impossible to apply the prohibition anywhere, unless we begin, where the apostle did, with informal, social meetings. We must apply the command to the kind of meetings, i.e. every sort of church service where both men and women are present, respecting which the prohibition was originally given, or to none at all. Women permitted to speak in social meetings will ask for the pulpit; and on what ground can they be denied?

(4) The principle on which Paul rests his prohibitions, that of subordination of woman to man (see 1 Cor. xi. 3, 7; xiv. 34; 1 Tim. ii. 12-14), applies equally to all meetings where men are present, — as really to social prayer-meetings as to the preaching service. These are our reasons for believing that the command of silence now in full force, is laid upon women in all Christian assemblies composed of males and females. If appeal be taken from them to common sense, we abide the issue. We have no fear of any reversal of what God has engraven in the constitution of the sexes, and written in his word. The decision may be slow in coming, but its utterance when given will be the repetition of Paul's command of silence.

With all earnestness and solemnity we, in the name of the truth, demand of those who, in teaching or in practice, or in both, set at naught Paul's commands of silence, the grounds of their action. Show, by fair and full exegesis, why women should now speak in the assemblies of the saints. If the truth be against us, let it be shown, and we will obey it. To this demand some will respond by quoting certain passages of scripture which they imagine conflict with the view presented; while others will appeal to the good which women do by speaking in the public meetings. On this point, is God's word divided? or, is his providence in conflict with his word? Let the facts answer.

Certain prophetesses under the old dispensation are frequently referred to, as justifying women's speaking in the churches at the present time; but wrongly; for (1) no instance of their public speaking is recorded. Miriam gave inspired responses to the song of Moses;¹ afterwards privately speaking against her brother, she was smitten with leprosy.² Deborah judged Israel oppressed by Jabin king of Canaan; called Barak, and, in the name of the Lord, ordered him to collect an army; accompanied him, but not as commander, to the battle; told him, as a prophetess, when to join battle with Sisera; composed and sung a song of triumph.³

¹ Ex. xv. 20, 21.² Num. xii.³ Judges iv, v.

Huldah is briefly mentioned as being privately consulted by the messengers of Josiah, and as foretelling the postponement of the threatened evils, until after the death of that good king.¹ Noadiah was a false prophetess.² Anna, coming into the Temple saw the infant Jesus, whom his mother had brought to Jerusalem "to present to the Lord," and she "gave thanks likewise unto the Lord, and spoke of him to all them that looked for redemption in Jerusalem."³ As there were no assemblages in the Temple on such occasions, and as only Simeon and Anna of all who "looked for redemption in Jerusalem" are mentioned as being present, the speaking of this holy woman could have been only in private. We can find no instance in the Bible of a woman's speaking in public. (2) If these prophetesses had each been called to public speaking, they would have been exceptions to the general rule, in striking contrast with the conduct of all other women under the law. Certainly no rule could have been or can now be founded upon these exceptional cases. (3) Yea, more; if under the law all women had been commanded to speak in public, as all males were commanded to be circumcised, the command under the old dispensation would have been reversed by the prohibitions under the gospel, as was actually the case with the ceremonial law and the rite of circumcision. Nothing certainly can be made of these cases against the position we have taken.

In turning to the dispensation of the gospel, we find certain women mentioned as helping the apostle much in the Lord; but in no instance are they represented as preaching, or speaking in any assembly of the saints. It is, indeed, an unconscious, and therefore a more humiliating, satire upon our times, that it should be assumed so generally that in those days women could not have been helpers at all without speaking in meeting. Have we come to this, that in the minds of so many the whole of Christian labor is public talk?

Joel predicts⁴ and Peter quotes⁵ that "in the last days"

¹ 2 Kings xxii. 14-20.

² Neh. vi. 14

³ Luke ii. 36-38.

⁴ Joel ii. 28-32.

⁵ Acts ii. 17-21.

God's Spirit should lead "daughters" and hand-maidens," as well as men, to "prophecy"; but neither prophet nor apostle specifies any particular place, as the church, in which it should be done. Now Paul nowhere forbids women to prophecy, except "in the churches." They could have exercised their gift in private, or in a congregation of women, as did the four virgin daughters of Philip. In saying this we do not speak lightly; for, at a time when women were so secluded that the churches appointed deaconesses for the well ordering of their affairs, there was a special need of the supernatural gift of prophecy among women and for women. A prophetess would have had enough to do among her own sex, without speaking in the assemblies. Besides, prophesying was not an ordinary, but a supernatural exercise; and could, if it had not then been forbidden to women in all churches, furnish no rule for our times. The proof is this: (1) The *usus loquendi* of the words "prophet" and "prophecy."¹ (2) The close union of "prophecy" in the passage with supernatural "visions," "dreams," and physical events. Surely the ordinary visions of young men, and the ordinary dreams of old men, neither arise from the outpouring of God's Spirit, nor add glory to the dispensation of grace. (3) Peter quotes the passage, to explain a supernatural event. This passage has, therefore, no possible application to ordinary, uninspired speaking. None could then, or can now, prophesy, but the inspired of the Holy Ghost. Though these supernatural events were to take place "in the last days" i.e. in the times of the gospel, there is no intimation that they were to continue throughout the new dispensation. Paul even expressly pronounces supernatural gifts, including prophecy, to be temporary in their exercise;² while he forbade women to prophesy in the churches.³ If they could not exercise a supernatural gift, much less could they their ordinary powers of speech in the assemblies. No one can find in this passage the least authority for the modern practice of women's speaking in public.

¹ See pp. 343-346.² 1 Cor. xiii. 8.³ See pp. 343-347.

“There is neither male nor female: for ye are all one in Christ Jesus” (Gal. iii. 28), is often used against us. Now it is fair, in explaining it, to ask, what was Paul speaking about? In view of what did he say, “There is no male and female”?¹ We learn from the context. He reasons, in vs. 1-5 of the same chapter, with the Galatians upon their apostasy from faith in Christ to reliance on the deeds of the law for salvation. Then he shows that “Abraham believed God, and it was counted to him for righteousness” (vs. 6-9), and “that God would justify the heathen through faith,” as he declared unto Abraham. Next he proves that there is no salvation for any one by the law; for the law itself says: “The just shall live *by faith*” (vs. 10-14). But salvation is by the covenant of promise made to Abraham, which is by faith, and which the law coming afterwards could not annul (vs. 15-18). The use of the law was not then, to introduce another way of salvation, namely, by works; but to lead to Christ, as slaves used to bring the children of their masters to school, that by faith in Christ, men might be saved (vs. 19-26). For the baptized into Christ have put on Christ (v. 27), i.e. they have by faith clothed themselves in the likeness of Christ, and not in the rags of good works. We are made Abraham’s seed, and heirs “according to promise” (v. 29), i.e. heirs according to the covenant of promise which is by faith. Thus the thought of the apostle, both preceding and following v. 28, is salvation by faith, and not by the law. This is his argument with the Galatians. In view of this salvation by faith, he says: “There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither bond nor free, there is no male and female; for ye are all one in Christ Jesus.” There is not one way of salvation for one, and another for another. Salvation by faith is the only way, and the same way for all mankind. There is a significant change of construction in this verse, which the common translation gives no intimation of, but which we have brought out in our quotation of it. On this change Ellicott rests the following comment, namely,

¹ See Greek Text.

“While the alterable, political, and sociable distinctions are contrasted by οὐδέ, the unalterable human one of sex is expressed by καί.” Paul, as if having his eye on the discussion of our day, by a slight change of construction guards the foundation, “the unalterable human distinction of sex,” on which he rests the difference he in other places makes between men and women in the public worship of God.¹ The meaning of this passage is, then, that salvation by faith is the same to all mankind, whatever be their race, condition, or sex, though *natural distinctions still exist in full force*. Now this essential unity in the way of salvation is not in the least inconsistent with different modes of worship or privileges and proprieties in worship. The Temple service was unlike the worship of a Christian assembly in form and in the privilege of participating in it; yet salvation under the law as under the gospel was by faith. So, in the Christian assembly, privileges may be accorded to some and denied to others, while all, if saved, must be saved by faith. Unless salvation by faith and speaking in the churches are identically the same thing, then the passage, “There is no male and female; for all ye are one in Christ Jesus,” can never be quoted against the silence of women in the churches.

Were it even doubtful what Paul referred to in Gal. iii. 28, that doubt could not be used against us. For, to make a doubtful passage, one that admits of another meaning, an argument against rules stated in the most explicit manner, positively, negatively, and repeatedly — rules which are discussed and reasons assigned for giving — is too desperate even for a forlorn hope. But there can be no doubt whatever that Paul speaks in it of salvation by faith for all mankind, and of that alone.

It would seem that we have said enough already about 1 Cor. xi. 5;¹ but we are forced to return to it again. According to what law of interpretation or of common sense, can the bare allusion to a practice or statement of a fact be made to reverse a full and repeated prohibition of the prac-

¹ See p. 353.

tice or denial of the fact? In opening an unknown volume we find a passage referring to a certain rebellion, and condemning the barbarities practised in it. A few pages further on we come upon an emphatic and repeated condemnation of the rebellion itself in principle and in practice. Who in his senses, we ask, would ever dare to offset the latter condemnation by the former reference? Who would say that the writer favored the rebellion because he at first alludes to it in order to condemn the cruelties accompanying it, and then denounces the rebellion itself as wrong? Alas! it is left for professed students of the Bible to do with it what no one would dare to do with any other book.

In the context (v. 3) Paul announces the underlying principle of the whole discussion in the words: *Θέλω δὲ ὑμᾶς εἰδέναι, ὅτι παντὸς ἀνδρὸς ἡ κεφαλὴ ὁ Χριστὸς ἐστίν, κεφαλὴ δὲ γυναικὸς ὁ ἀνὴρ, κεφαλὴ δὲ τοῦ Χριστοῦ ὁ θεός.* He starts out with the profound statement that "subordination pervades the whole universe, and especially the Christian system." In this way he met the women in the Corinthian church who "claimed equality with the men." The head of the woman is the man, as the head of every man is Christ, and the head of Christ is God. This fundamental principle he introduces with the strong words: "I would have you know," as though they had forgotten it, or were ignorant of it. Not on equality is the kingdom of God built, as was then and is now claimed by some, but on subordination; on which relation Paul proceeds to discuss certain improprieties of dress and conduct on the part of women.

Again he adds (v. 7): "For a man indeed ought not to cover his head" (i.e. wear the sign of subjection), "forasmuch as he is the image and glory of God; but the woman is the glory of the man;" hence the woman should cover her head. Such was then the law, and to-day in all our assemblies the women worship with covered heads, the men with uncovered. The custom has continued, because the law on which it is founded is permanent.

The Corinthian women, "claiming equality with the men,"

neglected the dress proper for their position, and were ready in this, as in other things, to defend their course. Paul meets such with his authority as an apostle. "But if any one thinks to be contentious in defence of such a custom, let him know that it is disallowed by me, and by all the churches of God."¹ Had he not his eye on the "contentious" also of the present day?

"Was not the priority of man, as founded on creation and Eve's deception, done away just so far as redemption has given us the perfect ideal of humanity"? Paul wrote under the gospel and not under the law; if, then, this priority had been done away in redemption, how could he have appealed to it in laying down rules for Christian churches? That it was not so done away is impliedly affirmed in his appeal to it.

As a final attack upon the position we maintain, on scriptural grounds, it is affirmed that the passages enjoining silence upon women in the churches are doubtful, equivocal. Should a critical and honest examination of them end in throwing doubt upon their meaning or upon their present binding force, then the churches would be *so far forth* free from any express law in the matter.

But, unfortunately for this assumption, these passages are genuine, explicit, unambiguous, uncontradicted by others, and have received from commentators, excepting always Dr. Clarke, early and late, the most recent as distinctly as the remote, the same interpretation. If these passages must be declared "doubtful, equivocal," there is not a verse in the Bible, from Genesis to Revelation, that may not with equal authority be declared doubtful, equivocal; while those doctrinal texts on which evangelical Christianity is built and defended are, on the same principles, and for the same reasons, far more doubtful and equivocal. Our rock is nothing but quicksand; for on what other point can such unanimity among commentators and Bible students be found? Will any dare cry, "It is doubtful, it is doubtful," in order to defend a practice condemned by it? God forbid.

¹ Verse 16, Conybeare and Howson.

In taking up another class of objections, we enter our solemn protest against submitting the revealed will of God respecting anything, to the test of experiment. We cannot do it without subverting his authority. This touches the essence of obedience. Shall we obey because God wills it, or because by experiment we have found it profitable to obey? Undoubtedly the words, as the works, of God will by the experiment be shown to be divine. In things unrevealed a sufficient experiment is necessary; and the results of obedience in things revealed become confirmations of God's authority; but to subject things revealed to the test of experiment implies unbelief and sin: it dethrones God.

As, however, there has been a short and limited experiment, to the results of which appeal is confidently made, we cannot be silent. The following principles underlie the whole discussion of results, namely: (1) That God does not contradict in providence what he has revealed in his word. (2) That no experiment can be conclusive until time has developed all the influences and results by which it is to be judged. (3) That an act may be subjectively benevolent which is objectively wrong, as the giving of poison for medicine by a loving mother; and *vice versa*. (4) That God in bestowing blessings regards the subjective state more than the objective act.

It is urged, as conclusive, that God's blessing does, in many instances, accompany the speaking of women in the assemblies. This we thankfully admit; for probably no woman has wilfully transgressed in the matter. The fault has been one of ignorance, not of intent; of interpretation, or rather a practice indulged in without knowledge or reproof, and not of the heart. Probably no one of them would have spoken, had she believed that Paul forbade her to do so. They probably read Paul's prohibitions as a good Methodist once told us that she read those passages which teach election and divine decrees: "I hurry over them as fast as I can"; not because she would trifle with God's message of love, but because these passages seemed to teach what was to her the gravest

error, Calvinism. Now, such being the attitude towards both God's decrees and his commands of silence, and the silence of women not lying at the foundation of the gospel plan, it is in accordance with God's providence to reward their earnest piety. His blessing is, however, to be ascribed to their piety, and not to their external violation of his commands. He, in other words, overlooks their departure from his strict injunctions in order to reward their devotion; and does not overlook their devotion in order to bless their public address. When once it is clearly accepted, however, that Paul's rules are now binding, any violation of them will involve the authority of God, and cannot receive his blessing, unless he encourage wilful disobedience.

Why not, then, let the churches rest in this ignorance, it may be asked. Because history shows us that just in the same way all the abominations of the Papacy grew up. It seemed desirable to the primitive churches, owing to the ignorance of the country clergy, to give the precedence in their common affairs to metropolitan bishops. That little disregard of Christ's express teachings respecting the parity of believers ended in the Papacy, and in the logical dogma of Papal infallibility. What worked so well for a time, wrought the downfall of pure religion, and filled the world with the blood of martyrs and the enslaving of the souls of men. Shall now the reformed churches begin a similar career? Shall we allow departures from God's word to grow into common practices? Shall we remain silent until they become popular, then seek to justify them? This we cannot do, either with honor to ourselves, or fealty to God, or safety to the church. The women's rights movement, which has already filled the thoughtful patriot and the Christian with so much solicitude, has the fountain of its strength right here. But the end is not yet. The principles of interpretation employed to lift the commands of silence from women in Christian assemblies lead logically and inevitably to heresy of every sort. The whole plan of salvation so attached must go down before them. The way in which the soundest laws

of interpretation are set aside, the merest allusion made of greater weight than positive prohibitions, is cause of anxiety for the future, lest the authority of every revealed truth be overthrown by the church itself.

“Do you not by your interpretation of Paul make the text of scripture, written eighteen hundred years ago, contradict the voice of Providence and of the Spirit, as unequivocally expressed in the history of his church?” The women were silent in the primitive churches, except for a time at Corinth; they have been silent in the Roman Catholic and Greek churches, in the Lutheran, Presbyterian, Episcopal, and Congregational churches, with here and there an exception, down to the present time. The departure from this practice is of recent date, and it came up first among the Quakers, then among the Methodists; the Baptists and some congregations in other denominations have fallen into it. The success that has attended some of these denominations can be adequately explained on other grounds. Indeed, Stevens, the historian of Methodism, in giving the causes of the progress of the Methodist movement, makes no mention of this as one.

Where, then, is “the voice of Providence and of the Spirit unequivocally expressed in the history of the church”? We should be glad to have that “voice” interpreted to us. We have not heard it. If it be meant, as we suspect it is, that the success of Methodism is that “voice” which proves that Paul’s words are obsolete respecting the silence of women in the churches: then why does not the success of the Papacy prove that Christ’s words, “But call ye no one your father upon the earth,” “for all ye are brethren,” are obsolete, and the true equality of believers in the kingdom of God, a contradiction? Why does not the success of Mohammedanism destroy the Trinity, the atonement of Christ Jesus, and prove the superiority of Mahomet to the Son of God? And why does not the pre-eminent success of Paganism prove that there are in reality “lords many and gods many”? Is God’s word inspired? is it the supreme law of the churches? or is it to be amended, set aside, or maintained, just as the syren voice of success demands?

“To the law and to the testimony.” Success cannot nullify God’s holy word. If it can, give us an infallible Pope, or rather, let us return to idolatry again; for its devotees outnumber threefold all Christian nations. The partial experiment, during one short century, of setting at defiance the express utterances of God respecting what may be, indeed, a minor matter, is not sufficient to prove that it can safely be done; and the arrogance of such a claim shows the danger of granting it. The Papacy can present a stronger.

“The truth is, that all those churches here in New England, characterized by the greatest amount of revival power are those in every case, so far as my acquaintance extends, which encourage the women to participate in the exercises of their religious meetings.” Now, if there had been no revivals in the times of the apostles, or during the Reformation, or under the preaching of Edwards, Tennant, and other ministers of more recent times, in all which women were silent in the churches, then we might conclude that the “revival power” of the churches, to which reference is made, was derived from the speaking of women in their meetings; but, as it is, it is more natural to believe that the revival opened the mouths of the women; and that had the women remained silent the revival power would not have been much less. The fact that these revivals have been accompanied with what we hold to be the violation of Paul’s injunctions, and that this violation has been encouraged by pastors under wrong conceptions of Paul’s teachings, cannot be received as conclusive against, or as impinging upon, the received interpretation of these teachings; for strong physical demonstrations have also accompanied, not cold churches, but revivals, and have been encouraged, and yet they have not promoted the salvation of souls or the growth of believers in grace and in the knowledge of Jesus Christ, but contrariwise.¹

¹ Rev. H. B. Blake, writing from Dudley, N. C., May 23, 1870, says of the colored churches in that vicinity: “They imagine that the wild excitement which leads them to dance, shout, wail, and go into convulsions, and which is unquestionably demoralizing and licentious in its tendencies, comes of the Spirit

But we need not take a position so readily assailed, if not assailable ; for, on the principle already announced, we may safely admit that God has blessed the prayers and remarks of these pious women, overlooking their improper conduct, because done in ignorance and under the encouragement of pastors.

It is said that our argument overleaps itself, that it would stop all singing of women in church and all their teaching in the Sabbath-school. This is a great mistake. Sabbath-schools are not the *kind* of meetings described or referred to. They are not meetings of the churches at all, but schools under the management of the churches for the children. Surely a command can apply to an assembly of worshipping believers that does not to a school of Bible instruction. All languages probably have words for singing and totally distinct words for speaking. At any rate the Greek has. And yet Paul does not employ one of them in his prohibitions. The word "silence" does not cover singing, for it was used with express reference to speaking. Who can show that it includes and covers what Paul was not speaking of at all ? If we appeal to logic, let us be governed by it.

Let it be understood that these commands of silence are general rules for fully constituted churches. They admit of exceptions in the case of weak churches composed almost entirely of women, and of female teachers of the ignorant negro and heathen. It is not only permitted to women, but it becomes their duty, to do in such cases what it would be improper for them to do in well constituted churches. When men fail, or are incompetent, let the women build the walls of Zion, let them proclaim the riches of redeeming love. These rules of propriety give place to a higher law in such exigencies ; but in the churches fully constituted, the command of silence is in force.

of God,"—Am. Missionary, July 1870, p. 146. We cannot, therefore, logically argue that whatever accompanies a revival, is approved of God ; the point now considered. In a revival, Christians will generally do what they think ought to be done, however mistaken in judgment they may be.

This modern movement to subvert the scriptural relation of the sexes has not yet produced its legitimate fruits. The attempt of the Corinthian women to assert their equality with men, in the conduct of worship, was met by the prohibitions which we have shown apply equally well to our day. It is still true that "the head of the woman is the man," as "the head of every man is Christ." But what excitement, if not animosity, would be produced in many of our churches, by the reading and sound exposition of these rules of conduct for Christian assemblies, which Paul founds upon this subordination? Is that condition of our churches a safe one, in which rules of conduct in Christian assemblies cannot be publicly read and fairly expounded? Yet, if we may judge from a recent trial in an assembly of clergymen and laymen, just this is the condition at present of many churches which profess to receive the scriptures as their only sufficient and perfect rule of faith and practice. Surely this is to be deplored.

Again, the way in which Paul is spoken of by most men and women who "disagree with him on this subject," to use the words of one of them, strikes at the citadel of inspiration, and destroys all regard for the authority of the Bible. These are some of the evil fruits which, already blushing into ripeness, will be largely gathered by the rising generation. But the most poisonous fruit hangs on the attempt to do with the Bible respecting the silence of women what every errorist tries to do with it respecting truths obnoxious to him, and infidels respecting the whole. We submit it to the enlightened judgment of the churches that thus far in the experiment these evils and others which might be mentioned are not compensated by the advantages. Indeed this is a matter of interpretation and of obedience, not of hoped-for benefits. The mother who sets Paul aside on this subject, cannot blame her son for doing the same thing, on the same principles of exegesis, with Christ and the apostles; for she has taught him how to do it. Though her logical powers may not carry her quite to this length,

his will carry him ; and, what is more, if she be right in discarding a part, he is right in rejecting the whole. In view of this certain result of the rules of interpretation employed to rid the Bible of these restraints, we solemnly call upon ministers and churches to beware what they do. We may easily open the dikes of Holland with our hands, but who can turn the devouring sea back again when once it enters ?

A modern apostle of infidelity used to say, that in half a century Christianity would be extinct ; so the prediction is ventured that in fifty years no one will hold the Pauline view of the silence of women in the churches. The Frenchman was mistaken ; for religion lies deeper than infidelity : and so will this later prophet be ; for Paul's teaching here rests securely on a law which pervades the whole universe, and especially the Christian system. Law is stronger than theory, and will bring this whole movement to naught. We have no fear ; God's laws will prevail, and his word will be vindicated, whoever opposes ; for the principle on which Paul discusses the question and founds his rules, is thus stated by him : " I would have you know, that the head of every man is Christ ; and the head of the woman is the man ; and the head of Christ is God."

In conclusion we would say, that it is not pleasant to seek to stem the tide of popular opinion. But loyalty to God's word is more than favor. When infidelity threatens the churches, we cannot afford to forge for it the weapons by which our destruction is to be wrought. Allegiance to God, to his word, to sound principles of interpretation, is what is now demanded. In this allegiance we stand. In this allegiance the church shall triumph ; out of it, disaster awaits the church.

In all the works of God " it is the glory of each part to keep the place assigned to it." The scripture, in harmony with the law of her creation, assigns a high place to woman ; and her glory lies in keeping it. To make the homes of the people divine in their influence, to take the plastic infant

from the hand of God and with loving fingers fashion its character, and perchance fix its destiny, before a father's or a pastor's influence can reach it, is a part of her privilege and glory. To do thousands of other potent things, the doing of which has made the Christian woman of all ages so radiant with celestial light and their memories so sweetly fragrant, is hers to-day. There is room enough for woman to attain the height of Christian perfectness, without seeking again a fruit which has been forbidden her. It was not to oppress her that Paul wrote as he did; but, being inspired by the Spirit to know the mind of God, he graciously hedged her allotted sphere round about with certain limitations, lest her glory should be sullied and her influence weakened. He impugns the wisdom of God and does woman a great wrong who seeks to lift the restraints imposed upon her in creation, that he may give her a larger sphere. If she heed him, her Eden will again be lost.

ARTICLE IX.

THE DIACONATE AN OFFICE.

BY REV. S. L. BLAKE, CONCORD, N. H.

WHATEVER it is, the diaconate should not be merely a name. It has been justly regarded with a certain degree of respect, if not reverence, and still deserves to be, because of its origin, the duties belonging to it, and the men who have *served* God and his church in it. It seems to us that there are cogent reasons why the diaconate should be considered an office, and that it was so considered by the apostolic and primitive churches. We propose to present a few:

1. The first reason which we shall notice is, that it seems probable that an organization of such importance as a Christian church would have *officers*. The Jewish church certainly did have officers whose distinctive business was to manage its temporal and its spiritual affairs. These were

selected from among the people, to perform services which the people were neither allowed, nor expected, to perform. The king was an officer of the church. Even a cursory glance at Leviticus must convince any one that the Jewish church had officers.

Any human organization is incomplete, and cannot accomplish its designed ends, unless it has officers. The machinery of such societies demands, in its manipulations, men whose special business it shall be to manage and direct its workings. Could there for one moment be any government if there were no executors of the law? We should soon become as Patagonians if mere might determined official position. It is part and parcel of a civilized government to have men elected to office. This is specially true of a republican government.

Now as the government of a church is of the first importance, both spiritually and temporally, and especially as our ecclesiastical polity is democratic, is it not in the nature of the case that a church should have officers, specially chosen by the members to the management of its various affairs? Is it not absurd to speak of an organization, especially such an organization, that is without officers? And when men are elected to the management of the spiritual and temporal affairs of a church, are they not elected to a particular service; and if they are elected to a particular service, are they not elected to an office? Are not the officers of our republic servants of the people; and are they any less officers because servants, or servants because officers? The only officers which Congregationalism and, as we think, the New Testament recognize, are those of the local church; and these we suppose to be pastors (ἐπίσκοποι) and deacons (διάκονοι). It seems probable that those who serve an organization of such importance as the local church, in an elected capacity, should be considered officers. The idea of such an organization seems to demand this.

2. The second reason we shall notice is that the manner in which the deacons ("the seven" in Acts) were elected

and inducted into the special service they were to perform, makes it probable that those thus chosen were considered officers by the apostles and brethren of the apostolic church; and that those who should subsequently perform a similar service in the Christian church, would be entitled to be called officers. "*Manente ratione, manet ipsa lex.*" If the occasion remains, the law itself is still in force. This we believe to be a legitimate principle by which to be governed in the settlement of the various questions to which it applies. Guericke says: "The first deacons were chosen by the church at the proposal of the apostles."¹ Schaff says: "When the first deacons were to be appointed, the twelve call together the multitude of the disciples, and require them to make choice."² A similar necessity existing at any time would amply justify a similar proceeding. This illustrates the Latin maxim above quoted.

Now the narrative in Acts is simple, and seems decisive (vi. 1-6). Some of the foreign or Greek-speaking portion of the church murmured, "as if they had not received their equitable share of the daily distribution of food," etc. (Acts ii. 45; iv. 35; vi. 1). Then the apostles, in whose sole control the whole matter had been previously (Acts iv. 35), called the whole church together (τὸ πλῆθος τῶν μαθητῶν, the multitude of the disciples), and said, it was "not reason" that they should have the sole care of both the temporal and spiritual affairs of the church (Acts vi. 2), and desired the brethren to select (ἐπισκέψασθε) "men of honest report, full of the Holy Ghost and wisdom, whom we may appoint over (καταστήσομεν, set over), this business" (vi. 3): i.e. the temporalities of the church, which business was then represented in the daily distributions about which complaint had been made, and which the twelve called "serving tables" (διακονεῖν τραπέζαις, vi. 2). This pleased the church, and the church chose seven men, whose names are mentioned in Acts vi. 5, and set them before the apostles (vi. 5, 6). Notice the word here used. They *chose* (ἐξελέξαντο, selected out)

¹ Church History (Shedd's edition), p. 110.

² Apostolical Church, p. 501.

those whose names are mentioned. We are not told here how this choice was made; but we have a possible and very probable solution of the manner given us in Acts i. 26. In the choice of Matthias to the place of Judas, it is said that "they gave forth their lots" (ἔδωκαν κλήρους). Mosheim says this was the suffrage of the church. The classic use of the word "lots" (κλήρους) allows this interpretation. There is nothing in the use of this word in the New Testament to forbid it. We can make no other supposition, than that "the seven" were chosen by the suffrages of the brethren. It seems, too, that this proceeding should be honored with the appellation of an election. Indeed the word translated "chose" in Acts vi. 5 is the root from whence we have the word "election." But there is never an election to induct men into an ordinary service that is not an office. Election implies office.

After this choice, the seven chosen were set before the apostles (vi. 6) for solemn induction into the service to which they had been already elected. This method of induction the narrative states thus: "And when they [the apostles] had prayed, they laid their hands upon them" (the seven). Of course this act was performed in the presence and with the sanction of the church, by whose free suffrage the choice had been made. The significance of this laying on of hands we shall not stop to discuss. Suffice it to say, the form was similar to the solemn act by which Saul and Barnabas were separated, at the command of the Holy Ghost, to the special work to which they had been called (Acts xiii. 2). The same act, in this instance; must have solemnly signified the separation of "the seven" to the special work to which the suffrages of their peers called them.

Now it is hardly probable that these formal acts of suffrage and ordination or induction, which in some recorded instances were certainly invested with great solemnity, merely indicated a choice to a *service* which was not to be performed in the discharge of the duties of an *office*. Did not the twelve ask for assistant officers? General Grant was

elected (ἐκλεξάμενος, the word used in Acts vi. 5) President in November 1868, but he was inducted into office, and became chief executive officer of this government, when the oath of office was administered to him in the following March. Was he elected merely to a service and not an office? It seems not. Does not the very idea of election and impressive induction involve that of an office? Can the two ideas well be separated? So "the seven" were elected to an *office* and inducted into it, by a form not wholly dissimilar to that by which General Grant became President, and certainly fully equal to it in impressive solemnity. The formality of the whole transaction recorded in the sixth of Acts is utterly inconsistent with the idea that no office was in question. Men are servants without election and induction, but not servants in an office. If a mere matter of service was involved in the narrative in question, the dignity and solemnity of the transaction seems very much impaired.

The church, as a local organization, could hardly exist, without requiring such service as that to which "the seven" were elected. Dr. Dexter has well said, "since every Christian church has 'temporalities' which require somebody's care and thought—that here was intended to be given a hint and pattern for the copying of every such organization to the world's end."¹ It is true that these men were never called deacons in the Acts, but "the seven." So the apostles were familiarly called "the twelve." But were they any less apostles? Did any one ever doubt who was meant by that term? Neander says: "Nor is it any objection, that in Acts xxi. 8 they were merely called 'the seven,' for as the name "deacon" was then the usual appellation of a certain class of officers in the church, Luke uses this expression to distinguish them from others of the same name, just as 'the twelve' denoted the apostles."² Dr. Dexter gives twenty-two instances in which the apostles were designated by this

¹ Congregationalism (edition 1865), p. 133.

² Planting and Training, etc., p. 34, note.

appellation. Twenty of these instances occur in the Gospels. So that it cannot be argued that these men were not deacons because they were usually spoken of as "the seven," any more than it can be argued that the apostles were not alluded to by the phrase "the twelve."

We repeat, the church will always require service similar to that to which "the seven" were elected. Is it not fair to consider the case in Acts a sample, and to suppose that those elected to a similar service sustain a similar relation to the church now, — that they are servants in an *official* station? Can we do less than call "the seven" officers of the church, on account of the peculiar and significant manner of their election and induction into service? Are not those now elected in a similar manner also officers as well as servants — servants because officers? Are they not deacons now as well as then?

3. The third reason we shall notice is, that the term used by the apostles in calling for the election of "the seven" was such as to indicate a service so special as to justify calling it an office.

An office or a service is often named from the kind of service rendered. Thus, men are called lawyers when their business pertains to the law; we have judges who judge; surveyors who survey; editors who edit; presidents who preside, etc. "The seven" were chosen to serve tables. The word indicating the service is derived from the same root as the word "deacon." They are the same words, one the verb, the other the noun. Dr. Dexter says: "Moreover, they [the seven] are, for substance, named 'deacons,' in the very Greek words which record the work to which they were chosen (Acts vi. 2), which are *διακονεῖν τραπέζαις*, which mean literally to *deacon* (i.e. to officiate as deacons at) tables; *διακονεῖν* being the verb expressing the activity of the noun *διάκονος*, *deacon*."¹ If their service was expressed by the word from whose root the term "deacon" is derived, why were not "the seven" deacons, and why were

¹ Congregationalism (edition 1865), p. 133.

they not substantially called so when they were elected to "deacon tables"? The church demands the same service now. Why, then, shall not those who are chosen to perform it take their title from their service, and be called deacons?

Now those who perform this service are entitled to be called officers, because their service is of a special kind. The laborer who wields the spade is a servant, but not an officer. The private in the ranks is a servant, but not an officer. The operative who stands at the loom is a servant, but not an officer. These, and many like them, perform a service common to a multitude. A general is both a servant and an officer. An overseer in a factory is both a servant and an officer. Men in many positions in life are both servants and officers, because they perform duties common to a few only. The service indicated by *διακονεῖν τραπέζαις* (serving tables) is not common to the many in the church, but the few. It is so special, and is made so by special selection to fill it, that those who perform it, by a common law of title, are officers as well as servants.

The use of the word *διακονεῖν* marks the specialty of the service indicated by it. The word "serve" occurs thirty-two times in our English version of the New Testament. In thirteen instances this word is a translation of the Greek verb *λατρεύειν*; in twelve instances it is a translation of the verb *δουλεύειν*. These indicate such a service as a slave or a hired servant might perform; e.g. Mark iv. 10: "Thou shalt worship the Lord thy God, and him only shalt thou serve" (*λατρεύσεις*). Matt. vi. 24: "No man can serve (*δουλεύειν*) two masters." Acts vii. 7: "And the nation to whom they shall be in bondage (*ὃ ἐὰν δουλεύσωσι*) will I judge, saith God; and after that they shall come forth and serve (*λατρεύσουσι*) me in this place." 2 Tim. i. 3: "I thank God whom I serve" (*λατρεύω*). Paul speaks here as one who, by the blood of Christ, is to receive something for service. Perhaps he thought of what he said in 2 Tim. iv. 7, 8. In Romans i. 1 he calls himself a "servant (*δοῦλος*,

slave) of Jesus Christ," speaking as one whose service belongs to Christ by right of property, as it were. Other passages might be cited, but these are sufficient to show that these words (*λατρεύειν* and *δουλεύειν*) indicate such a service as any Christian, in filial relation to God, would perform in the discharge of the duties which naturally arise from such relations.

The only other word which we have found translated *serve* is *διακονεῖν*. It occurs seven times in which it is translated *serve*.¹ In almost, if not quite, every case it denotes a service of higher and more special nature than that indicated by the other words. "But Martha was cumbered about much serving" (*διακονίαν*, Luke x. 40). Martha was a mistress in her own house; not a slave nor a hired servant. "Blessed are those servants whom the Lord when he cometh shall find watching: Verily I say unto you, that he shall gird himself, and make them to sit down to meat, and will come forth and serve them" (*διακονήσει*, Luke xii. 37). This is the act, not of the servants, but of the *Lord* of the servants. In Luke xvii. 8 this word is used of the act of servants, but not in the discharge of their ordinary duties. When they come in from the field, from their usual duties, the master tells them to serve (*διακόνει*) him while he eats. In Luke xxii. 26, 27 the word is again used with obvious reference to the dignity of service; and so *διακονεῖν* is used in preference to either of the other words. Christ said, "I am among you as one that serveth" (*διακονῶν*). The word is similarly used in John xii. 26. The only other passage in which we find this verb translated *to serve* is Acts vi. 2.

Now we think a fair exegesis of the passages where this verb occurs (whether translated *serve* or *minister*) will show that it is used to indicate a service different from the ordinary service indicated by its two synonyms. The rareness of the instances in which this word is used helps to

¹ It is also used, as in Matt. x. 45, with the signification "to minister." But these instances would not materially change our exegesis. We choose the translation *serve* from its special significance to the English ear.

give it this special significance. Couple this fact together with the special ceremony at the selection and inauguration of "the seven," and with its use to designate the kind of service to which they were thus specially elected, and we must conclude that they were in an order of service above that common to the brotherhood of Christians—that they were both servants *and* officers. They were certainly chosen to do what the rest of the brethren were not expected to do. "The seven" were *διάκονοι*, the brethren were *δούλοι*. *Διακονεῖν* is not used of ordinary Christian service, so far as we have been able to discover. We think that both the classical and New Testament use of the word justifies this statement. It seems to us that this usage of language and the special selection which appears to be sanctioned by the narrative in Acts, leave no room to doubt whether the deacons in our churches should be considered servants in the capacity of an *office*.

As we have already intimated, the duties which congregational churches require of those called deacons are not the ordinary duties of Christians, and were not so considered by the apostles; else why their call for an election of "the seven," to do, not duties which have fallen to the lot of the brethren, but the apostles? These duties, which still exist, are such that no one can assume them without being elected to discharge them as a specialty. Could any brother of the church assume to serve at the Lord's table, take charge of the funds of the church, distribute to the poor, etc., without he were appointed to do this? That would be strange Congregationalism indeed which would allow such assumption. The nature of the duties required, and the terms used in specifying them, justify us in calling the diaconate an office.

4. The fourth reason we shall notice is, that the diaconate seems to have been regarded as an office by the apostolic and primitive churches. In the first seven verses of the third chapter of first Timothy, Paul gives certain qualifications which must be found in those who hold "the office of a bishop." It is unnecessary to repeat them. The word

ἐπίσκοπος, *bishop*, is used technically. Now this fact is of great importance in aiding us to understand Paul's remarks about deacons in the same chapter (vs: 8-13). It seems very strange that the apostle should speak of officers in the church in the first seven verses, and then without any apparent turn begin to speak of the duties of the laity. Would not this be considered a breach of good rhetoric, of which Paul can hardly be charged? Would not so sudden a change, unannounced, confuse? Is it not fair to infer from the connection, that Paul uses *διάκονος* technically, as he does *ἐπίσκοπος*, since they are in the same connection, unless he informs us to the contrary? Besides, in specifying the qualifications of deacons (*διακόνους*) Paul uses precisely the same care as in specifying the qualifications of bishops. Why, unless they were alike considered as holding responsible official positions, which required characteristics not required in ordinary Christian service? It is fair to consider those who are spoken of in the same connection and in similar language as being in the same class.

The force of the connective *ὡσαύτως* must not be overlooked. It means "in the same way," "in like manner," "likewise." Here it clearly indicates similarity of responsibility, and so of station. This word would hardly have been used, if reference had been, in what it introduces, to those having no station. We should have had *ὡς ἐτέρως* instead. Its force is something as follows: I have given you directions about one class of officers; I now proceed to give you directions about the only other class of officers, deacons. Dr. Dexter says: "These directions clearly imply Paul's judgment that the office of deacon was the second" office in the church. *Ὠσαύτως* is evidently used, as it usually is, in comparison. But what comparison could there be, which would justify the use of so specific a word as this must be from its composition, if not between persons occupying similar stations? ¹

¹ Ellicott in commenting upon 1 Tim. iii. 8 says: "*ὡσαύτως*, 'in like manner,' as the foregoing class included in the *τὸν ἐπίσκοπον*, v. 2; it was not to be *ὡς*

The anarthrous use of the word *διάκονος* in 1 Tim. iii. 8 and Phil. i. 1 is not to be overlooked. The article is omitted before this word in both these passages. It certainly would not have been omitted without good reason. The rule of the Greek is to use the article. There are cases in which it may be omitted. Winer, in common with other grammarians, lays down this rule: "This omission, however, only takes place where it produces no ambiguity, and leaves no doubt in the mind of the reader whether the object is to be understood as definite or indefinite." Stuart says that the article is usually placed before nouns designating anything *single* or *nomadic*, or which the writer or speaker deems so. "But on the very ground that these things are so definite in their nature as to leave no room for mistake, the article is often omitted where it might be inserted." Again, he says: "where there is no danger of mistake, the article is sometimes omitted." Then we may infer that the article was omitted before the word *διάκονος*, because it was an office so well known and understood that it required no special designation. It cannot be said that merely servants were meant; for a term so specific as *διάκονος* would signify nothing in a use so general.

There is still another argument: Paul, in writing to the Philippians, addresses "the saints in Christ Jesus which are in Philippi, with the bishops and deacons." Here "the bishops and deacons" are carefully distinguished from the rest of the brotherhood of Christians, as if they were a distinct order. But why were the "deacons" included in this special mention, if they are servants in the same sense and capacity only in which "the saints" are servants? The deacons are certainly spoken of as a distinct and well-known order of servants, in connection with the bishops.

Here again we are to notice the omission of the article before the words "bishops and deacons," as if they referred

*ἐτέρω*s in any of the necessary qualifications for the office of a deacon, but *ὡσαύτως*, as in the case of the bishops." That is, the comparison is between things similar, not dissimilar; between two classes of officers.

to well-known officers common to all the churches. This omission has special force here, because the article is used before *ἀγίοις*. It is employed in its most distinctive use, by being repeated after the word *ἀγίοις* to specify that the saints at Philippi were addressed, as in distinction from saints elsewhere. The idea is somewhat as follows; "Paul, etc., to all the saints (*τοῖς ἀγίοις*) in Christ Jesus"; but there are many saints in Christ Jesus; what ones do you mean? "Which are (*τοῖς οὖσιν*) at Philippi." ¹ This method of address clearly shows, we think, that there were deacons, as officers, in the church at Philippi then (A.D. 63), "probably thirty years after the choice of Stephen and his fellows at Jerusalem." Schaff says of these officers of the apostolic church: "Thus these officers were living bonds of union between the congregation and its presbyters; taken from the bosom of the community; chosen entirely by the people themselves; intimately acquainted with their wants; and thus admirably qualified to assist the presbyters with council and action in all their official duties." ²

The history of the primitive church shows that the office of deacon was at that time recognized and established. Neander speaks of it in this way. Guericke says: "The second ecclesiastical office in the single church was that of *deacon*." Schaff says: "Deacons, or helpers, appear first in the church at Jerusalem, seven in number. . . . The example of that church was followed in all other congregations, though without regard to the number seven." ³ Kurtz says that the office originated with the church at Jerusalem, and that "thence it spread to most other Christian communities."

Later history shows that the office still existed. A writer in Smith's Bible Dictionary says: "Traces of the primitive constitution and of the permanence of the diaconate are found even in the more developed system of which we find the commencement in the Ignatian epistles." The authority

¹ On this use of the Article see Winer (Andover, 1870), § 20, pp. 131-143.

² Apostolical Church, p. 534.

³ History Christian Church, Vol. i. p. 134.

which some of the early deacons arrogated to themselves not only shows that the diaconate was at that time an established office of the church, but also affords a strong presumption that, as an office, it had grown with the growth of the church. Else how would deacons have undertaken to assume so much? Is it not likely that they were encouraged to assume priestly authority from the fact that they held an office? Ignatius speaks strongly of the reverence due to deacons. He styles them "ministers of the mysteries of Christ." "Study," says he, "to do all things in divine concord, under the deacons most dear to me, as those to whom is committed the ministry of Jesus Christ." As early as the time of this martyr-disciple of St. John, the general ecclesiastical corruption which affected the churches affected the diaconate. When the bishops were raised above the pastoral office, the diaconate was lifted from its early simplicity into an order of the clergy. Doubtless this corruption was due partly to the fact that certain spiritual duties come naturally to the lot of deacons. In the apostolic age we find Philip preaching, though this was probably not usual. In the third century the lines became still more clearly drawn by which the diaconate was made an order of the ministry. Guericke says: "After the fourth century the most influential person next to him [the bishop] was the *archdeacon*; while the *deacons* themselves, owing to their close connection with the bishop, obtained high authority, and in some instances even higher than that of the presbyters." They were called ἀκοὴ καὶ ὀφθαλμὸς καὶ στόμα, καρδιά τε καὶ ψυχὴ ἐπισκόπου. Tertullian, like Ignatius, classes them with the bishops and presbyters. The fourth council of Carthage speaks of them thus: "Diaconus non ad sacerdotum, sed ad ministerium consecratus"; from which it appears that there was a tendency among deacons to assume too much. But why, unless they felt warranted to do so from official station?

Now it was manifestly a corruption of the early simplicity of the diaconate to raise it to the rank of the clergy. But does not this corruption show that, at the time it began, a

more than ordinary importance was attached to the diaconate — an importance that was not, and never had been, attached to mere ordinary service in the church? We are driven to suppose that, at about the end of the first century, a new office was created in the church, wholly unknown to the apostolic churches, or that the diaconate had been reckoned an office from the time of the choice of “the seven.” The first supposition is untenable, for it is against all history. Then the corruption in the diaconate, which began not far from the beginning of the second century, is a proof that it had always been regarded as a special function, invested with such peculiar duties as to cause it to be considered an office. If not, it is not easy to understand how deacons came to be reckoned as a third order of the clergy. As Dr. Dexter says: “The Puritans re-discovered and re-introduced the office as it was known to the apostles and the primitive church, but to this day, the hierarchical churches pervert it as the third order of the clergy.” Then, we think, the diaconate of modern congregational churches is the primitive office restored, which was corrupted by that hierarchical spirit which destroyed the apostolic simplicity of the churches.

5. The fifth reason we shall notice is, that it accords with the republican nature of congregational churches to call the diaconate an office. That is a democratic government in which the people say by their suffrage to certain persons: Here is a duty which we cannot do collectively, and we choose you as our servants to act for us, and as such we elect you to perform this duty, and by our choice bestow upon you certain powers and prerogatives with which the discharge of this duty is invested, and so place you in office over us; you are over us because such is our will, and, as being over us, you are our servants. A church, whose government is vested in itself, says thus to those whom it elects to serve it in capacities so special that no one may undertake the service unless elected to it. Certain things require to be done which the church as such cannot do. Certain persons, whose character is supposed to fit them specially for it,

are elected, by the suffrage of their peers, to discharge these duties. As we have already argued, this election signifies placing in office.

The derivation of this word (*ob facere*) and its signification indicate the duty such an election imposes. An office is "that which is laid upon, or taken up by, one person to perform for another; work to be performed for, or with reference to others; a special duty, trust, or charge conferred by authority, and for a public purpose; an employment undertaken by the commission and authority of the government." Now this definition comports exactly with the nature of the duties required of those who are called deacons; and the manner in which such duties are imposed, comports exactly with the republican spirit of Congregationalism. Therefore we think it belongs to the genius of our polity to call the diaconate an office, to which certain fit ones are elected by the church to serve the church. We think such a view to be thoroughly congregational. We cannot quite see how a church without such an office would be complete as a working congregational church. But this office constitutes a rank, only so far as any office in any democratic government constitutes a rank.

The modern diaconate in congregational churches we conceive to be one of the distinctive features of our polity. As such we cannot spare it. Neither do we see what is to be gained by wresting from it the dignity and weight which naturally attaches to an office. Much harm rather would be done. For it would remove one of the features of our polity; and, as we think, make the government of our churches liable to become an aristocracy instead of a democracy; and so tend to hinder the success of our order. If any one cannot see how this could be, let him remember the tendency on the part of every congregational church to shift the responsibility of its management, and he will see that, if there were no office such as is represented by the diaconate, the whole government of the church would substantially fall into the hands of the pastor *ex officio*. The diaconate serves as a

connecting link between the pastor and the church, to keep it from falling into a worse than hierarchical form of government. Said a congregational pastor, who leaned to Presbyterianism, to the writer; "I do not like Congregationalism, because a pastor of a congregational church is substantially a pope." While this is not true, it is nevertheless true that Congregationalism might issue in such a result if any restraint were removed. The diaconate, being a creation of the church, is an office in which the church, by its representatives, confers with the higher official, the pastor, in relation to matters which are made sure to be laid before the church for action, because the church is represented in official council. And so, the diaconate, as an office, serves both as a connecting link between the pastor and the church in official relation, and so helps to save the church from aristocracy if not from despotism, and also to keep the church from neglecting to insist on its rights in the management of its own affairs. We think there are certain things in the history of certain churches which give reason to apprehend such a result, if the diaconate should come to be regarded merely as unofficial service. We think there are instances in which congregational churches have been saved from the tyranny of a pastor's unwarrantable ambition by the intervention of certain staid and discreet men, recognized as officers of the church, and called deacons; because, perhaps, by virtue of their office, the deacons come into closer *official* contact with both pastor and church than either with the other. We mean simply by this, that the pastor is *the officer*, and the deacons his *special* advisers and helpers, furnished by election by the church.

We believe our polity to be scriptural; and therefore we do not see how any, as Congregationalists, can regard the diaconate otherwise than as an office. We think it would be as detrimental to take from, as to add to, the officers. Either course would be a departure from the scriptural order of things as Congregationalists understand it. We are not willing to leave out anything of the idea that lies at the

bottom of our ecclesiastical polity. There can be no doubt that the diaconate was regarded as an office in the apostolic church. Our polity is framed after this pattern, and so we believe it to be an essential part of the local church, as an organization, that it have two, and only two, officers — pastor and deacons. A church would be crippled if either were spared. This would be done substantially if either were denied the dignity of official station.

It is of the very first importance that men be chosen to the office of deacon, according to Paul's directions to Timothy (1 Tim. iii.). It does not seem to be quite congregational nor scriptural to elect and ordain men to this office for a limited time. The genius of our polity seems to be that the act is permanent. We recognize it as such. For after men have, for any reason, retired from the office, we still name them deacon, as retired clergymen, Reverend. It has been urged against this that if unfit men are chosen to this office they cannot be removed. One writer has affirmed that the instance is not on record in which an unfit man has been removed from the office of deacon. But if bad or unfit men are elected, the church has in its own hands the same remedy that exists in the case of bad or unfit pastors. Not only have churches set deacons aside from their office because of unfitness, but they have also excommunicated them from membership. No republican government is without means of removing bad men from office. And yet this act is guarded properly against abuse. The welfare of the government demands that it should be. So it is as much for the welfare of the church, as for the officers, that the pastorate and diaconate should be shielded from too easy assaults. And yet, if error is committed in the selection of deacons, there is a remedy in the hands of the church. Better here than in the hands of the pastor.

We are surprised and pained to see a tendency to ignore this office. Some, even pastors, have seemed to fear lest their deacons should magnify their office unduly. For our selves, we have never had any difficulty in this direction,

but the opposite if any. We think that no church, and no pastor can afford to dispense with this *office*. It is usually true that the deacons of the church are men of sound judgment, earnest piety, and great weight of character. Can any pastor afford to deprive himself of the help of such wisdom, by ignoring this office in any way? He cannot reach all his flock for advice, but he can reach all his deacons. These are usually men who have been longer in a parish than the pastor in these days of short pastorates, and who know better than he can, the wants and peculiarities of the people to whom he is called to minister. From these men he will usually hear the simple facts unadorned by the tongue of gossip. We believe that many a pastor has been saved from trouble, by listening to the advice of his deacons. We believe also that many, especially young pastors, have fallen into serious difficulties, because they listened, not to the gray-haired wisdom of their deacons, but turned, like the foolish son of Solomon, to take counsel of the young men. For ourselves we have much to be thankful for in the good deacons whose wisdom has helped us in both our pastorates. We know and are sorry that deacons are sometimes bad men. So are pastors. But they are not all. Because we believe they are as a rule morally and spiritually helps to the prosperity of every church, and to the usefulness of every pastor, we have undertaken to defend their claim to be called *officers* of the church. May God raise up many more holy men to grace this office, who shall be as Stephen and Philip among the disciples of our Lord.

NOTE TO ARTICLE III.

BY REV. WILLIAM HAYES WARD, NEW YORK.

SINCE Article III. went to press, Ganneau's last readings of Mesha's Inscription have come to hand, published in the June number of the *Revue Archéologique*, and in a later separate pamphlet. A few of his additions and corrections to the text deserve notice. We have also received plaster casts of the fragments secured by Captain Warren; but these are of little additional value.

In the first line Ganneau reads the name of Mesha's father as כמשגר, *Chemosh-gad*. The last element in this name is גר, the god Fortune, whose name we have in Baal-gad, and probably in the name of the tribe of Gad. In the explanation of the name of this tribe given in Gen. xxx. 11, the *Chethibh* reads בגר, which the Septuagint translates ἐν τρύχη. In l. 2, Ganneau finds traces of the letters הר, which renders the reading "the Dibonite," quite certain. After ב at the end of l. 3, he finds a trace of the long stroke of a מ or נ, which renders our suggested reading untenable. The first letter of l. 8 is ז and not ט, confirming our own reading, and making ארץ probable. At the end of the long *lacuna* in l. 8 he finds ימי, which gives us "the days of his son forty years," but does not help the chronology at all. The gap at the end of l. 9 is partially filled up, so as to read וַאֲשֶׁר בָּהּ הָאֲשֶׁרָה, which records, according to Ganneau, the making of a moat for Baal-Meon. In Hebrew שִׁיקָה is "a pit"; but we would hardly expect here a prosthetic א, or that the full form with ו would be used. Both reading and translation are doubtful. The ישב which we have inserted in l. 10, Ganneau now finds on his impression. The name of the town missing in l. 11, he now finds to be ע[ט]ר[ת], *Ataroth*. It is very unfortunate that the ט is illegible, as it was the only letter missing of the whole alphabet. The first word in l. 12 is הָקָר, and not בָּקָר, as we had suggested; but the meaning is the same. The end of l. 12 and the beginning of l. 13 Ganneau now finds to be וַאֲס[ח]בָה, a reading which recurs in l. 18. In l. 14 the recovery of the fragments makes the first word מַחֲרֵה, and not שַׁחֲרֵה. In the same line by an error of transcription Ganneau had previously given וַיִּמָּר, where the monument has the full form וַיֵּאמֶר; and in the next line בָּלִילָה,

where the text has the shorter form בללה. The first two letters of l. 16 are זח, which must belong to the word ואחזה, "and I took it." In the long gap at the end of this line he thinks he reads the words גברת, "dames," and רחמית, "maidens," which would show that the women were dedicated to Ashtor Chemosh. The 17th line begins with ח, and the letters חמ also occur in this *lacuna*. The recovery of the original stone leaves no remaining doubt of the genuineness of the very important word "Jehovah," proving that the sacred name was currently pronounced by the Israelites at this epoch. Otherwise the Moabite scribe would have written "Adonai." In l. 18 Ganneau reads without doubt ואסחבהם where we had read ואקרבהם, from Warren's indistinct photograph. The letters here are certainly very weather-beaten; and it is a matter of regret that we do not have plaster casts of Ganneau's fragments for the use of scholars. The stem סחב means "to tear in pieces," which would make Mesha to have broken up, or torn up the vessels, [כ]לי, or else the tents [אה]לי of Jehovah; a sense not nearly so appropriate as that derived from our own reading. Ganneau confirms his reading here by finding, as we have said, ואסחבה in lines 12 and 13. If the letter ח there is secure it settles the reading in both cases as from the root סחב, and not, as we had supposed, from קרב. Ganneau finds his large fragment to give him העפל, "Ophel," "the hill," in l. 22, as we had independently deciphered from Warren's photograph. Another letter deciphered at the end of l. 23 makes the reading בקרב certain.

In a later communication Ganneau says that he has found the word David on one of the fragments. On a rough and partial copy made by Klein the words "from Thamor to Jericho" are found. We also add that in a late paper which we have not seen, Geiger suggests that in l. 23 כלאי is for כלי. He would then translate *** ין בקרב הקר "Fire vessels (i.e. for the service of Moloch) for there were none in the midst of the city." But the י after the *lacuna* seems to require something different from אן, the Moabite form of אֵן.

The reference on page 646 to the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society should have been to the New Series, Vol. I.

ARTICLE X.

NOTICES OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

A. GERMAN WORKS.

COMMENTARY ON THE BOOK OF JOB.¹—This commentary forms part of the *Kurzgefasstes exegetisches Handbuch* to the Old Testament. The present is the third edition, and, though based on the labors of Hirzel, the original writer, and I. Olshausen, the editor of the second edition, may in many respects be described as a new work. Dr. Dillman, its author, has recently succeeded Hengstenberg at the University of Berlin. He is far, however, from belonging to that extreme Lutheran's school. The general introduction to the whole and the preliminary remarks to the separate discourses may be specified as specially good. Dr. Dillman deems the discourses of Elihu to be later interpolations, but defends the prologue and epilogue. As the date of Job he assigns the early part of the seventh century—the time between Isaiah and Jeremiah. Conservative theologians may differ from many of the writer's positions, but all must confess his ability, learning, and acuteness.

HISTORY OF ISRAEL FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD DOWN TO THE CONQUEST OF MASADA.²—This History might fairly be termed, "Variations on the History of Israel, by a capricious Critic." Dr. Hitzig outbids all previous historians of Israel, with the exception, perhaps, of Noack, whose work, "From Eden to Golgotha," we noticed some time ago. We might fill pages with illustrations of his eccentricities; but, for the sake of our readers, shall limit ourselves to one or two specimens. "Ex pede Herculem": Abraham means Brahman; Sara, the nymph Saragu, to whom the river flowing past the royal residence of Rama owes its name. Melchisedek was a god, whose identity with the Indian Annaraga, King of Nourishment, is shown by his offering bread and wine. The names Moses and Aaron are derived from the Sanscrit, and are explained to denote "thief," or "mouse," and "day." The forty years in the wilderness are resolved into four. El Shaddai is the west Asiatic God, Ahuramazda, or Armazd. And so on to the end of the chapter.

¹ *Kurzgefasstes Exeg. Handbuch z. alt. Test. Hiob erklärt von A. Dillmann.* Leipzig: S. Hirzel. 1869. Price, 1 Thaler 24 sgr.

² *Geschichte des Volkes Israel von Anbeginn bis zur Eroberung Masadas.* Leipzig: Herzel. 1869. Theil I. Price, 1 Thaler 24 sgr.

THE ANTHROPOMORPHISMS AND THE ANTHROPOPATHISMS OF ONKELOS AND THE LATER TARGUMIM.¹—Dr. Maybaum attempts, in this Essay, to answer the question why Onkelos, in his translation of the Pentateuch, retained some and rejected other of the anthropomorphisms of the original Hebrew. The question has been repeatedly discussed before, for example, by Maimonides, Nachmanides, and others. Luzzato was the first to lay down a definite and intelligible principle—the principle that the Targum of Onkelos was written for the laity, for the ignorant people, and not for the learned. On this principle Frankel built, and Dr. Maybaum takes it as his guide. We do not feel enough interest in the subject to devote more space to the work in hand. This and similar productions by Jewish scholars are a significant evidence of one thing—how far they are receding from the living God of their ancient scriptures, and how deeply they are infected by the empty abstractions of that philosophy whose roots are traceable to heathen Neo-Platonism.

JEWISH MORAL THEOLOGY.²—The author of this work was one of the most noted rabbis of modern times—Samuel David Luzzato, formerly Professor at the Rabbinical Seminary in Padua. It consists of lectures written for the use of the students of the seminary, and first published in the Italian journal, *Rivista Israelitica*, in 1846. The translation is by one of Luzzato's former pupils. Neither philosophically nor practically do the lectures seem to us to have any special value. Their only interest lies in their showing how Jewish writers think on the matters that come under discussion. The author's ethical point of view will appear from the words: "Man may therefore be regarded as endowed with a single impelling power, which separates into the forces, desire of physical enjoyment, desire for moral joys. . . . Filantie, or self-love, is this one impelling force." Illustrative extracts from the Talmud make what would otherwise be flat and stale a little piquant.

JOHN CALVIN HIS CHURCH AND STATE IN GENEVA.³—Professor Kampschulte, author of this important work, is a Roman Catholic; but he has written about the arch-foe of Romanism in a candid and objective manner. Various judgments regarding Roman Catholics and their church, and such statements as that Calvin, so far from being animated by mean motives, sacrificed brilliant prospects for the sake of becoming a missionary of the new religious convictions, evince a fair and truly historical

¹ Die Anthropomorphien und Anthropopathien bei Onkelos, etc. Von Dr. S. Maybaum. Breslau: Skutsch. 1870.

² Israelitische Moral-Theologie Vorlesungen von S. D. Luzzato. Breslau: Skutsch. 1870.

³ Kampschulte F. W. Johann Calvin. Seine Kirche und sein Staat. Vol. I. Leipzig: Duncker and Humblot. 1869. Price, 1 Thaler 24 sgr.

spirit, rare enough, alas, in Romanist writers on the subject of the Reformation. Professor Kampschulte directs his attention specially to the political aspects of Calvin's labors. He seems to have had access to records hitherto little used, and is therefore able to correct mistakes into which some of the principal Protestant writers have fallen. The present volume — the first of three — is divided into an introduction and four books. In the Introduction attention is called to the interesting fact that three distinct nationalities prepared the way for the present position of Protestantism — the Slavic in John Huss, the Germanic in Luther, and the Romanic in John Calvin. Calvin was least peculiarly national in his efforts, hence the wider influence of his teachings. Book I. treats of the Establishment of the Independence of Geneva; Book II. of the Introduction of the Reformation; Book III. of Calvin and Geneva till the year 1541; Book IV. of the Foundation of the new Order. It is, of course, scarcely to be expected that Professor Kampschulte should always be fair; but, at all events, he has tried to be so.

THE THEODICEE OF PAUL.² — Another attempt to master that *crux interpretum*, the ninth, tenth, and eleventh chapters of Paul's Epistle to the Romans. The two principle views of these chapters hitherto have been the Calvinistic and Arminian; the latter adopted in substance by Tholuck, Hofmann, Philippi, and others. According to the former, Paul teaches that men are predestined to faith or unbelief; according to the latter, he teaches that men are predestined to grace or hardening according to their faith or unbelief. Both start with the idea of an eternal divine decree. Dr. Beyschlag denies the presupposition, and maintains that Paul is speaking of a divine procedure whose causes and effects alike root in time and history, not in a supra-temporal action of God. From this new point of view he arrives, finally, at the conclusion that according to Paul the judgment of hardening itself will turn out to have been a chastisement of God's redeeming love. We must leave the readers of Dr. Beyschlag's treatise to form their own judgment about his reasoning and results; but certainly they deserve careful consideration. One thing we have ourselves felt for years, that Paul rather designed to root out the Jewish idea of favored election by his vigorous reasonings, than to encourage it, as the high Calvinistic view implies.

CHRIST THE SON OF MAN AND SON OF GOD.¹ — The immediate occasion of this work would seem to have been Beyschlag's "Christologie" and a treatise on the "Menschensohn" by Professor Schulze, both noticed

¹ Die Paulinische Theodicee. Von Dr. W. Beyschlag. Berlin: Rank. 1869.

² Christus der Menschen- und Gottes-Sohn. Von K. Fr. Nösgen. Gotha: F. A. Perthes. 1869.

in the *Bibliotheca Sacra*. Both of them are regarded by the author as very unsatisfactory; and his aim is to supply something more to the purpose. Whether he has succeeded is another question, which will be variously answered, according to the point of view of the answerer. The First Section treats of the "Son of Man," in five chapters, entitled: Meaning of the Designation taken literally; Use thereof in the Old Testament; Its Force in the Synoptics; Its Force in John; The Relation of the Apostles to it. The Second Section discusses the "Son of God," in five chapters: The Meaning of the Name Messiah; The Old Testament Idea of Divine Sonship; The Relation between the two Names Christ and Son of God as used by the Contemporaries of Jesus; The Force of Jesus's Self-designation as Son of God; The New Testament description of the Divine Nature of Jesus as *πνεῦμα*. The Third Section expounds the doctrinal result of the exegetical inquiry. This is, in brief, that Christ was true and complete man; true and complete God; true and perfect union of God and man. The result is not new; it is the old Lutheran doctrine. Nor does the investigation by which the author arrives at it present much that is new; but still the treatise may be of service to students of biblical theology.

ON KNOWLEDGE.¹—The first part of this small work expounds the theory that being is apprehended by perception, not by thought (*Denken*); that we really do perceive things in themselves, while phenomena are our own product, and have no real existence. Our perceptions of things become representations by means of thought. In the second part we have the author's system of the world. He believes that it consists of an infinite number of infinite, unlimited, rational essences, which include and permeate each other. Every essence has consciousness: even plants and inorganic substances. In such a system there is clearly no room for a God. "The idea of God," says he, "originated in man's ignorance of the unconditioned nature of all essences. Our fundamental error is the regarding ourselves as conditioned and finite." This, surely, is philosophy turned upside down.

GLIMPSES INTO THE HIDDEN LIFE OF THE HUMAN SPIRIT.²—The volume before us forms a supplement to the same author's "Mystical Phenomena of Human Nature." He discusses here such subjects as Visions, Hallucinations, Sleep-walking, Daemonomania, Vampirism, Old and New Forms of Magic, Visionaries, Seers, and Prophets, and so forth. Professor Perty adduces many facts (supposed or real), both new and old, and probably thinks he has a theory to account for them; but what

¹ Ueber Erkenntniss. Von M. Drossbach. Halle: Pfeiffer. 1869.

² Blicke in das verborgene Leben des Menscheingeistes. Von M. Perty. Heidelberg: Winter. 1869.

his theory is would be rather hard to say. Amongst other curious positions which he lays down is this — that man is only one of the innumerable modes under which the gaeodaemonic spirit manifests itself; the human individual is one of its transitory forms; his consciousness is merely a part of the gaeodaemonic consciousness, in which everything on earth finds a place. Another notion is, that in the future like-minded spirits will be grouped in associations, which together will constitute heaven, and that each association will be the vehicle of a particular kind of blessedness. But enough.

PHENICIAN STUDIES.¹ — Dr. Levy publishes, at intervals, an account of what has been done or discovered for the furtherance of our knowledge of the Phœnician language. This is the fourth part of his repertory, and contains six Essays, of which the first is a review of the publications on the subject since 1863. The rest deal with various old or newly-discovered inscriptions. A large lithographed table at the end contains fac-similes of thirteen different inscriptions. The work will be of interest to students in Dr. Levy's department.

Studt: Die Materialistische Erkenntnisslehre. A review and criticism of the theories of knowledge advanced by such materialistic writers as Mayer, Moleschott, and Büchner. The author's result is, that while materialism is one of the ways toward the truth, it fails to lead us to it. Knowledge proper is not explicable by a reference solely to sense. We know of thought only by thought. Science belongs to a sphere which is distinct and separate from the outer world.

Erdmann: Vom Vergessen. One of Professor Erdmann's lively and witty lectures on out-of-the-way psychological questions. Forgetfulness is explained as an act, not a suffering — the act of putting aside what is relatively valueless. Hence the shame felt by a man when he finds that he has forgotten, i.e. thrown away, what is of value. The secret of a good memory is to interest one's self.

Linsz: Gury's Handbuch der Theologischen Moral, etc. At the Roman Catholic theological seminary in Mayence a handbook of ethics is in use, prepared by a Jesuit of the name of Gury, which has been severely condemned for the obscenity with which various sexual relations are discussed. The little work whose title we have given is an exposure of the weaknesses and wickednesses of the Handbook, and at the same time an attack on the Jesuits. It would be well if more pains were taken, even with us, to lay bare the vile secrets of the Romish priesthood — done, however, in a sober, not in a sensational manner.

Beck: Leitfaden der Christlichen Lehre, etc. Professor Beck, of Tübingen, is well known as a biblical theologian of a very peculiar type

¹ Phönizische Studien. Von Dr. M. A. Levy. Breslau: Skutsch. 1869.

— of his own type. The above work comprises two parts, the first containing the doctrine; the second, the texts. It is intended for schools and families, but will be found stimulating and instructive also by those who have to teach.

Otto: Evangelische Praktische Theologie. The first volume of a work on practical theology, by a German clergyman. It discusses what are termed the "Edificatory or Building-up Activities," including, among other things, Catechetics, Homiletics, Liturgies, and the more specifically Pastoral Duties. Those who like works of this kind will find Dr. Otto's treatise thorough and suggestive. We confess to a prejudice against them. Detailed classifications and systematizations of the duties of a minister of the gospel jar on our feelings in the same way that classifications of the duties of husband and wife would do. Nor are they of much real use.

Henke: Zur Einleitung in das Theologische Studium. A brief encyclopedia of theological study and science, after Hagenbach's well-known work. Professor Henke divides theology into historical, philosophical, systematical, and practical. There is a great want of a similar work adapted to American and English requirements.

B. ENGLISH AND AMERICAN WORKS.

THE PRIMEVAL WORLD OF HEBREW TRADITION. By Frederic Henry Hedge. 12mo. pp. 283. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1870.

This work consists of a series of discourses upon the antediluvian history. That the book has some very great merits we cannot deny. It is extremely interesting, and we only wish that it was more reliable. The scriptural narratives of the successive phases of antediluvian life are summarily disposed of by the author, under the title of Hebrew Tradition; though he gives no argument to prove that they do not belong to authentic history.

The opening sentence gives the key-note of the book. After taking for his text the first statement of scripture: "In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth," the writer says: "We have here the first proposition of human reason, as it shaped itself in the Hebrew mind." As this idea is almost self-evident, and has been adopted by the civilized world, we do not know why it is peculiarly Hebrew.

After a chapter of great poetic beauty upon the work of creation, the second chapter treats of the moral nature of man. According to the author, man may have existed for ages as a mere animal; but the time when he was made in the image of God marks the era when he had attained a moral character.

The difficulties which attend the origin of sin make our author very little trouble. He says: "The parable of the forbidden fruit embraces the results of Hebrew speculation upon this subject." Further on he sug-

gests that the prevalent theory of the fall of man had its origin in the later age of Hebrew thought, and adds: "With English readers this false impression has derived an added sanction from the great authority of Milton, who embodies it in his *Paradise Lost*." That the prohibition to eat of the forbidden fruit was a mere test of man's fidelity, he regards as "the most prevailing and most pernicious of all the errors concerning it." Yet the author thinks that man was, in one sense, a gainer by his apostasy; for his "knowing good and evil" marks the dawn of his moral self-consciousness. The chapter closes with an able analysis of the manner in which good is continually educed from evil.

No part of the book is more interesting than the chapter upon Cain and Abel. The two men, according to the author, mark the era of the first division of labor; Cain becomes the representative man of the agriculturists; Abel, of the shepherd nomads. The rise of property is ably described, and the gradual encroachment of the tiller of the soil upon the shepherd. A sharp conflict ensued; the nomads were defeated; but it is their version of the story which has come down to us through the Hebrews. The details of the contest have faded from history, and the event survives only in the tradition that one leader slew the other.

That one man could live for nine hundred and sixty-nine years the author decides to be impossible. Physically, man is not made for such a life; mentally, he cannot carry the weight of such a long and weary experience. Methuselah, therefore, is the representative man of a certain age of the world's history.

Man's first attempt at civilized society proved a total failure, largely due, says the author, to his inexperience and the total lack of precedent and example to guide him. The scriptural writer expresses his view of this fact by the phrase: "And it repented the Lord that he had made man upon the earth." The writer rapidly solves the problem of human depravity, admitting that "the bad in man is soonest developed," but declaring emphatically that the good in human nature far surpasses the bad, upon the whole. An eloquent tribute is paid to goodness: "The bad man sometimes plays a bold and decisive part in civilization; but without the good man there can be no civilization at all."

The author admits that the last one of many deluges upon the earth has occurred within the memory of man, as he finds the scriptural account confirmed by the traditions of every nation except the Chinese and the Egyptians. He infers, therefore, that these two nations had made their migration before the deluge took place. He considers the patriarch Noah to have been the representative man of the better mind of his age. The dispersion of Babel signified the failure which a conquering race has always experienced in uniting and ruling over other races for any length of time. Nothing could resist the tendency of men to separate and form

different nations, each nation gradually shaping its original dialect into a new language.

The conversation between Jehovah and Abraham concerning the fate of Sodom is considered by the author to be a marvellous Hebrew idyl; and the work closes with a beautiful discourse upon "the Heritage of the Inner Life." Isaac, when he went out "to meditate in the field," became the first representative of that inner, introspective life in which the Hebrews have far excelled all the nations of antiquity.

We have seen no book which moved so smoothly over the profoundest abysses of human thought. Nothing could be finer than this work, if we could only depend upon its truth. Once grant the author his theory, and we cannot praise the work too highly; but scarcely a proof of that theory is given us. The real subject of the book is, "The Writer's Conjectures upon the Primeval World," and the sense of the reader demands that the bold and startling theories of the book be flanked by something more than the mere assertions of the author. But, while the ideas of the work must be reduced from the form of statements to mere guesses, great praise is due to the manner in which they are expressed. The style of the book is elegant; in many passages brilliant and glowing; often the author is the more eloquent when his facts are doubtful, as the skater glides all the more rapidly over weak spots in the ice. We regard the book as a very beautiful structure, built upon some commonplace rationalistic ideas and some theories original with the author — theories which, most ingeniously conceived and elegantly told, lack nothing but a proof. Viewed as a species of poem upon the origin of society, the book is a very great success; but if offered as a work of fact, we think it a failure.

Some of the words of the book, like the ideas, are, we fear, a little too independent of common usage. Phrases like "the Bible account of creation," "the idea of hereditariness," "the unparadising of the heart," and "the co-present spirit" will hardly bear inspection. These are slight blemishes, however, upon the usually elegant sentences of the author.

THE LIFE OF OUR LORD. By Rev. William Hanna, D.D., LL.D. New York: Robert Carter and Brothers. 1870.

The author of this work is well known as the biographer of Dr. Chalmers, and as a distinguished preacher in the Scotch Free church. The volumes show rare qualifications on the part of the writer. He had evidently studied the subject with much care, having access to the best helps. He had harmonized the accounts of the life of Christ, as given by the different evangelists, and out of these constructed, in his own mind, a continuous narrative. He had visited the land of our Lord's life on earth, and imbibed the spirit and vividness of its history, which familiarity with such localities can scarcely fail to convey. To this he adds a glowing, picturesque, and often dramatic style, and a warm sympathy with his subject.

The volumes form a series of pictures drawn with great skill. The grouping brings into view every feature that can give symmetry and fulness to the sketch. What to the ordinary reader seems isolated and almost without meaning becomes significant when put in its place, and illustrated by the artist. Most readers will find the life of Christ, as here presented, invested with new interest. There is a connection and a continuity which are not grasped by the ordinary reading of the independent narratives given by the evangelists. What is omitted by one evangelist is supplied by another. Then, too, the time and place of the events are often overlooked. In what part of Christ's history, and where—on the east or west of the Jordan—were the parables of the Good Samaritan, the Barren Fig-tree, the Great Supper, the Lost Sheep, the Lost Piece of Money, the Prodigal Son, uttered? The narrative that gives unity, clearness, and precision here, that photographs the localities of the scenes, and carries the reader into the very midst of them, as our author does, leaves a more vivid and permanent image of the great central Character than is usually gained without such aid. Other lives of Christ may have more brilliancy, or may show more learned and elaborate treatment; but, while this does not deal with historical, critical, or doctrinal discussions, in the rich results it gives of critical investigations, in the fulness, completeness, and impressiveness of the scenes presented, and in the reality with which it invests the principal actors in them, it is without an equal. It will interest and profit the general reader, as well as the learned preacher. Every one who studies the volumes faithfully will be conscious of a more exalted view of Christ and his great work on earth, and will feel more deeply the practical value of the truths he uttered.

The work is in six 12mo. volumes. Volume I. contains the Earlier Years; II. The Ministry in Galilee; III. The Close of the Ministry; IV. The Passion Week; V. The Last Day of our Lord's Passion; VI. The Forty Days after the Resurrection. The fifth volume, which was the first published, has been translated into the Dutch, French, and German languages.

BIBLE ANIMALS: being a Description of every Living Creature mentioned in the Scriptures, from the Ape to the Coral. By the Rev. J. G. Wood, M.A., F.L.S., Author of "Homes without Hands," "Common Objects of the Sea-shore and Country," etc. With One Hundred New Designs by W. F. Keyl, T. W. Wood, and E. A. Smith. Engraved by G. Pearson. 8vo. pp. 652. New York: Charles Scribner and Company. 1870.

The country and people where the Bible was written were very different from our own. The language, customs, habits, all the surroundings, were different. The more fully this difference is understood, and the more perfectly we can reproduce biblical times, the more thorough will be our

appreciation of the language of the Bible, and the more impressive its illustrations and allusions. Contemporary history, antiquities, geography civil and physical, ethnology, natural history, are each important studies for the biblical student.

The work before us is limited in its scope, treating only one department of Natural History — the Zoölogy of the Bible. It is prepared with eminent ability. The same careful investigation, the same broad and minute study of the subject is evident here as in "Homes without Hands." The author presents every creature whose name is mentioned in scripture, and gives such a history of it as is necessary to elucidate the passages in which it is referred to. The description of some of these animals — as the lion, sheep, goat, camel, behemoth, dove, leviathan, serpents, etc. — is very full, and is of great interest, merely as a study of natural history; but as a means of giving a clearer and more impressive understanding of the scriptures the facts, which have been gathered from a great variety of sources, have a much higher value. The author's estimate of the importance of this department of study, as it relates to the scriptures, is not beyond the truth: "The importance of Zoölogy in elucidating the scriptures cannot be overrated, and without its aid we shall not only miss the point of innumerable passages of the Old and New Testament, but the words of our Lord himself will either be totally misrepresented, or at least lose the greater part of their significance."

The volume is very fully and beautifully illustrated, and its whole appearance tempting, even to the most fastidious eyes.

THE TYPOLOGY OF SCRIPTURE: viewed in connection with the Whole Series of the Divine Dispensations. By Patrick Fairbairn, D.D., Principal and Professor of Divinity, Free Church College, Glasgow. Fifth Edition. 2 Vols. 8vo. pp. 504, 555. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark. 1870.

The doctrine of types is one of the most difficult, as well as one of the most important departments of scriptural study. It is not easy always to indicate how much of the earlier scriptures are typical of subsequent events, either in the Old Testament or the New; and yet it is important, in order to a proper appreciation of the teachings of the scriptures, to know the relation between the type and the antitype, to know what is, and what is not, a type, and to what extent the analogy between the type and the antitype holds. The Fathers, both of the Greek and Latin church, often found types where none really existed: Moses with his arms extended in the conflict with Amalek was a type of the cross; "David's deliverance from the hand of Saul foreshadowed our deliverance, through Christ, from the power of death."

Still later, even after the Reformation: Asshur, going out and building Nineveh was typical of the Turk or Mussulman power. The "were re-

semblance, however accidental or trifling, between an occurrence in the Old, and another in New, Testament times was deemed sufficient to constitute one a type of the other." Abel (emptiness) prefigured our Lord's humiliation; his occupation, Christ's office as the Shepherd of Israel; Adam's awaking out of sleep, Christ's resurrection from the dead; Samson's meeting a young lion, Christ's meeting Saul on the way to Damascus.

The appearance of the fifth edition of Professor Fairbairn's work is an evidence of the need that has been felt of such a treatise, as well as of its success in meeting the wants for which it was designed. In its present form it is greatly improved over the earlier editions. The changes, however, are not in the general views and principles it maintains, but in a fuller presentation of the literature of the subject, and in the modes of explaining particular points. The fifth edition differs very little from the fourth; the changes and improvements having been made chiefly in the latter. In its preparation the author had the advantage of the discussions and earnest controversies which had been held on the Continent upon some of the topics embraced; so that now the work embodies the results of the best learning, as well as of broad, thorough, candid investigation, and forms a safe, sober, intelligent, and invaluable guide in studying the subject of which it treats.

The style is pure and vigorous. It is rare that one meets with a questionable word, as *dubiety* (I. p. 18), or a loose construction, as: "It may, and indeed ought, to lay the foundation" (I. p. 8).

The work is published in this country through Messrs. Scribner, Welford, and Company.

HOMILETICS AND PASTORAL THEOLOGY. By William G. T. Shedd, D.D., Baldwin Professor, in Union Theological Seminary, New York City. 12mo. pp. 429. Eighth Edition. New York: Charles Scribner and Co. 1870.

The favor with which these Lectures have been received by the religious public is fully deserved. They give a very correct idea of the preacher's functions in saying, that this function is to put strictly revealed truth into oratorical forms for popular impression, and to imbue all discourse, in the sanctuary and upon the Sabbath, with a strictly biblical spirit. Every one will agree, also, with Professor Shedd in the assertion, with such qualifications as good sense will at once suggest, that the minister ought not to pursue any other intellectual calling than that of sermonizing; nor need any one fear that if he practise in accordance with this maxim, he will, as a matter of necessity, have any other than a liberal and varied culture.

In commending these Lectures we are not to be understood as vouching for the correctness of all the rules for sermonizing which are laid down.

One of the chief advantages, indeed, of reading such a book as this, is that it stimulates the mind to reflection on the various topics brought forward; and thus, in cases where its instructions seem unsound, leading the reader to the formation of better rules for himself. We commend to special attention the Lecture on Extemporaneous Preaching. We have a very vivid impression of the lively interest with which this Lecture was listened to when read by the author, a good many years since, before a ministerial association. May it excite among our younger clergymen a new zeal in the cultivation of the power of extemporaneous preaching.

The Lectures on Pastoral Theology deserve study, if for no other reason, for the elevated view which is taken in them of the dignity and responsibilities of the ministerial office. The passages which relate to a course of reading for ministers are particularly valuable as laying down a most important rule in the choice of books.

A HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE. By William G. T. Shedd, D.D., Professor of Biblical Literature in Union Theological Seminary, New York. In two Volumes. 12mo. pp. 408, 498. Third Edition. New York: Charles Scribner and Co. 1870.

We are very glad that Messrs. Scribner and Co. have been moved to give to the public a comparatively cheap edition of this valuable work. As stated in the Preface, it is the first attempt in English literature to write an account of the gradual construction of all the doctrines of the Christian religion; and therefore, should any sharp-sighted observers detect imperfections in it, only moderate censure should be visited on them.

Within the compass of two volumes like these the history of Christian doctrine could hardly be given in any other than a most compendious form. This disadvantage will be in a measure atoned for, if the reader is excited, as he ought to be, to enter upon independent investigations in this department. The benefit of doing this will quickly be apparent in one's sermons.

Professor Shedd's style ordinarily is not deficient in perspicuity; and yet, at times, while reading these Lectures we have been at a loss as to whether we had got his exact meaning. This was the fact in reference to the account of Anselm's argument for the existence of God, and to the statement on another page, that the nature and the will of God are the same. We must be allowed to question, also, the correctness of the assertion, that if a man has voluntarily deprived himself of the power to perform a given action, he is still under obligation to perform that action, and deserves punishment if he does not. The truth rather is, that, in the case supposed, the man merits punishment for depriving himself of power, but not for failure to do what he is physically unable to do.

For the present, at least, Professor Shedd's Lectures are the standard work in the English language on the subject to which they relate.

SERMONS preached in St. James's Chapel, York Street, London. By Rev. Stopford A. Brooke. Boston: Fields, Osgood, and Company.

Whoever would get an idea of the present free, active, practical thought of the English pulpit will find an admirable illustration in these sermons. They do not teach theology. There is very little reference in them to the dogmatic faith. But they apply Christian truth to the practical wants of England with an earnest spirit and with a fresh and vivid style. A good illustration of the method and purpose of the preacher is found in the sermons on the Denial of Peter, John the Baptist the Interpreter, and Devotion to the Outward.

THE LAWS OF DISCURSIVE THOUGHT; being a Text-book of Formal Logic. By James McCosh, LL.D., President of New Jersey College, Princeton; formerly Professor of Logic and Metaphysics, Queens College, Belfast. New York: Robert Carter and Brothers. 1870.

A principal object of Dr McCosh's Logic is to criticise the New Analytic of Sir William Hamilton. "Had I been satisfied," says the author, "with the peculiarities of the New Analytic, with its fundamental Kantian principles, or its special doctrines, such as that of the universal quantification of the predicates of propositions with its extensive consequences, I would never have published this treatise." "Hamilton quotes" (Logic, Lect. iv.) "Esser with approbation: 'It is evident that in so far as a form of thought is necessary, this form must be determined or necessitated by the thinking subject itself. The first condition of a form of thought is that it is subjectively, not objectively determined.' This fundamental error (so I reckon it) runs through the whole system, and injures and corrupts the valuable truth to be found in the Logic of Hamilton. There are *a priori* laws in the mind operating prior to experience; but we can discover their nature, and give an accurate expression of them, only by means of careful observation. The science of logic is to be constructed only by a careful inductive investigation of the operations of the human mind as it is employed in thinking" (Preface pp. vii, viii).

Accordingly, "the main feature of this logical treatise is to be found in the more thorough investigation of the nature of the Notion." "In the thoroughgoing separation of the Abstract Notion from the Singular and Universal, we have the means of settling the curious questions which have been started in regard to judgment and reasoning in the New Analytic." Dr. McCosh holds, as laws of thought involved in abstraction, that "the abstract implies the concrete"; that "when the concrete is real the abstract is real"; and that "an attribute has no independent existence." He teaches, as laws of thought implied in generalization, that "the universal implies singulars"; that "when singulars are real the universal is real"; and that "the reality of the universal is in common properties of singulars." It is in the development of these propositions that the chief points of originality in his treatment of the Notion are found.

Dr. McCosh's definition of logic has the merit of assigning to the science a rigidly exact field. "Thought is called discursive in which we proceed from something allowed to something else derived from it by thinking; as distinguished from intuitive thought, in which we discern the truth immediately. The science which treats of the intuitive operations of the mind is called Metaphysics; the science which considers the discursive acts is Logic." "Logic may be defined as the science of the laws of discursive thought" (p. 1). It is one result of this definition that the discussion of the fundamental laws of thought, such as the Law of Identity, the Law of Contradiction, and the Law of Excluded Middle, is relegated to the department of Metaphysics, and occupies a most meagre space at the close of this logical treatise.

It is not an infrequent complaint that the definitions logical writers give of the three fundamental terms, "Notion," "Judgment," and "Reasoning," lack scientific precision. We think this complaint cannot be justly brought against Sir William Hamilton, but that Dr. McCosh and Dr. Whately are both open to it. As a definition of Notion, Dr. McCosh writes: "The operation of the mind in contemplating an object or objects is called simple apprehension. The object or objects apprehended constitute the Notion" (p. 7). As a definition of Judgment, he gives us the sentence: "Judgment is psychologically one act of the mind; but is of a concrete nature, and we analyze it into three elements, two notions and the declaration of their agreement or disagreement." Notions are "not mental states, as such, but objects apprehended" (p. 93). Reasoning is defined as "the act of proceeding from certain judgments to others founded on them" (p. 123).

We consider the extraordinary meagreness of the discussion of the fundamental laws of thought an important defect in this work, regarded as a text-book in Logic. Neither are we satisfied that Hamilton's doctrine of the thoroughgoing quantification of the predicate is overthrown by this treatise. Indeed, as a text-book in Logic, we should prefer Professor Bowen's recent work, now in use at Harvard and Yale, and which includes the Hamiltonian as well as the Aristotelian analysis. Dr. McCosh himself says: "The clearest account of the new Logic is to be found, not in Hamilton's own Lectures, which were left in a crude state, but in the *Logic* of Professor Bowen of Harvard College." Those lectures themselves, however, we regard as the most stimulating text-book for advanced students. But, as a vigorous criticism of Hamilton's *New Analysis of Logical Forms*; as a thorough discussion of that part of Logic which treats of the Notion; and as an illustration of the inductive method, the application of which to both Metaphysics and Logic is the great and distinguishing merit of Dr. McCosh's philosophical writings, this treatise has an important value.

FROUDE'S HISTORY OF ENGLAND. Vols. XI., XII. New York: Charles Scribner and Company.

In these two volumes Mr. Froude closes his picturesque narrative. In common with most of his readers we regret that he did not keep to his first purpose, and carry to its end the story of the great life of Elizabeth. But the history, to its last page, is marked by that freshness of detail, that vividness of portraiture, that clearness of statement, whether of fact or opinion, which make it as fascinating as a novel. No painting, for example, could present before us in colors more vivid and startling the execution of Mary than the words of this grave historian. We absolutely see the events, as if they were taking place, one by one, before us, and we feel like covering our eyes to shut the awful scene from our gaze.

It is among the interesting characteristics of modern historical literature that fields which have been gleaned again and again still seem to furnish fresh material for new labors; and even that the later workman, through improved methods, enlarged experience, and more subtle skill, gains a still richer result than the earlier. He may not be a greater writer, or a wiser man, but he has access to materials which enable him to correct some mistakes, to verify some conjectures, and to present events in greater minuteness and fulness.

THE HISTORY OF ROME. By Theodor Mommsen. Translated by Rev. William P. Dickson, D.D. New York: Charles Scribner and Company. Boston: W. H. Piper and Company.

The modern historian seeks not only for results, but for causes. If he is inquisitive and sceptical, he at least strives to base his conclusions on solid ground. If he has less scope for eloquence, he strives to compensate himself by careful details. If he is less stately and grand, he is more picturesque, individualizes more precisely, and gives you more of the homely element on which, after all, the life of a nation often depends.

Dr. Mommsen, the author of the History of Rome, was born in 1817, was educated at the universities of Altona and Kiel, became Professor of Law at Leipsic, and subsequently at Zurich and at Breslau, having been dismissed from Leipsic on account of the part he took in political affairs. He early edited a work of great learning on "Latin Inscriptions," and a work on "Roman Coins," and also another, on the "Earliest Inhabitants of Italy." The present translation of his History of Rome is from the fourth edition, or virtually from the fifth German edition, which differs very slightly from the fourth.

One will be struck with the apparent good sense with which the author strives to make his way among the evident myths and fables of the earlier periods, and the clear reasons which lead him to certain conclusions.

The first volume is taken up with the origin of Rome, the cause of the establishing of the city in its present in many respects unfavorable posi-

tion, and the period from the abolition of the monarchy in Rome to the union of Italy.

Side by side here with a development of the external facts is a discussion also of the Law and Justice, the Religion, the Agriculture, Trade, and Commerce, the Military System, the Economic Condition, the Arts and Sciences, the Nationality of the State—all those elements which go to make a people great, and keep them so.

The remaining volumes republished carry on the history through the grander cycles of events which marked that wonderful people, and give us also vivid pictures of the nations and kings with whom Rome contended. In no writer, for example, do we find a portraiture of Mithridates (who in general is a sort of myth—a name, and nothing more) so real, of veritable flesh and blood, a subtle, powerful, energetic, resolute, barbaric actor in great scenes.

We rejoice that the book is republished in a form so creditable, and that really new materials are presented to give us a more complete understanding of the greatest of ancient empires.

THE AMERICAN COLLEGES AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. By Noah Porter, D.D., Professor in Yale College. 18mo. pp. 285. New Haven, Ct.: Charles C. Chatfield and Co. 1870.

The substance of this book has already been printed in the New Englander. It well deserves republication in its present enlarged shape. The general question discussed by Professor Porter we understand to be, whether the system of education which has hitherto been pursued in our American colleges ought to be superseded by one radically different from it. It is cheerfully admitted that this system is not perfect. There are defects in it such as can be easily pointed out and remedied without much difficulty, and the position taken by Professor Porter seems to us to be the correct one, that *improvement*, and not *substitution*, is the thing to be done. The results of the present system have not, by any means, been so unsatisfactory as to lead us to wish that it should be abandoned, and the experiment of a new one be tried. Altogether too serious a hazard would be incurred in so doing.

We have been on the whole greatly pleased with this book. It abounds with valuable suggestions. Professor Porter is by no means blind to the faults of American colleges. He shows no unreasoning fondness for old usages, and no foolish dread of innovation. He pleads very earnestly for certain improvements, the desirableness of which no one can question.

The book is written in a calm and dispassionate manner, and the tone of severity occasionally indulged in is not at all unmerited.

The Second Volume of Keil's Introduction to the Old Testament, and the Second Volume of Bleek's Introduction to the New, have appeared, published in this country by Messrs. Scribner, Welford, and Company.

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